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ABSTRACT
WHEN TO TRUST AUTHORITATIVE TESTIMONY:
GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN
SAADYA GAON, AL-GHAZĀLĪ, AND THOMAS AQUINAS
Brett A. Yardley
Marquette University & KULeuven, 2021
People have become suspicious of authority, including epistemic authorities, i.e.,
knowledge experts, even on matters individuals are unqualified to adjudicate (e.g., climate
change, vaccines, or the shape and age of the earth). This is problematic since most of our
knowledge comes from trusting a speaker—whether scholars reading experts, students
listening to teachers, children obeying their parents, or pedestrians inquiring of strangers—
such that the knowledge transmitted is rarely personally verified. Despite the recent
development of social epistemology and theories of testimony, this is not a new problem.
Ancient and Medieval philosophers largely took it for granted that most human
knowledge primarily comes from listening to a trustworthy speaker whose virtuous
character serves to mitigate against the twin concerns of inaccuracy and dishonesty. Thus,
unlike contemporary Social Epistemology, few testimonial theories were explicitly laid out
despite the crucial role testimony plays throughout a wide range of topics and teachings.
To date, the working theory of testimony underpinning the works of medieval philosophers
are just now being codified. This is particularly relevant for the Abrahamic faiths since
they originate with testimony from God himself. The goal of this dissertation is to explore
how the generation and transmission of religious knowledge (i.e., testimonial theory)
appears in an exemplary thinker from each faith: Saadya (Sa'adiah) Gaon of Judaism (882942), al-Ghazālī of Islam (1058-1111), and Thomas Aquinas of Christianity (1225-1274).
While not contemporaries, these exemplars are theological philosophers who are likeminded in their desire to maintain an orthodox faith while possessing philosophical
approaches to truth. Thus, they maintained sophisticated epistemological theories of
generation and transmission within their own religious contexts (e.g., revelation, scripture,
and prophecy).
Cataloguing these medieval testimonial theories reveals a historical incongruity
with the current contemporary concept of testimony and its frameworks. Based on the
testimonial theories of these three thinkers, I argue for a "transhistorical" concept of
testimony that does not presume an evidentialist framework to account for pre-modern
theories of testimony which predominantly rely on virtue theoretic frameworks. To test the
proposed neutral framework, I offer a virtue epistemological account of testimony in which
trust is not an intellectual virtue, but the intellectual aspect of the historic virtue of
autonomy. I argue that intellectual autonomy and trust are inversely related in one's
interactions with authority (both practical and theoretical).
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION - AUTHORITY, TRUST, AND THEIR RELATION
1.1 Trusted Authority and the Bootstrapping problem
What authority should you trust? Put differently, whom, or perhaps what, should you trust?
This question underlies the quest for knowledge acquisition. In line with the ideals of
autonomy and egalitarianism, contemporary society frequently adopts a skeptical or
suspicious, even cynical, stance toward authority. This includes epistemic authorities,
experts, even on matters individuals are completely unqualified to adjudicate. People tend
to trust either themselves, even on complex macro-level issues impossible for an individual
(e.g., climate change),1 or in small epistemically protectionist communities even when
more authoritative expert consensus contradicts their beliefs (e.g., anti-vaxxers, flatearthers, and young-earthers).2 In answering the question of authority, the former engage
in self-trust while the latter engage in blind-trust. As the history of philosophy shows, we
have changed whom, or rather what, we trust as epistemically authoritative.
In philosophy’s quest for the ideal of certain knowledge, the source of authority for
ancient philosophers such as Plato was in external reason. Under medieval thinkers,
external reason became the divine reason until Scotus shifted the source of authority to the

1

For information about climate change, 79% Americans respondents reported trusting their "own
observations" as "a lot" or "some". This exceeded epistemically superior sources such as scientists at 78%,
local meteorologists at 67%, United Nations at 57%, mainstream news media at 51%, and the U.S.
government agencies at 45%. Cf. Jennifer De Pinto, Fred Backus, and Anthony Salvanto, “Most Americans
Say Climate Change Should Be Addressed Now — CBS News Poll,” CBS News, September 15, 2019,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cbs-news-poll-most-americans-say-climate-change-should-be-addressednow-2019-09-15/; Benjamin Fearnow, “Americas Trust Their ‘Own Observations’ on Climate Change Over
Scientists, Meteorologists: Poll,” Newsweek, September 15, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/climatechange-humans-cause-poll-trust-information-stats-scientists-survey-meteorologists-prediction-1459313.
2
The lack of public trust in authorities has become an important issue academically and politically, David
Kearns, “Eroding Trust in Experts to Be Quizzed as UCD Researchers Awarded €3m Horizon 2020 Grant,”
University
College
Dublin,
accessed
August
23,
2019,
https://www.ucd.ie/newsandopinion/news/2019/july/31/erodingtrustinexpertstobequizzedasucdresearchersa
warded3mhorizon2020grant/.
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divine will. Immanuel Kant arguably brought the source of authority down from the divine
will into my rational will, which has now morphed into merely my will (regardless of its
rationality).3 Emphasizing autonomy,4 epistemologists have traditionally focused on the
ideal conditions for personally justified beliefs. This heavily individualistic focus of
knowledge acquisition, in which "the emphasis was on evaluating doxastic attitudes
(beliefs and disbeliefs) of individuals in abstraction from their social environment" per
Alvin Goldman, has been challenged by the rise of social epistemology in the late 20 th
century and the so-called "social turn."5 This social turn acknowledges that most of our
knowledge comes from the testimony of others, namely what we learn from the speaking
or writings of trusted authorities. Whom you should trust is fundamentally a question of
identifying epistemic or intellectual authorities—"experts"—and evaluating their
testimony. Transmission of knowledge thus requires a community with established
relationships. As John Hardwig writes, "appeals to epistemic authority are essentially
ingredient in much of our knowledge," but it comes at the cost of autonomy, and even
egalitarianism.6 An expert, by definition, implies rational authority over laypeople. To trust

3

Cf. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4
I use Zagzebski’s definition of autonomy: "the right or ideal of submitting to nothing but one's own rational
will" or "the state of exercising the natural right of a self-conscious being to govern itself" Ibid., 19, 234.
5
Alvin Goldman and Thomas Blanchard, “Social Epistemology,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2018 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/epistemology-social/.
6
The full passage: "If I am correct, appeals to epistemic authority are essentially ingredient in much of our
knowledge. Appeals to the authority of experts often provide justification for claims to know, as well as
grounding rational belief. At the same time, however, the epistemic superiority of the expert to the layman
implies rational authority over the layman, undermining the intellectual autonomy of the individual and
forcing a reexamination of our notion of rationality. The epistemic individualism implicit in many of our
epistemologies is thus called into question, with important implications for how we understand knowledge
and the knower, as well as for our conception of rationality." John Hardwig, “Epistemic Dependence,” The
Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 7 (1985): 336. Zagzebski concurs saying "The most important theoretical
reason for the rejection of epistemic authority, I think, is the perceived conflict between epistemic authority
and two deep modern values: egalitarianism and autonomy." Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 6.
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them reveals vulnerability, areas where the layperson lacks power or knowledge and thus
must rely on another.7 The fact that everyone begins as a vulnerable novice who lacks
knowledge, confidence in what knowledge they do possess, and/or the expertise to
adjudicate judgments within a particular domain, reveals a bootstrapping problem.
The bootstrapping problem of knowledge and epistemic authority emerges since
novices lack in knowledge, including the knowledge of who are trustworthy epistemic
authorities and how to reliably obtain knowledge from them. First, novices lack the
prerequisite knowledge to reasonably determine who qualifies as a knowledgeable expert.
Novices learn to identify authorities on the authority of authorities. Second, novices lack
both the means of verifying that the beliefs are accurate and of determining the sincerity of
experts. To advance, novices can only accept the epistemic direction and support of experts
as genuine. In this way, a novice’s reliance on, or trust in, an epistemic authority is
inescapably/necessarily blind.8 Yet this trust is host to ideals and concepts (products of the
social environment) furnishing the very authorities who teach subsequent authorities on
how to identify authorities. Everyone is thus born in, shaped by, and reliant on a community
and its epistemic structures. Realizing that all authority is inherently cultural or
communally defined leads to a new problem analogous to moral conventionalism in ethics:
if the validity of epistemic authority is dependent on communal cultivation and acceptance,

7

A position which requires you to trust indicates you have recognized the person or object of trust either has
more knowledge or more accurate knowledge for the relevant topic than yourself. Annette Baier famously
argued that trust is different than reliance by its accepting vulnerability to the will of another. Annette Baier,
“Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986): 231–60. Also cf. the ten article special edition by PEriTiA
(Policy, Expertise, and Trust in Action): Maria Baghramian, Danielle Petherbridge, and Rowland Stout,
“Vulnerability and Trust: An Introduction,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28, no. 5 (October
19, 2020): 575–82.
8
Cf. John Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 12 (1991): 693,
699.
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then either there are no universally valid authorities, or universal authorities can never be
"known." This problem has led to two "communities" within social epistemology.
There is disagreement within social epistemology as to whether the discipline is
continuous with traditional truth-oriented epistemology. Social constructivists claim that
all expert beliefs are constructed via experts negotiating with one other. 9 Belief formation
processes never reflect reality (or "real" facts), but reflect the opinions and interests of the
community's epistemic authorities.10 The constructivist view is admittedly extreme and
scholars have largely chosen the latter route maintaining that traditional epistemology can
accommodate social knowledge without discarding notions such as truth vs. falsity or
knowledge vs. error. However, the problem remains. Like moral conventionalism, if there
is no objective (i.e., culturally neutral) epistemic standard beyond any/all communal
epistemic authority to which we could compare, we seem barred from saying the epistemic
authority of another culture is wrong, or inferior to those our own communal authorities.
The knowledge generated or transmitted by each community's recognized epistemic
authorities is (as instituted) trustworthy. One of philosophy's enduring quests has thus been
to secure access to an objective standard that transcends cultural communal authorities
whether in Plato's forms, the divine mind, or a rational will.
The history of epistemology, however, in pursuing some form of reason as an
objective standard has produced one categorical method after another in attempts to
determine truth. Yet in presuming an "epistemic individualism," philosophers have settled
for less and less epistemic confidence resulting in skepticism and epistemic defeat. The

9

I presume this claim regarding all knowledge being constructed necessarily includes itself.
Cf. the journal Social Epistemology edited by Steve Fuller and Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar,
Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979).
10
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"dismal verdict", according to Robert Pasnau, is that history seems to have left us two
options, naturalism or idealism, both of which change the subject of epistemology. 11 Calls
to reject "epistemic individualism" and return to accepting knowledge based on authority
have already been made by scholars like John Hardwig and Linda Zagzebski. 12 The role of
trust has also received renewed interest in works within the resurgence of virtue in ethics
and epistemology following G.E.M. Anscombe’s "Modern Moral Philosophy" and
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. However, as Roger Pouivet points out there is a "double
origin" to the rise of virtue theoretic approaches: contemporaries inspired by Anscombe
and Thomists who "never abandoned the project." 13 If the way forward is to recapture
concepts of authority and testimony before the shift to individual will and autonomy, it is
fitting to fully document and examine the theories of authority and testimony present in
Medieval origin.

11

Epistemology is naturalized in thinkers Hume and Quine, who embrace epistemic defeat and settle for
biological and psychological descriptions of how our cognitive faculties actually are. Idealists like Berkeley
create a new privileged mental domain through revisionary metaphysics. Robert Pasnau, After Certainty: A
History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 133–34.
12
Cf. Hardwig, “Epistemic Dependence.” Zagzebski argues in Epistemic Authority for the rationality in
adopting the authority of experts and communities even while accommodating the contemporary primacy of
the autonomous self as authoritative. The argument for accepting outside authority is based on self-authority
with variations on the following idea: "It follows that because I place particular trust in myself when I am
conscientious, I must place particular trust in others whose conscientiousness I discover when I am being
conscientious. The general principle is that insofar as I trust myself in virtue of having certain properties, I
owe the same trust to others whose possession of those properties is something I discover when I am behaving
in a way I trust." Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 56–57. Later she even develops the Principle of Epistemic
Trust in Others: "In any case in which, by believing in a way I trust in myself, I am led to believe that others
have the same property I trust in myself (to the same degree as I have myself), I have a prima facie reason to
trust them as much as I trust myself." Ibid., 211.
13
Roger Pouivet, Épistémologie des croyances religieuses (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2013), 73. My
translation from French. Jonathan Sanford points out that neither G.E.M. Anscombe nor Alasdair MacIntyre
likely sought to start a movement and contemporary virtue theory in many ways fails to heed the concerns of
"Modern Moral Philosophy" but embrace the post-Enlightenment rule-based approach to ethics that is willing
to suspend moral absolutes. Jonathan J. Sanford, Before Virtue: Assessing Contemporary Virtue Ethics
(Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2019), 60, 74.
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Unlike contemporary social epistemology, Ancient and Medieval philosophers
largely took it for granted that most human knowledge comes from listening to a reliable
speaker and is never personally verified—whether scholars reading experts, students
learning from teachers, the faithful listening to religious authorities, or children obeying
their parents. Thus, few testimonial theories were explicitly laid out despite aspects of them
interspersed throughout a thinker’s writings. To date, the working theory of testimony
underpinning the works of medieval philosophers are just now being codified. This is
particularly relevant for the Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam since they
originate with testimony from God. Since none can escape the bootstrapping problem of
knowledge, everyone being born in, shaped by, and reliant on a community, my aim is to
explore how the role of trust and authority in generation and transmission of knowledge—
the pinnacle being religious knowledge—appears in three medieval thinkers from each of
the Abrahamic faiths: Saadya (Saadiah) Gaon’s Jewish perspective (882-942), al-Ghazālī’s
Islamic perspective (1058-1111), and Thomas Aquinas’s Christian perspective (12251274). Each maintained a rational theory for the role of epistemic authorities in the
production and transmission of communal, and by extension religious, knowledge.
Since this topic lies at the intersection of medieval philosophy and contemporary
epistemology (two fields which rarely draw on one another), chapter two will provide a
brief history of social epistemology and recent scholarship on medieval accounts of
testimony to show that a rethinking of the contemporary categories of testimony is needed.
After accounting for the recent interest in "social" knowledge, the chapter introduces social
epistemology’s standard framework for knowledge generation and transmission—the
positions of reductionism, anti-reductionism, and the interpersonal view of testimony (or

7

the assurance view)—which determine whether testimony qualifies as a source of
knowledge or justifies testimonial knowledge. Chapters three, four, and five
chronologically present the testimonial theory of Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas
Aquinas. While each thinker maintained sophisticated epistemological theories of
transmission within their own religious contexts, I show they each held to the same
approach to ground testimony (despite the very different processes of testimonial
transmission for human vs. divine speakers) best accounted for via virtue epistemology
given the central role trust and virtue play for both speakers and listeners whether human
or divine. In fact, trust and virtue explain the disparity between the reliability and certainty
of human and divine testimony.14 These three chapters begin by outlining each thinker's
temporal and cultural milieu to grasp their structures of communal authority and their
theories of knowledge to show how their approach to testimony (for both human and divine
speakers) fits within. Each chapter closes claiming that their accounts of human and divine
testimony are grounded through virtuously trusting the speaker via a virtue theoretic
framework. The process of detailing their theories of testimony reveals that the
contemporary testimonial framework is beholden to an evidentialist approach to
knowledge which is anachronistic to pre-Enlightenment thinkers. Chapter six thus traces
the historical development of the two concepts "evidence" and "evidentness" to show that
philosophers prior to the 18th century appreciated a richer variety of evidentiary distinctions
than is typical of contemporary epistemologists. Since a theory of testimony that cannot
adequately account for half of history's concept of testimony needs to be addressed, I then

14

This presentation must table how the credibility of revealed religious knowledge in propositional form
allows humans to subsequently pass the same propositional knowledge to other humans with the same level
of testimonial certainty or "warrant" (avoiding the thorny issue of translating ineffable revelatory experiences
into propositional words of God).

8

propose a neutral framework using John Greco's "rethinking" of testimonial
categories.15 To test the framework, I offer a virtue theoretic account in which reasonable
reliance on the testimony of others is best understood through the notion of epistemic trust.
I argue trust is the inverse correlation of the intellectual aspect of the virtue of autonomy
where listeners should strive to achieve a virtuous mean of intellectual autonomy between
the vices of being too trusting (i.e., not autonomous enough) and not trusting enough (i.e.,
too autonomous). In the seventh and final chapter, I conclude with a project summary
before applying the issues of trust's inherently social nature to the particulars of whom,
what, and even how we trust within our communal epistemic authorities in the present day.
Recognition of this fact indicates that epistemology, even social epistemology, needs to
occur in dialogue with other branches of philosophy and science. I reflect on what this
project has accomplished and then treat it as a case study to address the dark side of trust's
role in knowledge for a post-2020 world alongside the opportunities this presents. I
conclude by arguing that issues in contemporary epistemology parallel those of G.E.M.
Anscombe's modern moral philosophy and that moving forward we should seriously heed
her call to first establish a philosophy of psychology, namely a philosophy of human nature.
In the remainder of this chapter, I analyze the nature of authority and argue that
using the so-called "social turn" we can identify three answers to what authority one should
trust. I will use these approaches to show the epistemic similarities between Saadya Gaon,
al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas. I identify the three approaches to authority as: self-trust
in applying rational methods which I will refer to as "closed rationalism"; blind-trust in the

15

Cf. John Greco, “The Role of Trust in Testimonial Knowledge,” in Trust in Epistemology, ed. Katherine
Dormandy (New York: Routledge, 2019), 91–113.
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dogmas of protectionist communities I term "rational fideism"; and virtuous-trust in
trustworthy speakers I call "open rationalism."16 Regarding the first two approaches, I
argue both undermine the goal of knowledge acquisition: self-trust and the ideal of selfreliance renders knowledge acquisition too difficult;17 and blind-trust renders knowledge
acquisition too easy and is prone to manipulation. I argue the best path forward is virtuoustrust with its emphasis on remaining open to epistemic authorities, even divine testimony.
This approach can be found in Ancient and Medieval thinkers who understood trust as one
of the key senses of "faith." The sense of faith as trust, considered alongside reason as an
authoritative source or ultimate standard for knowledge, must be distinguished from an
"act of religious faith," i.e., believing a proposition firmly by attaching high credence to it
despite insufficient evidence. 18 Faith as "trust" is "faithfulness" especially as it pertains to
"trust in a person or thing" which produces confidence.19 Since this trust grounds
knowledge received from another agent, then, assuming God speaks as the Abrahamic
traditions claim, knowledge by faith is testimonial. I focus on the class of philosophers who
maintained two channels to knowledge: natural reason and "faith" not as groundless belief
16

The categorization of strong rationalism–the idea that reason is "strong" enough to reach the telos on its
own–is akin to what I have termed closed-rationalism given its reliance on self-trust. The categorization of
limited rationalism–the idea that reason is useful but limited in its inquiry toward the telos thus requiring
another science to go beyond its limits (typically "faith")–I have divided into rational-fideism and openrationalism to capture faith methods that reach the same conclusions as rational ones while recognizing that
some knowledge is only obtainable via one method or the other.
17
Zagzebski claims that the faculties we trust in ourselves reveal the same trustworthy faculties in others
such that it is inconsistent to distrust others. Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 52.
18
Pace the sense in which "To hold a proposition on faith, as I will here use that term, is to believe it firmly,
and thus to attach high credence to it, even though one does not suppose that the evidence warrants such
confidence. Believing on faith, so understood, directly clashes both with evidentialism and with Lockean
proportionality, which is why it strikes so many as utterly disreputable." Pasnau, After Certainty, 135.
19
Recovering the notion of "faith" as trust is not novel and can be found in works such as Martin Buber's
Two Types of Faith where he distinguishes between the Hebrew Emunah of Judaism and Greek pistis of
Christianity. While his relegation of each type of faith to Judaism and Christianity is overly simplistic, he
accurately captures the sense in which faith (Emunah) is based on a relationship, the defining relationship of
trusting God, and not "reasons" underlying a faith (pistis) as belief (credo) in God. Martin Buber, Two Types
of Faith: Interpretation of Judaism & Christianity., trans. Norman P. Goldhawk (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951).
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but as trust in a speaker allowing the possibility of objective knowledge to remain open,
even for divine speakers. These philosophers anticipate the limits of reason and escape the
traps of self-reliance and socially constructed authority.
Before explicating the three epistemic responses, namely self-trust, blind-trust, and
virtuous trust, and why Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas fit within the final
approach, I must identify the concept of intellectual authority and the form it takes in both
persons and communities. I will thus unpack the notion of epistemic authority, the
challenge of identifying those who have it, and its roles in communities to both disseminate
and shape knowledge.
1.2 What is Authority?
1.2.1 Practical vs. Epistemic Authority
Authority is ultimately the ability to override acts or thoughts of another individual or entire
community. Linda Zagzebski defines "authority" in Epistemic Authority as "a normative
power that generates reasons for others to do or to believe something preemptively." 20 The
anti-autonomy and anti-egalitarian nature of authority is precisely what has made it so
unattractive to modern thinkers. The fear of authority’s abuse has stigmatized the entire
notion at best rendering it a necessary evil in social and political philosophy. It seems the
same fear has historically caused epistemologists to reduce the role of authority in
knowledge transmission and belief formation.
Immediately we must identify two types—practical and epistemic—and two
states—reputational and objective—of "authority." 21 Practical authority possesses a
legal/moral right to be obeyed or power to compel others to do what they command, e.g.
20
21

Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 102.
I will adopt the usage of Elizabeth Fricker and Linda Zagzebski Ibid., 18, 102.
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"officers in the army have authority over their soldiers." 22 Epistemic authority claims to
possesses reliable knowledge and to be trustworthy regarding a particular topic, e.g. "Dr.
Jones is an authority on heart disease." 23 Generally, practical authority is possessed by
"leaders" while epistemic authority is possessed by "experts" and the two senses are
understood by context (I will use the terms "expert" and "epistemic authority"
interchangeably). The key distinction is that practical authority is directed by the
possessor’s will, hence commands can be given, rescinded, and contradicted across time
without impugning the authority which gives the commands weight. Conversely, claim to
epistemic authority is lost, actively denied even, if the possessor asserts, retracks, and
contradicts across time. This is because epistemic authority is directed not by the will, but
by the truth about a body of knowledge. The two types occur in two states of reputational
and objective authority. Extrapolating from Alvin Goldman's epistemic categories, "a
reputational expert is someone widely believed to be an expert (in the objective sense),
whether or not he really is one."24 In short, a claim to authority does not an authority make.
While conflating the two senses or the two types of authority can undermine trust and, by
extension, knowledge transmission, the senses and types are not mutually exclusive. Great
explanatory power comes from the potential permutations of the two types and two states
of authority (see Chart 1.2.1.1).

22

John R. T Lamont, Divine Faith (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 20–
21.
23
According to John Lamont, "A claim to teach with authority binds the person making the claim to his
assertions, in a way that a claim to the right to command does not." Ibid., 21.
24
Alvin I. Goldman, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 63, no. 1 (2001): 91.
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Chart 1.2.1.1

Once Chart 1 is given a context, we can identify socially beneficial and harmful positions
(I will focus on epistemic authority, but similar claims can be made for political
authority).25 Positions which cause epistemic harm include AB (objective epistemic
authority lacking reputation) since knowledge is overlooked or lost when an objective
expert's contributions are not recognized (e.g. the contribution of minority views as
feminist philosophers and philosophers of race have demonstrated); or AD (reputational
epistemic authority lacking objectivity) when non-experts are falsely identified resulting
in the transmission of opinions and falsehoods as facts. The intersection of epistemic and
practical authority allows for greater harm if: a) BC (objective practical authority lacking
epistemic) can obscure a lack of epistemic authority or conflate practical with epistemic

25

Context determines who occupies each intersection and their potentiality for, and kinds of, beneficence or
harm. In the context of a courtroom, examples of AB/D could be an eyewitness, BC/D a bailiff, and ABCD
the judge. A bailiff is beneficial in keeping courtroom order, but harmful if relied upon for knowledge of the
case or if their practical authority pressures AB/D into distorting facts.
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authority; b) ACD (reputational practical and epistemic authority lacking objectivity)
quells objections to its false epistemic claims made by people under its practical authority;
and c) BCD (reputational and objective practical authority lacking epistemic) claims
epistemic justification for claims (which are otherwise unjustifiable) to the subjugation of
others.26 Ideally, knowledge should be obtained from some intersection of epistemic and
objective authority (i.e. AB, ABC, ABD, and ABCD).27 Such objective experts, regardless
of reputation, earn authority by collecting and developing facts pertinent to their area of
expertise. However, objective authorities are more than receptacles of accurate
information, they also require the propensity to apply their knowledge to new questions by
knowing both where to obtain relevant knowledge and how to apply it. 28
Given these distinctions, Zagzebski shows how Joseph Raz’s theses of "content
independence" and "preemption" of political authority also apply to epistemic authority.
For political authority, the "content" of a command is neutral in that the subject would have
reason to comply with an alternative act had a different command been given. Zagzebski
claims the parallel is true for epistemic authority: "If the epistemic authority had believed
a different proposition, the subject would have had reason to believe the other proposition
instead."29 Raz’s second thesis of preemption is more controversial. Most philosophers
26

Wolfhart Pannenberg has raised concerns regarding authoritarian testimony. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg,
“Response to the Discussion,” in Theology as History, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, 1st ed.,
New Frontiers in Theology, v. 3 (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 224–28.
27
Intersections AB and ABC would at least need to be recognized to obtain knowledge from them thus slowly
moving occupying entities into intersections ABD and ABCD.
28
Goldman, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?,” 91. Zagzebski reminds that this trust in epistemic
authorities is ultimately grounded in one’s self-trust through the "Dependency Thesis for the authority of
another's belief – If the belief p of a putative epistemic authority is authoritative for me, it should be formed
in a way that I would conscientiously believe is deserving of emulation." Thus, "an epistemic authority is
someone who does what I would do if I were more conscientious or better than I am at satisfying the aim of
conscientiousness—getting the truth." Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 108–9.
29
As we shall see, this is the result of the fact that: "Given that trust is directed towards the way in which the
authority gets her belief, that is what we would expect" Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 107.
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follow John Locke in assuming that while practical authorities can command subjects to
obey, epistemic authorities cannot command others to believe. 30 Yet, going back to
Zagzebski’s definition of "authority," to be an epistemic authority is to have the power to
cause others to believe something preemptively, namely just as "the fact that an authority
requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance that replaces other
relevant reasons and is not simply added to them" so too does "The fact that the authority
has a belief p is a reason for me to believe p that replaces my other reasons relevant to
believing p and is not simply added to them."31 Zagzebski offers the following justification
thesis to defend a person having such epistemic authority:
Justification Thesis 1 for the Authority of Belief (JAB 1) - The authority
of another person's belief for me is justified by my conscientious judgment
that I am more likely to form a true belief and avoid a false belief if I believe
what the authority believes than if I try to figure out what to believe
myself.32
The typical objection is that an epistemic authority's belief should not replace an agent’s
other reasons but merely be added to them, even if it is more heavily weighted. 33 This
objection makes several assumptions: that an authority’s belief automatically qualifies as
evidence for me; and that all reasons are of the same kind, namely objective evidence.

30

"For it is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in men's powers to perform. And to
believe this or that to be true, does not depend on our will"; "Nobody is obliged in that matter to yield
obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another, further than he himself is persuaded, Every man
in that has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself." John Locke and Mario Montuori, John
Locke. A Letter concerning toleration: Latin and English texts revised and edited with variants and an
introduction by Mario Montuori. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963), 77, 81.
31
Zagzebski calls this the "Preemption Thesis for epistemic authority." Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 102,
107.
32
Zagzebski also offers a second thesis based on her overall argument from autonomy that "truth is what
survives conscientious self-reflection, and we always need to trust the connection between conscientious selfreflection and success in reaching the truth" "JAB 2–The authority of another person's belief for me is
justified by my conscientious judgment that I am more likely to form a belief that survives my conscientious
self-reflection if I believe what the authority believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself." Ibid.,
110–11.
33
Ibid., 114.
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However, all reasons are not necessarily evidential, especially for medieval thinkers. 34 A
crucial non-evidential reason is trust. The idea, however, that trust is blind in some capacity
raises fears of epistemic tyranny, namely that authorities are insincere and/or have ulterior
motives and thus gain power (perhaps practical authority) over others and infringe on their
freedom.35 Simultaneously, the division of cognitive labor and the incoherence of epistemic
self-reliance necessitates communal epistemic authority. So, when should one trust a
communal epistemic authority?
1.2.2 Communal Epistemic Authority
Despite the parallels between political and epistemic authority, Zagzebski notes two
disanalogies in how the authorities function: the risk of tyranny and the limits of
community size. The fear of bad practical authorities (e.g., tyrants) condones the separation
of power and overrides any desire for benevolent dictators who are better able to bring
about individual and collective good.36 If truth is both the grounds of authority and a
community's final goal, then there is no immediate risk of epistemic tyranny. Fear of
epistemic tyranny only arises if the authority is insincere because their end is not truth but
the tyrant's own personal ends.37 Pointing to feminist thought, Zagzebski claims we should
not fear epistemic tyranny, but "a more subtle kind of epistemic oppression" where
authorities manipulate the beliefs of others "making it appear to the subject that she formed
the belief through a rational process." 38 The problem is removed not by limiting authority
as with the practical, but the historic aim of identifying epistemic authorities who are both

34

This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.
Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 141.
36
Ibid., 140.
37
Historically this is more likely when practical and epistemic authority reside in the same entity. Ibid., 141.
38
Ibid., 142.
35
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sincere and accurate.39 The fear of strong epistemic authorities is thus mitigated if not
removed entirely. The second disanalogy is that practical authority works with large
populations even assuming the authority has no trusting relationship with, has different
aims than, and is distant from the subjects.40 Conversely, epistemic authorities struggle
with larger communities because they require trust, a shared goal, and, often, intimacy.
These differences render Joseph Raz’s normal justification thesis 41 of practical authority
inadequate for epistemic authority so that Zagzebski offers a new justification thesis
tailored to the difference of both small and large communities. 42
Given that the tested justification theses for practical authority prove inadequate for
epistemic authority, Zagzebski provides the General Justification of Authority Thesis. 43
The thesis shows how adopting communal beliefs on authority is justified insofar as one
prudently judges that the belief accepted on authority is superior to beliefs obtained via
independent efforts. Variations of this thesis aim to answer two questions: 1) what justifies

39

Ibid., 143. The problem can reassert itself in identifying authorities if privileged and discriminatory ideas
color what traits an "expert" should exhibit.
40
Ibid., 140–41.
41
The Normal Justification Thesis (NJ thesis) states that the normal way to establish that a person has
authority over another person is to show that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons that
apply to him if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow
them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons that apply to him directly. Ibid., 108.
42
Our topic assumes large communities, but it should be noted that the justification of epistemic authority is
different for small communities on account of four unique features. First, both practical and epistemic
authority in small communities (e.g., construction teams, orchestras, monasteries, etc.) are defined by the
"purpose" of the community, not that of its individual members. The result is the community’s reasons for
acting become the member’s reasons only upon joining and cease upon leaving. Second, members have
reasons to modify their personal end on the word of the authority. As is common in learning philosophy,
students can be reasonable to modify their goals of study on their teacher’s authority "even though it was
trust in the teacher's ability to aid him in acting on those reasons that led him to accept the authority of the
teacher." Third, small community authorities often resemble exemplars rather than leaders, hence an
individual's trust in their admiration for the leader justifies their authority more so than leader's ability to help
individuals reach personal goals. However, the final reason indicates that successfully learning a desired
practice justifies the authority of the teacher. Ibid., 145–51.
43
"The authority of another person is justified for me by my conscientious judgment that if I do what the
authority directs (or believe what the authority tells me), the result will survive my own conscientious selfreflection better than if I try to figure out what to do/believe myself." Ibid., 148.
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my community in taking a belief on authority? and 2) what justifies me in taking a belief
that my community is justified in believing on authority? In response to the first, it is
reasonable for a member to adopt beliefs in accordance with the community’s system of
epistemic prudence, i.e., a member will more effectively obtain truth by trusting the system
with its authority structure than by alternative means. However, this reasoning must be
more sophisticated than accepting an authority because someone I trust accepts that entity
as authoritative.44 Instead, such a transitive adoption of authority must follow a "hierarchy
of experts" in which justification comes "from the judgment of the experts on the
experts,"45 which Zagzebski account for using the:
Expansion of Authority Principle 1 (EAP 1): The authority of B's
testimony for me is justified by my conscientious judgment that A is more
likely to get the truth in some domain than I am, and A judges that B is more
likely to get the truth than she is.46
Recognition of epistemic authority can thereby extend beyond persons one has met (and
hence trust). The community develops a structured epistemic hierarchy, but only in a weak
sense of communal epistemic authority since the impersonal nature is only effective in
transmitting information, not individual community members' experiences, emotions, or
prior beliefs.47
To answer the 2nd question, Zagzebski modifies EAP 1 to permit epistemic
authority to pass by "chains of interpersonal trust," but only for more homogeneous
communities (e.g., similar life experiences, background beliefs, and dispositions):

44

Zagzebski refers to this as the "General Expansion of Authority Principle" which fails because individual
conscientious self-reflection differs between individuals.
45
Keith Lehrer (1977) and Hardwig also refer to a "hierarchy of experts" (1985). Zagzebski 152 Hardwig,
“Epistemic Dependence.” 341
46
Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 152. This thesis assumes truth is objective and thus the same for everyone.
47
Ibid.
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Expansion of Authority Principle 2 (EAP 2) – The authority of B's
testimony for me is justified by my conscientious judgment that A's
judgment about who the authority is in some domain is more likely to satisfy
my conscientious reflection than my own judgment, and A judges that B is
an authority in that domain.48
This mechanism can provide a strong sense of communal epistemic authority, but the
requisite homogeneity cannot be expected of large communities. The solution comes from
seeing a community as an extended self and accepting its structure of authority as amenable
with one's own.49 Since the communal goal of truth can differ from individual goals of
truth, the beliefs of collective doxastic agents should be seen as mirroring those of
individuals where assertions within the community are akin to self-reflection and assertions
to those outside are akin to person-to-person testimony.50 The result is that Zagzebski
modifies her earlier justification of epistemic authority for individuals—"I"—to fit the
extended communal self—"we":
The fact that We believe p can give me a preemptive reason to believe p,
but since I am part of the community and accept it as an extended self, the
authority that We have is not something alien to me, as the authority of the
political state often is. The ultimate authority over me is still myself, and
what I take to be the authority is an extension of myself.51
48

Ibid.
"A community in the sense I mean is an extended self because it has many of the features of a person, and
the persons who are its members relate to it in the same sort of way they relate to themselves, although in
healthy individuals there is never any doubt about the difference between self and community. A community
has a communal consciousness with the same components upon which its members can reflect as individuals
have when they engage in self-reflection. A community has a history of experiences; it has communal beliefs;
it may have communal emotions expressed and fostered in the community's stories. It often has hopes and
plans for the future. It has values. It often acts as an agent. A member of the community will refer to these
components of the community consciousness as 'our' experiences, beliefs, values, and so on, and its acts as
'our' acts." Ibid., 153–54.
50
Ibid., 154.
51
Zagzebski also provides two communal variants of the theses for Justification of Epistemic Authority:
Justification of Communal Epistemic Authority 1 (JCEA 1)- "The authority of my community is justified
for me by my conscientious judgment that I am more likely to believe the truth and avoid falsehood if I
believe what We believe than if I try to figure out what to believe in a way that is independent of Us" and
"Justification of Communal Epistemic Authority 2 (JCEA 2) The authority of my community is justified
for me by my conscientious judgment that if I believe what We believe, the result will survive my
conscientious self-reflection better than if I try to figure out what to believe in a way that is independent of
Us." Ibid., 155.
49
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The individual justification for accepting communal epistemic authority flows from
blurring the line distinguishing "my reasons to believe" and "why my extended self
believes."52
Given the pervasive role of communal epistemic authority, the social turn and the
bootstrapping problem seem to inevitably lead to constructivism. Knowledge seems to only
have currency within a given epistemic community governed by its own structure and
hierarchy of experts. The analysis of the reality all communities share is ultimately
determined by each community's interpretation, interpretations which are effectively
predetermined by assumptions and methods previously established. In this sense Bertrand
Russel's critique of Thomas Aquinas applies to all, including himself.53 Escape from this
circularity can only be found through an objective (i.e., culturally neutral) epistemic
authority beyond all communal epistemic authority to which we could compare. The
history of philosophy is the story of what neutral objective authority one should trust for
knowledge.

52

Ibid., 156. This notion is complicated by what Stephen John calls a natural vs. artificial consensus: "In a
natural consensus, typically, each individual comes to accept some claim, which she then asserts; in an
artificial consensus, it is possible that each member of the group may be willing to endorse some statement
as the group’s assertion while, herself, not accepting that claim." Stephen John, “Epistemic Trust and the
Ethics of Science Communication: Against Transparency, Openness, Sincerity and Honesty,” Social
Epistemology 32, no. 2 (2018): 80.
53
Bertrand Russell critiqued Aquinas for knowing the truth before philosophizing: "There is little of the true
philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument
may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he
begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently
rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better: If he cannot, he need only fall back on
revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special
pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of
Greece or of modern times." Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1996). 463.
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1.3 Self-Trust, Blind-Trust, and Virtuous-Trust
Having established the nature of authority, we can see that the quest for an objective
epistemic standard, or the solution to "what authority should you trust?", reveals three
cognitive approaches to knowledge: 1) closed-rationalism which exhibits self-trust in only
accepting knowledge in accordance with one’s employment of an epistemic method
thought to be demanded by reason; 2) rational-fideism on account of its blind-trust in
accepting any claim until opposing details emerge; and 3) open-rationalism whose
hallmark is virtuous-trust in accepting knowledge from virtuous epistemic authorities. 54
Insofar as trust is a form of faith, it is often overlooked as a means to ultimate authority
since philosophers tend to maintain the faith-reason dichotomy best summarized by
Boethius of Dacia in the 13th century:
For the view of the philosophers’ rests on demonstrations and on other
possible arguments in those matters whereof they speak, but in many
instances faith (fides) rests on miracles and not on rational arguments. But
that which is held because it follows from rational arguments is not faith but
knowledge (scientia). 55
Broadly construed this division presumes rationalism vs. fideism in which either the
epistemic rules of logic, demonstration, and dialectics frequently work contrary to revealed
truths resulting in agnosticism or irrationalism, or there are different epistemic levels such

54

These three approaches mirror Harry Wolfson's distinction between "rationalist single faith theory" (assent
to teachings "only as derivatively known by demonstration"), "authoritarian single faith theory" (assent to
teachings "only as immediately known by revelation") and their joint usage in "double faith theory" in "The
Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and Its Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics."
Harry Austryn Wolfson, “The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and Its
Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 33, no. 2 (1942): 223.
55
Tr. mod. Boethius of Dacia, “On the eternity of the world,” in On the supreme good, On the eternity of the
world, On dreams, trans. John F. Wippel (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1987), 36.
sententia enim philosophorum innititur demonstrationibus et certis rationibus possibilibus in rebus de quibus
loquuntur, fides autem in multis innititur miraculis et non rationibus: quod enim tenetur propter hoc quod
per rationes conclusum est, non est fides, sed scientia. Boethius of Dacia, “De Aeternitate Mundi,” in Boetii
de Dacia Tractatus de aeternitate mundi, ed. Geza Sajo, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie
4 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1964), 31–32.
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that, per Boethius, "it is foolish to seek rational argumentation for things which should be
believed by reason of Law."56
1.3.1 Closed Rationalism & Self-Trust
The most prevalent position in the history of philosophy rejects (or fails to recognize) the
influence of communal epistemic authority. The most trustworthy, or least doubtful, source
of knowledge is yourself. The ideal is captured in Ibn-Tufail’s philosophical tale Hayy ibn
Yaqẓān of a boy who was raised by a doe on a deserted island isolated from language,
society, and tradition whose uncorrupted self-teaching allows him to ascertain ultimate
truth.57 When Hayy ibn Yaqẓān finally encounters humans he is able to distinguish ultimate
truth from religious imagery and materialism, calling those who are able to recognize
reason to abandon such distractions. Ibn-Tufail’s key lesson is epistemic self-reliance: the
only authority you should trust is yourself. 58 Other people, your community, even your
faith, are unreliable. Hayy ibn Yaqẓān should evoke the concept of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s "noble savage" since the fruit of the European Enlightenment, as Samar Attar
argues, can be traced back to the roots of Ibn Tufail’s story. 59
56

Boethius of Dacia, “On the eternity of the world,” 36.
Quia sicut in his quae ex lege credi debent, quae tamen prò se rationem non habent, quaerere rationem
stultum est, — quia qui hoc facit, quaerit quod impossibile est inveniri, Boethius of Dacia, “De Aeternitate
Mundi,” 31.
57
Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Malik Ibn Ṭufayl and Lenn Evan Goodman, Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn Yaqzān: A
Philosophical Tale Translated with Introduction and Notes (Los Angeles: Gee tee bee, 2003).
58
Linda Zagzebski refers to this as "epistemic egoism", of which there are two forms, extreme and standard.
Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 54. Elizabeth Fricker refers to this as being an "autonomous knower" writing
"this ideal type relies on no one else for any of her knowledge...tak[ing] no one else's word for anything, but
accepts only what she has found out for herself, relying only on her own cognitive faculties and investigative
and inferential powers" and is explicitly espoused by Descartes and Locke. Elizabeth Fricker, “Testimony
and Epistemic Autonomy,” in The Epistemology of Testimony, ed. Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 225.
59
Samar Attar says that "Hayy Ibn Yaqzan could be considered one of the most important books that heralded
the beginning of modern science in Europe." She shows that the ideas expressed in Hayy ibn Yaqzan appear
in the thought of major European thinkers including: Roger Bacon (1220-1292), Thomas Hobbes (15881679), Rene Descartes (1596-1650), John Locke (1632-1704), Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz (1646-1716), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and even Charles Darwin (1809-1882). The parallel idea
is found in Hayy ibn Yaqzan: "Ibn Tufayl’s protagonist, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan, had no religion. He was not a
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Despite the importance of the self, knowledge from others is not dismissed. Hume
is famous for his theory of testimony, but it reduces to traditional individual knowledge
sources (such as perception and memory). 60 Testimony cannot be a generative source of
knowledge since it reduces to other non-subspecies of knowledge (primarily intuition).
Likewise, transmission typically reduces to back-to-back instances of generation. 61 Hume
exhibits this ideal of epistemic self-reliance most poignantly in section 10 of "An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding" regarding miracles where he denigrates the authority
of scripture or tradition as "merely founded in the testimony of the apostles, who were eyewitnesses to those miracles of our Savior", claiming Christianity rests on testimony which
is a weaker form of evidence than perception and should therefore yield in the face of "just
reasoning."62 In short, trust should be placed in oneself and never in outside epistemic
authorities (even communal ones), for the inferior evidence of testimony must yield to the
stronger evidence of personal experience. For this self-reliance to be authoritative,
individuals must trust in their reliable performance of an epistemic method. Roger Pouivet
calls this "Epistemological Methodism" in which "the determination of what we know or

Muslim, a Christian, or a Jew. He was not white, or black. When he matured on his own without the help of
parents, society, or religious mentors, he managed to discover some power in the universe, and he gave it a
name from the science of mechanics, i.e., the Mover of the Universe, not as God, Allah, or Yehua. When he
became acquainted with other human beings, he did not convert to their religion, or use subservient means
to convert them to his. He realized that conventional rituals, literary interpretations of scriptures and
abandonment of reason and evidence in favor of blind faith could be very harmful. He endeavored to reason
with other human beings, but never sensationalized their shortcomings, or spoke with contempt about their
religion. There is no doubt that he felt immense pity for those who neglected to use their reason, and thought
that they would eventually use if they had the will to do so. Hayy did not condemn religions per se. He saw
some benefits to those who needed it. On the other hand, he realized that truth was something relative, and
that people who did use their reason did not exactly reach his own conclusions." Samar Attar, The Vital Roots
of European Enlightenment: Ibn Tufayl’s Influence on Modern Western Thought (Lanham: Lexington Books,
2010), 52, 10.
60
Reductionism as a theory of testimony will be discussed at length in chapter 2.
61
Cf. chapter 6 and Greco, “The Role of Trust in Testimonial Knowledge.”
62
David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,” in The Complete Works and
Correspondence of David Hume., ed. T. H Green, T. H Grose, and Norman Kemp Smith, vol. 5
(Charlottesville, Va.: InteLex Corporation, 2000), 109, http://crkn.nlx.com/xtf/view?docId=hume/hume.xml.
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can know assumes the prior formulation of epistemic criteria."63 Since trust returns to the
ground-up epistemic method to evaluate knowledgeable experts to form a closed-loop, I
call this first cognitive approach closed-rationalism.
Insistence on an epistemic method that determines how evidentia leads to
knowledge is a form of rationalism. "Reason" has a systematic task to build knowledge
from the ground-up using natural causes. We see this clearly in Aristotelian science as
outlined in Posterior Analytics 1.2 which medieval thinkers perceived as the sole path to
certain (philosophical or scientific) knowledge. 64 Certain knowledge was obtained by the
method of demonstration based on Aristotle’s logic (and often metaphysics), in which
validly formed syllogisms built on true premises necessarily reveal true conclusions. 65 A
side-effect of epistemological methodism is it also erects the boundaries of truth limiting
what counts as knowledge.66 Anything beyond the limits set by the epistemic method are
"out of bounds" or must fall under the judgment of the method. The strong-rationalism of
thinkers like Averroes and Maimonides reduces testimony to an epistemic method in this
way. As an example, prophecy must be merely another form of rational knowledge using
the same epistemology as science and metaphysics. For Maimonides, prophecy is a rational
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My translation. Pouivet, Épistémologie des croyances religieuses. 83. The ethical parallel might be found
in adherents to Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy" whose notion of morality is "that acting in a morally
right manner is dependent on the correct application of a particular rule." Sanford, Before Virtue, 47.
64
Cf. Posterior Analytics 1.2, 70b19-70b24.
65
For a concise discussion of the method of medieval demonstration, cf. Richard C. Taylor, “Ibn
Rushd/Averroes and ‘Islamic’ Rationalism,” Medieval Encounters 15, no. 2–4 (2009): 225–35. 229. Since
Aristotelian demonstrative knowledge is the strongest and most certain form of knowledge, any claim
unproveable by reason cannot obtain certainty, and if certainty equals knowledge, then such claims are
effectively unknowable.
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Scholars such as Quentin Meillassoux has not un-controversially argued that reason has no limits in which
the only absolute is the necessity of contingency; however, Christopher Watkins argues this comes perilously
close to proving the very object of faith Meillassoux set out to disprove. Cf. both Quentin Meillassoux, Après
la finitude: essai sur la nécessité de la contingence (Paris: Éd. du Seuil, 2012).; And Christopher Watkin,
Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).
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process, an emanation of an intelligible form from God via the causality of the Agent
Intellect. Prophets require the necessary rational faculties to receive the intense degree of
the intellectual emanation and the necessary imaginative faculties to concretely represent
what they received intellectually. Averroes likewise describes a true prophet not as
revealing knowledge beyond the limits of natural reason but making knowledge and laws
known that "are in accordance with the truth and which bring about acts that will determine
the happiness of the totality of mankind."67 The theories of prophecy implied by Averroes
and set out by Maimonides reveal that once demonstration was accepted as the method to
obtain certain knowledge, sacred texts must yield to demonstration. However, whether
there is a transcendent reason that humans imperfectly participate in, every epistemic
method is necessarily anthropocentric and will be limited as much as human intellectual
capacity.
Self-trust as the ultimate epistemic authority is a non-starter. There are no Ḥayy ibn
Yaqẓāns. Ibn Tufail’s allegorical novel of the epistemic ideal in which an autodidactic feral
child discovers and employs rational methods to reach ultimate truth should underscore
several realities. First, the value of truth and the value of self-reliance are competing goods;
they are opposed to one another. If knowledge is perceived as superior to other epistemic
states, then self-reliance undercuts knowledge, since most of the information we possess
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Averroës, Tahafut Al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), trans. Simon van den Bergh (London:
Luzac, 1954), 316. tr.mod. Averroes maintains a skeptical view of testimony such that divine testimony
would undermine the certainty of revelation compared to his notion that prophets are philosophers working
through demonstration. The truth of the prophet and the Qur’an are recognized through the consequences of
what they have done for humans (not miracles which could be mere trickery). Cf. Taylor R.C, “Averroes and
the Philosophical Account of Prophecy,” Studia Graeco-Arabica Studia Graeco-Arabica, no. 8 (2018): 291.
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comes from what others say or write, otherwise known as testimony. 68 If one's aim is
knowledge (even mere belief justified by available evidence) all but those who Zagzebski
calls the "extreme epistemic egoist" should accept authoritative testimony when their
epistemic position is inferior to that of the expert. Self-reliance comes at the cost of less
knowledge, so that relying on the self ultimately limits the self. Second, it is impossible for
an individual to ascertain knowledge, let alone (ultimate) truth, without an epistemic or
cognitive division of labor (whether authoritarian or egalitarian). 69 Human life-expectancy
is simply too short. Third, the ideal of self-reliance is incoherent. As Zagzebski claims, the
faculties we trust in ourselves reveal the same trustworthy faculties in others so that it is
inconsistent to distrust others.70 Finally, epistemological methodism's requirement that one
trust themselves to reliably perform a rational epistemic imperative is a dead-end. Robert
Pasnau’s After Certainty tells a story about the history of epistemology from Aristotle to
Hume through the establishment of epistemic ideals and their subsequent loosening when
those ideals cannot be reached. Settling for less and less epistemic confidence, the
epistemic quest provides one failed epistemic method after another leading to the
impossibility of certain knowledge. Pasnau claims that certainty is unachievable and
instead we should believe "hopefully."71 This dead-end led to the recent anti-evidentialist
turn in general epistemology away from the idea that all knowledge (justified belief,
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"The person who values self-reliance presumably also wants true beliefs, but he values them more if he
gets them a certain way—by using his own powers. One way to express this desire is that we want to get
credit for the truths we acquire; we want the truths we get to be attributed to us as agents." Zagzebski,
Epistemic Authority, 117–18.
69
Robert Pasnau's account is strongly egalitarian, cf. Robert Pasnau, “Divisions of Epistemic Labour: Some
Remarks on the History of Fideism and Esotericism Knowledge, Mind and Language,” Proceedings of the
British Academy 189 (2013): 83–117. Also cf. Fricker, “Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.”
70
Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 52.
71
This remains intellectually honest since hope is an affective rather than cognitive state. Pasnau, After
Certainty, 136–38.
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reasonable belief, rational belief) must accord with an "epistemic imperative" in the form
of beliefs supported by evidence.72 The subsequent "social turn" sees the path forward in
stepping past philosophy’s heavily individualistic focus on knowledge acquisition via
doxastic rules by accurately reflecting the complex reality of social relationships and
institutions.73 Ultimate epistemic authority must include trusting others.
1.3.2 Rational Fideism & Blind-Trust
As illustrated above, trusting epistemic authority is in some sense blind, for if one were in
a position to know then they would not need to trust someone else. In the contemporary
testimonial debate, some hold that testimony as a source of knowledge is justified by an
entitlement or "a kind of presumptive right to take every understood utterance as
knowledge-generating and hence knowledge-imparting." 74 Trust is placed in a testimonial
faculty or the testimony itself (at least until given a reason not to). 75 John Lamont observes
this amounts to following a rule, such that it likewise falls under Pouivet's "epistemological
methodism", to justify the acceptance of testimony as a unique source of knowledge. 76
Opponents like Elizabeth Fricker see such presumptive trust leading to massive gullibility
or the transmission of what John Greco refers to as "garbage," neither of which help in
obtaining truth.77 In fact, blind trust is often attributed to religious groups on account of its
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John Greco, “Transmitting Faith (And Garbage),” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 3
(2018): 86–88.
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Alvin Goldman claims epistemology's historical "emphasis was on evaluating doxastic attitudes (beliefs
and disbeliefs) of individuals in abstraction from their social environment." Goldman and Blanchard, “Social
Epistemology.”
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Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, eds., Knowing from Words: Western and Indian
Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1994), 8.
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This approach might be seen as a predecessor to the anti-reductionist theory of testimonial justification
typically traced back to Thomas Reid, as discussed in chapter 2.
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Lamont, Divine Faith, 144.
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Cf. Elizabeth Fricker, “Against Gullibility,” Synthese Library., no. 230 (1994): 125–61; Greco,
“Transmitting Faith (And Garbage).”
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similarities to Christian scripture's famous definition of faith as "the assurance of things
hoped for, the conviction of things not seen."78 This alignment with fideism fits since
testimony as the sole evidentia permits high credence in a belief without any other criteria
in the absence of defeaters.79 Since this theory includes blind trust in non-supernatural
evidentia, I call this second approach rational fideism.
Given the rationalism-fideism dichotomy, the disreputable alternative of fideism
emboldens those holding to self-trust's application of rational methods. Historically,
several philosophers like Averroes and Maimonides castigated the Mutakallimūn for
relying on blind-trust and thereby making reason subservient to religion by building
rational arguments on presupposed revelatory premises unproven by reason. Maimonides
devotes four full chapters in I.71 of his Guide for the Perplexed (Dalālat al-Hā’irīn) to
refuting kalam’s post-hoc demonstrations to promote religious doctrines.80 Averroes
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Hebrews 11:1 RSV
Alvin Plantinga’s "Properly Basic Beliefs" arguably fit here, cf. Alvin Plantinga, “The Reformed Objection
to Natural Theology,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 (1980): 49–62.
and Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Faith and rationality, reason and belief in God (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
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Sections 1.74-76. These include: an atomistic and occasionalist understanding of the physical world; the
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God. Herbert A. Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 89. Herbert Davidson summarizes the philosopher’s view succinctly saying, "Maimonides'
opinion…was that the Kalam thinkers failed to grasp the criteria whereby propositions regarding the universe
can properly be judged true or false, and their failure to do so disqualified them from being classified as
philosophers." Ibid., 87. To support his claim, he cites both the Guide for the Perplexed 1.73 (10, excursus)
and al-Fārābī’s Risālah fi'l-'aql. See al-Farabi, Risālah fīʼl-ʻaql, ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beyrouth: Dar ElMachreq Sarl, 1983), 7–8. Shlomo Pines likewise points out in the introduction to his translation of the
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defense of religion, which means that it does not regard the grasp of theoretical truth as an end in itself."
Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed, Volume 1, trans. Shlomo Pines (University of Chicago
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the achievement of an end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own sake". Richard C. Taylor,
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likewise criticizes arguments made by the Mutakallimūn as non-demonstrative in
Uncovering [Religious] Methods (al-Kashf ʻan manāhij).81 Even al-Ghazālī attacked
Ta'limism, the new Shi'ite view of batinism (i.e. Ismailis), which taught all things have an
apparent and a hidden aspect than can only be known through the direction of an infallible
teacher, namely the Imam from the Shi'ite line of succession back to Muhammad. AlGhazālī castigates the Ta'limites as seeing an authoritative teacher's "categorical
pronouncements without needing any proof" as the only path to certain knowledge. 82 While
al-Ghazālī himself affirms an infallible teacher in Muhammad, he differentiates Ta'limism
as "deceiving the common folk and the dim-witted by showing the need for the
authoritative teacher, and to disputing men's denial of the need for authoritative teaching
by strong and effective argument."83 In short, Ta'limism rests on blind-trust, which alGhazālī denounces as taqlīd (blind and unwavering imitation), a charge that al-Ghazālī
similarly leveled at philosophers in his Incoherence of the Philosophers.84

“Averroes and the Philosophical Account of Prophecy,” Studia Graeco-Arabica, no. 8 (2018): 304. It seems
plausible such a view could be attributed to Maimonides as well.
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Cf. Averroës,  نقد علم الكﻼم ضدا على الترسيم اﻷيديولوجي للعقيدة ودفاعا عن العلم، أو،الكشف عن مناهج اﻷدلة في عقائد الملة
 وحرية اﻻختيار في الفكر والفعل/ al-Kashf ʻan manāhij al-adillah fī ʻaqāʼid al-millah, ed. Muḥammad ʻĀbid Jābirī
(Bayrūt: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʻArabīyah, 2007). For an English translation see Averroës, Faith and
reason in Islam: Averroes’ exposition of religious arguments, trans. Ibrahim Y Najjar (Oxford: Oneworld,
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needing any proof. How, then, can we give up the certain because of the uncertain?'" al-Ghazālī, Freedom
and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazālī’s al-Munqidh Min al-Ḍalāl and Other Relevant
Works of al-Ghazālī, trans. Joseph McCarthy (Boston, Mass.: Twayne Publishers, 1980), 104.
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"In fact, the right way to proceed is to acknowledge the need for an authoritative teacher who must also be
infallible. But our infallible teacher is Muhammad-God's blessing and peace be upon him!" Ibid., 83, 89.
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Al-Ghazālī rebukes the philosophers for merely trading in the taqlīd of the Imam for the taqlīd of the Greek
philosophers. Richard M. Frank, “Al-Ghazālī on Taqlīd: Scholars, Theologians and Philosophers,” Zeitschrift
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In juxtaposing faith with a rational approach to truth, faith must be irrational
creating a type of fideism. Assuming the rationalism-fideism dichotomy in which
rationalism trusts the self to acquire knowledge and fideism blindly trusts others results in
knowledge that is either too hard or too easy. Neither option offers a suitable objective
standard for knowledge to escape from social constructivism. However, there is another
sense to fides other than an "act of religious faith" which Augustine and other medieval
thinkers understood, namely fides as "trust" or "faithfulness" especially as it pertains to
"trust in a person or thing," which produces confidence.
1.3.3 Open Rationalism & Virtuous-Trust
Recovering the historical aspect of faith as "trust" grants access to an often-overlooked
epistemological approach to knowledge based on trusting virtuous speakers which offers
at least a middle ground between self-trust and blind-trust and at most a truly objective
source in divine speech. This second approach or "source" of knowledge alongside
philosophical demonstration is commonly referred to as "faith" since it captures knowledge
from God. The Latin fides is a polysemic term, which Christophe Grellard shows means
faith, trust, reliability, and fidelity, and thus plays a larger role under social epistemology
as "trust."85 The Greek pistis in Aristotle reveals the same polysemic nature. Owen Goldin
argues that pistis is a pros hen equivocal such that a "state of being rationally led by what
another says is the core sense of pistis."86 The exact epistemic nature of "trust" is debated
(as discussed in chapter 2), but trust fits best in a virtue-theoretic framework. We see this
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Grellard explores this "polysemic concept" in Christophe Grellard, P Hoffmann, and Laurent Lavaud,
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historically since the emphasis was not in trusting testimony itself, but in trusting both one's
own epistemic virtues and those of the speaker. The listener cannot attach high credence to
a telling without recognizing the situation they find themselves in and assessing if the
speaker is knowledgeable and virtuous. Roger Pouivet calls this "Epistemological
Particularism" in which "the determination of epistemic criteria consists in generalizing
from particular cases of knowledge."87 Listeners must determine the legitimate value of the
belief, but are not forced back to the epistemic method. 88 As such, virtuous-trust in
epistemic authority aligns outside the rationalism and fideism dichotomy. 89 Since virtuoustrust remains open to the transmission of knowledge of a speaker (via the epistemic virtues
of both the speaker and the listener), I call this third approach open-rationalism. Since
open-rationalism is not confined to an epistemic method but remains open to virtuous
speakers it permits knowledge from outside the community. However, developing trust in
a non-community source requires additional vetting. In understanding faith as trust
suggests, one non-communal epistemic authority whose testimony can be accepted is God.
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My translation. Pouivet, Épistémologie des croyances religieuses. 83. Alvin Goldman's seminal article
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and contemporary appeal for a return to Aristotle’s three modes of proof cf. Krista C McCormack, “Ethos,
Pathos, and Logos: The Benefits of Aristotelian Rhetoric in the Courtroom,” Washington University
Jurisprudence Review, 7, no. 1 (2014): 131–55.
89
Due to the role of trust, this view most resembles the interpersonal view of testimony (IVT), also called
"assurance theory" where a speaker gives assurance to the hearer that the statement is true. Cf. Richard
Moran, “Getting Told and Being Believed,” in The Epistemology of Testimony, ed. Jennifer Lackey and
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Said another way, open-rationalists are not limited to a single method of acquiring truth,
but open to a second.90
Openness to two paths of knowledge is not of course "double truth." Even though
Boethius of Daca, along with Siger of Brabant, were accused of holding to contrary truths
(such that the same proposition may be false in philosophy and true in theology or vis
versa), Richard Dales is convinced "there never was such a doctrine." 91 Neither is faith's
role to address matters of ultimate concern left unresolved due to natural reason's
limitations.92 Faith as trust is not believing because of miracles but trusting God as a
speaker. In the Abrahamic faiths, revelation is testimony.93 As such, they perceive the
teachings of their faith community as authoritative whether the Rabbinic Court and
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Such thinkers readily adopt reason, but often have a different perspective of it as Robiglio notes with
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"Tradition" such as the Mishna and Talmud, the Ummah (Muslim community) and its
hadiths and fatwas, or the Church and its sacra doctrina. At first this seems contrary to the
certainty of revealed knowledge since, testimony was deemed an inferior source compared
to demonstration.94 Virtuous-trust in epistemic authority, however, explains these extremes
as lack of trust in the virtue of human speakers and maximum trust in the virtue of the
divine speaker.
Using these epistemic approaches to authority as a selection criterion reveals that
Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas are a better fit for the exploration of
communal and religious knowledge/authority on account of their desire to maintain an
orthodox faith while possessing philosophical approaches to truth. 95 While these three
thinkers provide a solid representation of medieval thought across each of the three
Abrahamic faiths and across three centuries, they were not contemporaries nor were any of
them explicitly engaged in a dialogue with another’s work. 96 Thus, it may be argued that
more notable or more influential thinkers from their tradition and time (e.g. Moses
Maimonides, Avicenna, or Averroes) are being overlooked. The normal trio of paragon (or
at least the most renowned) thinkers from each faith is normally Averroes (d. 1198), Moses
Maimonides (d. 1204), and Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), however, other than historical
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precedent, the selection criterion used to arrive at these three thinkers is not readily
apparent. This common grouping may have emerged since Averroes may well have
influenced Maimonides and both Averroes and Maimonides clearly influenced Aquinas,
which allows for the tracing of philosophical ideas across time and faith. At worst, the
grouping reflects an Orientalist mentality beginning with Aquinas and moving to the nonChristian thinkers he relied on. Viewing this trio through the "social turn," reveals that
Averroes and Maimonides fit more comfortably in the closed-rationalism epistemological
approach on account of their strong-rationalism and Aquinas in the open-rationalism group.
The "social turn" also shows that Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas are a
better fit for the exploration of communal and religious knowledge/authority making them
exemplars who are like-minded in their desire to maintain an orthodox faith while
possessing philosophical approaches to truth. This is best seen in their attempts to establish
an alternative ground beside strong-rationalist accounts of reason embraced by thinkers
such as Maimonides and Averroes, and more hardline faith-based approaches embraced by
groups such as the Karaites, the Kalaamists, and the Augustinians by developing
understandings of revelation as truths told by God himself, or God revealing through a
rational account of testimony. Each thinker distinguishes between propositions known "by
natural reason" and propositions known "by faith", or more clearly as knowledge by divine
testimony and knowledge not by divine testimony.97 This distinction can be found in
multiple thinkers including Albert the Great who claims theological and philosophical
contemplation are similar but distinct due to differing habitu, end, and object, but not
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These do not "map onto the modern distinction between knowledge and 'mere belief.'" Mats Wahlberg,
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Publishing Company, 2014), 31.
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rationem.98 Their focus is thus on the speaker's character, i.e. trustworthiness, as a
precondition listeners must assess prior to accepting a speaker's report, whether human or
divine.
1.3.3.3 Saadya Gaon
In his Book on Beliefs and Opinions, Saadya Gaon establishes two approaches to
knowledge through natural reason and revealed "Tradition." Saadya lauds the intuitions of
the intellect and rejects the condemnation of speculation via scientific laws out of fear that
they lead to heresy.99 He condemns man’s dismissal of revelation in lieu of private
reason.100 He even goes so far as to call it a sin since even "professional thinkers" are not:
i) guaranteed to find truth, ii) will be without faith until they find truth, and iii) even if they
singlehandedly find the truth which religion teaches, nothing prevents them from losing it.
This is because human knowledge is distinguished from God's knowledge in that while the
latter is unconditioned, timeless, and certain, the former is always mediated whether by
sense data or principles of the mind making knowledge acquisition time consuming and
difficult.101 God gave "complete instructions" regarding religious requirements through his
prophets as confirmed by miracles. However, what intellectual truth God has provided can
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147–64.
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also be achieved by diligent speculation and inquiry and thus it is impossible for anyone to
provide a sound argument that injures the divine teaching. 102 Thus, Saadya answers why
God transmitted the same knowledge via prophets supported by miracles if all matters of
religious belief can also be obtained by intellectual demonstration (research and correct
speculation) saying "the conclusions reached by means of the art of speculation could be
attained only in the course of a certain measure of time", such that humanity would be
without religious guidance for a long time (until the reasoning process was complete). 103
Since many would never complete the process, or engage in flawed reasoning, God
provided "quick relief" in transmitting the truths via messengers. The faithful are still to
authenticate what has been provided (but sustained by faith during the process), but those
without an aptitude for speculation can also have "a perfect and accessible faith". 104
1.3.3.2 Al-Ghazālī
Al-Ghazālī similarly upholds a duplex approach valuing both knowledge rendered by
human reason while maintaining the superiority of knowledge from God. 105 In his major
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Its Avicennian Foundation (London; New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2012). 84. Al-Ghazālī
claims in the Tahāfut that since the philosophers’ method ultimately do not succeed, then Qur’anic
interpretation is not rationally impossible. Cf. al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers: A Parallel
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al-Ghazālī, Deliverer from Error, 89.
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theological work Moderation in Belief, al-Ghazālī rejects seeking knowledge through
either reason or revelation alone to endorse their combined usage (which do not conflict)
to free one from error.106 Reason and revelation provide a more complete picture since, as
he states in Deliverer from Error, reason is limited107 making knowledge via prophets
necessary.108 "Reason," al-Ghazālī states in On Legal Theory of Muslim Jurisprudence,
"can lead one to the truthfulness of the Prophet, but then abdicates itself" since reason
"cannot independently comprehend, nor determine its impossibility" regarding God, the
Last Day, and similar matters.109 Frank Griffel has even argued the goal of the Incoherence
of the Philosophers is to create room for revelation by showing the limits of philosophy.110
Al-Ghazālī thus holds that certain knowledge is obtainable via philosophical demonstration
and the Sufi concept dhawq, literally a "tasting" of the divine comparable to mushāhadah
("actual seeing and handling") the divine objects of knowledge. 111 However, such higher
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Treiger argues convincingly that al-Ghazālī's analysis of dhawq is indebted to Avicenna's usage, cf. Treiger,
Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 60–63; Jules Janssens, “Book Review: Inspired Knowledge in
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forms of knowledge are only obtainable by the Ulamā' (scholars) or the Ḥokmā' ("the
learned ones", "the wise"). While he maintained a twofold approach, it is more esoteric
since knowledge from philosophy can be dangerous to the ʿavāmm ("masses",
"commoners").112 He famously illustrates that just as a snake charmer does not retrieve
antidote in front of his son lest the child likewise attempt and be bitten, the learned should
not openly extract truth from philosophy lest the masses imitate and fall into despair. 113
1.3.3.1 Thomas Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas famously stated that there is a "twofold mode of truth", commonly
referred to as the "preambles of faith" (objects of knowledge obtainable by natural reason)
and the "articles of faith" (objects of knowledge which are exceed the ability of human
reason and thus only obtained by revelation or faith).114 To obtain the end of truth, both
modes must be employed, with faith being the more egalitarian, faster, and more reliable. 115
Thomas claims not only that it is necessary for man to receive objects of belief beyond
human reason from God, but also that this necessity can be proven. 116 As a result, selftrust, or self-reliance, is the "mother of error." 117 This is because, even though faith exceeds
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that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers, being guided by the light of
natural reason, proved demonstratively about God." Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, Books I-II,
trans. Laurence Shapcote, vol. 11, Latin/English edition of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Green Bay:
The Aquinas Institute, 2018), 4.
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SCG I.4, Thomas describes three "inconveniences" that would follow if reason were humanity’s sole mode
of inquiry: few would possess knowledge of God; those who did discover divine truth would barely reach it
after a great deal of time; and human reason’s investigations are always plagued with flaws such that no truth
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the human capacity of reason, human reason and faith are harmonious since God is also
the author of nature and thus natural reason is also contained in divine wisdom. 118 Thomas
avoids double truth stating that if an argument concludes against revealed truth, something
is wrong not with reason or demonstration, but in the way the conclusion is "derived from
the first and self-evident principles imbedded in nature." 119 For, as the Liber de Causis
teaches, all human reason is an effect from the cause of divine reason and all effects bear
a likeness to their cause.120 The relation of the two modes then is faith professes and reason
investigates.121
1.4 Conclusion: The Nature of Testimony and Revelation
Since testimony, broadly defined, covers knowledge obtained from other minds,
Abrahamic thinkers sought to explain ways in which 1) it is evident that God is the speaker
and 2) the process by which God speaks. 122 Regarding the first, that God speaks is
uncontroversial, e.g., "this is the word of the Lord." However, identifying that it is indeed
God who is the speaker behind a given proposition becomes paramount. One of the oftencited ways of confirmation is through miracles since only God can subvert or suspend the
laws of nature. However, the faith in view here is not trust in "miracles" (manifestational

the whole nature of things by their intellect, namely, thinking all things are true that seem so to them, and
false which do not."
Ibid.
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signs of the actuality revealed) or even "revelation" (broadly, the actuality revealed) but
the speaker, i.e., to trust God (or credere deo as Thomas states).123 What separates openrationalism as virtuous trust from rational fideism through blind trust may rest entirely on
the perceived role of miracles in what they are proof of. When a prophet proclaims "thus
sayeth the Lord, p" immediately followed by a miracle where p is what God says, the
miracle can be seen as confirming the truth of p directly, i.e., acting as a form of
supernatural evidentia, or as confirming the truth of "thus sayeth the Lord", i.e.,
confirmation of the speaker's identity. In both cases the miracle is seen as performing a
proof, but the audience's understanding of what the miracle is a proof of completely alters
their epistemic approach. If the miracle is seen as proof of p, then the miracle is a kind of
evidentia justifying p. The speaker's identity is irrelevant compared to their ability to
perform signs and wonders. This falls precisely into the fideism divide presented by
Boethius of Dacia that I have labeled rational fideism on account of the listener's blind trust
in the speaker. However, if the miracle is proof not of p, but of the speaker's identity,
namely that the speaker is God and the prophet truly delivers God's message, then the true
epistemic weight shifts from the miracle to the virtues of the speaker and the listener. The
truth of p is confirmed indirectly through the perfectly virtuous character of God.
Establishing that God speaks requires a subsequent explanation of how God speaks to
maintain divine testimony as an epistemic authority.
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Wolterstorff notes that reading a sacred text to "discern what God said or is saying by way of the text"
requires different commitments than the more comfortable academic practiced of reading a sacred text "to
discern the literary qualities" or "to discern the theology of biblical writers." Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine
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Regarding the second question, the process of God speaking tends to vary by
thinker.124 However, there are also different approaches to the nature of divine testimony.
As Nicholas Wolterstorff stresses in his landmark book Divine Discourse, "speaking is not
revealing" and thus "divine discourse is not divine revelation." 125 Revelation only occurs
when ignorance is dispelled, not by "discovery", but by an intentional act that discloses
what is hidden either through a manifestational (non-assertoric) act or non-manifestational
(assertoric) speech act.126 One can speak and not reveal, and one can reveal without
speaking, but for speaking to reveal is to be propositional.127 How then can sacred texts be
the speech of God? Wolterstorff outlines many modes of discourse by which human words
can be or can become God's words via dictation or a form of double agency discourse such
as authorization or appropriation.128 After likewise arguing for the existence of divine
speaking, John Lamont distinguishes the nature of God speaking, including how God utters
his message.129 Lamont distinguishes the nature of God speaking between: 1) deistic
speaking, which asserts that a typical believer assents to reports about what God has said
to others through a chain of transmission, and 2) direct speaking which asserts that God
speaks to every person who has faith (not just an initial group). 130 Lamont answers how
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Each thinker's method of prophecy, i.e., how a being without a tongue can still communicate via linguistic
utterances, is treated in their respective chapter.
125
Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 19.
126
The difference between manifestational and non-manifestational revelation is the means. The former is
"by a sign of the actuality revealed" whereas the latter is not since it ""always goes through the knowledge
of the revealer". Thus, manifestational revelation is any means of revelation other than assertion, e.g. "God
directly bringing about a true conviction in a person, God bringing about a text which, when properly
interpreted, transmits knowledge from God to us, God planting in a person - or ln all persons - some
disposition which, when activated, yields true Conviction." Ibid., 23–29.
127
"If speaking is a species of revelation, it will be a species of agent self-revelation; and more particularly,
a species of propositional rather than manifestational revelation." Ibid., 31–32.
128
Ibid., 38–74.
129
Lamont, Divine Faith, 5–27.
130
Lamont's deistic divine speaking arguably also falls under what I have categorized as rational fideism
insofar as it requires blindly trusting in propositions justified by a private sense of immediate conviction often
producing irrational beliefs. Ibid., 150–52.
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God produces sacred texts (with the Catholic Church in mind, but his thought is applicable
to other faiths) by addressing the scope of what Wolterstorff calls "double-agency" through
three views. The first "scriptural view" holds that God only speaks in the scriptures via the
original authors and followers believe his speech only in believing the text, but it is often
objected the text is insufficient for doctrine leading to the second view. The "magisterial
view" also holds that God only speaks in the scriptures but adds that to believe God
includes not only the text but also propositions taught by religious epistemic authorities
even though such propositions are not themselves divine speech. The inclusion of religious
authorities settles the textual insufficiency objection but introduces questions of whether
divine utterances only become dogma when formally proposed by the religious authorities
thus omitting the oral teachings passed down from the original witnesses. This challenge
leads Lamont to present the third "ecclesial view" where God speaks in the teachings of
the religious authorities such that by believing them one also believes God. This
incorporates scripture since it is included in the religious authorities' teachings. 131 Divine
speech thereby encompasses more than scriptural revelation. As Mats Wahlberg highlights
in Revelation as Testimony, revelation includes divinely asserted sacred texts not merely
as collections of propositions (e.g., knowledge transmission) but as a discourse by which
one comes to know another person. 132 This requires not blind-trust, but an informed-trust
based on the relationship of the speaker and listener. Such a trusting relationship, I argue,
relies on a virtue theoretic approach present in Ancient and Medieval thinkers.
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND MEDIEVAL
TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE
2.1 Introduction
Testimony and knowledge transmission from speaker to listener is, perhaps curiously, a
new epistemic concept invigorated by the rise of Social Epistemology in the late 20 th
century. In his seminal work Testimony: A Philosophical Study (1991) C.A.J. Coady
explained that ancient and medieval thinkers’ "view of knowledge as a kind of
thoroughgoing rational understanding militated against treating beliefs based upon
testimony as part of knowledge" and post-Renaissance Western thinkers were too
dominated by an "individualist ideology" granting testimony "little or no epistemic
importance."133 Since that time, a plethora of studies have come out in the past decades to
the contrary.
This chapter outlines a brief history of the relatively new discipline of social
epistemology including its relation to traditional epistemology. Maintaining this timeline
approach and the "social" nature of knowledge, I will loosely follow the chronological
emergence of social epistemology’s primary areas of study with a focus on testimony
proper. In doing so, I track the introduction of key testimonial categories followed by both
existing and proposed frameworks related to testimony’s role as an epistemic source either
through knowledge generation or transmission. Then I present the status quaestionis of
research into historic testimonial accounts stimulated by the rise of social epistemology.
As of 2020, new articles on historical accounts of testimony are being published
exponentially, hence I focus on medieval accounts related to Saadya, al-Ghazālī and
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Thomas Aquinas (namely accounts of thinkers who were likely influenced by or responded
to these thinkers’ testimonial theories). While testimony makes an appearance in
epistemological summaries of thinkers such as Avicenna and Averroes, treatises
specifically presenting medieval testimonial accounts are primarily limited to Latin
thinkers. Given social epistemology’s work on trust and theories reliant upon a virtuetheoretic framework, I will touch upon the concurrent reemergence of virtue epistemology
following G.E.M. Anscombe’s seminal paper "Modern Moral Philosophy." 134 Following
the contributions of virtue epistemology to social epistemology, I raise the epistemic
question (fully addressed in chapter 6) of "justification" and its historical role as it pertains
to testimonial knowledge. I will close with a review of recent scholarship "rethinking" the
standard categories and framework of testimony which solves long running challenges and
provides more categories for assessing non-contemporary testimonial theories. I will adopt
this expanded framework of testimony to analyze the theories of human and divine
testimony in the chapters to follow on Saadya, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas.
2.2 Brief History of Social Epistemology
The term "social epistemology" first appeared in Jesse Shera’s book Sociological
Foundations of Librarianship (1970) which sought the social effects of reading.135
However, the groundwork for Shera’s work was arguably laid by Thomas Kuhn’s infamous
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), emphasizing the social influences on how
phenomena appear to scientists in contrast to Baconian facts waiting to be discovered. 136

134

G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1–19.
J. H Shera, Sociological Foundations of Librarianship, vol. 23, Ranganathan Series in Library Science
(Bombay: Asia Publ. House, 1970).
136
Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1970).
135

44

This socializing method of thought can be traced further back to Michel Foucault, the
"Strong Programme" in the sociology of science, and other thinkers who questioned the
nature of truth and objectivity. However, in keeping with the original study proposed by
Shera for a discipline which provided a framework to understand how communities
produce, disseminate, perceive, and accept information, Alvin Goldman published
promissory notes that continued the work of traditional epistemology by identifying a
positive form of social epistemology in 1978/79.137 A special 1987 issue of Synthese
juxtaposed Goldman’s truth-oriented "veritistic" approach (classical epistemology) with
Steve Fuller’s truth-debunking "constructivist" approach (anti-classical epistemology) to
social knowledge.138 After this "split", the discipline of social epistemology embraced
Goldman’s approach in keeping with classical epistemology’s goals pertaining to truth and
justification—maintaining rational beliefs—as applied to the social realm. While the
catalyst behind the rise of social epistemology was the launch of a dedicated journal—
Episteme—in 2004, it was the publication of multiple seminal works in the late 1980s and
early 90s that established the three major branches of social epistemology: 1) Collective
Agents, addressing collective doxastic agents (i.e. juries, committees, and other group
agents), following the work of Margaret Gilbert’s On Social Facts (1988); 2) Institutions
& Systems, addressing system-level influences on member beliefs, following the work of
Philip Kitcher’s "The Division of Cognitive Labor" (1990) and The Advancement of
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Science (1993); and 3) Testimony & Peer Disagreement, addressing individual knowledge
stemming from other people, based on the work of C.A.J. Coady’s Testimony (1992).139
2.2.1 Standard Framework of Social Epistemology
The third branch of social epistemology sees testimony as a distinctive type of social
evidence undergirding vast amounts of knowledge and innumerable beliefs. Testimony
itself is thus divided into several related but different areas of study. One is the speakers
behind testimony including: experts and their epistemic authority, identifying experts, and
peer disagreement (how to proceed when qualified experts disagree). Another is testimony
proper identifying whether testimony transmits or merely generates knowledge, i.e.,
whether testimony falls under ("reduces to") a more traditional source (e.g., intuition) or is
a unique species of knowledge. The focus here is on the latter area of testimony proper in
which much of the literature centers around settling two questions: whether testimony
transmits vs. generates knowledge and what justifies testimonial knowledge.
2.2.1.1 Testimony: Transmission vs. Generation of Knowledge
In the issue of whether testimony transmits or generates knowledge, contemporary social
epistemology highlights that not all testimonial knowledge is necessarily transmitted
knowledge. While nearly all hold that testimony can transmit knowledge, some hold that
transmission has a unique epistemological role. The traditional understanding of the
"Transmission View" explains how a speaker’s transmission is either a sufficient (Michael
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Dummet, 1994) or necessary condition (Robert Audi, 1997) for knowledge. 140 Jennifer
Lackey provides a concise summary in her chapter on "Testimonial Knowledge" in The
Routledge Companion to Epistemology (2014):
[Transmission View-Necessary] TV-N: For every speaker, A, and hearer,
B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s testimony that p only if A knows that
p…
[Transmission View-Sufficient] TV-S: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B,
if (1) A knows that p, (2) B comes to believe that p on the basis of the
content of A’s testimony that p, and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for
believing that p, then B knows that p.141
In an earlier work explicitly on transmission, Lackey likens testimonial knowledge to a
chain of people passing buckets of water to dowse a fire, "each person must have a bucket
of water in order to pass it to the next person, and moreover there must be at least one
person who is ultimately acquiring the water from another source." 142 In this sense,
testimony parallels memory as Dummet claimed, with testimony transmitting knowledge
from one person to another just as memory preserves knowledge form one time to
another.143 Hence, as Audi claimed, if a speaker does not know p, then the speaker cannot
transmit p to the listener.144 Just as memory does not generate knowledge neither does
testimony generate knowledge. However, scholars have revealed instances for which the
Transmission View cannot account. 145 TV-N fails in instances when listeners believe
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knowledge that the speaker does not believe and thereby does not know. The most famous
example describes students learning evolutionary biology from a creationist teacher. Since
the teacher does not believe evolution and thereby does not know it, knowledge appears to
be generated in students who believe and know on account of the teacher’s testimony. TVS fails in instances where the speaker has the knowledge, speaks sincerely, and yet the
listener only obtains belief and not knowledge despite the absence of "undefeated
defeaters."146 An example would be a three-year-old sincerely asserting that she brushed
her teeth. Since a three-year-old often believes the "right" answer is what her parents want
to hear regardless of whether she brushed her teeth, the listener’s belief cannot qualify as
knowledge. Lackey claims that these counterexamples and subsequent Generation theories
"show that testimony is not merely a transmissive epistemic source, as the TV assumes,
but that it can instead generate epistemic features in its own right." 147 If testimony can
generate knowledge, then it must be a source of knowledge alongside traditional sources
like perception and intuition.
2.2.1.2 Testimony: Justification
Whether testimony is a source of knowledge is related to the second question of when
listeners may rightly believe a speaker’s testimony. As Lackey and John Greco note, TVN and TV-S line up with two theories on testimonial justification that predominate the
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literature: reductionism and anti-reductionism as advanced as early as Coady who linked
them to David Hume and Thomas Reid respectively.148 A third view, the interpersonal view
of testimony (IVT) was recognized following Edward Hinchman and Richard Moran in
2005/6 (commonly referred to as the "assurance" view following Moran’s usage). 149 1)
Reductionism argues that while testimonial claims may be accepted based on the reliability
of the speaker, testimony itself does not provide justification, but ultimately reduces to
another source for justification, such as perception or memory. 150 Within reductionism
there are two forms, global and local reductionism. 151 The key difference between the two
is whether listeners, independently of testimony, possess the belief that testimony is
generally reliable. This belief is inferred from experience that reliable sources of
information include certain speakers, reports, or other contextual clues. Global
reductionism thus claims that testimony is justified in that it reduces to the general
reliability of testimonial knowledge based on previous experiences. Local reductionism, in
contrast, is the stronger form since it denies the general reliability of testimony on the basis
that such a general reliability would lead to widespread gullibility. Since most listeners
maintain a healthy level of skepticism, testimony is only justified when the speaker is
judged to be an expert or at least reliable regarding the topic in question (generally aligning
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with the speaker’s expertise). However, a weakness of reductionism is accounting for
normal social interactions when the reliability of a speaker is completely unknown (e.g.,
asking for directions), is completely unseen (e.g., airport loudspeaker announcements), or
how children without the requisite experiences learn through testimony. 2) Antireductionism argues that testimony does not provide justification by reduction to other
sources, but testimony itself is a justified form of social evidence.152 Thus, listeners do not
need additional positive reasons to accept a speaker’s claims as justified. Testimony is
justified or warranted by default unless proven false or unreliable. However, a weakness
of anti-reductionism is accounting for deceptive or unjustified claims (e.g., email scams,
televangelists, and fake news).153 3) IVT (or assurance view) argues that testimonial
justification comes from the assurance of the speaker that their claim is true. 154 The inherent
evidentialism assumed by the reductionist and anti-reductionist views is denied. Since
testimony is inherently interpersonal, justification comes from either the responsibility of

152

For other articles endorsing anti-reductionism cf. Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”; Michael
Welbourne, “Testimony, Knowledge and Belief,” in Knowing from Words: Western and Indian
Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam
Chakrabarti (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1994), 297–313; C. A. J. Coady, “Testimony, Observation and
‘Autonomous Knowledge,’” in Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of
Understanding and Testimony, ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic, 1994), 225–50; John McDowell, “Knowledge by Hearsay,” in Knowing from Words: Western
and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam
Chakrabarti (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1994), 195–224; Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); M Weiner, “Accepting Testimony,” The Philosophical Quarterly
53 (2003): 256–64; Robert Audi, “Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity,” in The Epistemology of Testimony,
ed. Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 25–49; David Owens,
“Testimony and Assertion,” Philosophical Studies 130, no. 1 (2006): 105–29; Sanford Goldberg,
“Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimonial Knowledge,” in The Epistemology of Testimony, ed.
Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 127–44; Owens, “Testimony and
Assertion”; Ernest Sosa, “Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial,” in The Epistemology of Testimony, ed.
Jennifer Lackey and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 116–23.
153
This weakness of the theory would also apply to discrediting or dismissing true claims as false by a
speaker, which is both a historical and contemporary problem societies face especially relating to religious
and political authorities.
154
For other articles endorsing IVT cf. Angus Ross, “Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?,” Ratio 28
(1986): 69–88; Hinchman, “Telling as Inviting to Trust”; Moran, “Getting Told and Being Believed,” 2006;
Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

50

the speaker to stand by the truth of their claim or from the speaker’s invitation to the listener
to trust them (not trust in the claim). Testimonial justification is akin to "taking the
speaker’s word for it."155 While the IVT excels at explaining parent-child or friend-friend
exchanges, such interpersonal features are questioned as epistemologically irrelevant, since
trust has no effect on reliability, proper functioning, truth-tracking, or other features of
"true" testimony. The best way to accommodate the insights of IVT and the role of trust is
within a virtue-theoretic framework, such that those who place a high emphasis on the role
of trust in testimony tend to be virtue epistemologists.156 The aforementioned objections
that recipients of testimony do not deserve credit for much of their knowledge parallel
objections leveled against virtue epistemology which has generated several responses
arguing for the virtues of reliable speakers and listeners with emphasis on the possession
of character traits by both speakers, such as trustworthiness, and listeners, such as
discernment of reliable experts.157 I will return to an analysis of virtue epistemology below.
2.3 Historical Assessment of Testimony
Despite social epistemology’s contemporary beginning dating back to 1970s, social
epistemology claims historical precedent with the formal treatment of testimony by David
Hume’s and Thomas Reid’s discussions in the 1700s. David Hume is the father of
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reductionism laying the formal groundwork in An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding (1748). Hume discusses testimony in section 10 regarding miracles, where
he recognizes the epistemic importance of testimony writing "there is no species of
reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which
is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators." 158
However, the value in testimony is found solely in our being accustomed to find conformity
between witness reports and reality. The epistemic value of testimony is not found a priori
or the result of a cause-and-effect relationship. The impact this has on the reports of
miracles is profound. Hume claims the authority of scripture "is merely founded in the
testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Savior," and
that testimony is an inferior evidence compared to alternative sources of knowledge:
Text 2.3.0.1
Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the
evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our
religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from
them to their disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their
testimony, as in the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence
can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real
presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to
the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. 159
The reason for this is nicely summarized in Testimony (Coady, 1992) with a chapter
devoted to the "Reductive approach" where Hume serves as the principal case study. 160
There Coady explains: "Essentially his [Hume’s] theory constitutes a reduction of
testimony as a form of evidence or support to the status of a species (one might almost say,
a mutation) of inductive inference. And, again, in so far as inductive inference is reduced
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by Hume to a species of observation and consequences attendant upon observations, then
in a like fashion testimony meets the same fate."161 Interestingly, a more recent account of
Hume’s theory of testimony affirms the role of induction without employing the language
of reduction.162
Thomas Reid’s status as father of anti-reductionism is traced by Coady back to his
Inquiry Into The Human Mind (1785).163 In chapter 6 section 24 titled "the analogy between
perception, and the credit we give to human testimony," Reid claims there are two kinds of
language, natural vs. artificial, that both employ "signs." Nature speaks directly through
signs of sensation which humans believe without having to infer the nature or existence
based on those signs. Analogously artificial human languages speak through signs
representing thoughts and dispositions of the mind.164 Reid thinks both languages provide
knowledge through "a particular principle of our constitution." For artificial language,
humans are divinely disposed for the reception of testimonial claims based on two further
principles:
Text 2.3.0.2
The wise and beneficent Author of Nature, who intended that we should be
social creatures, and that we should receive the greatest and most important
parts of our knowledge by the information of others, hath, for these
purposes, implanted in our natures two principles that tally with each other.
The first of these principles is, a propensity to speak truth, and to use signs
of language, so as to convey our real sentiments.165
Another original principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a
disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what they tell
us. This is the counter-part to the former; and as that shall be called the
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principle of veracity, we shall, for want of a more proper name, call this the
principle of credulity.166
Reid’s parallel between perception and testimony is given a full treatment by James Van
Cleve who ultimately disagrees with Reid that beliefs based on testimony are "basic or
foundational" in the same way as perception.167
While the opposing inquiries of David Hume and Thomas Reid are cited as the first
formal discussion on testimony and then used to frame the rest of the conversation, many
have noted that the concept of testimony has served a large role within traditional
epistemologies long before the Enlightenment. The cataloguing of medieval testimonial
accounts using the framework of social epistemology has recently developed in the field
and here I will focus this overview on:168 1) testimonial accounts of the focal thinkers
Saadya, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas; 2) prior thinkers’ who likely impacted the focal
three; and 3) immediately subsequent thinkers who were likely impacted by the focal three.
2.3.1 Testimony in St. Augustine
2.3.1.1 C.A.J. Coady. 1992: Testimony
C.A.J. Coady gives minor attention to medieval thinkers, but in a dismissive way — a trend
which has only begun to be subverted in recent years. Coady mentions Aquinas and
Augustine in the first chapter of his book Testimony as examples of medieval philosophers
for whom testimony is in a sense homeless within their epistemology since testimony is
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not certain enough to count as scientia, but certain enough to consider seriously.169
Influenced by Platonic ideals, Augustine has a strong vs. weak thesis on knowing: hard
episteme excludes perception and testimony while soft episteme includes them (which is a
harmless yet intelligible "widespread misuse" of hard episteme for pragmatic concerns).170
Coady sees this dichotomy as being inconsistent: generally testimony is not considered
knowledge since it is a matter of believing, yet other times knowledge does consist of
"things seen and things believed." 171 The result, he claims, is that testimony fits poorly into
Augustine’s overall epistemology.
2.3.1.2 Peter King and Nathan Ballantyne. 2009: "Augustine on Testimony"
Peter King and Nathan Ballantyne elucidate some of Coady’s concerns in their 2009 article
"Augustine on Testimony," arguing that, while the early Augustine did reject testimony
(likely due to residual Platonic Skepticism) the mature Augustine embraced an antireductionist position long before Thomas Reid. 172 Their article considers three questions
about testimony raised by Augustine: "the analytical question of what sources count as
testimony (Section I); the epistemological question about the status of testimony-based
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belief (Section II); and the doxastic question about the circumstances in which it is
appropriate to believe on the basis of testimony (Section III)." 173
To answer what sources count as testimony, they claim Augustine uses testimony
both as a signifier and as an intentional activity of affirmation in the transfer of information
that includes speech, writing, and "other means" such as gestures. Speakers, or testifiers,
are said not to need firsthand authority or to be an eyewitness for Augustine. The result is
"distant" reports, such as historical accounts, can still be believed even though it is
impossible for the listener to check them with non-testimonial evidence. However, the
strength of the report is increased if the listener can and does verify the speaker's claim. 174
To answer the epistemological status of testimony, King and Ballantyne show that
Augustine’s attitude toward testimony as "knowledge" evolves over time. Early works such
as De magistro, argue that "it is impossible to gain knowledge from testimony, since the
mark of knowledge is an 'inner episode' of illumination which cannot be transmitted from
one person to another," while his late work such as De Trinitate or De Civitate, "claims in
no uncertain terms that testimony is a source of knowledge." 175 The reason for this shift is
thought to follow Augustine's overall epistemological theory shaped by his transitions from
Academic Skepticism to Platonism and finally to Christianity.176 The mature Augustine
thus held all human knowledge originated in: "(a) the interior or mental sense, (b) the
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external or bodily senses, and (c) testimony." 177 Augustine exhibits two models of
testimony. The first or "standard" model is straightforward since the testifier knows "the
places, people, and events that the testimony is about." 178 The unique exception to this is
when testifiers know an event they did not perceive, such as the resurrection of Jesus Christ.
King & Ballantyne suggest that in such cases the listener’s testimonial knowledge is a
combination of inference and received reports: "the premisses are known by testimony, the
conclusion is drawn from the premisses rather than directly from the testifier." 179 The
second model is a less restrictive version that allows for testimonial situations in which the
listener comes to believe a speaker's report even when the speaker does not believe it. 180
To answer when a listener can believe on the basis of testimony, King and
Ballantyne argue Augustine maintains that a "hearer should believe a testifier's report
unless it seems to the hearer either that the testifier or the report is untrustworthy." 181 This
position stems from Augustine’s position on friendship and that "friendship demands belief
in things unseen..." and "doesn't require gathering reasons and evidence for a friend's
trustworthiness."182 Since Christian charity requires friendship, Augustine extends this
friend-like trust even to strangers as his default position on testimony. 183 Hence, listeners
ought to believe: a) a speaker if they are deemed trustworthy or b) a claim if it "seems
appropriate."184 The result, per King and Ballantyne, is that the mature Augustine position
reflects that of Thomas Reid and what is now known as anti-reductionism.

177

King and Ballantyne, “Augustine on Testimony.” 200.
Ibid. 202
179
Ibid. 205.
180
Ibid. 207.
181
Ibid. 207-208.
182
Ibid. 208.
183
Ibid. 210.
184
Ibid. 211.
178

57

2.3.1.3 Matthew Siebert. 2018: "Augustine’s Development on Testimonial Knowledge"
Following his 2014 dissertation on testimony in Augustine and Aquinas, Siebert makes the
claim that Augustine was "the first in western philosophy to defend the thesis that we can
know something on everyday human testimony explicitly."185 Siebert also notes shifts in
Augustine’s account of testimony, but sees the works of Coady, Peter King, and Nathan
Ballantyne to be "misleading." He argues that textual evidence rules out Augustine being
an anti-reductionist for "in the first stage, Augustine says that testimony can yield nothing
more than belief (credere); in the second, that it can yield scientia; and in the last, that it
yields lower-level knowledge (notitia), but not scientia, strictly speaking."186
In the first stage (the "Classical" position), Augustine held to a hard epistēmē
heavily influenced by Platonism and saw all knowledge as a matter of seeing intelligibles
(direct or firsthand experience) or a systematic discipline. 187 Regarding intelligibles,
Augustine claims in On the Teacher that nothing is learned from words (De magistro
10.33),188 and the discipline or technē for belief formation is far more involved than
accepting a speaker’s testimony. Siebert is quick to point out however that Augustine does
not simply laud epistēmē while denigrating doxa. This is because Augustine holds two
forms of doxa: acceptable credere beliefs which are plausible even though one cannot
claim to "know"; and unacceptable opinio which is falsely believing that one knows.189
This allows Augustine to join his epistemology with Christian doctrine and escape from
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the "paradox of inquiry."190 A systematic Christian discipline results since God and Jesus
of Nazareth fit even the Platonic ideals of a wise teacher. Hence, Christians are required to
provide "non-provisional" assent to a set of teachings provided by Christ the teacher. 191
For early Augustine, however, these beliefs do not count as knowledge despite the
believer’s faith and God’s authority.192
In the second stage (the "Ordinary Language" position), Augustine reverses his
position by making natural science a sort of knowledge and forms of testimony qualify as
scientia.193 Siebert admits the reason for the change is unclear and offers three possible
motivations stemming from Augustine’s adoption of Christianity. 194 This introduces two
functions of the mind: higher reason aimed at wisdom (sapienta) concerning eternal things
and lower reason aimed at knowledge (scientia) concerning temporal things. Scientia is
now a product of the mind resulting from the senses and from testimony. 195 Siebert
disagrees with King and Ballantyne’s assessment that this new position is anti-reductionist
claiming it is neither supported by recent scholarship nor by Augustine’s own works which
claim it is imprudent to believe everything one hears, especially from strangers.196
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Augustine gives "permission" for testimonial belief and for "judging" whether to believe
testimony using Roman legal procedure for identifying "suitable" (idoneus) witnesses.197
Siebert argues that Augustine became an "inferentialist" in which testimony is a kind of
knowledge of induction like other knowledge forms. In short, testimony allows listeners to
obtain very certain inferential knowledge about unseen things using the evidence from
reliable speakers.
In the final stage (the "Compromise" position), Siebert cites Augustine’s
Retractationes near the end of his life in which Augustine holds two senses of knowing
(scire): a proper sense of knowing in the classical Platonic sense and another ordinary sense
of knowing which includes cognition and notitia.198 Siebert points out this two-sense
position is what Coady criticizes. However, Augustine reaffirms this compromise position
in City of God 19.18 and again in De Trinitate. Augustine’s mature position puts testimony
under a notitia which is so certain that not believing it would be "absurd," taking notitia to
be factive "in the sense that, necessarily, if you have notitia that p, then p is true (Trin.
15.10.17, 15.12.22)."199 Notitia comes from a fallible yet reliable source to provide "an
indirect acquaintance with truth." Testimony is thus a kind of knowledge that fits
Augustine’s journey, which can be doubted, but would be absurd not to believe.
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2.3.2 Testimony in Avicenna & Averroes
2.3.2.1 Deborah L. Black. 2013: "Certitude, justification, and the principles of knowledge
in Avicenna’s epistemology"200
Deborah Black notes that Avicenna, like most ancient and medieval philosophers "did not
identify any branch of philosophy that would map neatly onto the contemporary field of
epistemology." Still in her entry on Avicenna’s overarching account of knowledge, she
devotes a few pages to an Avicennian social epistemology. Avicenna uses the Arabic term
al-tawātur, which describes reliable and unbroken chains of transmission back to the
prophet Muhammad, to refer to any true beliefs about unseen historical figures (e.g., Galen
& Euclid) or distant places (e.g., Mecca). These "testimonial propositions" are certain (free
from doubt) when multiple witnesses agree on non-suspicious objects. Black reasons that
for Avicenna there is a hidden syllogism in which "it would be impossible for all these
witnesses to be mistaken, lying, or colluding."201 While Islamic jurisprudence debated
exactly how many witnesses were needed for a hadith to qualify as authentic, Avicenna
(and al-Ghazālī after him) dismissed such quotas. A claim was known to be true and certain
not due to any quality of the proposition itself but on the knower’s tranquil psychological
state: "we know that the witnesses are sufficiently numerous because certain assent has
been evoked and doubt, while objectively possible, has been removed." 202 Thus, the same
proposition will frequently cause different levels of certitude in different minds. However,
Avicenna’s overall philosophical system limits testimonials and their certitude to sensibles
(e.g., existence and actions of particulars). Essential universal knowledge cannot be
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obtained by tawātur.203 Hence, Avicenna’s testimonials fall under dialectical and rhetorical
arguments in which beliefs are derived from authority via a form of al-mashhūrat (akin to
Greek endoxa). Such received claims may be true or demonstrable, but they have a "lower
epistemic value" without additional evidence to verify them. This lower value stems from
the practice of using unverified testimonials as premises which "can only be verified by a
discursive inferential process — they represent potential conclusions of arguments, not
their premises."204 In such a case, the testimonials are blindly accepted based on authority
and hence fall under taqlīd—"partisan adherence to a belief on the basis of authority
alone."205 Even moral beliefs that are not products of authority are denied as innate but
seen as mere products of social and political customs.206 For primary truths cannot be
doubted while ethical maxims can be. However, Avicenna maintains that the social
consensus is the only, and therefore legitimate, basis for accepting moral claims even
though they do not rise to the level of necessary beliefs. 207
2.3.2.2 Deborah L. Black. 2018. "Avicenna on Knowledge" 208
In another treatment of Avicenna's epistemology, Black states that by appropriating views
from the Mutakallimūn, most notably the distinction between natural or innate knowledge
('ilm badīh)— i.e., "necessary knowledge" (darūrī)—and acquired knowledge ('ilm
muktasab), Avicenna developed "new lines" of knowledge for the Aristotelian tradition
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including testimony as a source of knowledge.209 Avicenna, Black claims, has an
"inchoate" or non-explicit concept of social epistemology that draws on both philosophers
like al-Fārābī and dialectical theologians like the Mutakallimūn. From the former,
Avicenna accepts that most forms of testimony give rise to dialectical and rhetorical assent.
From the latter he accepts tawātur, the technical juridical term ascertaining which sayings
accurately descend from the Prophet Muhmmad, but broadens it to include geographical
and historical facts.210 Tawātur is akin to experiential knowledge (tajriba) via repeated
tellings which trigger a hidden syllogism "that warrants our confidence in the veracity and
dependability of those witnesses," by inferring from corroborating reports that error,
conspiracy, and/or coincidence are implausible.211 As stated in 2013, Avicenna rejects
tawātur quotas and the "only criterion" for knowing a proposition is certain is that "the
reliable mechanism that naturally removes doubted has in fact been triggered", which is
the Mutakallimūn subjective experience of "repose of the soul" (stated clearly in her 2013
article and far less so here). Black does say here that Avicenna acknowledges that
testimony cannot lead to certain knowledge of any universal since tawātur is limited to the
historical and geographical. All other testimony is based on authoritative testimony that is
merely probable since it is acquired. However, testimony about demonstrations or scientific
proofs can lead to certain knowledge once a listener works the claim out for themselves. 212
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2.3.2.3 Deborah L. Black. 2018: "Constructing Averroes’ Epistemology" 213
As in her article on Avicenna’s epistemology, Black notes that while medieval
philosophers "did not recognize a distinct area of philosophical inquiry under the rubric of
epistemology, epistemological speculation was unusually predominant in classical Arabic
philosophy..." and thereby includes a section on "Testimonial Knowledge: Averroes’
Social Epistemology." Black maintains that Averroes’ position on testimony differs from
Avicenna since no form of testimony can yield certain knowledge. One caveat, however,
is that Black notes that Averroes holds two notions of certitude, absolute and accidental.
Accidental certitude—"hold[ing] a strong, true belief from a source that is not naturally
capable of conferring certitude"—can result from tawātur in some cases (e.g. that historical
figures like the prophet and unseen places exist).214 Even then Averroes rejects both
witness quotas and a subjective sense of certainty as essential causes for knowledge of
sensibles.215 Sharing al-Fārābī’s views, Averroes sees tawātur as a species of testimony
(shahāda) which is al-mashhūrat and thereby only suitable as a source for dialectic and
rhetoric. In fact, Averroes holds low appraisals of dialectical and rhetorical arguments
because they are grounded in testimony.216 However, Averroes does place a higher
epistemic value on ethical principles and other "most noble" (ashraf) beliefs that are
unanimously accepted, even though they are still "mere opinions" and thereby
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"epistemically deficient."217 In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Averroes agrees
with Avicenna on the Aristotelian notion that testimony is restricted to sensibles and thus
cannot provide certain knowledge of intelligible matters and universals. Since knowledge
begins with perception and the human cognitive apparatus, testimony is denied any positive
role when the senses can provide more certain knowledge. How people obtain knowledge
of sensory objects via testimony relies on their internal sensory apparatus in which reports
or tawātur are constructed into an image of a sensible particular based on previous
experience.218
2.3.3 Testimony in Thomas Aquinas
2.3.3.1 C.A.J. Coady. 1992: Testimony
In his first chapter introducing testimony to contemporary philosophy, Coady defends
testimony from the prominence of first post-Renaissance individualist ideologies and then
the rise of probability theory in the 17th century that deemed testimonial knowledge
unimportant. He treats testimony in ancient and medieval epistemology together as
beholden to self-evident principles and subsequent deductions lowering the epistemic
status of testimonial knowledge.219 Coady devotes several paragraphs to Thomas Aquinas
as his example that pre-modern philosophers "…deny testimony the title of knowledge
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[but] do concede it a significant role in the formation of true and sometimes highly
advantageous belief."220 Aquinas’s concern was the relation of testimony to scientia —
theoretical knowledge providing both knowledge that and knowledge why. Coady indicates
that Aquinas and other medieval thinkers’ hesitancy with testimony reveals a "latent
tension" between what today amounts to individuals’ "justified true beliefs" and objective
certain truth in the form of scientific understanding. Thus, Aquinas talks about testimony
as a type of faith in his Commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate question III, article 1 which
falls in-between knowledge and opinion.221 Coady thus paints Aquinas like Augustine as
one who recognizes (or is beginning to recognize) the importance of testimony but cannot
give an adequate epistemological account of it without upending the Greek epistemological
system he is wed to.222
2.3.3.2 Eleonore Stump. 2014: "Faith, Wisdom, & the Transmission of Knowledge through
Testimony"223
Eleonore Stump argues that not only does Aquinas advocate for an assurance view of
testimony, but also that his account answers contemporary objections leveled against the
assurance view. Aquinas’s account of faith and wisdom demonstrates how interpersonal
trust can allow for knowledge to pass from speaker to listener while maintaining that the
listener is not entirely passive in the transmission since they generate intellectual virtue.
Citing the Summa Theologiae on the will, Stump elucidates two ways in which a veridical
state can be achieved in the intellect.224 In the first way, "the object of the intellect’s act"

220

Coady, Testimony, 16.
Coady also notes ST II‐II.4.1 and II-II.2.1. Ibid.
222
Ibid., 18.
223
Eleonore Stump, “Faith, Wisdom, and the Transmission of Knowledge through Testimony,” in Religious
Faith and Intellectual Virtue, ed. Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 204–30.
224
Ibid. 209. cf. ST I.82.2, 4.
221

66

(i.e., evidence) is sufficient for the intellect to assent to a belief without the will. In the
second way, the "object of the intellect" is insufficient to move the intellect to assent
without the will (when the will is cooperating with the intellect’s purpose), and thus the
will has the final say in assenting to a belief (the will can move the intellect to either
indirectly or directly assent to a belief).225 The most notable case for the second way is the
interpersonal process of coming to faith in God, which results in gaining wisdom, namely
the will acting on the intellect to assent to the propositions of faith. 226 Stump describes a
person coming to faith as moving through two sequences in which the will influences the
intellect. First, the person has their will drawn to God because of his goodness in
cooperation with the intellect’s purpose of achieving eudaimonia in seeing God.227
Furthermore, Stump claims that "because these truths are important and have far-reaching
epistemic impact on a person’s intellect, for Aquinas faith contributes to the perfection of
the intellect; and so faith is an intellectual virtue." 228 Recognizing God’s goodness provides
the necessary ground to establish an interpersonal relationship between the believer as
listener and God as the speaker. The subsequent trust from this relationship allows the
believer to assent to the propositions of faith. Citing ST II-II q.45 a.2., Stump argues that
the second sequence begins once the relationship is established. The relationship develops
in the person of faith some degree of "connaturality" or "sympathy" with God enabling a
disposition in the intellect, namely the intellectual virtue of wisdom, such that "this virtue
will manifest itself in [a believer’s] intuitively knowing things she would not otherwise
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have known by the exercise of reason or would not have known as readily or as well." 229
She claims that this process fits the assurance view of testimony since God voluntarily and
intentionally shares some part of his mind with another person. 230
Stump spends the rest of the paper arguing that this two-step basis for the
transmission of knowledge through trust accounts for human-to-human testimony
(regardless of creed) in addition to coming to faith in God via divine testimony. She draws
heavily on contemporary neuroscience and developmental psychology to show the
parallels between Aquinas’s relational connaturality and "neurological systems and the
interpersonal connections of empathy."231 This scientific connaturality is referred to as the
cognitive social skill of "mind-reading," which allows for persons to not only have
knowledge that but understanding of other persons and their mental states. This is
accomplished through a process known as "the mirror neuron system" which explains
empathy as the same firing of neurons in an observer’s brain as in the first-person
experiencer’s brain establishing an intrasubjective link.232 On account of this "intellectual
virtue," all humans neurologically mirror the mind of another human being, allowing them
to assess the speaker’s goodness and form the basis for the trust to accept the speaker’s
claims. Stump also sees this as a defeater to an objection against virtue epistemology that
listeners are epistemic free-riders passively obtaining knowledge from the speaker’s
epistemic labor’s since the intellectual virtue in the listener also labors to examine the
evidence or assess the reasons pertaining to the speaker’s claims. 233 In sum, Aquinas holds
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to a theory of testimony in which connatural knowledge is a kind of testimonial knowledge
transmitted from a speaker and is justified in an empathic experience by which a listener
comes to initially trust a speaker, namely God.
2.3.3.3 Matthew Siebert. 2016: "Aquinas on Testimonial Justification: Faith and
Opinion"234
Summarizing two chapters of his 2014 dissertation, Matthew Siebert presents Thomas
Aquinas’s account of general (i.e., human) testimonial justification as the "pluralist view"
since it does not neatly fit into any predefined categories. 235 This pluralism results from
Aquinas generally accepting reductionism while reserving the interpersonal assurance
view for certain cases. Siebert builds on Stump with a general account of interpersonal
testimony that does not rely on the special case of faith in God and does not count
connatural knowledge as testimonial knowledge. His analysis shows a non-empathic
experience in having "faith in" or coming to trust a speaker.
Two sections of the paper focus on the term "faith" and explain specifically how
everyday testimonial "faith" works in Aquinas’s epistemology. The first section outlines
three ways testimonial faith contributes to society: 1) a vertical epistemic division of labor
extending from knowledge experts (i.e., talented intellectuals who can demonstrate certain
truths) to those who believe that truth on faith since they cannot perform the demonstration
themselves due to a lack of time, talent, or training; 236 2) a "horizontal epistemic division
of labor" between epistemic equals since societies would halt unless individuals acted in
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faith on reports from other people despite not being in a position to personally verify claims
for themselves;237 and 3) a student-teacher epistemic evolution necessary for learning the
sciences since the faith of a student in their teacher is provisional until the student becomes
an expert and understands why the principles they accepted at the beginning of their
education are true.238
The second section explicates the broad and narrow senses of "faith." The broad
sense is akin to Augustine’s definition of assent to the unseen, since insofar as an object is
unseen assent cannot be fully automatic and requires an act of will.239 Siebert argues that
Aquinas’s adoption of the broad sense of faith makes him a reductionist since most
testimonial claims are justified by reducing to other sources. 240 This includes a form of
faith called "strong opinion", which is the result of inductive or "probable" inference based
on "signs" or "probable" (non-demonstrative) syllogisms. Citing the Summa Theologiae,
Siebert points to a common form of strong opinion when "other things being equal, we
should give more weight to p when more witnesses say p than not, because ‘it is probable
that the saying of many contains the truth more than the saying of one.’" 241 The narrow
sense of "faith" adopted by Aquinas is similar to the interpersonal assurance view as
advocated by Stump, but extends it beyond a Christian’s faith in God to human
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testimony.242 Siebert gives the following definition of the narrow sense of faith and then
explains each part in detail: "When one has faith that p, one (i) believes the speaker’s
statement in order to adhere to the speaker, (ii) with a special act of will not present in
opinion, and (iii) typically for the reason that the speaker is truthful." 243 First, Aquinas
presents propositions as "material objects" with different "formal objects" for believing
them.244 The formal object of faith is the reason one assents to a proposition (the material
object of faith), which in this case is due to faith in the person of the speaker. 245 Aquinas
identifies this as Credere Deo ("believing God")—reason’s act of inclining the will to
assent, where the object is the proposition believed, but only as spoken by that speaker. 246
The reason for assent does not reduce to inductive reason, but merely "because God said
them."247 The key difference of narrow faith is the formal object as means to assent, which
here is a trusting belief out of loyalty for the speaker (whereas opinion is based on evidence
regardless of the speaker).248 Second, narrow faith must be a special act of the will. This is
what differentiates faith from science (which is forced by evidence) and opinion (which
does not have firm assent), and what makes faith a meritorious act. 249 Third, the typical
motivation for faith is that the speaker is truthful. Since society requires a minimum level
of truth for epistemic divisions of labor, knowledge can be gained from faith in speakers.
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Siebert concludes by discussing how Aquinas’s view of testimony is unique, first
in being "pluralist" by holding to both a reductionist and an assurance view, and second in
how his assurance view is different from contemporary accounts. Aquinas does not focus
on the speaker’s role or the means by which speakers take responsibility for their claims.
Aquinas sees a speaker’s saying of a proposition as a preemptive reason to assent to the
proposition which in turn makes the listener "more sensitive to the speaker’s knowledge"
and "less sensitive to your own evidence." 250 This introduces a virtue account of testimonial
trustworthiness, in which speakers fulfill the responsibility to speak the truth out of a
virtuous motivation. This is superior to contemporary approaches which define a
trustworthy speaker just as sincere and competent for several reasons: first, since nonvirtuous speakers can be sincere and competent, but not worthy of a listener’s faith; second,
truthfulness is a more fundamental reason for faith in a speaker since "having faith in a
speaker does not require taking the speaker to be an authority, but it does require taking
the speaker to be truthful, even when the speaker is an epistemic authority." 251
2.3.3.4 Richard Cross. 2018: "Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval
Religious Epistemology"252
Richard Cross compares Thomas Aquinas’s and Duns Scotus’s disparate accounts of
reasonable belief which he shows flow from their underlying positions on testimony and
error. Cross highlights the distinction between the two as: "Aquinas holds that the only
ground for Christian belief is divine testimony; Scotus, contrariwise, holds that Christian
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belief can be made fully credible simply on the basis of human testimony."253 This is
because Aquinas is more doubtful than Scotus that we can identify when our cognitive
processes malfunction to have confidence in our beliefs. This is largely a result of their
different epistemological approaches with Aquinas’s externalist reliabilism vs. Scotus’s
internalist justification.
Starting with Thomas, Cross identifies Aquinas as amenable to an error theory that
could deny certainty to internalist justifications for religious faith. This follows from
Thomas’s distinction between "externalist" objective certainty, which is "without fear of
error" because it is the effect of a certain cause—God—through the reliable process of
divine testimony, and "internalist" subjective certainty, which is "probable certainty" on
account of the "felt level of credence attaching to a belief." 254 Even though human
testimony is only "liable to undiagnosed error in a minority of cases," the concern is everpresent, earning it a low epistemic appraisal. This leads to an explanation of Thomas’s
process for belief formation which is more error prone the farther it proceeds from the
source. Thus, the imagination is more prone to error than the senses, which is important
due to the imagination’s key role for beliefs. These epistemic attitudes combined with the
Medieval assumption "that Christian faith must be as epistemically robust as scientific
knowledge" mean Christian faith cannot be grounded in human testimony. 255 Natural
reason (scientia) based on compelling evidence and what it entails reaches a limit proving
at best that the Christian faith is not impossible. In contrast, the certainty of faith is caused
externally as the effect of a cause that cannot err, namely, faith is a gift infused by God.
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For Aquinas, faith is a "hyper-reliable" habit or intellectual virtue to automatically assent
to true propositions and to preclude assenting to propositions contradicting true sacred
doctrine.256 This raises questions about the human will and whether it is coerced to believe;
however, God bestows the habit of faith by moving a person’s will to accept the habit
which subsequently "causes the will to accept — and the intellect to assent to — the
contents of Christian faith."257 The section concludes by addressing two problems that arise
on an internalist reading of infused faith in which the human knowing of propositions
revealed by God also justifies their belief. First, this is circular (which Scotus notes).
Second, the will is superfluous in Christian faith if human belief is caused by infallible
testimony. Cross addresses the first question in his section on Scotus who raised this
objection and claims the second fails since Aquinas does not claim humans are
"antecedently aware" that faith propositions are revealed by God since humans assent to
the revealed contents after receiving infused faith (i.e. the habit). 258 Cross’s conclusion is
that Aquinas pursues his insight that human testimony cannot be sufficient for faith to its
absolute logical conclusion: "It is not the Prophets, Apostles, and Evangelists who are
relevantly trustworthy: it is God alone." 259
Cross then moves on to Scotus, who argues the best response to the challenge of
skepticism is not divine illumination but epistemological naturalism. This leads Scotus in
the opposite direction of Aquinas with an internalist account of rational Christian beliefs
based on human testimony. The certainty of faith does not come from outside, but inside
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as something humans "experience in ourselves", namely a subjective "felt credence
level."260 Scotus hence gives arguments against skepticism showing that human epistemic
faculties are mostly reliable. Even in the cases of illusion, humans always have some
mechanism to detect and correct to avoid error. This leads to an "optimistic internalism"
which puts testimonial beliefs on the same credence level as knowledge (scientia). This is
because humans accept the truth of speakers by default, presumably because humans
assume the truthfulness of speakers unless there is a defeater. 261 Pace Aquinas and infused
faith, faith is acquired through human testimony, specifically that of the Church. He even
gives examples of how peoples’ beliefs can possess the same content and subjective
certainty through human testimony as infused faith without divine testimony. A main
difference is that "for Aquinas, the Church’s teaching amounts to divine testimony; for
Scotus, it is merely human."262 Scotus argues the reason for such a high credence is that
the Church and the Bible are highly credible witnesses, and he gives ten ways to rationally
convince unbelievers. Several ways presume the rationality of following what our
community believes unless there is a defeater. 263 This leaves infused faith which Scotus
first rejects before adopting a modified form himself. Scotus objected to infused faith as
being both propositional content (i.e., articles of faith) and causal assent from divine
testimony because his internalism saw the ground for divine testimony being divine
testimony itself to be circular. In short, Scotus searched for a ground for Christian belief
outside of divine testimony, such as a direct "encounter with the realities that the relevant
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propositions—the articles of faith, for example—are about." 264 Those who do not have
such direct experiences, Scotus argues, have ways of rationally accepting the (human)
testimony of those who received revelation.
2.3.4 Testimony in William of Ockham
2.3.4.1 Robert Pasnau. 2010: "Medieval Social Epistemology: Scientia for Mere
Mortals"265
Robert Pasnau provides a basic overview explaining how the contemporary field of social
epistemology fits within medieval philosophy. He provides a more optimistic appraisal of
medieval thinkers than Coady arguing that Medieval thinkers are engaging in social
epistemology when they attempt to relax or weaken the strict standards of attaining certain
scientia set out by Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. While Pasnau devotes less than a page
to testimony, his account of William Ockham maintains that testimony falls under scientia
as a kind of faith insofar as both are "a certain apprehension of something true" since
knowing about the unseen (like Rome or who one’s parents are) without doubt qualifies as
knowledge. Ockham perceived common knowledge as still requiring evidence, but not
evidence that demands demonstration.266 Thus, individuals can be said to possess
knowledge with differing degrees of certainty with demonstration being strongest (since it
logically entails the conclusion) followed by perception, and finally testimony. The latter
two are considered contingent and unstable since they deliver knowledge that without
knowledge why. Such knowledge is tolerated since it is practical, corresponding with lived
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experience: "So if we want to engage with the sorts of knowledge claims that we mere
mortals make, we need a theory that accommodates the sorts of doxastic practices that
ordinary folk actually engage in—in particular the testimony of others and direct
observation."267
2.3.4.2 Jennifer Pelletier. 2018: "William Ockham on Testimonial Knowledge" 268
Jennifer Pelletier’s aim is to show that despite Ockham's lack of interest in testimonial
knowledge, he has both a notion of and addresses sources of testimonial knowledge.
Testimonial knowledge is even included under scientia, albeit the weakest of the four
senses of the term as "truths known only on trust (fides)" quoting the prologue to Ockham’s
commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. These truths known by testimony are certain, but not
always "cognized evidently," as part of a twofold act of forming and then assenting to an
apprehended proposition.269 Testimonial knowledge for Ockham occurs when "a subject
can be said to know that p if (i) p is true and (ii) she firmly adheres to p because (iii) some
speaker says that p."270 Pelletier points out key differences between Ockham’s and
contemporary accounts of testimonial knowledge:
Contemporary accounts of testimonial knowledge include other conditions
that [Ockham’s] knowledge-acts fail to meet: for example, (1) the speaker
invites the hearer to understand and believe his testimony (Adler 2015: sec.
1), (2) the speaker has the competence or authority to state that p (Coady
1992: 42), and (3) the speaker’s testimony that p is important for resolving
a question and aimed at those who require clarification on the matter
(ibid.).271

267

Ibid., 29
Jennifer Pelletier, “William Ockham on Testimonial Knowledge,” in Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy,
ed. Henrik Lagerlund, vol. 2, 4 vols., The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History (London: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2018), 145–65.
269
While one can only know true propositions, belief states apply to both true and false propositions.
270
Pelletier, “William Ockham on Testimonial Knowledge,” 151.
271
Ibid. Also cf. Jonathan Adler, “Epistemological Problems of Testimony,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entriesestimony-episprob/.
268

77

Another key difference is Ockham’s position on religious sources of knowledge (e.g.,
Scripture) having infallible testimony since, by definition, their authority cannot be
deceived, err, or disproved.272 For non-religious testimony, Ockham maintains a form of
Aristotelian endoxa that is deemed plausibly true (probabilia) since it is accepted by the
many or the wise. Interestingly this means that the articles of faith are not plausible
sentences since those who rely solely on natural reason (i.e. "the wise") do not accept them
(the possible exception being a predominantly Christian society where the wise are open
to truths beyond natural reason).273 As for what causes testimonial knowledge, Pelletier
points out Ockham’s distinction between assenting to a speaker’s testimony (because they
say so) and assenting to that speaker as an authority (whose testimony ought to be
believed).274 The possible cause for the intellect to assent to a proposition is thus either
assent to authority or the will willing to believe on account of underlying evidence (e.g.
that the speaker is trustworthy).275
2.4 Virtue Epistemology’s Contribution to Testimony
Parallel to the development of social epistemology, Virtue Epistemology made a return in
1958 following Elizabeth Anscombe’s article "Modern Moral Philosophy." A historical
assessment of virtue epistemology is beyond my scope here, but in his 2013 book
Epistémologie des croyances réligieuses, Roger Pouivet argues the in the past 30 years
contemporary epistemology has shifted from the Evidentialist and Deontological models
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by dispensing with rules that designate truth or justification of beliefs. 276 Thus,
epistemology is no longer "…a normative discipline in charge of defining the rules of truth
and knowledge."277 Instead, two approaches to epistemology have (re)emerged. One form
merely describes why individuals form beliefs, a psychology or sociology of knowledge.
Citing Richard Rorty, Michael Foucault, and Thomas Kuhn, Pouivet’s description of the
form aligns with the "constructivist" or "anti-classical" positions outlined at the beginning
of this chapter. Within this framework, religious beliefs are thus naturalized to explain why
some are led to hold them through the evolutionary process. Religious belief is at best
confined to a "phenomenological meadow" examining experiences of the divine by
describing "subconceptual modalities, the ineffable surge of the Divine as the invisible in
the Visible, the encounter of the Absolute Other in Love." 278 The other "new" approach is
virtue epistemology comprising the followers of Anscombe’s 1958 article and the
unbroken epistemological lineage of Thomists.279
Increasingly as social epistemology’s two dominant testimonial views of
reductionism and anti-reductionism are found wanting, virtue epistemologists have begun
offering an alternative type of theory relying on a virtue-theoretic framework. 280 In these
theories trust and trustworthiness emerge as crucial for accepting testimony. Two kinds of
virtue theory have arisen based on what kind of virtue trust is. Paul Faulkner identifies that
there are "those that trace their lineage to Aristotle’s conception of ‘intellectual virtues’,
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where virtues are conceived as excellences, like the sharpness of a knife; and those that
trace their lineage to Aristotle’s Ethics, where virtues are conceived as character traits, like
kindness or generosity, which are manifested in judgement and action." 281 The two groups
are commonly referred to as "virtue reliabilism" and "virtue responsibilism"
respectively.282 Virtue reliabilism sees trust as a reliable faculty or cognitive disposition
through which true beliefs are acquired. 283 Intellectual virtues are conceived of as
intellectual abilities that reliably produce true belief (given appropriate circumstances and
environments). Virtue reliabilism emerged in the late 20th by shifting process reliabilism’s
focus from cognitive processes to intellectual virtues.284 Unlike traditional virtues these
dispositions are not necessarily acquired through habituation or involve a motivational
component. Virtue reliabilists claim their perspective best accords with the "traditional
epistemological task", i.e., "providing an account of knowledge in terms of necessary,
sufficient, and informative conditions…by understanding the virtue condition on
knowledge in terms of cognitive abilities or reliable faculties." 285 In short, truth via
testimony is achieved directly via a reliable process.
Virtue responsibilism sees trust as an intellectual virtue akin to moral virtues (e.g.
intellectual courage, carefulness, open-mindedness, and humility) as one of the personal
qualities of a believer.286 Sarah Wright claims the "distinctive characteristic" of
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responsibilists is "a focus on developed traits of intellectual character that reflect on the
evaluation of their possessor."287 Pouivet claims this responsibilism is closer to the views
of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas since believers have an epistemic responsibility in
utilizing intellectual virtues in belief acquisition (pace impersonal rules of justification).
Pouivet also argues it preserves the normative project in epistemology through the
development of epistemic virtues in individuals with a "good" intellectual life. By
developing epistemic virtues and avoiding epistemic vices the virtuous epistemic actor will
always be seeking truth.288 The difference is in the person and a focus on the intellectual
character of persons who possess natural epistemic virtues that "ensure our success in
discovering the truth" (as far as our finiteness allows).289 The virtuous epistemic actor is
thus one who "thinks well." The key to truth is developing intellectual virtues and avoiding
vices and thus is being epistemologically virtuous and not vicious. Since there is no internal
control of beliefs through a "categorical epistemological imperative" or rule which
guarantees the truthfulness or justification of a set of beliefs, truth via testimony is achieved
indirectly through moral virtues.290 Faulkner argues that "moral trust can give epistemic
reasons that support testimonial uptake" via a bridge between the virtue ethics of trust and
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the epistemology of testimony.291 Andrea Robiglio provides an example of such a bridge
between character, specifically "nobility", and truthfulness for testimony in his article
"Testes nobilitatis: una riflessione sul nesso tra verità e nobiltà." 292 The meaning of trust
(or reliability) presupposes intellectual and moral virtues in both the speaker and listener.
Thus, no conversation about testimony is complete without discussing social reputation,
the opinions of others, and the guarantees of personal dignity.293 Citing Aquinas’s
comments on the Gospel of John, Robiglio reasons that testimony can be understood as not
just probable, but certain insofar as Jesus the teacher has both impeccable knowledge and
an impeccable character.294 Insofar as scripture is based on divine witness, then both the
bible and the Qur’an are based on testimony of the highest credibility. 295 Robiglio stresses
the necessary link between virtue and legitimate testimony with the legal setting which
truly brings out the key difference of an epistemology of virtue in testimony: "is the witness
reliable because he attests to the truth or is the truth attested because a reliable witness says
so?"296
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Despite the differences in these two views' conception of intellectual virtues, the
conflict has yielded "something of a consensus" in recent years with some scholars seeing
the two views as being compatible within their respective broader and narrow epistemic
domains. However, there are still objections to general accounts of knowledge in terms of
the character of virtues alone or abandoning traditional epistemological projects that aim
to give an account of knowledge.297 Given the historical goals of this dissertation,
responsibilism will be relied on more regularly.
2.5 Rethinking the Contemporary Categories of Testimony
In light of the external challenges from virtue epistemology and internal challenges facing
the predominant views on the transmission and justification questions, social
epistemologists have started questioning the prevailing answers and thus the categories and
framework they form to assess testimonial theories. These challenges to the traditional
framework have led to speculation about new frameworks. Since these new frameworks
provide additional tools for analyzing historical accounts of testimony while maintaining
room for virtue and trust, they will be incorporated into the following chapters’ assessment
of Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas.
In "Testimonial Knowledge and the Flow of Information" (2015), John Greco
fleshes out the three prevailing issues.298 First, on whether testimonial knowledge can be
"reduced" to some other kind of knowledge. Neither reductionism nor anti-reductionism
provide an adequate account of testimonial knowledge since testimonial knowledge is too
hard under reductionism and too easy under anti-reductionism. Furthermore, under both
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theories "there is nothing epistemically special going on in testimonial knowledge" when
intuition indicates otherwise. Second, whether testimonial knowledge involves knowledge
transmission or not, neither the transmission nor generation views provide an adequate
account of testimony. Testimonial knowledge is again too hard if testimonial knowledge
does not include knowledge transmission and too easy if it does. 299 Third, is whether
testimonial knowledge is distinctively social. Since reductionism does not include
knowledge transmission, testimonial knowledge is no longer distinctively social.
Conversely, anti-reductionism is distinctively social because it includes transmission, but
creates "a disconnect between the requirements for testimonial knowledge and the
requirements for knowledge of any other kind."300
In light of the objections to the transmission view (TV) of testimony, theorists are
generating stronger rather than weaker forms of TV. Following John Greco’s notion of
"special transmission" (a narrowly defined epistemic phenomenon often outside typical
epistemic concepts such as evidence and reason, etc.), 301 Stephen Wright recasts the
traditional views of TV-N as the "weak sense" and TV-S as the "moderate sense" of
transmission in his book Knowledge Transmission (2019).302 Wright proposes a "strong

299

Ibid., 279–81.
Ibid., 281–82.
301
John Greco, “What Is Transmission*?,” Episteme 13, no. 4 (2016): 481–98. 482 Greco refers to this special
notion of transmission as "transmission*". Transmission* is marked by four themes: 1) it serves a different
role in that it does not generate knowledge like perception, reasoning, etc., such that a speaker cannot transmit
knowledge they do not possess; 2) it relieves the hearer of the usual burden associated with non-testimonial
knowledge; 3) it allows for epistemic dependence and an epistemic division of labor; 4) some phenomenon
akin to transmission* must exist to account for account for most of our knowledge and avoid skepticism.
Ibid., 483–84.. It should be noted that Greco admits, "on the level of individual knowers, it is hard to draw a
meaningful distinction between knowledge transmission and knowledge generation. In both cases, the hearer
comes to know something that she did not know before. And testimony is often called a source of knowledge,
along with perception, reasoning, etc." Ibid., 490–91.
302
Stephen Wright, Knowledge Transmission (New York: Routledge, 2019). Wright notes that Fricker gives
a more recent example of the "moderate sense in Elizabeth Fricker, “How To Make Invidious Distinctions
Amongst Reliable Testifiers,” Episteme 12, no. 2 (2015): 173–202.
300

84

sense" position where the transmission of knowledge is defined in terms of the transmission
of epistemic grounds since epistemic grounds are a necessary condition for the
transmission of knowledge but the transmission of knowledge is not a necessary condition
of the transmission of epistemic grounds.303 Unlike the weak and moderate sense, strong
notions of transmission (i.e. Greco’s "transmission*") relieve listeners of the usual
epistemic "burdens" associated with non-testimonial knowledge (e.g. perception, reason)
and argues listeners depend on the speaker in an "epistemically interesting way." 304
Following objections to testimonial justification, Greco draws on Edward Craig’s
idea of knowledge to propose that testimonial norms are (and should be) applied differently
to two separate activities governed by the concept of knowledge: information acquisition
and information distribution.305 Information acquisition involves activities that introduce
information into a community of knowers. For testimony, information acquisition occurs
when the speaker is not a member or is outside of the listener’s community. Information
distribution involves passing acquired information as effectively and efficiently as possible
within a community of knowers and hence occurs when both the speaker and listener are
members or inside the same community. Under such a distinction, Greco claims: "different
norms govern the different kinds of testimonial exchange, some of which are at the service
of information distribution within a community of knowers, others of which are at the
service of information uptake for first use in a community of knowers" and that it follows
that "we should make it harder to get information into the system than we make it to
303
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distribute that information, once in." 306 As a result, it would be reasonable for thinkers to
employ the testimonial theory of reductionism during information acquisition and antireductionism during information distribution.
While Greco does not spell out why different testimonial norms should be applied
in cases of information acquisition vs. distribution the obvious answer implies trust. This
explains why Greco presents a further level of rethinking for the traditional categories and
framework of testimony in "The Role of Trust in Testimonial Knowledge" (2019). 307 In
this new framework, the terms reductionism and anti-reductionism are maintained not as
independent theories of testimonial justification, but as types of approaches to the key
questions of testimony proper: 1) testimony as source of knowledge and 2) testimony as
knowledge transmission. Regarding the first question of whether testimony is a source of
knowledge, either testimonial knowledge does or does not reduce to some other nontestimonial species of knowledge. Answering in the affirmative that knowledge does
reduce to or can be "subsumed" under some other species of knowledge (e.g., induction),
and thus is not a generative species of knowledge in itself, is the position of "sourcereductionism." Answering in the negative that testimonial knowledge does not reduce to or
cannot be subsumed under another species of knowledge because testimony is itself a
generative species of knowledge or its "own kind of thing", is the position of "source-antireductionism."308 Regarding the second question of whether testimonial knowledge is
transmitted knowledge, either knowledge transmission does or does not reduce to a form
of knowledge generation. Answering in the affirmative that knowledge transmission is
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reducible to knowledge generation, that is, "back-to-back" cases of knowledge generation,
is the position of "transmission reductionism." Under transmission reductionism,
knowledge is first generated in the speaker via a non-testimonial source of knowledge (e.g.
perception) and then on the basis of speaker testimony knowledge is generated in the
listener by a non-testimonial source of knowledge (e.g. intuition). 309 Per Greco’s analysis,
this is a conservative view of testimony in which "nothing epistemically special is going
on in transmission."310 Answering in the negative that knowledge transmission is not
reducible to knowledge generation, but is its own distinct phenomenon, is the position of
"transmission anti-reductionism."311 I conceive of this new framework as follows:

Chart 2.5.0.1

Reductionism:

AntiReductionism:

Source:
1 - Can testimonial knowledge
be reduced to a non-testimonial
species of knowledge?
"Source Reductionism"
Yes: Testimony is NOT a
generative species of knowledge
since it "reduces" to a nonsubspecies of knowledge
"Source Anti-Reductionism"
No: Testimony IS a generative
species of knowledge in its own
right

Transmission:
2 - Can knowledge transmission
be reduced to knowledge
generation?
"Transmission Reductionism"
Yes: Transmission "reduces" to
back-to-back instances
knowledge generation
"Transmission AntiReductionism"
No: Transmission does not
reduce to knowledge generation
but is a distinct phenomenon.

Under this new schema, theories of testimony result from combining a position on source
and a position on transmission resulting in conceivably four permutations. First, the most
309
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conservative option Greco labels "traditional epistemology" would hold to both source and
transmission reductionism in which testimony amounts to nothing more than repeated
instances of traditional methods of knowledge generation. The second option maintains
source anti-reductionism and transmission reductionism so that knowledge is generated in
the listener via testimony as its own irreducible source of knowledge. The third option
holds to both source and transmission anti-reductionism in which case there are two ways
of coming to know either by generation or by transmission. The fourth option (which fits
the view Greco ultimately endorses) is source-reductionism and transmission antireductionism. Greco ultimately adopts this position in which he proposes the process of
knowledge acquisition in bringing new information into a community of knowers be
governed by source reductionism while the distribution of acquired information within the
community be governed by transmission anti-reductionism.312 In this rethinking, trust is
considered a form of anti-reductionism such that a thinker’s theory of testimony can
involve trust in three possible combinations: in the production of knowledge as a source,
during the transmission of knowledge, or both. 313
The result of this rethinking is that the three typical theories of reductionism, antireductionism, and IVT give way to a much more complicated array of possible positions
and thus better account for the wide-ranging diversity found amongst historical thinkers.
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2.5.1 Evaluating Social Epistemology’s relation to other Epistemological Theses
The discipline of social epistemology has fit the various testimonial theories within existing
epistemic theses. Within evidentialism, testimony is itself a form of evidence in antireductionism or reduces to other forms of evidence under reductionism. Within reliabilism,
testimony is valid only when it follows reliable cognitive processes or faculties. While a
wide number of combinations are possible, several theories better accommodate one
another. Reductionism and anti-reductionism presume an evidentialist thesis. The
interpersonal view of testimony lends itself to a virtue-theoretic framework (however
testimony can be understood as a type of evidence "justified" by the speakers' offer of
assurance or invitation to trust). In expanding the types of source and transmission (chart
2.5.0.1), accounts can be unified or non-unified: unified accounts maintaining the same
epistemic thesis (e.g., evidentialism) for both source and transmission; non-unified
accounts maintaining mixed theses for source and transmission combination. 314
It is important, as I see it, to draw attention to the relation of testimonial theory to
broader epistemological theses since these broader theses do not persist through the history
of philosophy. Contemporary epistemology typically follows reliabilist or evidentialist
conceptions. Reliabilism is traced back to F.P. Ramsey in 1931. 315 The epistemic role of
evidence only emerged in the 13th to 14th C. with Duns Scotus and William Ockham and
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the role of "justifying" belief in the 18th C..316 As Robert Pasnau points out in his history
of epistemology After Certainty (2017), there are three distinguishable notions of
evidentness that are entwined:
A. The evidentness of a cognitive object; that is, a thing’s being evident.
B. The evidentness of a cognition that grasps such an object; that is, an
evident cognition.
C. That which makes something be evident; that is, the evidence.317
Modern and contemporary epistemology predominately only speak of the final sense:
The last of these senses is most deeply entrenched in epistemology today.
Moreover, whether we are dealing with Latin (evidentia), French
(évidence), or English (evidence), modern readers find it natural to suppose
that we are talking about type-C evidence. In fact, however, it is not until
the later eighteenth century that this third sense became prevalent in
philosophical texts. Before that time, the predominant senses were A and
B.318
Cases of notion B largely trace back to cases of notion A, which trace back to metaphysical
foundations. The bridge from the metaphysical to the cognitive was typically considered
to be the powers or "virtues" of human nature. Knowledge was the fruit of a causal process
or the proper use of their intellectual and moral virtues. Starting in the times after Thomas
Aquinas, the strong metaphysical underpinning of knowledge was rejected giving way to
cognitive and explanatory processes of knowledge acquisition. 319 This shift from historic
"evidentness" to modern "evidence" likely explains why the historical assessment of
testimony is only traced back to David Hume and Thomas Reid. Insofar as the epistemic
thesis of "evidentialism" is assumed, Hume and Reid’s use of evidence-based theories of
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testimony are early accounts which readily fit the contemporary presumption of
justification for assent to propositions. This leads to two problems, one contemporary and
one historic. First, a concept of testimony that is incongruent with entire traditions of
historical thought reveals an incomplete theory that needs to be revised or replaced. 320
While contemporary thought often dismisses historical concepts as no longer relevant, the
problem is not one of replacing outdated theories of how testimony occurred, but on what
testimony is and its fit within knowledge frameworks which is essential insofar as
testimony is the transmission of knowledge and history itself is a kind of testimony of the
past. Second, a concept of testimony beholden to any one epistemic thesis cannot be
applied across history (transhistorical) without distorting the accounts of thinkers past and
present. Rendering the testimonial accounts of Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas
Aquinas will show that pre-Enlightenment theories of testimony are best captured by a
virtue-theoretic framework and confirm the need for a "transhistorical" notion of
testimony, i.e., one that does not presuppose a single concept of "evidence." I will then
return to this problem in chapter 6 to offer thoughts on such a transhistorical concept that
does not repeat the mistake of being beholden to a particular historical era (albeit a different
one) in which a telling serves as a reason to believe (which can include but is not equivalent
to evidence).
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CHAPTER 3: SAADYA GAON'S THEORY OF HUMAN AND DIVINE TESTIMONY
3.1 Introduction
Rabbi Saadya ben Yosef al-Fayyūmi321 lived from 882-942 and was appointed Gaon (or
chief) of the Babylonian academy in Sura (south of Baghdad) in 928. 322 He was an
influential thinker in linguistics, poetics, exegesis, philosophy and Jewish Kalām; his
commitment to reason allowing him to survive questions regarding his status as a
philosopher, albeit as a limited-rationalist in contrast to Maimonides’s strongrationalism.323 Saadya is frequently cited as one of the first distinctly Jewish philosophers
who strongly influenced subsequent thinkers in the Jewish tradition. 324 He was a prolific
writer covering Halakhic (legal) and religious works including translations and
commentaries on the Written and Oral Law traditions. Two of his works have more
philosophical aims. His most famous work is the Kitāb al-Amānāt wal-'I‘tiqādāt
(commonly translated as The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, or Emunoth ve-Deoth in

ِف ْالفيﱡومِ ي
َ ( רבי סעדיה בן יוסף אלפיומי גאוןin Hebrew) "Sa'adya", "Se'adyah", "Saadia", and
َ سع ِد َيا غَا ُؤون ب ِْن يُوس
"Saadiah" are common alternative spellings (Scholars of Wissenschaft des Judentums believe "Saadya" is a
"Hebrewised" form of the Arabic name )سعيد.
322
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Hebrew) (henceforth al-Amānāt),325 which is the first systematic presentation of Judaism
as a rational body of beliefs, reportedly written in Baghdad circa 933. 326 Saadya's overall
goal in the work is to confirm that trusting traditional religious authorities leads to rational
beliefs that are to be internalized where such trust (or belief), per Gyongyi Hegedus in
Saadya Gaon: The Double Path of the Mystic and the Rationalist (2013), "is completed
and strengthened by correct speculation about the fundamental questions of the faith." 327
Said another way, his aim is to lead believers to a second order awareness of the correctness
of Tradition received from their ancestors through rational verification. Saadya’s second
most philosophical work is his commentary on the mystical Ṣefer Yeẓirah (Commentary on
the Book of Creation) (henceforth Yeẓirah), a text which Tradition claims descended from
Abraham and which explains the ontological nature of the cosmos and the role of the
Hebrew numbers and letters as the building blocks of reality.328 Saadya's aim, per Haggai
Ben-Shammai, is to rationalize or philosophize the enigmatic text. 329
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ed. Alexander Altmann (Indianapolis: Hackett Publ. Co, 2002). Al-Amānāt is also commonly referred to by
the Hebrew title (Sefer ha-Emunot we-ha-De‘ot or just Emunoth ve-Deoth) following Judah ben Saul ibn
Tibbon’s first Hebrew translation in 1186.
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Ronald Kiener notes that Saadya reedited individual compositions into one work with an introduction on
epistemology as shown by comparing the Oxford and Leningrad recensions of the Judeo-Arabic text. Ronald
C Kiener, “The Hebrew Paraphrase of Saadiah Gaon’s Kitāb al-Amānāt Wa’l-I’tiqādāt,” AJS Review 11, no.
01 (1986): 1–25. 2, footnote 3.
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Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 49.
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While Saadya does not accept Abraham wrote the Yeẓirah, he says Abraham conceived the subjects of the
numbers and letters in his mind and these were passed down via Tradition. Raphael Jospe, “Early
Philosophical Commentaries on the Sefer Yezirah: Some Comments,” Revue des Études juives 149, no. 4
(1990): 375. Hegedus clarifies Saadya's view: "that the content of the book was inspired by God, while the
grammatical formulation, the redaction, and the division into chapters and paragraphs are the work of scholars
(ʿulamāʾ)." Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 10.
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Haggai Ben-Shammai, “Saadya’s Goal in His Commentary on Ṣefer Yeẓira,” in A Straight Path: Studies
in Medieval Philosophy and Culture. Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, ed. Arthur Hyman and Ruth LinkSalinger (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 1–9.
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These two works establish a key role for testimony in Saadya's epistemology which
moves in both directions across both rational and revealed laws including divine and human
speakers. Divine testimony dovetails with human testimony and human testimony
complements divine testimony to ensure its accuracy in transmission from generation to
generation. This makes separating divine and human testimony not only challenging, but
oftentimes impossible for revelation. The key to understanding testimony in Saadya is that
while the fourth root of knowledge, Trustworthy Tradition, is a unique source of
knowledge, "testimony" itself is not. For while all Tradition is testimony, not all testimony
is Tradition. Testimony ultimately reduces, for Saadya, to perception and rational intuition
('ilm al-'aql) except when knowledge comes from God where perception and intuition are
impossible. The difference is in how a particular instance of testimony, a telling, occurs for
divine and human speakers. Despite how a telling is received, the testimonial framework,
or epistemic process of testimony operates in the same way for both, namely that testimony
transfers knowledge once the speaker is verified to be trustworthy as understood in
accordance with virtue. Virtue's role also accounts for the disparities between human
testimony and divine testimony. The former is open to falsification given humanity's
natural propensity to vice while the latter is immediate and certain since God is the most
trustworthy speaker making his reports the best form of knowledge.
Since testimonial knowledge is grounded in who the speaker is, it is necessary to
understand the nature of authority for Saadya. In what follows, I will introduce Saadya and
his milieu including the medieval Jewish perspective on communal authority. I will also
give an overview of Saadya's epistemology providing context for his views on testimony.
The bulk of the chapter will then explore Saadya's account of testimony, including its
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human and divine forms. I conclude with a contemporary assessment of Saadya's theory of
testimony utilizing the framework established in chapter 2 differentiating reductionist and
anti-reductionist forms of knowledge generation and transmission.
3.2 Saadya Gaon and his Milieu
3.2.1 Medieval Jewish Communal Authority
According to many Jewish traditions, authority traces back to God and subsequently
Moses, Israel's divinely chosen leader, and the Law he received directly by God's
testimony. The Law was given to Moses in two forms. The first form is the Written Law
(the Torah) Moses was commanded to write down and the laws which emanate from it (Mid'Oraite) which are often covered by the second form, the Oral Law. The Oral Law (Torah
Shebe'al Peh) thus includes the Laws God taught orally to Moses (Halachah LeMoshe
MiSinai) who transmitted them in the same way to Israel along with the hermeneutical and
exegetical principles to interpret the Torah in applying it to everchanging societal needs. 330
The Rabbinical Tradition emerges because "the written laws themselves, detailed as they
may appear to be," according to Arnold Cohen, "are only a skeleton of the Law and cannot
in any way be meaningfully understood without the traditions, Rabbinic interpretation and
exegesis which form the Torah Shebe'al Peh—the Oral Law which surrounds it."331 The
advice Moses received from his father-in-law Jethro in Exodus 18:13-26 to establish a
hierarchical division of "trustworthy authorities" ('enowsh 'emeth, literally "men of truth"
or " faithful men") to serve as judges over smaller and smaller subsets of the population
also serves as the basis for practical authority through a system of Jewish legal courts
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Arnold J Cohen, An Introduction to Jewish Civil Law (Jerusalem; New York: Feldheim, 1991), 29–30,
51–52.
331
Ibid., 27.
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(battei din).332 The ideal was thus a series of lower courts starting in one's own town which
passed difficult cases on to the court of the next nearest town and then up to the court which
sat at the gates of the Temple Mount, and finally the court of the Sanhedrin with its 71
members (one of which was the High Priest) who sat in the Hall of Hewed Stone (an
opening off the courtyard of the temple).333 In addition to acting as the equivalent of the
modern US Supreme Court, the Sanhedrin also served as the legislative branch. Only the
King, the undisputed Head of State per the Torah, had comparable executive power. After
the loss of the Jewish nation state, the king's practical authority was replaced by the office
of the Exilarch, which tradition holds was established after the first fall of Jerusalem and
the exile of King Jeconiah in 597 BCE, while the authority of the Sanhedrin fell to
Talmudic scholars in the Rabbinites. However, the King's or Exilarch's power was
contingent upon his (1) faithful observation of the Torah and (2) his fair ruling consistent
with the Torah's precepts. The members of the Sanhedrin were the experts in Torah. 334
Since much of Jewish Law is derived from Rabbinical hermeneutical principles
applied to scripture (such as a fortiori reasoning),335 the Rabbis took on the dual role of
interpreters of Scriptural Law and legislators of Rabbinic Laws. As a result, Jewish
communal epistemic authority was simultaneously theological (epistemic) and political
(practical), as Cohen summarizes:
The close connection of religion and law is the essence of the Jewish legal
system, and the Civil and Criminal Law is regarded by the Jew as an integral
part of the Torah. Therefore, grounded in Scripture and centered on God, it
332

'enowsh 'emeth אַ ְנשֵׁ י אֱמֶ ת. Battei din is the plural of beit din, בית דין, literally "house of judgement". Cf.
Shemot 18:23 of the parashah (annual Jewish cycle of Torah reading) and Sanhedrin 88b of the Talmud.
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Davidson,
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Bavli,”
Sefaria,
2015,
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Cohen, An Introduction to Jewish Civil Law, 22–23.
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Ibid., 37.
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is not like other legal systems, rooted in the creation of the State, nor did it
ever draw its inspiration from political feeling. For the Jew, the Torah is an
independent and positive source of inspiration, regulating individual and
corporate action; and on the Torah is to be raised the whole structure of the
Jewish legal system. Consequently, morality is a dominant factor in Jewish
communal life and the underlying principle in all social and economic
legislation. The object of the Jewish legal system is not to preserve a
particular dynasty or certain form of government, but to establish social
righteousness and to maintain thereby a close, constant, inseparable
connection between ethics and law, both flowing from the same source. 336
Cohen thus states that it should be clear "that the role of the Talmudic Scholar cannot be
over-emphasized," for they not only serve as the conduit of Tradition, but also "interpret
and expand the written law by applying their tradition, dialectic, exegesis, and logic; so
much so that they are also able to alter what is the apparent Scriptural meaning." 337 This
power of the Rabbis created a rivalry first with the Sadducees, and then their spiritual
successors the Karaites, who denied a role for the Oral law since the Written Law was to
be interpreted literally leaving no room for Rabbinic authority.338 Yet, while the Karaites
were dismissive of the validity of the Oral Law, they were not dismissive of the power of
testimony, which they held proved the authority of the Written Law (and the Rabbis had
yet to prove for the Oral Law).339
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Ibid., 14.
Ibid., 52–53.
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The Karaites (קראית, meaning "readers"; also commonly rendered as "Qaraites") are a Jewish religious
movement that only recognizes the Tanakh ( "תַּ ַנ, or Hebrew Bible) as authoritative in stark contrast to
Rabbinic Judaism which also recognizes the authority of the Midrash ()מ ְד ָרשׁ
ִ and Talmud ()תַּ לְ מוּד, the oral
tradition. Much of Saadya’s defense of the oral tradition, and thus testimony, could be credited to his debates
with the Karaites.
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The poem Book of the Wars of the Lord, Canto I by Karaite Salmon Ben Jeroham against Saadya and
Rabbinic Judaism still sings the praises of testimony:
12 We believe firmly that the written Law
Was in truth given to Israel by the right hand of the Almighty
According to the testimony of the whole congregation of the Lily [Israel],
Who are scattered in every land.
13 All of them, believers as well as unbelievers,
Divided as they are by language and tongue,
All Israel, from the east to the westernmost ends of the world,
337
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While the Sanhedrin and subsequently the Rabbis had a considerable amount of
both epistemic and practical authority, the source of their practical authority was from the
people themselves.340 As representatives of the people, the Rabbis could not institute laws
the people rejected.341 This was because the power of legislation came from the nation as
a whole which could be broken down into smaller communal parts which received power
from its members over its members.342 Disputes were run up through appointed
representatives with final resolution under the Talmudic scholar. This led to an interesting
distinction between practical and religious authority laid out in the Mishnah, in which
practical authorities do not implement the law of the Torah thereby allowing a cultural
diversity to legislate with the caveat that their Talmudic scholar does not disagree with
them.343 The result is Jewish Law serves as the foundation for a Jewish community to thrive

Testify to the sanctity of the written Law, all of them, the little and the great.
14 This testimony has become firmly established in their midst
By their united and universal consent, without challenge.
Likewise, the signs and miracles which the Dweller of the heavenly abode has wrought
Are written therein and are explained for them who wish to understand.
15 Selah! They remember the splitting asunder of the Red Sea
And they do not deny the words spoken by the Almighty on Mount Sinai;
And with their mouths they sing of the glory of the Law and of the other miracles.
Israel and all other nations speak of this as one.
16 Now if Israel and Judah are both united
Concerning the validity of the Oral Law, which is, as they [the Rabbanites] say, perfect,
Let them offer their testimony, and let their voices be heard;
If not, then the Fayyumite’s [Saadiah Gaon’s] words are void and his tongue has been silenced.
Leon Nemoy, ed. and trans., Karaite Anthology. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 73–78.
340
Cohen, An Introduction to Jewish Civil Law, 80.
341
Avodah Zarah 36a of the Talmud explains whether a decree can be voided is contingent upon its spread
among a majority of the Jewish people: "The Sages issue a decree upon the community only if most of the
community
is
able
to
abide
by
it."
Davidson,
“Talmud.”
https://www.sefaria.org/Avodah_Zarah.36b.1?lang=bi&with=all&lang2=en.
342
Cohen writes: "To make the process less cumbersome it may delegate its power to its representatives so
that not all members of the community must become involved in any particular piece of legislation." Cohen,
An Introduction to Jewish Civil Law, 83. As an example, by the late 13th and early 14th century Abraham
Adret wrote in Responsa 3:411 "The kahal [the local governing body of a former European Jewish
community administering religious, legal, and communal affairs] agreed to appoint us to eliminate sins. And
we have taken an oath to do so. And the charter of the mandate states that we are authorized by the [gentile]
government to impose penalties, whether corporal or fiscal, as we see fit." Cf. Michael Walzer et al., The
Jewish Political Traditions. Vol. 1, Vol. 1, (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press, 2000), 402.
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Cohen, An Introduction to Jewish Civil Law, 85–86.
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anywhere, as a unique political entity within a foreign state, thus preserving the uniqueness
and independence of the Jewish identity.344
Historical periods of Rabbinic authority are classically known by the title given to
the top Rabbinic authorities of the age.345 The Geonim (c. 609-1040CE), the title given to
the heads of the two Babylonian academies of Sura and Pumbedita, 346 fundamentally
shifted the nature of rabbinic authority away from one of institutional power. David Sklare
indicates this change stemmed from 1) "the gaonic yeshivot which viewed themselves as
preservers of rabbinic tradition", 2) "the Karaite claim that Rabbanite practice was merely
the uncritical support (taqlīd) of humanly created rabbinic law," and 3) the adoption of the
epistemological structure of Islamic jurisprudence such that the authority or legitimacy of
legal sources (e.g. Scripture, tradition, analogy, or consensus i.e. tawātur) were determined
by whether they rendered certain knowledge or probable opinion. 347 David Sklare rightly
notes that "the concept of tradition had to make sense within the conceptual world of the
gaonim, and this world was Mu'tazili in nature." 348 The more creative role of the rabbi
using the Torah and Talmud as a springboard to solve problems was replaced with a more
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Ibid., 89.
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consistent and defensible role for the rabbis as linked to transmission which Robert Brody,
in The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture (1998), describes
as "promulgation, interpretation, and application."349 Saadya himself states that the thirteen
hermeneutical principles for interpreting the Torah were not to be used to create new
laws.350 The Talmud thus was considered a "closed literary corpus no longer open to
revision."351 Despite this change, the Geonim saw themselves as the successors to the
Sanhedrin and organized the Babylonian academies accordingly. With little competition to
the claim of Talmudic authority, questions from even the most distant lands were
forwarded to the Babylonian centers of Jewish learning effectively making the Geonim the
worldwide spiritual leaders of the Jewish community during the Medieval era. The
authority of the Geonim only diminished as Talmudic scholarship was decentralized and
fewer questions were forwarded to Babylon. 352 It was this decline of the Babylonian
academies, and thus the Gaonic period, that allowed for Saadya's unique contributions
including the writing of systemic treatises on legal and Talmudic topics. 353 Brody reports
that:
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This is an interesting change from their immediate predecessors the Savora'im (c. 500-600) who did
modify the Talmud the Geonim received. Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval
Jewish Culture, 7.
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Cf. Sa’adia ben Joseph, “Fragments of the ‘Kitāb Taḥṣīl Al-Sharā’i’ Al-Samā’īyah’ / קטעים מכתאב
תחציל אלשראיע אלסמעיה לרס"ג,” ed. Moses Zucker, Tarbiz / תרביץ מא, no. 378 :(1972) ד.
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Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture, 7.
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"For the first time since the exodus from Egypt, the center of gravity migrated westwards, from Palestine
and Babylonia to North Africa and Europe. But in actuality, this move was accompanied by a far-reaching
decentralization: No individual or institution of this period could lay claim to the same sort of worldwide
recognition and influence which has been enjoyed by the leading academies of the ancient Jewish heartland."
Ibid., 11.
353
Brody cites three related factors that brought about the end of the Gaonic period: first, "a decline in the
stature of the Babylonian academies" due to economic distress and a "decline in intellectual stimulation and
moral support"; second, "a corresponding rise in the self-confidence of scholars and academies located
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100

The appointment of the outsider Se'adyah to the Geonate of Sura in 928
already represents an attempt to come to grips with the growing crisis.
Se'adyah himself undertook numerous unconventional initiatives – some of
them at the expense of the Exilarch who had appointed him – which
contributed to a temporary revival of the institution's prestige. Still, his
protracted struggle against the same Exilarch and his allies certainly did
nothing to strengthen the academy, and he left no worthy successor, so that
the academy was forced to close shortly after his death in 942. 354
The Babylonian academy at Pumbedita, despite following Saadya's lead (including the
writing of systematic works), carried on a little longer, but ultimately the center of Jewish
epistemic authority decentralized and shifted to the West. 355
Unfortunately, other than Saadya being born in Fayyûm Egypt (hence the common
title "The Fayyûmite" marking him an outsider), "next to nothing is now known about his
immediate forebears, his youth, or his education."356 Following up on minor reports, textual
analysis has led some to suspect Saadya studied under Jewish philosopher al-Muqammas
and possible Karaite Abu Kathir Yahya al-Tabarani, but while such contacts would have
been possible (especially given their common language) nothing exists to confirm such
links.357 However, according to Sarah Stroumsa in Saadya and Jewish Kalām (2003),
"although we have no definite landmarks of Saadya’s education, we can be quite certain
that, by the time he wrote his theological summa, he must have had access to practically
everything on the intellectual market." 358 Stroumsa thus summarizes Saadya's historical
role as more systematizing than groundbreaking:
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Saadya’s predecessors, al-Muqammas and Isaac Israeli, delineate the
spectrum of influences to which an educated Jew would be exposed:
Christianity and Islam, Christian Kalām (which includes some Aristotelian
philosophy), Muslim Kalām, and Neoplatonic thought. The role of pioneer
belongs to these predecessors, who legitimize these influences and show the
way for their integration into Judaism. It was then Saadya who, creatively
and systematically, shaped, smoothed the rough ends, and consolidated the
foundations laid by his predecessors, and presented the outcome as "Jewish
philosophy," with an authority that his predecessors lacked. 359
This introduces us to the intellectual milieu of Saadya’s day which was characterized by
either the "liberal" embracing of rationalism or the "conservative" return to more traditional
orthodoxy. This tension between arrogant unbelief and faithful dogma is what led Saadya
to write al-Amānāt in the first place. The same controversy was also playing out
concurrently in the Islamic tradition. Israel Efros identifies 912 (16 years before Saadya
took the position of Gaon) as the "climax of the controversy" when al-Ash’ari publicly
"repented" of being a liberal Mu’tazilite from the mosque pulpit in al-Basra where he called
the faithful "to realign their forces around the Sunnite banner of anthropomorphism,
determinism, and the pre-existence of the Koran." 360 Al-Ash’ari’s affirmation comes nearly
50 years after the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun's infamous Mihna or inquisition on the
createdness of the Qur’an ended. The same questions pertaining to these topics are reflected
in Saadya's major works, especially when dealing with the idea that scripture is a product
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of God’s speech or divine testimony. This is evident in al-Amānāt, which was influenced
by Kalām, the Mutakallimūn, and Saadya's polemical relationship with Karaite Judaism.361
3.2.2 Saadya’s Account of Knowledge
Many of Saadya's works have been pieced back together from incredible archeological
finds like the Cairo Genizah fragments which has made it possible to likewise piece
together Saadya's epistemic thought. Since it is clear that Saadya was deeply influenced by
Kalām and specifically Mu'tazilite thought, gaps in his epistemology (because they are lost,
Saadya took for granted, and/or Saadya did not feel the need to expound upon) can be
explored and oftentimes filled using like-minded thinkers from his milieu who employed
the same structures and terminology. Sarah Stroumsa describes Saadya's philosophy as
being built "on a Kalām technique of analysis of (possible) arguments", in which, he
combines "the Kalām fascination with heresiography, and incorporates it within a
conventional Kalām structure of theological discussion." His "innovation," per Stroumsa,
is the "calculated upgrading of the technique into a comprehensive methodology, which
dictates the framework of the discussion and informs it with an almost obsessively
controlled search for the one, perfectly constructed truth."362 This considerable influence
of Kalām has led many scholars, including Maimonides, to view Saadya and the other
Geonim as Mutakallimūn, but as Stroumsa points out "the question arises, however, how

The Mutakallimūn ( )متكلمونwere scholars of ʿIlm al-Kalām (ع ِْلم الكَﻼم, literally "science of discourse") or
Kalām for short. Kalām as a discipline incorporates reasoning to explain, argue for and defend fundamental
Islamic beliefs and doctrines which are necessary for a Muslim to believe in. Collette Sirat points out that:
"In his inquiry, Saadiah often uses arguments drawn from Kalām, and the plan of the Amānāt immediately
delimits his intellectual context. The first two chapters treat of the unity of God, as is generally done at the
beginning of Mu'tazilite treatises, the next seven of the justice of God, the second Mu'tazilite principle."
Colette Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 22.
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to reconcile Maimonides’ devastating evaluation of the Kalām with the stature of Saadya
and the magnitude of his contribution to Jewish thought" in addition to other significant
differences between Saadya's approach and Kalām. 363 While I will not address whether
Saadya is a Mutakallim, the influences on his thought cannot be denied such that
accounting for Saadya's theory of testimony should also reveal insights into a
Mutakallimūn (e.g. Mu'tazilite) theory of testimony.
Truth for Saadya is directly tied to speech.364 Truth relies on a correspondence
between statements (propositions) and reality such that, according to Hegedus, "Truths are
conceived of as statements out of which further statements can be deduced by strictly
logical methods."365 Saadya even states a proof (burhān) consists of speech (Kalām):
Text 3.2.2.1
For the sake of elucidation let it be assumed that a person is looking for
proof (burhana) by means of which he might arrive at the truth (correctness,
ṣahiyi). Now such a proof (burhān) is a statement (kalām), and a statement
(kalām) is a kind of sound, and sounds are of many types.366
To find the truth, Saadya employs a method that consists of a formal analysis influenced
by a Kalām structure of discussion and review of alternative positions or arguments. The
first step in Saadya's method is to systematically reduce each problem to its smallest
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 والكﻼم فهو نوع من انواع الصوت واﻻصوات فكثيرة,وشرح ذلكى كمن يطلب برهانا ليقف به على الصحيى ونحن نعلم ان البرهان كﻼم
الضروب
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components often resulting in a linguistic analysis. Knowledge then can be understood as
being built up first from sounds, then syllables, and finally words and propositions. 367 Air
serves as a medium to transmit the sounds.368 Then Saadya provides the alternatives to a
given question in a list which he whittles down one by one with an accumulating number
of arguments (the objections to the first apply to the second, and so on). Once all the
incorrect views have been refuted, Saadya proves the remaining correct view with
prooftexts from scripture.369 Failure to obtain knowledge results from terminating the
process prematurely (making doubt the agent's fault), such that one is left with an
unexplored or unexplained cognitive state.
Saadya's epistemology is influenced by Mu'tazilite thought which begins with an
agent who "finds oneself" (wajad nafsah) in a cognitive state: "being convinced" (mu'taqid)
or "reflecting" (nāẓir). The experience of finding oneself in a state of knowing (ḥāl) is the
beginning of one's personal epistemology which requires one to deduce whether one is
knowing because of a cause (sabab or 'illa) or an assumption (zann).370 Since all knowledge
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from nine, and seven from eight, until all the alloy is removed and the tested and purified remain." Israel
Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 33, no. 2 (October 1942): 151–52.
368
"Air receives the sound of a speaker and transmits it to us. When it is not struck by a sound, however, we
hear nothing. Yet we do not on that account say that the air, which does not transmit any sound, is the opposite
of sound, but merely that it betokens the absence of sound." Air is also the medium for light (sight) and smell.
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 54. Treatise I; (Rosenblatt trans., 65).
369
Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 5.
370
Jan R. T. M Peters, God’s Created Speech: A Study in the Speculative Theology of the Muʻtazilî Qâḍî lQuḍât Abû l-Ḥasan ʻAbd al-Jabbâr Bn Aḥmad al Hamad̲ânî (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 48.
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(except God's) has a cause (sabab), being convinced (mu'taqid) requires a cause,
specifically conviction (i'tiqād).371 The agent is thus tasked with ascertaining the cause of
their cognitive state based on the combination of two criterion: i) an objective criterion of
truth, and ii) a subjective repose or tranquility of the soul (sukûn an-nafs).372 Following
J.R.T.M. Peters assessment of Mu'tazilite 'Abd al-Jabbār's (935-1025) epistemology,
conviction (i'tiqād) is a genus with various species.373 As shown in Chart 3.2.2.2, the
species of conviction include: ignorance (jahl, either the absence of knowledge or "misconviction" i.e. beliefs that do not correspond with reality) results from having neither the
criterion of truth nor repose of the soul (repose of the soul but no criterion of truth, often
understood as zann—assumption—collapses into this category); uncritical adherence
(taqlīd, to accept words without verification) results from having the criterion of truth but
no repose of the soul; and, the goal, knowledge ('ilm) which results from having both the
criterion of truth and repose of the soul.

371

This is not because the agent made a conviction or willed to believe (Saadya rejects doxastic voluntarism).
Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 15.
372
In the Amānāt Saadya says "he who is capable of knowledge without depending upon a cause (sabab) is
none other than the Creator of the universe." and gives sukûn an-nafs a confirmatory function in his account
of testimony. Cf. Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Intro & Treatise III, 10, 126–27; (Rosenblatt trans., 13,
155–57).
373
'Abd al-Jabbar is antecedent to Saadya; however, from Saadya's reliance on Kalām it is clear that 'Abd
al-Jabbar accurately reflects the thought and milieu of the time. Peters, God’s Created Speech, 41.
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Chart 3.2.2.2

Does agent have
"repose of the soul"?

Yes

Does agent have "the criterion of truth"?
No

Yes

Knowledge ('ilm)

No

Uncritical adherence (taqlīd)

(Not explained, but conceptually
possible) An "assumption" (zann)
that is false fits here, but
understood by the mis-conviction
sense of jahl
Ignorance or Mis-conviction
(jahl)

This framework fits Saadya's stated goal for al-Amānāt and provides a better translation
and understanding of the book's title—al-Amānāt wal-'I‘tiqādāt—which Efros translates
as "The Book of Dogmas and Convictions" as in turning dogmas (blind-faith) into
conviction (reasoned/confirmed knowledge). 374 Knowledge is traceable to four sources:
sense perception (eye-witness), reason (intuition of the intellect), inference (logical
necessity), and Trustworthy Tradition (al-khabar al-sādiq, literally "trustworthy reports")
which is the revealed Written and Oral Law. 375 Saadya sets the fourth root of knowledge

374

Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 163–64. Hegedus confirms both the Muʿtazilite framework and
Efros's translation as keeping with Saadya's overall goal in al-Amānāt: "Conviction is measured against its
objective content, i.e., how far it agrees with reality, and secondly against its intensity, i.e., how firmly it is
rooted in the soul. The objectively defined set of beliefs is referred to as amāna, and in this way the title of
Saadya’s magnum opus [al-Amânât] refers to the external, objective present and articulated doctrine of faith
(amānāt ‘beliefs’) and its internalized subjective dimension (iʿtiqādāt ‘opinions, convictions’). The concept
of ‘conviction’ functions as a general epistemological category which is based on the attitude of the soul
towards the object of knowledge. …For Saadya, conviction is always generated by the translation of
information coming from an external source into the categories existing in the intellect. Where they coincide,
we can speak of the institution of meaning. …The definition of the concept of ‘conviction’ appears to rely
on the description of the process of internalization. Thus, conviction is equal to (objective) truth internalized
in the soul by way of speculation by the intellect." Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 25.
375
Efros notes that Saadya is indebted to the Mutakallimūn once more for these four sources. Efros interprets
the four as "Sensation," "Nous,", "Necessity", and "Tradition." Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 134.
Cf. Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Intro, 12–13; (Rosenblatt trans., 16–17).
ّ
ّاﻻول فينبغى ان نذكر مواد
| للحق ومعطيات اليقين التى هى معدن لك ّل معلوم وينبوع لكل معروف
ّ واذ قد انقضى ما اردنا للحاقه بالقول
ونتكلّم عليها بمقدار ما يوافق قول صدر هذا الكتاب ونقول انّها موادّ اﻻول علم الشاهد والثانية علم العقل والثالثة علم ما دفعت الضرورة اليه
حواس ا ّما ببصر او بسمع او بمش ّم او
| ونتبع ذلك بشرح واحد واحد من هذه اﻻصول ونقول ا ّما علم الشاهد فهو ما ادركه اﻻنسان باحد ال
ّ
بذوق او بلمس
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apart arguing it is both derived by means of the first three roots and simultaneously
"corroborates" (yuḥaqqiqu) their validity.376 A distinction thus emerges between sources
of earned and received knowledge stemming from Islamic jurisprudence and the Kalām
school's dual basis of rationality and scripture which are not seen as contradictory but two
pillars supporting human knowledge.377 This overlaps the Mu'tazilite conception between
intuitive knowledge ('ilm ḍarūrī, also referred to as "immediate" or "necessary"
knowledge) resulting from one's personal effort or acquired knowledge ('ilm muktasab)
obtained from someone else.378 David Sklare points out that Saadya rather confusingly
applies the terminology differently referring to intuitive knowledge as 'ilm al-'aql and

376

"As for ourselves, the community of monotheists, we hold these three sources of knowledge to be genuine.
To them, however, we add a fourth source, which we have derived by means of the [other] three, and which
has thus become for us a further principle. That is [to say, we believe in] the validity of trustworthy tradition
(al-khabar al-sadiq), by reason of the fact that it is based upon the knowledge of the senses as well as that of
reason, as we shall explain in the third treatise of this book. At this point however, we remark that this type
of knowledge (I mean that which is furnished by trustworthy tradition (al-khabar al-sadiq), and the book of
prophetic revelation), corroborates (yuḥaqqiqu) for us the validity of the first three sources of knowledge.
Thus it enumerates the senses in connection with the denial of their functioning in the case of the idols,
making them a total of five with two more added to them." Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Intro, 14;
(Rosenblatt trans., 18). Tr. Mod.
وا ّما نحن جماعة الموحّدين فنصدّق بهذه الثﻼث موادّ التى للعلم ونضيف اليها مادّة رابعة استخرجناها بالثﻼث فصارت لنا اصﻼ وهى صحّة
للحس وعلم العقل كما سنبين فى المقالة الثالثة من هذا الكتاب | فنقول هاهنا ان هذا العلم اعنى الخبر
ى على علم
ّ
ّ الخبر الصادق فانّه مبن
ّ
الحواس فى باب نفيها عن اﻻوثان فيجعلها يضم اليها
 اصول | انّها علوم صحيحة لنه يحصى٣المنزلة يحقّق لنا هذه ال
الصادق والكتاب
ّ
377
Regarding the Islamic influence, Stroumsa notes, "The epistemology of the Jewish Mutakallimūn is built
upon a firm belief in human rationality as a tool for obtaining a true picture of the world and a sound
interpretation of Scripture. The intellectual endeavor is perceived as both a natural human drive and a
religious duty. The basic sources of knowledge for each individual are sense perception and rational thought.
The knowledge accumulated over the years by generations of scholars is added to these, in the form of
transmitted interpretive information ('the veridical tradition')." Stroumsa, "Saadya and Jewish Kalām," 73.
378
The division can be traced at least as far back as Bishr ibn al-Mu'Tamir (d. 825) who founded the Baghdad
school of Muʿtazila (and thus a plausible source for Saadya). Another possible influence might be Muʿtazili
al-Gahiz (d. 869), who also studied in Baghdad. His monograph Hugag al-nubuwwa offers the two traditional
Islamic proofs for the verification of prophets as miracles and tawātur which also appear in Saadya's thought.
In The Economy of Certainty which details the Islamic ḥadīth tradition as tawātur knowledge, Aron Zyzow
claims that holding knowledge from tawātur is muktasab goes back to al-Mu'tamir. Aron Zyzow, The
Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory, Resources in Arabic and
Islamic Studies 2 (Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013), 15.
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inductive knowledge as ‘ilm ḍarūrī where inductive knowledge is acquired from another
following rational reflection (nāẓir).379
Intuitive knowledge is non-discursive and rationally available to all because of the
agent's activity. There are two kinds of intuitive knowledge: direct and indirect. 380 First,
direct knowledge is the immediate apprehension of one's inner experience, i.e., to "find
oneself" (wajad nafsah) in a cognitive state. This includes perceiving that one is either
convinced (mu'taqid) or reflecting (nāẓir). If one finds that one is convinced, then one
recognizes a stable connection between themselves and a thing. Even though this first kind
of intuitive knowledge is direct, experience does not define or provide knowledge. This
turns to the second type, indirect knowledge which occurs "by way of something." The
primary "way" to knowledge is sense perception, which is not knowledge itself, nor does
it generate knowledge. Likewise, the knowledge sources of reason (intuition of the
intellect) and inference (logical necessity) serve as ways to knowledge (like ethical
principles). Acquired or inductive knowledge, by contrast, is discursive knowledge

379

"Saadya uses the term 'ilm ḍarūrī to refer to inductive knowledge …For him, it [‘ilm ḍarūrī] therefore
refers to a type of discursive knowledge which the Muʿtazilis labeled "acquired knowledge...i.e., to
assumptions that we are forced to make in order to explain perceived phenomena as that if we see smoke
there must be fire." Saadya uses the term 'ilm al-'aql (intellectual knowledge, as opposed to sensual
knowledge), to refer to intuitive knowledge." Sklare, Samuel Ben Ḥofni Gaon and His Cultural World, 145–
47. For more on Muʿtazilite epistemology, cf. Jan R. T. M Peters, God’s Created Speech: A Study in the
Speculative Theology of the Muʻtazilî Qāḍî l-Quḍāt Abû l-Ḥasan ʻAbd al-Jabbār Bn Aḥmad al Hamad̲ānî
(Leiden: Brill, 1976), 51. Marc Herman makes a misleading statement saying that received tradition possess
the characteristics of "necessary" knowledge (‘ilm ḍarūrī; as opposed to "acquired" knowledge, ‘ilm
muktasab) seemingly unaware that Saadia's usage of the terminology is not consistent with the Muʿtazilite
usage: "Saadia also articulated his understanding of extrascriptural traditions using the terminology of
contemporary Mu'tazilites, asserting that received tradition, which he considered to be rabbinic teachings,
possesses the characteristics of "intuitive" or "necessary" knowledge (‘ilm ḍarūrī; as opposed to "acquired"
knowledge, ‘ilm muktasab). Marc Herman, “Prophetic Authority in the Legal Thought of Saadia Gaon,”
Jewish Quarterly Review 108, no. 3 (2018): 283. It is possible Herman is referring to a direct perception of
"knowing," a blind knowing (taqlîd), or an assumption (ẓann) that is "awakened" by testimony, but this does
not qualify as knowledge ('ilm) in the strict Muʿtazilite framework (even though Saadya does not restrict his
use of 'ilm to the latter).
380
Peters, God’s Created Speech, 51.
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acquired from another following rational reflection (nāẓir). Testimony, whether human or
divine, does not create immediate or necessary knowledge since it must be verified through
reflection. Since this rational reflection (nāẓir) is the basis for knowing the truths of the
fourth source of knowledge, all testimony, including revelation, which Saadya defines as
"that which is furnished by Trustworthy Tradition (al-khabar al-sādiq, literally
"trustworthy reports") and the books of prophetic revelation," falls under acquired
knowledge. The result is the fourth source of knowledge is literally the "hearing" of
"trustworthy reports" from both the Jewish religious community and God. Samuel
Rosenblatt translates the fourth root as "Authentic Tradition," which tends to obscure the
testimonial connection, but does reflect Saadya's inclusion of religious communal
authority.381 In this way, the earned vs. received distinction between knowledge sources
serve as: 1) coequal approaches to knowledge since both build on the same underlying
reality making them unable to contradict one another (when properly interpreted); 382 and
2) a means to validate and verify the other sources. 383 Hence, Saadya claims that

381

Rosenblatt renders  للخبرالصادقas "Authentic Tradition." Alexander Altmann uses the translation "Reliable
Tradition", Stroumsa prefers "Veridical Tradition", and Michael Linetsky also translates it as "Trustworthy
Tradition."
382
"Saadiah was convinced that Torah and science spring from the same branch; they cannot contradict each
other in any way". Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages. 23. For example, both human
reason and revelation can grasp even moral principles independently as Saadya states in the introduction to
his commentary on Job. Cf. Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Theodicy: Translation and Commentary on the
Book of Job, trans. Lenn Evan Goodman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 124. Unaided reason,
being capable of grasping universal ethical principles, has been recognized as another potential Muʿtazilite
influence on Saadya. However, while reason can outline universal moral principles, it is revelation that
outlines the proper way to follow rational commandments. For alternative reading of the same claim cf.
Richard C. Taylor, “‘Truth Does Not Contradict Truth’: Averroes and the Unity of Truth,” TOPOI 19, no. 1
(2000): 3–16.
383
Verification is a crucial epistemic function for Saadya, even for divine testimony, which he often likens
to handling money using the prooftext "like tested silver is the speech of the righteous" (Prov. 10:20). Saadya
uses a moneylending example for his claim that the role of perceptible miracles is to verify revelation until
reason can later provide confirmation. Diana Lobel contrasts Saadya with a similar example in later Baḥya
ibn Paquda stating that for Saadya, "the matter is purely an epistemological one: how we verify truth." Diana
Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue Philosophy and Mysticism in Bahya Ibn Paquda’s “Duties of the Heart”
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc., 2007), 52–53. Cf. Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Intro,
3, 24-26; (Rosenblatt trans., 6, 31-33).
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Trustworthy Tradition simultaneously is "based upon the knowledge of the senses as well
as that of reason" and verifies (via prooftexts) the knowledge via sense perception,
intuition, and logical necessity.384 The result of this dual approach and verification is that
reason and revelation complement or mutually reinforce one another.
Reason needs revelation to corroborate or verify the first three roots because there
is a limit beyond which these three roots can provide no further knowledge. 385 Israel Efros
describes Saadya's view of thought as "pyramidal": "We begin with a broad and concrete
basis; and as we climb, the material thins until we have nothing to hold on." 386 Hegedus
describes a "flash-like" illuminative knowledge in Saadya (most prominent in Yeẓirah)
which "appears to be the only way to have an understanding about this 'other reality'; i.e.
'the first principles of things' beyond the reach of the senses." 387 Thus while sense
perception is the primary source, it is only a sufficient and not a necessary condition for
knowledge.388 Even though God is the most trustworthy speaker making his reports the
most certain form of knowledge, revelation requires reason. Oral reports can never be
accepted blindly for Saadya, but must be tested and confirmed by the other three roots of
knowledge: "Moreover this last source of knowledge [the senses] also confirms (ḥaqqaqa)

384

Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Intro, 14-15; (Rosenblatt trans., 18-19).
"I have furthermore stated that man advances from one idea to another until he arrives at a point which no
further knowledge is possible. There are three reasons for this." Saadya then lists: 1) the limited, finite, powers
of human bodies; 2) science is finite; and 3) sensation, by which the sciences are learned is finite. Thus, it is
impossible to derive the infinite from the finite. Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Treatise II, 74; (Rosenblatt
trans., 89).
وقلت ان اﻻنسان يترقَى من معلوم الى معلوم حتى ينتهى الى معلوم ﻻ معلوم وراءة لثﻼث خﻼل
386
Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 152–53. "Saadia does not state like Halevi that religion goes
further in its discovery of divine truth than philosophy. According to him wherever religion asserts, reason
can prove. This does contradict his admission of the limitation of philosophy, noted in §8, for to prove the
existence of a thing does not necessarily mean to understand its essence or causes." Ibid., 161.
387
Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 34.
388
Ibid., 30.
385
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for us the validity of trustworthy reports." 389 Revelation is linked to language and its
flexible or ambiguous nature on account of its extensiveness (ittisāʿ), which is, according
to Hegedus, "able to open a window onto the invisible realm which is otherwise
inexpressible."390 Saadya states that multiple connotations underly a single expression
which can only be unlocked by reason and proper interpretation. In order to transmit
multiple connotations "grasped by our minds at one blow" multiple expressions must be
employed since the literal meaning of one expression cannot express the full import of its
own intelligible content.391 Saadya later adds "unless there existed the possibility of an
extension of meaning in language, nothing more than the barest reference to substances
would have been within its competence—I have seen fit to indicate the various ways in
which they are to be interpreted so as to harmonize with reason." 392 Revelation needs
reason to methodically eliminate erroneous interpretations so the true meaning can emerge.
Given the broad division between knowledge as either earned or received, Israel
Efros and Abraham Heschel note a "dualism" or "contradiction" in Saadya's epistemology
between the first and second roots of knowledge (sense perception & rational intuition) in
their contributions to the Jewish Quarterly Review (1942-43). Heschel sees an
epistemological dualism emerging from Saadya's ontological dualism: "On the one hand,
he [Saadya] insists that all knowledge is derived from sense experience, that all our notions
are based on perception" and "On the other hand he speaks of an immediate knowledge

389

Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Intro, 15; (Rosenblatt trans., 19). Saadya here uses Job 15:17-19 as
prooftext and his commentary on the verse is also illuminating, cf. Text 3.3.1.6.
ّ ث ّم حقّق لنا اﻻخبار الصادقة انها
حق بقوله
390
Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 52.
391
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Treatise II, 74-75; (Rosenblatt trans., 101-2).
392
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, Treatise IV, 159-160; (Rosenblatt trans., 196-97).

112

that is inherent in the soul and independent of sense experience."393 Efros likens the two
approaches to Aristotelian sensation-based knowledge (e.g. empiricism) and Platonic
innate knowledge (e.g. rationalism) which Saadya combined such that the mind "is not a
blank tablet, but…comes endowed with all knowledge", and yet "this knowledge requires
awakening through experience and through reason working on the material of experience;
and that in so far as our innate knowledge has to be discovered and made articulate, it is at
the same time all based on our sensation" (e.g. "empirical rationalism"). 394 Hegedus bases
his book Saadya Gaon: The Double Path of the Mystic and the Rationalist (2013) on this
epistemological tension and appears more in agreement with Efros claiming Saadya
combines the two distinct epistemological frameworks. 395 These differing frameworks
appear in his two main philosophical works: al-Amānāt describes an "externally oriented
foundationalism" while the Yeẓirah "displays features of an internalist (imagination-based)
coherentism."396 In his commentary on the book of Ecclesiastes, Saadya desires proofs for
two types of wisdom, which Hegedus neatly summarizes:
[Saadya] attempts to arrive at an understanding of wisdom as an easily
attainable, evident type of knowledge (based on sense perception), while
simultaneously maintaining an understanding of it as a remote, challenging
and ultimately unattainable realm (involving such processes as the precise
understanding of the creation, of the soul, etc.). After having established
this double nature of wisdom, he emphasizes the necessity of striving for

393

Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 147–48; Abraham Heschel, “The Quest for Certainty in Saadia’s
Philosophy,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 33, no. 3 (January 1943): 280.
394
Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 147–49.
395
"I cannot but agree with the above-mentioned authors concerning the following three statements: (1) in
the epistemology of the KAI [al-Amānāt] there exists a tension, or rather bi-polarity, between the sources of
sense perception and the immediate knowledge of the soul, (2) an ontological duality between body and soul
is expressed as well, and (3) similar epistemological structures existed in antiquity." Hegedus goes on to
argue "that Saadya attempts to make use of two distinct epistemological frameworks based on different
philosophical traditions in order to attain two goals, namely, (1) to justify Judaism as a network of convictions
based on objective reality, and (2) to offer an appropriate reading for an enigmatic text that seems to
contradict the Biblical story of creation." Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 12–13.
396
Ibid., 14.
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the latter type of wisdom as well, even if it does not promise the same
concrete results as the first type.397

The result is what Hegedus calls a "double foundationalism" or two frameworks with
different approaches to the same epistemological problem "examined from different angles
and expressed with different terminologies."398 The picture in al-Amānāt is humans build
up knowledge from sensation (epistemology precedes and thus shapes ontology) while in
Yeẓirah divine knowledge disseminates down into the human mind (ontology precedes and
supersedes epistemology). Saying the two works are "analogous is not strong enough,"
according to Hegedus, "rather, they are better described as being homologous, or even
isomorphic."399 Since God is understood as the ultimate source of knowledge, Saadya
indicates that even rational knowledge is really "acquired" since God puts knowledge in
the Reason of all humans and sense perception is merely a way to "awaken" it.400
Within this epistemological dualism, testimony seems to belong to acquired
knowledge while simultaneously providing a vital role for rational knowledge. Even
though testimony is discursive and requires verification, Saadya seems to want testimony
to be an intuitive kind of knowledge. Efros notes that Saadya's illustrations "seem to show
that the assent to tradition is meant to belong to the second class ["root"] of knowledge, to
be intuitive rather than reasoned, though discursive reason too approves the contents of
397

Ibid., 39 footnote 87.
Ibid., 69.
399
Ibid., 115.
400
'Abd al-Jabbar claimed God created knowledge in the perceiving subject at the time of perception. Saadya
like the Mu'tazilites, and unlike al-Fārābī, did not hold to the Aristotelian philosophical conception of Reason
or 'aql as a distinct intellect, but as the summation of things known. Sklare reports that Mutazilite "'Abd alJabbār explicitly rejects the view of 'aql as a substance, instrument, sense or faculty. In the Mu'tazili
conception, reason distinguishes not only between true and false but also between good and evil. People who
have enough life experience and who have developed their moral intuition to the point of being able to
distinguish between good and evil are said to have a mature or perfected reason (kamāl al-'aql)." Sklare,
Samuel Ben Ḥofni Gaon and His Cultural World, 145.
398
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tradition."401 The result is Saadya gives testimony a unique role that is simultaneously
highlighted and obfuscated between divine and human speakers.
3.3 Testimony in Saadya Gaon
In the prolegomena to his commentary on the Psalms, Saadya outlines eighteen different
categories of speech explicitly demarcating divine and human speech. 402 The result is that
for Saadya, revelation, or Tradition, is unmistakably testimonial. 403 Saadya speaks of
acquired knowledge and revelation almost synonymously since revelation is literally words
heard from God and transmitted by humans. As shown above, Trustworthy Tradition, i.e.,
revelation, is a unique source of knowledge that works in collaboration with reason.
Tradition has a tradition it would seem since the Mu'tazilite view of Tradition came from
the Persians, who in turn acquired it from the Aristotelian commentators. 404 However, it is
important not to collapse the fourth source of knowledge and testimony proper.

401

Efros adds: "This is in keeping with the general Jewish and Arabic view, which…goes back to Alexander
of Aphrodisia, that the mekubalot or traditions require no proof." Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,”
162.
402
Saadya divides the five main types of Speech (Exhortation, Inquiry, Narrative, Imperative, and
Intercession) into " 1. Exhortation. 2. Inquiry; Hyperbole. 3. Inquiry; Rhetorical. 4. Narrative: Past, Divine;
prehistoric. 5. Narrative: Past, Divine; historic good. 6. Narrative: Past, Divine; historic - bad. 7. Narrative:
Past, Human; pre-historic. 8. Narrative: Past, Human; on behalf of Israelites. 9. Narrative: Present, Divine.
10. Narrative: Present, Human. 11. Narrative: Future, Divine; Invitation. 12. Narrative: Future, Divine;
Intimidation. 13. Com- mand; Singular. 14. Command; Plural. 15. Prohibition; Singular. 16. Prohibition;
Plural. 17. Intercession; Singular. 18. Intercession; Plural." Sa’adia ben Joseph, “Saadiah Gaon’s
Prolegomenon to Psalms,” ed. Moshe Sokolow, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research
51 (1984): 137, 143.
403
Saadya explicitly says as much in his commentary on the book of Job referring to "the book’s testimony
(shahāda, שהאדה,  )شهادةthat he [Job] was a blameless, upright, and godfearing man (1:1)." Sa’adia ben Joseph,
The Book of Theodicy, 130. Sa’adia ben Joseph, Version Arabe Du Livre de Job de R. Saadia Ben Iosef alFayyoûmî, Publiée Avec Des Notes Hébraïques Par W. Bacher. Accompagnée d’une Traduction Française
d’aprés Farabe Par J. Derenbourg et H. Derenbourg, ed. Wilhelm Bacher, vol. 5, Œuvres Complètes de r.
Saadia Ben Iosef al-Fayyoûmî (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1899), 7.
404
"The idea of tradition as a source of knowledge, Saadia took over from the Mutakallimūn. But they did
not originate it. It came to them from the Syrians; for Paula Persa in his Logica says: "Knowledge, either a
man seeks and finds, or it is acquired by instruction. Instruction is partly transmitted directly from man to
man, and partly by men who came with a message, i.e., from the angels." The Syrians in turn took it over
from the Aristotelian commentators; for, as J. P. N. Land shows, from the opening words of Aristotle's
Posterior Analytics: "all doctrine and all intellectual discipline arise from preexistent knowledge," Alexander
of Aphrodisia inferred authority of tradition." Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 159–60.
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"Testimony" is not revelation and revelation is not "testimony." In the same vein, it is
important not to assume revelation is ipso facto acquired knowledge ('ilm muktasab).
In al-Amānāt Treatise III chapter 6, Saadya gives a lengthy explanation of what,
why, and how God made Scripture available to humans (what: namely historical
summaries; why: to make people more virtuous). 405 The how of Scripture is via testimony.
Saadya argues a fortiori from the necessity of trusting human testimony to that of divine
testimony. This passage also reveals the depth of Mu'tazilite influence ranging from the
use of the technical term ṣaḥiḥa, the repose of the soul, allusion to the consensus
verification of reports (tawātur), and concluding using the term thabit.406 Rosenblatt
provides a faithful translation from the Arabic Landauer translation which I have
reproduced here with modification since Rosenblatt (perhaps to better capture Saadya's
argument) glosses any mention of a correct or trustworthy reports as "Authentic Tradition"
which can have the unfortunate effect of unnecessarily linking the whole of testimony to
the fourth root of knowledge.
Text 3.3.0.1
Furthermore, let me say that it was well known to the All-Wise, exalted and
magnified be He, that His precepts and the reports ('akhabār)] of His signs
would in the course of time require transmitters, in order that these matters
might seem as correct (ṣaḥiḥa) to posterity as they did to the early ancestors.
405

Saadya states only three basic themes are communicated by all the prophetic and scholarly work in
Scripture: 1) commands and prohibitions; 2) rewards and punishments; and 3) "an account of the men that
lived virtuously…and were, therefore, successful, as well as of those who dealt corruptly in them and perished
as a result." These three themes fully serve the "interests of human well-being." Saadia Gaon, Kitāb alAmānāt, 126-127. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 154-155). Saadya gives a parallel account in the prolegomena to
his Commentary on the Psalms. Sa’adia ben Joseph, “Saadiah Gaon’s Prolegomenon to Psalms,” 137.
406
Ṣaḥiḥa – "This is the most general term to qualify a proposition which is true, the contents of which
correspond with reality. The noun "being correct" is rendered by "ṣaḥḥa" (correctness), and the act of
demonstrating that a proposition is correct by the verbal noun "taṣḥiḥ"; to be correct is rendered by the verb
"ṣaḥḥ".
thabit – "This qualification, given to a proposition, indicates that the proposition concerned 'stands firm and
immobile', expresses an established fact, and, consequently, is certain. 'Abd al-Jabbar happens to use this
term sometimes by way of conclusion, to indicate that a proposition because of the argumentation given has
become to express an established fact." Peters, God’s Created Speech, 80, 84.
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Therefore did He render the human mind susceptible to the acceptance of
trustworthy tradition (al-khabar al-sādiq) and the human soul capable of
finding repose (sukûn) therein, so that His Scriptures and traditions [reports,
('akhabār)] might be acknowledged as true (in perfect condition, ṣalaḥa).
I deem it proper also to call to mind the following details that lend color to
the correctness of reports (ṣaḥḥa al-khabar). For example, were it not for
the fact that man felt satisfied in their hearts that there is such a thing in the
world as correct reports, (khabara ṣaḥiḥa), no person would be able to
cherish legitimate expectations on the basis of the reports he receives about
the success of a certain commercial transaction, or the usefulness of a
specified art—and, after all, the realization of man’s potentialities and the
satisfaction of his needs depend upon enterprise. Nor would he heed the
warnings about the dangers of a certain road, or the announcement of the
prohibition of a certain act. [However,] without such expectations and
apprehensions he would fail in his undertakings*.
Again, were it not for the assumption that there exists in the world {such a
thing as} correct reports (khabar ṣaḥiḥa)], men would accept neither the
command nor the interdict of their ruler, except when they saw him with
their own eyes and heard his words with their own ears. In the event of his
absence, however, the acceptance on their part of his command and interdict
would cease. But if things were like that, it would mean the end of law and
order, and the death of many human beings.
Also, were it not for the existence in the world of such a thing as correct
reports (khabara ṣaḥiḥa)], no man would be able to identify the property of
his father or his inheritance from his grandfather. Nay, he would not even
be certain of being the son of his mother, let alone of his being the son of
his father. The result would then be that the affairs of men would always be
subject to doubt, to the point where human beings would believe only what
they perceive with their senses at the time of perception. Such a viewpoint
would we have mentioned be close to the theory of the Skeptics, whom we
have mentioned in the first treatise.
Now the Scriptures, too, assert that trustworthy tradition (al-khabar alsādiq)] is as correct (ṣaḥiḥa) as things perceived with our own eyes. That is
the import of their statement: For pass over to the isles of the Kittites, and
see, and send unto Kedar, and consider diligently (Jer. 2:10). But why, in
the portion of this verse pertaining to the report, were the words and
consider diligently added? My answer is that a report is subject to
falsification [corruption/imperfection, (fasad)] in two directions from which
direct observation is immune. It may be due either to false impression or
else to deliberate misrepresentation. That is why Scripture says: and
consider diligently.
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Now when we ponder these two criteria of the trustworthiness of reports
(al-khabar), our reason arrives at the conclusion that it is only the individual
who is subject to and fooled by false impression or deliberate deception. In
the case of a large community of men, however, it is not likely that all of its
constituents should have been subject to the same wrong impressions. On
the other hand, had there been a deliberate conspiracy to create a fictitious
tradition, that fact could not have remained a secret to the masses, but
wherever the tradition had been published, the report of the conspiracy
would have been published along with it. When, therefore, a tradition is free
from the above-mentioned two flaws, there is no third means of invalidating
it. Accordingly, if the traditions transmitted to us by our ancestors are
viewed in the light of these [three] principles, they will be found to be proof
against these arguments, correct and unshakable (stable/firm, thabit).407
From Text 3.3.0.1, several aspects of Saadya's account of testimony become apparent.
First, there is such a thing in the world as "correct reports" (khabara ṣaḥiḥa) and that even
the most rationalist of thinkers is forced to rely on them.408 Saadya claims life would be
impossible without trustworthy testimony, for, just as Hume would later claim, daily affairs

407

Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 126-128. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 155-157). Tr mod.
ّ
| لﻸولين
 ج ّل,ث ّم اقول ﻻن الحكيم
ّ  من علمه ان شرائعه واخبار اعﻼمه تحتاج عاى طول الزمان الى ناقلين لتص ّح لﻸخرين كما صحّت,وعز
ّ جعل فى العقول مكانا لقبول الخبر الصادق وقى النفوس
محﻼ للسكون اليه لتص ّح به كتبه واخبارة | وارى ان اذكر جزئيّات من صحّة الجبر
ّ لوﻻ ان للنغوس تسكن الى ان فى الدنيا خبرا صحيحا لم يكن اﻻنسان يرجو ما سبيلة ان يرجوه م ّما يب
شر به من صﻼح التجارة الفﻼنيّة والنفع
ى ومن النداء
ّ فى الصناعة الفﻼنيّة اذ
ّ قوة النسان وحاجته موضوعة على التكسّب | ولم يكن ايضن يخاف ما يحذر منه من فساد الطريق الفﻼن
ى ما لم يرج ويخف فسدت عليه
ّ بالمنع من العمل الفﻼن
(the original Arabic text is defective here, see Hebrew below*)
ولو لم يوضع فى الدنيا خبر صحيح كان الناس ﻻ يقبلون أمر سلطانهم وﻻ نهيه ّاﻻ فى وقت ما يرونه بعيونهم ويسمعون كﻼمه بآذانهم | متى
غاب منهم ارتفع منهم قبول امرة ونهيه | ولو كان كذلك لبطل التدبير وهلك كثير من الناس | ولوﻻ ان فى الدنيا خبرا صحيح لم يحصل
لﻼبسان ان هذا ملك ابيه وان هذا ارث جدّه | بل لم يحصل لﻼبسان انّه ابن ا ّمه فضﻼ عن ان يكون ابن ابيه | ث ّم كانت امور الناس ﻻ تزال فى
| شكوك حتى ﻻ يصدّقوا ّاﻻ بما وقع عليه حسّهم فى وقت وقوعه فقط | وهذا المذهب قريب من قول المتجاهلين النى نكرناه فى المقالة اﻻولى
( כי עברו איי כתיים וראו וקדר שלחו2,10 وقد قالت الكتب ان للخبر الصادق صحّة كصحّة الشىء المدرك عيانا ذاك قولها )ירמיה
והתבוננו מאר ول ّم زاد فى باب الجبر והתבוננו מאר | فاقول ان الخبر قد يقع فيه فساد ما ليس يقع فى المحسوس من جهتين احداهما من
طريق الظنّ واﻻخرى من طريق التع ّمد | فلذلك قال והתבוננו מאד | فعند اجتهادنا فى هذين اﻻمرين كيف نامن الخبر عليهما وجدنا فى العقل
ان الظنّ والتع ّمد ﻻ يقعان فيخفيان ّاﻻ من الفراد | وا ّما الجماعة الكثيرة فان ظنونهم ﻻ تتّفق لكنّهم ان تع ّمدوا وتواطؤوا على ابداع خبر لم
ْ
| يخف ذلك على المﻸ منهم بل يكون خبرهم الى حيث ما خرج يخرج معه خبر تواطئهم | فاذا سلم الخبر من هذين فﻼ وجه ثالث يوجب فساده
ف ادا عرض خبر آبائنا على هذا اﻻصول وجده العارض سليما من هذه المطاعن صحيحا ثابتا
*The Hebrew of Ibn-Tibbon's text renders the defective section as "if he did not hope and fear, all his affairs
would be lost" ()אם לא יקוה ויירא יפסרו לו כל עניניו אמתית. Sa’adia ben Joseph, Ha-Emunot Ṿeha-Deʻot: Heʻetiḳo
Li-Śefat Ḳodshenu Yehudah Ibn Tibon., trans. Yehudah ibn Tibbon (Jósefów: Bi-defus B. Zetser, 1885), 114,
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100557881.
Alexander Altmann's translation is more word for word and does reflect the distinction made between types
of reports.: Cf. Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, 109–11.
408
Even Maimonides, like all Medieval philosophers, allows for instances of deriving beliefs from others, or
accepting their testimony, but as an unreliable source of knowledge. Thus, even strong-rationalists such as
al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes who built upon Aristotle’s teachings received them through a long
transmission of reports.
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would be plagued by doubt with people only believing what is immediately before their
senses.409 Second, the human mind is prepared to accept testimony such that it is not in a
perpetual state of doubt or unknowing. The mind for Saadya is its own agent "in the process
of percepts becoming concepts" since he did not hold to an Active or Agent Intellect. 410
Thus, Saadya is likely referring to faculties/powers (quwwa) of the soul, or a combination
thereof: first, knowing (i'lam) results from the "gathering faculty" (al-quwwa al-ḥāšira);
the ‘faculty of discernment’ (al-quwwa al-mumayyiza) then "discerns" (yaftakir, yumayyiz)
true facts by verification and false ones by invalidation; and finally the ‘faculty of
conviction’ (al-quwwa al-muʿtaqida) receives this information and, after becoming
convinced of its truth, preserves it.411 Third, reliable reports are susceptible to forms of
corruption that perception is not: i) an error in judgement and ii) willful distortion. This
simultaneously introduces a rational and moral component which makes knowledge
experts and virtuous figures more qualified speakers. Fourth, given these two corruptions,
tellings cannot cause conviction unless they are verified as not being susceptible to either.
However, if a telling's assertion is shown to be neither an error in judgement nor willful
deception, then it cannot be invalidated and causes conviction. As a result, Saadya
maintains that it is rational to accept tellings that overcome testimony's two corruptions.
This is the main thrust of the passage arguing for the rationality of Trustworthy Tradition:
God ordained human minds to be constituted in such a way as to receive reliable reports

409

Saadya here seems to anticipate Hume’s skepticism in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Chapter 4, Part 2: "As to past experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those
precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: But why this experience
should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance
similar; this is the main question on which I would insist." Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding,” 32.
410
Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 133.
411
Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 22.
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and accepting divine testimony is no more controversial than accepting day-to-day human
testimony which is necessary and ubiquitous. To quote Sklare: "Since the veracity of
revealed knowledge is essentially founded on universal reason, knowledge of revelation is
cogent and is theoretically known to be true by all rational men." 412 Saadya treats the two
as nearly indistinguishable (or is himself equivocating) by implicitly claiming that rejecting
Trustworthy Tradition (al-khabar al-sādiq) is tantamount to rejecting correct reports
(khabara ṣihiha) which would be the pinnacle of irrationality. Verification for the revealed
law comes from reason and the Mu'tazilite conception of consensus (tawātur) arguing that
fabrication or conspiracy would be impossible in communal groups without some report of
it.413 As we shall see below, the absence of a counter report for such large groups renders
the telling not only verified, but certain.
From Text 3.3.0.1 it follows that testimony proper best fits under acquired
knowledge requiring reflection for both human reports and divine reports transmitted by
humans; however, Saadya also treats hearing a speaker as a form of perception meaning
that testimony does not escape Saadya's epistemic dualism and cuts across both necessary
and acquired knowledge. Since testimony is tied to language, it is also tied to sensation.
Testimony, like all perception, is thus one of the "ways" necessary knowledge awakens
God given knowledge within. In the introduction to Kitāb Ṭalab al-ḥikma (The Book of the
Search for Wisdom, Tafsir Mishlei in Hebrew) his translation and commentary on Proverbs,
Saadya explains everyone needs guidance from a wise man (chacham) who helps awaken

412
413

Sklare, Samuel Ben Ḥofni Gaon and His Cultural World, 148.
tawātur ()تواتر
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inner knowledge by dispensing advice (and "the Wise One", i.e., God, saw it necessary to
provide the expressions of the wise man Solomon son of David). 414 Saadya writes:
Text 3.3.0.2
The audible things are discovered by the organ of hearing, and man testifies
(shahid): this is what I have heard and none other. The same is true of the
other organs of sensation. Similarly there is in the mind (al-'aql) a knowing
force (quwa) which, when confronted by intellectual matters, verifies them,
so that the person becomes convinced that they are undoubtedly the
concepts. According to this example all knowledge ('ilm) lies concealed
(maknun) in the mind; and the purpose of coming to know (bil'ta'ilm) and
acquisition (iktisāb) is only to discover it after its awakening, so that when
it stands before the mind, the mind testifies concerning it that it is the truth.
That is why he [Solomon] made this book and its vision in order to
wake/alert them in the mind and awaken to what was unknown to it and in
that he said: "O simple ones, understand prudence; and O fools, understand
the heart [wisdom] (Proverbs 8:5)." 415

414

The purpose of Proverbs, per Saadya, is guidance in pursuing wisdom. He understands Proverbs 1:1-7 to
be part of Solomon's introduction and thus interprets the list of terms as stages in the learning process:
"haśkel, 'instruction', is what the aspirant learns from the sage and from all rational matters such as
multiplication, division, and equations, such as one hundred is equal to one hundred, and one hundred is half
of two hundred. Tsedek, 'veracity', is what the student acquires by way of scrupulous proof, such as
geometrical proofs which require one, two, three or more steps. Mishpaṭ, 'justice', is what the aspirant learns
with regard to rational religious requirements, which are already embedded in his mind, such as the
distinction between good and evil. Meysharim, 'equity', are the commandments that are not required or
rejected by the intellect. They are the commandments and prohibitions that he follows in an upright manner."
Ilana Sasson, “The Book of Proverbs between Saadia and Yefet,” Intellectual History of the Islamicate World
1, no. 1–2 (2013): 161–63. For a Hebrew translation, cf. Sa’adia ben Joseph, Mishle ’im Targum Uferush
Ha-Ga’on Rabbenu Se’adyah Ben Yosef Fayyumi, trans. Yosef Qāfiḥ (Jerusalem: Ha-Vaʿad le-Hoṣaʾat Sifrei
Rasag, 1976).
415
English translation from Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 146–47. Tr mod. Saadya uses terms
loaded with epistemological meaning based on his other works so I have rendered learning as "coming to
know" ( )بالتعلمand clarified inference as acquisition ()اﻻكتساب.
Judeo-Arabic:
 כד'לך פי.אלמסמועאת אמ'הרתהא פמ'הר פשהד אלאנסאן עלי ד'לך אלשי אנה הו אלמסמוע לא נירה ועלי הד'א באקי אלחואס
 פעלי.''אלעקל קוה'' עאלמה'' פאד'א טאלעתהא אלאמור אלמעקולה'' איקנת בהא וצח ענד אלאנסאן אנהא הי לא סחאלה'' אלמעקולה
הד'א אלמת'אל כל עלם פהו מכנון פי אלעקל ואנמא אלמראד באלתעלם ואלאבתסאב נ'מיעא ליט'הרא ד'לך בער אלאת'ארה'' פאד'א
 פלד'לך ג'על הד'א אלכתאב ונט'ראה לינבהו עמא פי אלעקל וייקט'ו עלי מא כאן מנפולא.הו אנתצב ללעקל שהד עליה אנה אלחק
.ענה ופי ד'לך יקול הבינו פתאים ערמה וכסילים הבינו לב
Hebrew Translation:
]ואם היה הדבר מן[ הדברים הנשמעים יגלה אותן ]כח השמיעה[ ויעיד האדם על זה הדבר כי זה הוא ששמע ולא זולתו וכן בשאר
 ועל זה. כמו זה יש בשכל כח יודע וכשיערכו לפניו הדברים המושכלים יאמיתם ויתברר לאדם שהם בלי ספק המושכלים.החושים
הדמיון כל ידיעה מעונתה בשכל והכוונה בלימוד וההבנה היא רק שיגלו שניהם זאת הידיעה אחר שנתעוררה וכשהיא נצבה לפני
 ולפיכך חובר זה הספר והדומים לו להעיר האדם על מה שהוא בשכל ולעוררו על מה שלא שם לב.השכל יעיד עליה שהיא אמת
.(עליו ועל זה אמר הבינו פתאים ערמה וכםילים הבינו לב )משלי ח׳ ה׳
Sa’adia ben Joseph, Versio Arabe Des Proverbes, Surnommés Livre de La Recherche de La Sagesse de r.
Saadia Ben Iosef al-Fayyoûm, trans. Joseph Derenbourg and Mayer Lambert, Œuvres Complètes de r. Saadia
Ben Iosef al-Fayyoûmî, Publiées Sous La Direction de J. Derenbourg,v. 6 (Paris: E. Leroux, 1894), 9.
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Efros summarizes this text saying that, for Saadya, "Knowledge then lies concealed in the
mind, and reflection only discovers it, even as the ear discovers sound." 416 Whether the
knowledge awakens necessarily or requires reflection depends on what knowledge is being
awakened (e.g., moral truths such as the difference between right or wrong is a consistent
example of knowledge within that requires no reflection). This captures that all knowledge
is ultimately given by God.
Awakening knowledge via testimony occurs regardless of whether the speaker is
human or divine. Testimony in this sense clearly seems reducible to perception. 417 Any
speech, according to Saadya in his prolegomena to the Psalms, "which rationally, could not
have been said by man (i.e., all things future or prehistoric)" must be divine speech. 418 This
explains why Trustworthy Tradition must stand apart as a unique source of knowledge and
why Saadya references human and divine testimony in the same sentence. Reports of what
is beyond human limitations must originate with God and can only be known because they
are heard by a prophet who tells the people in an uninterrupted chain of transmission. 419
Parallel to the Arabic tradition, Saadya sees the Torah as dictated, from Genesis 1:1 to
Deuteronomy 34:4, by God to Moses, who told the officer of one thousand who told the
officers of one hundred so that all the nation learned what God taught them from generation
to generation. Despite the human role in transmitting the Laws of Revelation to subsequent
generations, Saadya gives it the weight of divine authority almost entirely denying human

416

Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 148. Also Cf Amānāt VI, 153.
Divine knowledge beyond human perception would be an exception.
418
Sa’adia ben Joseph, “Saadiah Gaon’s Prolegomenon to Psalms,” 139.
419
This is not a blind acceptance based on authority, for Saadya claims early in the Amānāt that he will
deliver people from such "taqlīd" Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 14. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 18).
417
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authority.420 To do so, "Saadia turned to methods found in Islamic literature to explain
internal Talmudic 'harmonization' of rabbinic disagreements," per Marc Herman, given
"Karaite allegations that disagreements in rabbinic literature undermine claims of the Oral
Torah’s unbroken transmission."421 Thus, as shown above, Saadya devises his
epistemology such that revelation needs reason and vis versa. Despite Saadya's overlapping
account of human and divine testimony I will evaluate them separately.
3.3.1 Human Testimony
While most of Saadya's discussions of testimony occur within the context of Trustworthy
Tradition, there are a few clear exceptions. The clearest example is Kitab al-Shahadah
wa'l-Watha'iq (The Book of Testimony and Legal Documents or Ṣefer ha-Shetarot in
Hebrew), a halakhic monograph thought lost but largely reconstructed from Genizah
fragments. The majority of the work deals with "standard clauses that recur in all or most
legal documents," and then specific legal documents (the last chapter is subdivided into 54
sections "devoted to the text of a single type of document and the rules associated with
it").422 The legal purview largely presumes a banking or financial context (such as
420

"Consistent with the characterization of the rabbis as transmitters of tradition, and not as its producers,
Saadia portrayed rabbinic tradition as prophetic and of great antiquity. He referred to rabbinic tradition as
naql (tradition), naql al-aslāf (tradition of the pious forbears), and āthār al anbiyā’ (traditions of the
prophets). Saadia also described rabbinic traditions as having 'reached' him (using Arabic phrases such as
jā’a al-āthār bi- and jā’a fī al-fiqh)." Herman, “Prophetic Authority in the Legal Thought of Saadia Gaon,”
283–84.
421
Herman notes Saadya felt the need to reconcile disagreements in addition to apparent contradictions unlike
his predecessors since "the amoraim were not troubled by the existence of disagreement per se but by
contradictions between earlier and later generation and by internal inconsistencies in the Mishnah." Herman
thus claims, that Saadya "appears to have been the first Rabbanite to attempt to harmonize conflicting
Talmudic traditions." Herman identifies three reasons Saadya gives for Torah transmitter disagreements by
Karaite Ya‘qūb al-Qirqisānī (10th C): "(1) temporary misunderstanding; (2) a transmitter heard only one
aspect of a prophetic report, and (3) a transmitter assumed that a statement was of general application (‘āmm)
when it actually referred to a specific case (khāṣṣ)." Herman concludes Saadya followed Islamic
jurisprudence in rooting the Oral Torah and other extra-biblical in primarily divine authority and not to "parry
Karaite claims" (without necessarily believing his own claims as some scholars have suggested. This is
because Muslim jurists likewise "attempted to jettison nonprophetic elements of religious law and sought to
root Islamic law solely in prophetic dictates." Ibid., 284–85, 292–93, 271.
422
Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish Culture, 258.
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testifying that a debtor is delinquent, that a loan has been repaid, or who may sign and cosign a bill). However, the first four chapters discus testimony in general providing a clear
view of human testimony in a non-theological setting.
As a legal scholar, Saadya has legal testimony in view, not testimony proper in this
work. Since legal testimony is not restricted to the courtroom, such as legally "testifying"
that one does not have a testimony on a litigant's behalf (i.e., an adjuration), distinguishing
between ordinary and legal testimony required Saadya write the treatise. One section is
devoted to distinguishing legal from proper testimony to determine what is admissible in
court:
Text 3.3.1.1
That which is knowledge of testimony should know that audible
speech/words between people does not qualify as legal testimony, such as
by Ruben saying to Simon: "you owe me 1,000 dirhams do you not?". He
says to him "yes"; and he had sat witnesses behind a curtain, [such that] they
heard it. It is not permissible to testify against him according to the wise
men Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Zarid…423
Being a halakhic text, however, Saadya makes frequent allusions to the Talmud and the
Mishna without citation or explanation of concepts (e.g., chapter 3 of the Sanhedrin

423

Sa’adia ben Joseph, “Fragments from Saadya’s ‘Sefer Ha-Edut Ve Ha-Shetarot’ / שרידים מספר העדות
והשטרות לרב סעדיה גאון,” ed. M. Ben-Sasson, Shenaton Ha-Mishpat Ha-Ivri: Annual of the Institute for
Research in Jewish Law / 75–173 :(1984) יב/שנתון המשפט העברי של המכון לחקר המשפט העברי יא. Translation mine
of the Judeo Arabic:
יגוז אן יתערפאה בקול מרה או קריב לה לק ואשתמודענוהי דהו >א< פלוני בד פלוני דהוא אחוהי דפלוני מיתנא דמן אבוהי אפילו
אשה ואפילו קרוב פלמא כאן הדא הו אלאצל אלמוצוע וגב אן יכון מן וגדנא כתאמתה עלי כתאב תם קאל אנה שהד עלי מא לם
נקבל מנה לאן פי אצול אלאחכאם אלמכתום עלי אלכתאב פהו כמן חצר ענד אלחאכם ואדא שהרתה לקו עדים החתומין יערפה לם
 וחכם כל מן אדי שהאדתה לא נקבל מנה נקצהא לק איצא כיון שהגיד שוב אינו חוזר:על השטר נעשו כמי שנחקרה עידותן בבית דין
.ומגיד אללהם אלא אן יכון אלמשהוד עליה אמראה ואלשאהד
Saason's Hebrew translation:
 בהם עדות ומשל אומר בראובן שאמר לשמעון8  לדעת שהדברים הנשמעים בפי הבריות לא חלה7 שהוא ידיעת איכות העדות ראוי
 אין העדים רשאים להעיד על11  והושיב לו עדים מאחורי פרגוד ושמעו אותו10  האם אין לי בידך אלף דרהם והלה אמרלו הן9
14  יהודה אמר רב וצריך שיאמר אתם עידי13  כמו שאמרו החכמים אמ׳ רב, עד שיאמר להם העידו עליי12 שמעון בשום דבר
 עליו והתאפק16  בין אמרלהם מישמעידים לו העידו, העידו עליי15 ושווה (=ואין חלוק) לעדים בין אמר להם מישמעידים בו
. לנתבע הנה אלה יעידו עליך17 (=ושתק) מי שמעידים עליו או אמרהתובע
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includes witnesses hidden under bed curtains as a lender questions a debtor). 424 Such
references could be taken as Saadya's endorsement of a broadly Jewish theory of testimony
stemming from the Written and Oral Law.
Despite this distinction between common and legal testimony, Saadya discusses
testimony in a way that applies to both. In his introduction, he simultaneously highlights
the importance of testimony and its pitfalls:
Text 3.3.1.2
…whoever looks at this book will be astonished at what [the trial] is called,
being very amazed and say 'are not the pillars of the trial built on the
statements of the litigants? And in turn on the witnesses' statements?' And
you do not have a litigant who will make or respond to a claim without it
being possible to express what he has in mind. And likewise you have no
witness whatsoever without it being possible that he will neglect in the story
or expand, until he exceeds what he has to tell. And if both of these things
are the roots (of the law), then how will the branches be true? 425
Saadya thus reiterates not only the centrality of testimony but also its two corruptions. He
goes on to identify the "greater defect" of testimony as wrongly accepting false testimony
(i.e., the judge thinks the witness speaks justice when in truth they are false). This problem
cannot completely be avoided, but Saadya claims injustice in the Earthly courtroom will

At the time of this writing Ben-Sasson informed me his forthcoming "Sa'adya Gaon's book of deeds and
testimonies (a critical edition, translation and notes)" is still unavailable.
424
Also Cf. Sanhedrin 29 and Shevuot 4 for instances of testimony.
425
Sa’adia ben Joseph, “Fragments from Saadya’s ‘Sefer Ha-Edut Ve Ha-Shetarot’ / שרידים מספר העדות
66–165 ”,והשטרות לרב סעדיה גאון. Translation mine of the Judeo Arabic:
פאקול אן אלנאטר פי הדא אלכתאב יתעגב מן תסמיתה חקא עגבא טוילא פיקול כיף והי מוצועה קואעדהא עלי כלאם אלכצום דאירה
 ומא מן כצם יתכלם בדעוי או בגואב ענהא אלא וימכן אן יכון לם יחכם אלעארה בלפטה עמא.אקטאבהא עלי מקאל אלשהוד
 וכדלך מא מן שאהד אן יחכי מא חצרה אלא וימכן אן יקצר פי אל חכאיה או יתםע חתי יכרג ען חד אלשי אלמחכי פאדא.פינפםה
.כאן הדאן אצלהא פכיף תכון פרועהא חקא
Sasson's Hebrew translation:
( והלא עמודי המשפט23)  ( ישתומם על מה ש)המשפט( נקרא אמת השתוממות רבה ויאמר איך22) ואומר שהמסתכל בספר הזה
( טענה או ענה מענה עליה מבלי25) ( קטביו על דבר העדים ואין לך בעל דין אשר יטען24) בנויים על דברי בעלי הדין ומסתובבים
( מבלי שיהיה אפשרי שיתרשל28) ( וכמו כן אין לך עד מגיד דבר מה27) ( להביע את אשר בנפשו26) שיהיה אפשרי שלא היטיב
( שרשי )הדין( איך יהיו ענפיו אמת2)  ואם שני הדברים האלה הם. עד שיצא מגבול מה שעליו לספר, ( בסיפור או שירחיב29)
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ultimately be corrected in the afterlife.426 With the problem established, Saadya gives the
reason for the treatise saying:
Text 3.3.1.3
…that the purpose of this book is to verify the story of the witness's words
[testimonies] orally and in writing and it is possible to encompass both of
these matters in the quotation of chapters and I will mention their names
and then their details. And it is all this book and this book will be small in
scope and great in its usefulness.427
Most of Saadya's discussions on verifying testimony focus on the witnesses and the
particular situation. The halakhic rule of two witnesses is presumed, but considerable
attention is paid to who constitutes a witness (such as women and family members of the
litigants) and their character.428 Saadya gives the first qualification in his introduction
pertaining to the witnesses' faithfulness to religion stating "scripture said and told me:
faithful witnesses, they must be faithful and trustworthy about their religion and others." 429
Saadya echoes the Talmud in identifying undependable witnesses by either a bodily defect
that would prevent a complete testimony (such as being deaf, blind, or a fool) or a moral
defect that calls their testimony into question (such as moneylenders, thieves, and "those
who play the cube" i.e., gamblers). Remaining factors are to be determined by the judge. 430

426

Ibid., 166.
Ibid., 170. My translation of the Judeo Arabic:
אוגב אן יכונא אומנא מאמונין עלי דינהם ועלי גירהם ואיד קד סוקת אלכלאם אלי הדא פינבגי אן אקול אן גרץ הדא אלכתאב הו
תחקיק חכאיה אלפאט אלשהוד לאל ]שאה[דה פי קול ופי כתאב ואלאחאטה באח ]צארהדין[ תתבית ח׳ אביאב פאדכר א אל לאס
.מאהא תם שרוחהא והו גמיע הדא אלכתאב פיכון הדא אלכתאב יסירא מקדארה כבירא מנפועה
Sasson's Hebrew translation:
( על דתם ועל זולתם ומאחר שהגעתי23) ( עדים נאמנים חובה עליהם להיות נאמנים ואמינים22) ולכן אמר הכתוב ואעירה לי
( בעל פה ובכתב26)[( הינה אימות סיפור מילות העדים ]אתהעדות25)  כי תכלית ספר זה:( אל זה יהיה צורך שאומר24) בדבר
( הספר2)( שמותיהם ואחר כך פרטיהם והוא כל1) ( שני העניינים האלה בהבאת ח שערים ואזכיר ה27) ואפשר להקיף את הבאת
( בהיקפו וגדול בתועלתו3) הזה וספר זה יהיה קטן
428
Cf. Gerushin 13 regarding exceptions for one witness.
429
Translation mine of the Judeo Arabic. Sa’adia ben Joseph, “Fragments from Saadya’s ‘Sefer Ha-Edut
Ve Ha-Shetarot’ / 170 ”, שרידים מספר העדות והשטרות לרב סעדיה גאון.
430
Ibid., 172–73. Cf. Ketubot 2; Sanhedrin 5, 8, 11,12
427
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Despite Saadya's overall positive outlook on testimony proper, Saadya foreshadows
Maimonides's future position by not believing that human reports can be automatically or
blindly accepted based on authority (taqlīd) until verified.431 Saadya makes this point even
more clearly in Tafsir Rasag (Commentary on the Torah by Saadya, specifically on
Genesis, Perushe Li-Bereshit in Hebrew).432After succinctly reiterating his claims
regarding Trustworthy Tradition from Text 3.3.0.1 (shown below in Text 3.3.2.1), Saadya
discusses human testimony using the example of when it is acceptable for persons to accept
the report of an eclipse to expound upon overcoming testimony's two corruptions:
Text 3.3.1.4
When the one who seeks the truth wishes to find what the path to recognize
the trustworthy reports (trustworthy tradition, al-khabar al-sādiq) is he
finds at the outset that the path to this is first to recognize the deceitful
reports, which may be one of two kinds. They are: that the one who is
reporting either [1] intends to lie or [2] [just] conjectured something but it
did not turn out as he thought. For example one who came into somebody's
house and tells {the people} [in the house] that there is a solar eclipse. As a
result of the two reasons that I have mentioned, they are not obligated to
believe this [report] even though he is the only one reporting [it] and even
though this is on a day that there may be an eclipse. The first is for the reason
that he may have intended to lie and the other is that he may have seen a
cloud forming under the sun and thought it to be an eclipse. But if those
who spread the rumor are many it is not possible that they should [all]

431

"If you are one of those who are persuaded by what the Mutakallimūn say, and if you believe that the
demonstration with regard to the creation of the world in time is correct, bravo for you. If, however, it is not
demonstrated in your opinion, and if you take over from the prophets, through obeying their authority (taqlīd),
the doctrine that it was created in time, there is no harm in that." Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed,
Volume 1. Moses Maimonides, Dalālat al-ḥāʼirīn, ed. Hüseyin Atay (Ankara: Ankara University Press,
1974). 188.
فان كنت ممن يقنع بما قالوه المتكلمون وتعتقد أن قد ص ّح البرهان على حدوث العالم فيا حبذا! وإن لم يتبرهن عندك بل تأخذ كونه حادثا من
.اﻻنبياء تقليدا فﻼ ضير
432
"Rasag" is an acronym for Rabbeinu Saadia Gaon. For an Arabic translation cf. Sa’adia ben Joseph, Torah:
Original Commentary in Arabic, ed. Yomtov Chaim ben Yaakov Daknish Hacohen (Jerusalem: Project
Saadia Gaon, 2015). All references to Saadya's Perushe Li-Bereshit ( )פירושי לבראשיתare to the Judeo-Arabic
edition by Moshe Zucker (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1984) with page numbers
provided in parentheses to the English translation by Michael Linetsky, Rabbi Saadiah Gaon’s Commentary
on the Book of Creation, (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 2002). Saadya Gaon, Perushe Li-Bereshit, Intro,
15; (Linetsky trans, 24-25).
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commit the same error nor would they make {the error} intentionally for it
would manifest if they invented the report… 433
Reports must be tested or verified by the other three roots of knowledge. In his book on
prophecy in Jewish Philosophy, Howard Kreisel summarizes Saadya’s role of reason in
reports as: "[1] to verify ‘actively’ what was passively received from the prophets and [2]
to be able to refute rationally the arguments advanced against the teachings of Judaism." 434
Both roles mirror Kalām methodology. Drawing from Islamic jurisprudence, Saadya
verifies testimony of an eclipse, and even the miracle of manna in the desert, by
differentiating reports (khabar) into two kinds: individual (āḥād) reports traced through a
transmission chain to one person or tawātur (or mutawātir reports) traced to a collective.
Sklare provides a neat summary of the Mu'tazilite conception of tawātur:
The tawātur tradition is a report of something experienced by a group of
people large enough to preclude them from acting in collusion, which is
then transmitted by similarly large groups of people. The criterion of the
large group is to guarantee that the story was not made up by the initial
reporters. Such a tradition provides certain knowledge, although there was
a disagreement as to whether this knowledge was daruri (intuitive)* or
muktasab (acquired). The Qur’an itself can be considered a mutawātir
tradition, since "Its transmission is equivalent to a report that the Prophet
spoke the text of the Qur’an in the name of God. 435

433

Unfortunately the manuscript is damaged at the end of the passage reading: "…my heart…since he himself
saw… in the Torah: 'His heart softened and cried like…' when he heard the reproach of God to him like
Yoshiahu praised when he says: 'Because your heart was tender and you humbled yourself in front of me,' (2
Kings 22:19) and also 'You have rent your clothes and wept before me,' (2 Chronicles 34:27) for God
scrutinizes everything he does as the verse ends and says: 'I have heard, God spoke' (1 Kings 22:19)." Saadya
Gaon, Perushe Li-Bereshit, Intro, 23-24; (Linetsky trans, 42). Judeo Arabic:
וואד'א אלתמס טאלב אלחק כיף אלסביל ליקף עלי אלכ'בר אלצאדק וג'ד אלונג'ה פי ד'לד אלוקוף אולא עלי אלכ'בר אלכאד'ב אלד'י
 מת'לא אקול כמן דכ'ל. והמא אן יכון אלמכ'בר בה תעםד אן יכד'ב אן תוהם ש'א פלם יכן כמא ט'ן.אנמא לה וג'האן לא תאלא להמא
אלי קרם פי בי ת פאכ'ברהם באן אלטמס קד אנכספת ואן כאן אלמכ'בר ואחדא פלן ילזמהם אעתקאד ד'לד פעלי אנה פי יום יג'וז אן
 אחדאהמא לעלה' קצד אן יכד'ב ואלאכ'ר לעלה ראי סחאבא קד סתרת דון אלשמס פתוהמה.תנכסף פיה ללכ'לתין אלתי וצפתהמא
 ואמא אן כאן אלמכ'ברין ג'מאעה' פלא יג'וז אן יתוהם ג'מיעהם תוהמא ואחדא ולא יתעמדה ג'מיעהם איצ'א אלכד'ב אלא.כסופא
.וט'הר פאד'א בדא כיברהם
434
Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy. (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publisher, 2003). 31.
435
Note: This is the Mu'tazilite usage of ḍarūrī, not Saadya's, cf. footnote 379. "The basic type of the ahad
tradition is a report by one person which is transmitted by a chain of individuals, each one reporting to the
next. This is the core of the usul al-fiqh discussion of tradition, in which the controversy centers on whether
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Sklare continues claiming that a subsequent Gaon, Samuel ben Ḥofni (d. 1034), also
explained Jewish revelation by explicitly adopting tawātur as verification for revelation:
Samuel ben Ḥofni states that rabbinic traditions are true because they are
mutawātir, i.e., have been reported by a large number (kathra, perhaps
meaning "majority" here) of the people. In an approach identical to that of
Muslim legal theory, he goes on to say that we know the authenticity of the
Torah through this type of tradition."436
Saadya is clearly drawing on this Mu'tazilite conception when defending the use of
speculation to verify revelation. Saadya describes multiple miraculous events using the
notion of tawātur even using the verbal form of tawātur for the Israelite's consensus on the
miracle of manna in the desert:437
Text 3.3.1.5
When furthermore He says: And ye are My witnesses (Isa. 44:8), He alludes
to the marvelous signs and the manifest proofs (burhāni) witnessed by the
[Jewish] people. These [were revealed] in many forms, such as the visitation
of the ten plagues and the cleaving of the [Red] Sea and the assemblage at
Sinai. Personally, however, I consider the case of the miracle of the manna
as the most amazing of all miracles, because a phenomenon of an enduring
nature excites great wonderment than of a passing character. Aye it is hard
for the mind to conceive of a scheme whereby a people numbering
something like two million souls could be nourished for forty years with
nothing else than food produced for them in the air by the Creator. For had
there been any possibility of thinking up a scheme for achieving something
of this nature, the philosophers of old would have been the first to resort to
it. They would have maintained their disciple therewith, taught them
wisdom, and enabled them to dispense with working for livelihood for
asking for help.
Now it is not likely that the forbears of the children of Israel should have
been in agreement (tawātawū) upon his matter if they had considered it a
lie. Such [proof] suffices, then, as the requisite of every trustworthy
tradition (khabar sadiq). Besides, if they had told their children: 'We lived
in the wilderness for forty years eating naught except manna,' and there had
been no basis for that in fact, their children would have answered them:
the ahad tradition has only the presumption of authenticity or whether it can be considered certainly authentic.
" Sklare, Samuel Ben Ḥofni Gaon and His Cultural World, 162.
436
Samuel ben Hofni goes a step further collapsing claiming that the consensus of the people (ijmā') can
serve as an authoritative source of law effectively collapsing consensus with tawātur tradition. Ibid., 163.
437
 تواطؤواfrom وطء. Cf. Hans Wehr and J. Milton Cowan, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: (ArabicEnglish), 4th ed. (Urbana, Ill.: Spoken Languages Services, 1994), 1264.
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'Now you are telling us a lie. Thou, so and so, is not this thy field, and thou,
so and so, is not this thy garden from which you have always derived your
sustenance?' This is, then, something that the children would not have
accepted by any manner of means.438
In turning to his commentary on Job 15:17-19 (a prooftext for the fourth root of
knowledge), Saadya reiterates the twofold division of knowledge but inserts the caveat that
Tradition is only reliable insofar as it is unbroken:
Text 3.3.1.6
His words, what the wise relate, following what he has just said, and this,
which I have seen. I shall narrate (v. 17), teach us [by the juxtaposition]
that sound knowledge of a thing may be obtained in two ways, either by
personal experience, as he puts it, and this, which I have seen, I shall
narrate, or by trustworthy report, of which he says, what the wise relate—
that is, barring conjecture and collusion; for he goes on to say, concealing
naught of what their fathers. . . . This means that the tradition must be
continuous, each generation receiving it from another as reliable as
themselves.439
Relying on tawātur, Saadya deemed trustworthy tradition (and correct reports) reliable
since it would have been impossible for such extensive agreement to have formed across
so many people unless it really happened. For if the proposed agreement or consensus had
been a grand conspiracy, the following generations would have detected it. For Saadya,

438

Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 23-24. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 29-30).
ّ
وشق
 وهى على انها كثيرة من حلول لعشر آفات.وقوله ואתם עדי يشير به الى ما شاهد القهم من اﻻيات المعجزة ومن البراهين الباهرة
 ﻻنّه ﻻ يخطر على البال حيلة فى. فانّى ارى امر آية المنّ اعجب اﻵيات كلّها ﻻن الشىء الدائم اشدّ تعجّبا من الغير الدائم.البحر وموقف סיני
 ولو كان هلهنا وجه للحيلة.ان يعال قوم مقدارهم شبيه بالفى انسان اربعين سنة ﻻ من شىء ّاﻻ من طعلم منتدء يبتدئه الخالق لهم فى الهواء
 ولو جاز. الفﻼسفة المتقدّمون فكانوا بها يمونون تﻼميذهم ويعلمونهم الحكمة ويغنوهم عن التكسّب وعن اﻻسترفاد.الى بعض هذا لسبق اليها
 "انّا اقمنا فى: ومع ذلك فكانوا اذا قالما لبنيهم. فكفى بشرط ك ّل خبر صادق.ان يكون سلف بنى اسرائيل تواطؤوا على هذا المعنى ان يكذبوه
 انت يا فﻼن اليس هذه ضيعتد وانت يا فﻼن اليس هذه." ولم يك لذلك اصل يقولون لهم بنوهم " هوذا يكذبونا, ّالقفر ارعين سنة نأكل المن
" هذا م ّم يكن البنون يقبلونه منهم بوجه وﻻ سبب وقوله.تتقوتون
ّ روضتك التي منها لم تزالوا.
439
Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Theodicy, 264; Sa’adia ben Joseph, Version Arabe du Libre de Job, ed.
Joseph Derenbourg and et al, vol. 5, ŒuvresComplètes de R. Saadia Gaon (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1899), 49.
Original Judeo-Arabic: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.ah174n&view=2up&seq=170
 אמרו אשר החמים יגידו אחר שאמר וזה חזיתי ואספרח ריל שחידיעת השלמה תהיח על שגי דרכים או בהרגשת התושים וזה:ביאור
אמר ו וזה חזיתי ואספרח או בהגדח גאמגת וח אמרו אשר החמים יגידו ותוא כאשר ירתיקו מתהגדה דמיון שוא והסכמת ]ניא ולא
 ואחר כן אמת:(15  עיין מח שכתב חגאון בהקדמתו לסי אויד )דף- .[כחדו מאבותם ריל שכל כת המגידים תעתיק חהגדח מכת כמות
לנו המאמרים העדיקים שתם אמת כאמרו אתוך שמע לי וגר ויש לתם תגאים כבר ביארגום בפיארוש אלח הפסוקים במקומם.
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reason’s verification of reports mirrors contemporary inferential reasoning, but instead of
being merely probably it produces certain knowledge:
1. If all people report p about event X and nobody reports -p about event X, then p
about event X is true
2. Generations upon Generations say p about event X (and nobody reports -p about
event X)
3. therefore, p about event X is certain440
On purely epistemic grounds, p about event X being certain (as opposed to highly probable)
appears unwarranted even having overcome the falsifications of willful distortion and error
in judgement.441 What makes this argument work is that Saadya does not have mere
numbers in mind, but who is included in "generations", specifically "the wise." Hence, the
second premise might be rendered "Generations upon generations of the wise (i.e., expert
scholars upon expert scholars) say that p." This leads to the best grounds for accepting
testimony, reports from the wise who possess both intellectual and moral wisdom.
This reveals the core of Saadya's use of reason to verify "trustworthy reports," or
what does the true epistemic work: determining whether or not the speaker is trustworthy
in a thick sense, i.e., the speaker is epistemically a trusted source of accurate information
and is morally a trusted person who will honestly report their knowledge. These two traits
account for testimony's falsifications. Saadya is clear: the best speakers are those who are
members of the wise, and others are to defer to their authority. In his commentary on the
book of Job, he notes that not only were the transmitters the wise, but that common people

440

The contemporary parallel, following epistemic shifts to probability, has proposed a similar inferential
argument:
1. If most people say p, then probably p
2. Generations upon Generations say p
3. therefore, probably p
441
This view assumes that religious leaders honestly report their own orthodox beliefs as opposed to
distinguishing between the apparent and inner meaning of Scripture as Taylor attributes to Averroes or
scholars who advocate for Straussian interpretations. See Taylor, “Truth Does Not Contradict Truth.”
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should "submit to their authority."442 To be one of the wise entails that the speaker is not
just knowledgeable, but also exhibits the moral character epitomized in Jewish wisdom
literature and subsequent Jewish wisdom tradition. Knowledge and character are
intrinsically linked under the notion of wisdom. In the introduction to al-Amānāt, Saadya
remarks that scholars and students will "improve in their inner being as well as in their
outer conduct" as a result of their striving for certain knowledge and the removal of doubt
(cf. Text 3.4.3.2).443 This connection reappears through his works as if it is implicitly
assumed, such that the wise man appears without explanation in sections on doubt and
certainty with true beliefs being the hallmark of the wise and false beliefs those of the
foolish. The difference between the foolish and the "praiseworthy" wise man is that the
wise "relies only on what is deserving of trust and is wary wherever caution is in order." 444
One of the clearest accounts linking wisdom and character also appears in Saadya's
commentary on the book of Job where the themes of God’s speech and silence
predominate. Saadya sees the transmission of knowledge to Job without the use of speech.
God’s silence in suffering serves two roles: an act of grace (moral) and an act of knowledge
transmission (knowledge). Saadya is clear that Job's suffering is a test of his character.
God's silence is portrayed as grace since telling Job the answer to his question directly

442

"He adds, to whom alone the land was given. implying that since the tradition was handed down by the
learned and the wise, it was the duty of the people of the land, the masses, to submit to their authority. No
one could say, I will not accept this, unless the common people vouch for it as well. This was not necessary.
Rather, the transmitters were the wise, as he says, what the wise relate, while the general public were their
followers, as he puts it, to whom alone the land was given. And when he says, and no stranger passed among
them, he means that no one alien to the transmitters of the tradition was permitted to interject himself amongst
them and demand that they produce the logical or perceptual support for their traditions, since what they had
reported was possible. Thus you see, in accordance with what I have shown, that the ancients of earliest times
were involved in the same sort of discourse (Kalām) and traditions that are current among the people of our
times." Sa’adia ben Joseph, Version Arabe du Libre de Job, 5:49; Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Theodicy,
265.
443
Sa’adia ben Joseph, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 6. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 9).
444
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 11. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 15).
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would rob him of the meaning of his suffering. If God told Job the meaning of his trial
before it reached is conclusion, then it would cease to be a trial and the suffering would be
for naught. Suffering thereby becomes a medium for the transmission of knowledge and
makes Job even more righteous. Goodman’s assessment is Job’s suffering raises him from
conventional piety to prophecy which could not occur otherwise:
Only those who have come through the crucible of suffering doubt, as Job
did, can comprehend the glory and the justice in nature as Job is seen to
have comprehended it. There is no means, then, by which we could receive
enlightenment, as Job did, except by such means as he received it. And we
cannot simply be told that a price is worth paying unless we have known
Job’s affirmation from within. Perfect assurance from a supernal Source
would trivialize our sufferings but would not necessarily reassure. 445
Thus, when God does speak, he does not directly answer Job's question. Instead, Saadya
claims God has Job reflect on the pure grace of creation, the constitution of nature in things,
and the providential provision for each creature within the whole world. 446 God’s speech
causes Job to see and appreciate God’s creation and God’s wisdom and justice in it. The
force of God’s speech is to point Job to the answer to his question. The result is Job’s
renouncement of his former position and that God, and his ways, is higher than humans.
The testing of Job follows Saadya's interpretation of character development claiming that
through it he achieves even greater wisdom.
The most obvious connection between wisdom and character is God himself. Most
medieval thinkers were, at least in part, influenced by the Platonic tradition which saw both
nous and "the good" as the highest forms of truth and reality. Philosophical thinkers from
the Abrahamic faiths understood this either to be God or to be the supreme reflection of his

445
446

Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Theodicy, 114–15.
Cf. Job 38
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essence. Saadya is no exception often referring to God as "the Wisdom" or "the Allwise."
To improve intellectually and morally is to imitate the Creator, making the Wise closer to
God in a certain sense. This connection allows for the same theory of testimony to carry
over from human testimony to divine testimony. Human testimony requires the additional
work, however, of verifying the character of the speaker which is done either by reason or
by confirmation through the agreement of generations as in the Oral Tradition. 447 Just as in
human testimony, however, even divine testimony must be critically assessed case by case,
but since the speaker is God (the definition of morality and knowledge) knowledge from
divine testimony is immediate once it is verified that the speaker truly is God. As shown
below, Saadya follows the traditional view which understands miracles as perceptual
verification for divine testimony, but the miracles verify not the testimonial claim but the
identity of the speaker as God. So, it is not trust in revelation as a report that is immediate,
but trust in God (the most trustworthy agent).
3.3.2 Divine Testimony
Trustworthy Tradition, God's testimony, the fourth source of knowledge is verified in the
same way as human testimony, i.e., on account of the virtue of the speaker, because Saadya
is explicit that "trustworthy revelation can come about only by means of prophecy." 448
However, God as a speaker presents its own unique challenges. As with all Abrahamic
accounts of God’s revelation, Saadya faces two questions regarding the relation of God’s
highest revelation—divine speech or Logos in the communication of the Torah, the Qur’an,

447

As shown, Saadya deems Tradition reliable on account of tawātur (no agreement could have formed
across so many people unless it really happened). This is an example of Grellard’s claim that social
epistemology’s fides mitigates epistemic risk across an entire community, cf. Grellard, “Beyond the Ideal,
the Social?”
448
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 51-52. Treatise I; (Rosenblatt trans., 63). Tr. mod.
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or Christ—to the divine essence. First, is divine speech the result of divine action or a
manifestation of the divine essence?449 Either answer poses unique challenges to God’s
oneness: affirming that God’s speech is a manifestation seems to introduce multiplicity
into the divine essence; affirming that God’s speech results from divine action typically
renders God’s wisdom co-eternal with God to create a form of dualism. Recalling that
Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mun's infamous Mihna (inquisition) on the createdness of Qur’an
ended a little over 30 years before Saadya was born, we know that the question was
particularly live for Saadya.450 The second question is how should God’s speech be
interpreted when scripture describes God with anthropomorphic language such as in the
form of a man, sitting on a throne, or Moses’s seeing God face to face? Saadya’s answers
reveal his motivations regarding reason, orthodoxy, and the crucial role of testimony.
While Saadya was well versed in the Islamic rationalist tradition of the Mu’tazilites who
resolved this problem by interpreting Qur’anic texts where God anthropomorphically
speaks either as allegory (taw’il) or as inner vision within the prophet’s imagination where
God speaking is a psychological phenomenon in the mind of the prophet, he avoids these
solutions. While occasionally adopting the Mu’tazilites allegorizing hermeneutic, Saadya
wishes to remain faithful (not literal) to the plain meaning of the biblical text. However,
Saadya also wishes to maintain a rational account that avoids anthropomorphism and

449

Alexander Altmann, “Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: It’s Origin and Background,” in Studies in Religious
Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. Alexander Altmann (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 148. Cf. A. J.
Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development, 2nd ed (New Delhi: Oriental Books
Reprint Corp, 1979), 150.
450
This question, while central to Muslim theology, remained of marginal interest in Jewish Kalām. Cf.
Stroumsa, "Saadya and Jewish Kalām," 74. Saadya maintained that Scripture is created and thus reason is
prior as shown by the notion of the "Created Speech". Efros also notes that "In Em. [al-Amānāt], VII, 163,
he states that he examined four sources of knowledge: nature (i.e., sense-perception), reason, Scriptures, and
tradition, to see whether there is any refutation to the dogma of resurrection, and that he 'began with nature
because its priority is that of substance.' Thus in an arrangement according to substance, i.e., epistemological
indispensability, reason is prior to the Bible." Efros, “Saadia’s Theory of Knowledge,” 167.
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introduces multiplicity into the divine essence while simultaneously accounting for Jewish
tradition including texts such as Shi’ur Qomah which affirmed a pseudo dualism with a coextensive mediating angel parallel to the Philonic Logos. 451
As with human testimony, the two objections to testimony stand; however, God,
being all goodness and the source of all knowledge, cannot lie and cannot err. Verification
vs. interpretation thus come to the fore. Verification applies less to understanding than to
identifying the speaker. Thus, unless an assertion is rationally false (in which case God
obviously is not the speaker), the question becomes a matter of interpretation to properly
understand what God is communicating. Verification of divine testimony occurs according
to two kinds of precepts of the Torah: intellectual and auditory precepts. First, there are
intellectual precepts which align with reason and can be discovered by the intellect even if
they were not reported in the Law. For Saadya, God’s intellectual commandments have
rational explanations or else God would not command them. 452 The fact that the command
is rational provides additional verification that it originated with God (and conversely any
irrationality in a command denotes false prophecy). In this role, reason not only augments
what revelation teaches but guides the principles and patterns of biblical exegesis. Saadya
only deviates from a literal interpretation of Scripture if it conflicts with the teachings of
reason and any apparent contradiction is due to truths beyond human reason, faulty human
reasoning, or human failure to interpret revelation correctly. 453 Second, there are auditory
precepts which can only be known if they are recorded (because they are in principle
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Altmann, “Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: It’s Origin and Background,” 154.
As discussed, auditory commandments lack rational explanations.
453
Cf. both Kreisel, Prophecy. 33; and Sirat, A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages. 23.
452
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unintelligible or to preserve the means of fulfillment).454 Since these reports are not ipso
facto intellectual, and thereby testable by reason, they must be verified by a miracle from
God to confirm a prophet speaks on his behalf (often two, an immediate sign to confirm
the prophetic message, e.g. fire from heaven; and a miracle occurring over a long period
for many people to confirm for later generations, e.g. the mana in the desert), as explained
in Text 3.3.0.1, and succinctly in his earlier commentary on the book of Genesis: 455
Text 3.3.2.1
Now the faith of the believers will not be perfected until he believes that in
this world there are trustworthy traditions (khabar sadiq). [This is] because
being that the precepts commanded upon the worshippers are of the third
kind,456 which are optional, [i.e.] there is no way to know them unless it is
through the messenger who provides them for {the people} and lets {the
people} understand them. Since they are only obligated to receive from the
messenger if there is a verification by which it is certain for them that God
endowed him with it and thus he does something that the other creations
cannot do like them He required that there be trustworthy traditions (true
reports, al-khabar ṣahiha) in order that the person that was with the
messenger, when he tells one who was not present with him which of his
acts he saw and which commands he heard, it is upon the one to whom it is
transmitted to accept his statement (‘akhaba, "report") of the knowledge
(al-'ilm) and fulfilling it just as the one who was present and saw {it}. The
Scripture already describes this for it says: "Which we heard and knew it of
what our fathers related us" (Ps. 88:3).457

454

A distinction between the oral tradition received by Moses and that arrived through Talmudic exegesis is
preservation of the common knowledge of how the Israelite community fulfilled the commands recorded in
the Torah, e.g., which grain to make matza from or how much a zav is in abstaining from impurities. Sages
felt it necessary to preserve this information during the exiles which disrupted the community and thus might
be forgotten. The Mishnah records the wisdom from the first exile and the Talmud the second. Saadya Gaon,
Perushe Li-Bereshit, Intro, 13,15; (Linetsky trans, 21, 25).
455
Saadya's "definition" of a miracle in al-Amānāt: "But these extraordinary miracles can come about only
through the creation of what does not correspond to nature or to the habitual course of things." Saadia Gaon,
Kitāb al-Amānāt, 51-52. Treatise I; (Rosenblatt trans., 63).
456
Saadya claims acts are in three levels: "The first level is the things that are pleasant for us so our intellect
demands doing them, like righteousness and fairness. The second level consists of things that are unpleasant
for us and we find that our intellect negates and warns against them, like deceit and extortion. The third level
is those things that are optional that the intellect neither prompts to do nor does it preclude them, rather it is
something possible like standing, sitting, combining, and separating" Sa’adia ben Joseph, Rabbi Saadiah
Gaon’s Commentary on the Book of Creation, trans. Michael Linetsky (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 2002),
40.
457
Saadya Gaon, Perushe Li-Bereshit, Intro, 23-24; (Linetsky trans, 41-42). Tr. Mod. Judeo Arabic:
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However, Saadya aims to demystify prophecy by showing how it parallels human
testimony since prophecy is verified by perception and reason. 458 To explain how an
incorporeal God (as proven by rational proofs) can be seen and heard by human prophets
Saadya claims prophets do not physically see God sitting on a throne or hear God speaking
(for God has no physical tongue), but experience God’s Created Glory (khavod nivra) and
Created Speech (dibbur nivra).459
To preserve divine testimony, Saadya claims God’s speech is created in a
metaphysical substrate of God’s Glory under numerous names with "subtle air" (or "second
air") being the most explanatory since the substrate conducts God’s created speech audibly

 לאן אלשראיע אלמשרועה עלי אלעבאד מן אלקסם.ולם יתם ללמונעין דין דון אן יעתקד אן קד יכון פי הד׳א אלעאלם כ׳בר צאדק
 ולמא כאן אלרסול לא יג׳ב עליהם.אלת׳אלת׳ אלד׳י הו אלמבאח לא סביל אלי מערפתהא אלא מן אלרסול יבעת׳ בה ויוקפהם עליהא
אלקבול מנה אלא בתאייד יתביין להם מגה אן אללה אידה בה והו אן יפעל מא ליס פי טאקה אלמכ׳לוקין אן יפעלו מת׳לה וג׳ב אן
תכון פי מא בין אלכ׳לק אכ׳באר צחיחה חתי יכון מן חצ׳ר מע אלרסול אד׳א הו נזל מא שאהדה מן אפעאלה ומן שראיעה אלי מן לם
 וקד וצפת אלכתב איצ׳א.יחצ׳ר וג׳ב עלי אלמנקול אליה קבול כ׳ברה ד׳לך אלעלם ואלעמל בה כוג׳ובה עלי אלחאצ׳ר אלמשאהד
. וקאל למען ידעו דור אחרון וג׳/ד׳לך אד׳ תקול אשר שמענו ונדעם ואבתינו ספרו לנו לא נכחד מבניהם וג
458
"That is [to say, we believe in] the validity of trustworthy traditions, by reason of the fact that it is based
on knowledge of the senses as well as that of reason." Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 18. Intro.; (Rosenblatt
trans. tr.mod., 37).
459
The terms Created Glory ( )כבוד נבראand Created Speech ( )דבר נבראcome from the Hebrew translations.
In the Amānāt, Saadya equates the Created Glory with: the "light of the glory" (ha-khavod), "great light"
(gadol), the "resplendent light" (ha-bahir), and even the "God of Israel" which Moses sees. In Ṣefer Yeẓirah,
Saadya equates the Created Glory with the Shekhinah, the Holy Spirit (ruach ha-qodesh), the throne of glory
(khisse' ha-khavod) a la chariot mysticism, and the Created Speech with bat qol ()בּת קול. This is because
Saadya claims that " ‘spirit’ and ‘word’ are things specially created by God, constituting the detailed speech
revealed by God to His prophet linking several concepts to argue for the unity of God contrary to the Christian
Trinity as shown in al-Amānāt: "If, again, they derive their proof from Scripture, as, for example, someone
of them might assert: ‘I see that Scripture says that God is possessed of a spirit and a word, as it is borne out
by its statement: The spirit of the Lord spoke by me and His word was upon my tongue’ (II Sam. 23:2), our
answer thereto is that this spirit and word are things specially created by God, constituting the detailed speech
revealed by God to His prophet. We know, in fact, that the Scriptures call the name of God ‘soul’ (nephesh),
as Scripture says: Who hath not taken My soul in vain (Ps. 24: 4) instead of My name, Now inasmuch as in
the case of the creatures ‘soul’ (nephesh) and ‘spirit’ (ruach) have one connotation and the Creator also has
a ‘soul’ (nephesh), by which is meant His name, the ‘spirit’ (ruach) which is attributed to Him means
‘revelation’ and ‘prophecy.’ The misinterpretation of these terms on the part of these individuals who cite
them as proof of their theory is, then, due to unfamiliarity with the Hebrew language." Saadia Gaon, Kitāb
al-Amānāt, 87-88. Treatise II; (Rosenblatt trans., 105).
( רוח י' דבר בי23, 2  שמואל2) وان كانوا استدلّوا من المكتوب كما لع ّل بعضهم يقول رايت الكتاب يقول ان روحا وكلمة ذاك قوله
ומלתו על לשוני قلنا له ان هذه الروح والكلمة مخلوقان وهما ذلك الكﻼم المفضّل الذى اوحى ﷲ به الى نبيّه وقد علمنا ان الكتب تس ّمى اسم
( אשר לא נשא לשוא נפשי مقام שמי فكما كان فى المخلوقين נפש ודוח معنى واحدا وكانت נפש للخالق24, 4 ﷲ נפש كما قال )תהלים
ونبوة وهدا من هأوﻻء المستدلّين قلّة بصر بلغة العبرانيّين وكذلك وجدت بعضهم يستدلّون
ّ معناها اسم كانت له רוח معناها وحى
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into the realm of manifest air.460 This substrate is described most clearly in Saadya's
Commentary on Ṣefer Yeẓirah since the original work explicates both how God spoke the
world into being and how the initiated can likewise "create" using the 22 Hebrew letters
and numbers one to ten.461 According to the text, the first and highest of the ten numbers,
i.e. Sefirot, which emanate from God is the ruach—Spirit, breath, air—of God identified
as God’s Holy Spirit, Voice and Word. 462 Saadya comments that this "subtle air" is a
figurative description of the biblical khavod or God’s "Glory" which Saadya explicitly says
elsewhere is produced from light.463 The Glory is described as a created hypostasis which
acts as a substrate or medium through which God created the world and in which God
reveals himself to prophets via two distinct creations. This is seen most clearly in Saadya's
commentary on Yeẓirah:
Text 3.3.2.2
According to the holy writings, they name the subtle second air "Glory" as
it is said "all the earth is full [of] his glory [Isaiah 7:3]," and as He said "[as]
I live and the glory of the Lord fills the whole earth [Numbers 14:21]." And
the [Jewish] people call it "Shekinah" ["dwelling" or "abode"] for what is
said "and the Glory of the Eternal abode" [Exodus 24:16] and also "for the
Glory dwells in our land/Earth" [Psalms 85:9]. And the author of this book
named [it] the spirit/breath (ruach) of the Living God (Elohim), [and]
regarding it, it was said "and my spirit (ruach) is standing in your midst do
not fear" [Haggai 2:5]. And by means of this subtle second air the word of
prophecy is conveyed as it said, "the breath/Spirit (ruach) of The Lord God
(Elohim) [was] upon me" [Isaiah 61:1]. And by it, the entirety of its proofs
(burhāni) appear to the prophets, as it is said "in appearance with the
breath/spirit (ruach) of God (Elohim)" [Ezekial11:24]. And it is a
460

The designation of "first" or "second" air can vary from scholar to scholar depending on whether they
maintain an ontological top-down such that the "subtle air" ontologically precedes or an epistemic bottomup approach such that it is epistemically known second.
461
Ben-Shammai, “Saadya’s Goal in His Commentary on Ṣefer Yeẓira.”
462
Ṣefer Yeẓirah 1:9 "These are the ten emanations of number. First, is the Spirit ( )רוחof the Living God,
blessed and more than blessed be the name of the Living God of Ages. The Holy Spirit is his Voice, his
Spirit, and his Word." “Sefer Yetzirah,” Sefaria, accessed June 7, 2019, //www.sefaria.org/Sefer_Yetzirah.
https://www.sefaria.org/Sefer_Yetzirah.1?lang=bi
463
Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 121,129. Saadya opts for the imagery of air since
it more fully pervades the entire world than light. Kreisel, Prophecy, 71.

139

creaturely/created (makhluq) thing not changing, because everything is a
creature, except the Creator—may his name be blessed, bless his name!—
as it is said "there is nothing apart from Him" [Deuteronomy 4:35]. And
with this, the creaturely/created (al-makhluq) subtle second air which is in
the world, like the life-breath is in the human, exists [in] the created word
which Moses heard in the visible (al-zahir) air, the speech which the fathers
heard in the visible air, and "he heard this the voice of the living God"
[Deuteronomy 5:26]…464
First is God’s speech or Logos which is created as God’s Created Speech (dibbur nivra).
Second are prophetic visions which are created as God’s "Created Glory" (khavod nivra)
and serve to verify to the prophet that the voice they hear is indeed from God. Both are
manifested in the Glory, the "second air", before being conducted into the realm of manifest
air ("first air") where they are sensibly heard or seen by a prophet. The prophets do not see

464

My English translation of the Judeo-Arabic:
 וכמא קאל הו ואולם חי אני וימלא כבוד ה׳,פאלכתב אלמקדסה תסמי אלהוא אלת׳אני אללטיף כבוד כמא קאל מלא כל הארץ כבודו
 וצאחב הד׳א אלכתאב סמאה רוח. ואיצ׳א לשכן כבוד בארצנו, ואלאמה תסמיה שכינה עלי מא קאל וישכן כבוד ה׳.את כל הארץ
 ובהד׳א אלהוא אללטיף אלת׳אני יתאדא כלאם אלנבוה כמא קאל רוח ה׳. עלי מא קאל ורוח י עומדת בקרבכם אל תיראו,אלהים חיים
 לאן כל מא, והו שי מכ׳לוק לא מחאלה. ובה תט׳הר ג׳מיע אלבראהין אלמראיה ללאנביא כמא קאל במראה ברוח אלהים.אלהים עלי
 ובהד׳א אלהוא אללטיף אלת׳אני אלמכ׳לוק אלד׳י הו פי אלעאלם. כמ א קאל אין עוד מלבדו,הו סוי אלבארי יתברך שמו פמכ׳לוק
 ]עה[ ואלדיברות אלתי סמעוהא אלאבא פי כאלחיוה פי אלאנסן יכון אלכלאם אלמכ׳תרע אלד׳י סמעה משה פי אלהוא,אלט׳אהר
. וענה קילת ג׳מיע אוצאף קול ה׳ אלסבעה, וסמי ד׳לך קול אלהים חייםת,אלהוא אלט׳אהר
Sa’adia ben Joseph, Ṣefer Yetsirah = Kitab almabadi, ed. Yosef Kafaḥ (Jerusalem: Ṿaʻad le-hotsaʼat sifre
Rasag, 1972), 108.
French Translation:
"Et les Ecritures saintes appellent le second air, qui est plus ténu, gloire, comme il est dit: Toute la terre est
remplie de sa gloire, et comme (Dieu) dit lui-même: Mais aussi vrai que je vis, ma gloire remplira toute la
terre. Le peuple l’appelait résidence, comme il est dit: La gloire de l'Éternel résida, et ailleurs: Pour que la
gloire réside dans notre pays; et l’auteur de ce livre l'a appelé: Souffle du Dieu vivant, comme il est dit: Et
mon souffle se tiendra au milieu de vous, ne craignez point. C’est par cet air ténu, qui est le second, qu’était
apportée la parole de la prophétie, comme il est dit: Le souffle de l'Eternel Dieu est sur moi, et c’est par lui
qu'apparaissent tous les miracles visibles aux prophètes, comme il est dit: Dans une vision, par le souffle de
Dieu, et c’est une chose évidemment créée, car ce qui est en dehors du Créateur — que son nom soit béni!
— est une chose créée, comme il est dit: Il n’y a rien en dehors de lui. C’est par ce second air ténu mais créé,
qui est dans le monde comme la vie dans l’homme, que se produit la parole créée qu’a entendue Moïse dans
l’air visible, et le décalogue qu’ont entendu nos peres dans l’air visible, et cela a été appelé: Voix du Dieu
vivantet, et c’est d'elle qu'ont été dites toutes les sept qualifications de la voix de l’Éternel." For a complete
French translation Cf. Sa’adia ben Joseph, Commentaire sur le “Sefer yesira ou Livre de la création,” ed.
Mayer Lambert (Paris: Bibliophane, 1986), 94–95.A heavily abridged English translation of the French
version by Scot Thompson and Dominique Marson (San Francisco, 1985) can be found online at
https://www.themathesontrust.org/papers/judaism/saadia.pdf. For a complete analysis of English translations
of the Sefer Yetzirah (not just Saadya's commentary), cf. Don Karr, “Notes on Editions of Sefer Yetzirah in
English,”
Academia.Edu,
2020,
https://www.academia.edu/22875900/Notes_on_Editions_of_Sefer_Yetzirah_in_English.
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God physically sitting on a throne or hear God audibly speaking but do truly see God’s
Created Glory and hear God’s Created Speech as they are conducted from the substrate of
God’s Glory. Sarah Pessin maintains an even more robust sense of khavod where the
second air pulses the prophecy into the prophet.465 Thus, Saadya preserves both the rational
oneness of the incorporeal God and Scripture’s physical perceptions of the divine by
shifting the object of perception.
Saadya’s metaphysical solution is less a product of the Mu’tazila than rationalizing
Jewish mystical ideas. Alexander Altmann argues convincingly the doctrine of the Created
Glory did in fact originate with Saadya and was not a carryover from either the Karaites or
the Mu’tazilites through them.466 Despite the similar conception of the "created Speech" of
Allah, the Mu’tazilites posit that divine speech is created in the Prophet (and possibly the
reader) whereas Saadya posits that the speech is created in a special metaphysical
substrate.467 Since divine speech for the Mu’tazilites is created in human minds, their
reliance on allegory and psychologizing has no need to posit a created Glory. 468 Altmann
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Sarah Pessin, “The Manifest Image: Revealing the Hidden in Halevi, Saadya, and Ibn Gabirol,” in History
of Platonism: Plato Redivivus, ed. Robert Berchman and John Finamore (New Orleans: University Press of
the South, 2005), 258–60; Sarah Pessin, “Saadya [Saadiah],” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2008 Edition), accessed February 21, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/saadya/.
466
Saadya’s innovative use of the Created Glory and Created Speech for revelation has been disputed.
Wolfson follows Jacob Guttmann and Saul Horowitz in maintaining that Saadya pulled the idea from
Mu’tazilite thinkers such as Al-Naẓẓām traceable back to Philo, but Alexander Altmann argues against the
Mu’tazilite influence view claiming Saadya drew on the Jewish mystical tradition to introduce a new concept.
See Altmann, “Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: It’s Origin and Background.”; Harry Austryn Wolfson,
Repercussions of the Kalām in Jewish Philosophy. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979). 9091; Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalām (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1976).
274-276.; Jacob Guttmann, Die Religionsphilosophie Des Saadia (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1882).; and Saul Horovitz, Die Prophetologie in der jüdischen Religionsphilophie (Breslau: T. Schatzky,
1883). For an overview of Created Glory and Created Speech see Kreisel, Prophecy. 56-93.
467
Al-Djubba’i extends the creation of speech in both the prophet and the reader of the Qur’an. Altmann,
“Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: It’s Origin and Background,” 150.
468
Mu’tazilites such as Josef al-Basir were so adverse to anthropomorphic conceptions of God (even going
so far as to deny the faithful will "see" God in the afterlife), that khavod nivra likely would have been
unwelcomed. Ibid., 144.
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shows that Saadya’s concept of the Created Glory comes from synthesizing Jewish
mysticism, which Ben-Shammai suggests Saadya desires to rationalize. 469 As with the
Spirit of God in the Yeẓirah, both Kabbalah mysticism and the Midrashic text Shi’ur
Qomah maintain an angel or deuterous theos acts as a demiurge or living spiritual
substance parallel to the Neoplatonic world soul which mediated creation (likely motivated
by biblical passages including Proverbs 3 and Isaiah 55:11). By replacing this mediating
being with the Glory of God (perceived as a proxy for God by the prophets, e.g., Exodus
33:18), Saadya eliminates the concern of dualism. While Saadya does not appear to accept
the mystical views at face value, he seems to embrace the cosmological hierarchy which
parallels Neoplatonism to explain that the Glory, being created from light, is more noble
than angels which are produced from the lower element of fire. 470
Unfortunately, Saadya’s theory of revelation has not come down to us in a
particularly clear fashion. An artifact of synthesizing these Jewish traditions is that the
Glory goes by several names in being equated with several entities including the divine
light of glory, the Shekinah, God’s throne, the Holy Spirit, and sometimes seemingly God
himself. Furthermore, the Glory is described both as a passive instrument and as
comparable to an angel being an active living intermediary. The many roles and names
belonging to the Glory make it difficult to fully comprehend and a full explanation requires
interpretation. By the time Saadya wrote al-Amānāt, the more mystical origins of the Glory
and its status as a separate hypostasis are downplayed or omitted entirely: the Glory is
never referred to as the "second air" or a medium for creation; the created voice is not
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Ben-Shammai, “Saadya’s Goal in His Commentary on Ṣefer Yeẓira.”
Kreisel notes that the Glory is also identified as the "will" of God, the animate force of the world, and
Intellect of the world which suggest a Neoplatonic influence. Kreisel, Prophecy, 79.
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treated as a distinct entity; the Glory and the Created Glory are often treated as one with
roles originally ascribed to God’s Glory spoken of God directly and whether the Glory has
agency or is a mere instrument becomes less clear. Whether these differences are because
Saadya changed his views or merely was more sensitive to a wider audience is
indeterminable. Howard Kreisel is convinced Saadya was not interested in establishing a
theory of prophecy complete with gradations and biblical examples. 471 Our limited and
fragmentary collection of Saadya’s works may prevent a full answer. However, the
distinction between the speech of God and the light (or glory) of God confirming the
speech’s divine origin remains consistent. Al-Amânât does affirm that many of the mystical
entities are in fact a special creation from light that serve a justificatory role in divine
testimony:
Text 3.3.2.3
Our answer to this objection is that this form was something [specially]
created. Similarly the throne and the firmament as well as its bearers, were
all of them produced for the first time by the Creator out of light for the
purpose of assuring His prophet that it was He that had revealed His word
to him, as we shall explain in the third treatise of this book. It is a form
nobler even than [that of] the angels, magnificent in character, resplendent
with light, which is called the glory of the Lord. It is this form, too, that one
of the prophets described as follows: I beheld till thrones were placed, and
one that was ancient of days did sit (Dan. 7:9), and that the sages
characterized as śĕkhinah. Sometimes, however, this specially created being
consists of light without the form of a person. It was, therefore, an honor
that God had conferred on His prophet by allowing him to hear the oracle
from the mouth of a majestic form created out of light that was called the
glory of the Lord, as we have explained.472
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Ibid., 62.
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 99-100. Treatise II; (Rosenblatt trans., 121). Italics original to Rosenblatt
signifying where the Landauer retains the original Hebrew.
ى عند نبيّه انّه هو الذى اوحى اليه
ّ ى والعرش وح َملته كلّهم محدثون احدثهم الخالق من نور ليص
ّ اجبنا بان هذه الصورة مخلوقة وكذلك الكرس
بكﻼمه كما سنبين فى المقالة الثالثة | وهى صورة شريفة من المﻼئكة عظيمة الخلق بهيّة النور وهى تس ّمى כבוד י' | وعنها الذى وصف
( חנה הוית עד די כרסון רמיו ועתיק יומין יתיב وعنها الذى وصف العلماء שכיוה | وقد تكون نور بﻼ صورة7,9 بعض اﻻنبياء )דניאל
فشرف ﷲ نبيّه بان اسمعه الوحى من صورة عظيمة مخلوقة من نور تس ّمى כבוד י' على ما بيّنّا
ّ شخص
472
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The key takeaway is that Saadya postulated an intermediary bridge created between the
incorporeal and corporeal to explain how God could provide reports which human listeners
could both receive and verify as divine, thereby maintaining both revealed scripture as a
report and the accuracy of the prophets’ reports without falling into anthropomorphism.
As Elliot Wolfson summarizes in his book on Jewish mysticism, the mediating hypostasis
allows Saadya to maintain justice to the biblical text of a real miraculous experience
without impugning God by shifting the object of prophetic or mystical visions from God
to his Created Glory.473 The substrate allows prophecy to parallel normal hearing from
human speakers since prophecy is based on the first three roots of knowledge. 474
3.4 Conclusion: Testimonial Assessment
Trying to analyze Saadya's theory of testimony using contemporary social epistemology
raises challenges. His thought does not fit cleanly into the existing categories as seen in
Text 3.3.0.1. In discussing human testimony and divine testimony, Saadya appeals to what
is now categorized under either anti-reductionist or reductionist theories of justification in
the same breath claiming on the one hand God "render[ed] the human mind susceptible to
the acceptance of true reports…so His Scriptures and traditions might be acknowledged as
true" in keeping with anti-reductionism, and on the other hand that reason must "confirm
for us the validity of trustworthy reports" falling squarely in line with reductionism. 475 To
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"It may be concluded, therefore, that Saadiah's response to the challenge of anthropomorphism avoids the
extremes of allegorism and psychologism, for he flatly denies that prophetic or mystical visions are of God,
yet at the same time they are not simply psychic phenomena or inner perceptions. Prophetic and mystical
visions lie within the sphere of outer perception, for in both cases a real, luminous form, albeit created and
therefore ontologically distinct from God, is apprehended, in the former case by human beings and in the
latter by angels." Elliot R Wolfson, Through a Speculum That Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval
Jewish Mysticism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). 127.
474
"That is [to say, we believe in] the validity of trustworthy traditions, by reason of the fact that it is based
on knowledge of the senses as well as that of reason." Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 18. Intro.; (Rosenblatt
trans. tr.mod., 37).
475
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 127-128. Treatise III; (Rosenblatt trans., 155-156).
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close this chapter I will look at Saadya's epistemology of testimony from an antireductionist and reductionist standpoint before arguing that Saadya is best understood
through a virtue-theoretic framework (particularly the John Greco inspired framework
introduced at the end of chapter 2). 476
3.4.1 Is Saadya Gaon an anti-reductionist?
One could be forgiven for thinking Saadya is an anti-reductionist based on a casual
understanding of his epistemology, a cursory read of al-Amānāt, or limited exposure to
isolated texts. Saadya's claim that God intentionally prepared the human mind to receive
testimony sounds remarkably similar to what Thomas Reid, reputational father of antireductionism, said, namely that God "implanted in our natures two principles" enabling us
to learn via testimony.477 Moreover, Saadya's claims that Trustworthy Tradition, literally
the hearing of reliable reports, is a unique source of knowledge fits a key claim of antireductionism.
Even though Saadya lists trustworthy reports as a "source" of knowledge, he clearly
does not mean the same thing that contemporary social epistemologists mean as a nonreducible genus of knowledge. We are clued to this fact by Saadya offsetting the fourth
root of knowledge from the other three. When Saadya states that "trustworthy reports" are
a source of knowledge he seems to include both the contemporary notion that testimony is
a genuine source of knowledge and serves the unique role of knowledge transmission.
Following Text 3.3.01, Saadya's presentation of Trustworthy Tradition as a unique source
of knowledge appears to be open to two possible interpretations regarding testimony: 1)

476
477

Cf. Chart 2.5.0.1
Cf. Text 2.3.0.2 of Chapter 2
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correct reports (al-khabar al-ṣahiha), upon which Trustworthy Tradition is based, are a
non-reductive source of knowledge whether human or divine; or 2) Trustworthy Tradition
(al-khabar al-sadiq) is a way to knowledge and often the sole way to a source of knowledge
beyond perception, reason, and inference, namely God. The former can seem plausible
since Saadya's goal of moving from dogma (amānāt) to conviction ('i‘tiqādāt) implies two
epistemic stages: an initial acceptance of religious propositions without personally
ascertaining if the claim is true, followed by a later rational confirmation of what was
originally believed. While it might seem Saadya advocates for a position in which
testimony can be accepted without verification (or until proven false) such that rational
verification of revealed claims may occur later, Saadya clearly maintains that revelation
must be verified by the senses, e.g., miracles, as shown at length in the next section on
reductionism. The only parallel that exists in Saadya's epistemology for propositions
unverified by either reason or perception is taqlīd (blind assent without repose of the soul)
and it would be a misnomer to render taqlīd, a species of conviction, as an acceptable form
of knowledge acquisition. Doing so would allow all religions to be equally true. Saadya
thus explicitly distinguishes taqlīd from 'ilm (knowledge). Furthermore, Saadya's purpose
in writing al-Amānāt was to move believers away from an unreasoned acceptance of dogma
(amānāt) to conviction ('i‘tiqādāt) by means of rational reflection (nāẓir). As shown,
Saadya repeats in multiple works in multiple places that testimony only furnishes
unshakable knowledge when it is verified not to be the result of willful distortion or an
error in judgement. This leaves the second interpretation which is clearly more in line with
Saadya's claims: divine testimony is a source for objects of knowledge that cannot be
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obtained by means of the first three. The question is thus whether divine testimony is a
generative source of knowledge since it cannot reduce to other sources of knowledge.
Unlike the Christian tradition which maintains that God's eternal speech or Logos
is a manifestation of God's essence, the Mu'tazilites (possibly inspired by Jewish influence)
held that the eternal word of Allah (the Qur'an) resulted from a divine act. Saadya, in
following the Rabbinic tradition (i.e., "in Talmudic and Midrashic thought the pre-existent
Torah was considered to be a creation Of God, but was never taken to be an eternal entity
in the sense of Logos" per Altmann), thus refers to the dibbur nibra (created speech).478 So
while transmission is clearly a key component to Trustworthy Tradition, it could be argued
that knowledge via divine testimony is being created and thus generated which is in
keeping with anti-reductionism. Divine testimony would thus serve as either a reductive or
non-reductive source depending on whether the claim can be verified by the first three
sources of knowledge. The difficulty here appears to be a conflation of theological and
epistemological concepts outside of the purview of social epistemology. Before one even
turns to the hermeneutic question of whether God's act of speaking or creating the divine
Logos is metaphorical, the act of creating rationality and knowledge itself far outstrips the
testimonial act of creating words or speech. Instead of claiming that testimony is a source
of knowledge alongside traditional sources like perception and inference, this would imply
the more radical position that the traditional sources ultimately reduce to divine testimony.
Furthermore, anti-reductionists presume that testimony generates knowledge in the
listener, whereas Saadya's unique solution generates it in the Glory, an enigmatic
metaphysical substrate used to transmit the knowledge to humans. Even then the Logos is
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Altmann, “Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: It’s Origin and Background,” 147–48.
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only generated once before even the creation of the world. The creation of the divine Logos
is thus irrelevant to understanding a thinker's theory of testimony.
3.4.2 Is Saadya Gaon a reductionist?
The dualist tension of Saadya's epistemology often treats testimony as if it is a form of
"intuitive" knowledge, but even then tellings require reflection (nāẓir) to verify if a telling
overcomes testimony's two falsifications. This means testimony most comfortably falls
under the Mu'tazilite epistemic framework as acquired knowledge. 479 As a result, Saadya
often sounds reductionistic. In al-Amānāt's introduction, the pursuit of knowledge is
frequently likened to moneylending in which uncertainty is the product of being unfamiliar
with the craft and thus making mistakes because agents do "not know the art of
weighing."480 Saadya even prooftexts this analogy from revelation:
Text 3.4.2.1
Scripture does indeed liken the sorting of just statements to the sorting of
money when it says, Like tested silver is the speech of the righteous whilst
the heart of the wicked is of little worth (Prov. 10: 20). Those whose
knowledge of the art of sorting is limited or who have but little patience are
presented as wrongdoers, because they wrong the truth… 481
It could be said of Saadya that, like David Hume, "justification" reduces to sense perception
or reason. Prophets rely on the perceptual experience of the Created Glory. Claims that
God created the world in time are verified by the rational demonstrations of Kalām
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The agent will thus have both prerequisites for 'ilm: repose of the soul and possession of truth criterion.
"The seeker does not know what he is seeking. Such a one would be even further removed and more
distant from his goal, so much so that he would fail to recognize the truth even if it should by chance occur
to him or he should happen to come upon it. He is thus like a creditor who does not know the art of weighing,
or even the nature of a balance and weights, nor yet how much money is due him from his debtor." Saadia
Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 2-3. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 5).
481
Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 3. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 6). Rosenblatt notes that the usual translation
of Proverbs 10:20 is The tongue of the righteous is as choice silver; the heart of the wicked is little worth.
( כסף נבחר לשון צדיק לב רשעים כמעט يحبعلون الذين علمهم بصناعة10,20 وقد شبّه الكتاب انتقاد كﻼم العدل بنقد المال اذ قال )משלי
ّ
...الحق
النقد قليل او صبرهم قليل ظاملين ﻻنّهم يظلمون
480
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theologians. In short, the acceptance of a telling reduces to other non-testimonially based
positive reasons.482 This is clearly seen in Saadya's explanation of logical inference where
he totals seven points "that must be observed to make possible for us the emergence of
truth" and concludes that "should, therefore, someone come to us with an allegation in the
realm of inferential knowledge, we should test his thesis by means of these seven
[criteria]."483 Only after testing ("weighed by their balance") should one assent. He claims
the same level of verification is required for divine testimony: "Similarly also must we
proceed with the subject matters of Trustworthy Tradition—I mean the books of
prophecy."484 In his subsequent defense of speculation (i.e. that it does not lead to heresy),
he reiterates at length the role of perception for miracles to verify revelation until reason
can later provide confirmation (again using a moneylending example) in keeping with his
aim of moving from dogma (148mānāt) to conviction ('i‘tiqādāt):485
Text 3.4.2.2
That is why God, exalted and magnified be He, afforded us a quick relief
from all these burdens by sending us His messengers through whom He
transmitted messages to us, and by letting us see with our own eyes the signs
and the proofs supporting them about which no doubt could prevail and
which we could not possibly reject…
Thus it became incumbent upon us immediately to accept religion, together
with all that we embraced in it, because its authenticity had been proven by
482

For a relevant summary of testimony in social epistemology as it pertains to religious belief, see Jennifer
Lackey, “The Epistemology of Testimony and Religious Belief,” in The Oxford Handbook of the
Epistemology of Theology, ed. William J Abraham and Frederick D Aquino (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017), 203–17. The parallel between Reductionism’s requirement that hearers possess nontestimonially based positive reasons post-hoc for accepting a speaker’s report and Kalām theologians using
reasoning-in-the-service-of-pre-established-ideas is striking.
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Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 19-20. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 25-26).
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Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 26. Saadya, however, does not explain the
"properties of these books" here claiming that is "something that I have already done for an extensive portion
of this subject in the introduction to my commentary on the Torah" as shown in Texts 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.1.4.
485
"Now someone might, of course, ask: "But how can we take it upon ourselves to indulge in speculation
about the objects of knowledge and their investigation to the point where these would be established as
convictions according to the laws of geometry and become firmly fixed in the mind, when there are people
who disapprove of such an occupation, being of the opinion that speculation leads to unbelief and is
conducive to heresy?" Ibid.
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the testimony of the senses. It's acceptance is also incumbent upon anybody
to whom it has been transmitted because of the attestation of trustworthy
tradition (al-khabar al-sadiq), as we shall explain. Now God commanded
us to take our time with our speculation (nanẓuru) until we would arrive
thereby at these selfsame conclusions…
So, then, even if it should take a long time for one of us who indulges in
speculation (nāẓir) to complete his speculation (nāẓir), he is without worry.
He who is held back from engaging in such an activity by some impediment
will, then, not remain without religious guidance (hadith). Further women
and young people and those who have no aptitude for speculation (nāẓir)
can thus also have a perfect and accessible faith, for the knowledge of the
senses is common to all men. Praised, then, be the All-Wise, who ordered
things thus. Therefore, too, dost thou often see Him include in the Torah the
children and the women together with the fathers whenever miracles are
marvels are mentioned.
Next I say, in further elucidation of this matter, that one might
compare the situation to that of a person who out of a total of 1,000
drachmas weighs out 20 to each of five men, and 16 2/3 to each of six, and
14 2/7 to each of seven, and 12 ½ to each of eight, and 11 1/9 to each of nine,
and who wishes to check with them quickly on how much money is left. So
he tells them that the remainder amounts to 500 drachmas, supporting this
statement by the weight of the money. Once, then, it has been weighed by
them quickly and found to be 500 drachmas, they are compelled to credit
his statement. Then they can take their time until they find out [that] it [is
really so] by way of calculation, each one according to his understanding,
and the effort he can put into it and the obstacles he might encounter. 486
Here we see the two stages in Saadya's process of knowledge acquisition relying on two
different types of verification. The second stage leads to conviction after rationally
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Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 25-26. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 31-33).
ّ وتذهله فكفانا
عليها وبراهين عنها ما لمر يتسلّط علية-عز وج ّل هذه المؤن كلّها وبعث الينا برسوله اخبرنا بها خبرا واورانا بعيوننا عﻼملتت
( אתם ראיתם כי מן השמים דברתי עמכם وخاطب رسوله بحضرتنا فجعل موجبا20,22 الشكّ ولمر نجد الى دفعة سبيﻼ كما قال )שםות
( בעבור ישמע העם בדברי עמך וגם בך יאמינו לעולם فوجب علينا من وقته قبول امور الدين بجميع19,9 لتصديقه دائما كما قال )שםות
ما انطوت عليه ﻻنّه قد تبرهن بالشاهد المحسوس ووجب قبوله على ما نقل الينا بدليل الخبر الصادق كما سنبين وامرنا ان ننظر على مهل
الى ان يخرج لنا نلك بالنظر فلم نزل من نلك المقف حتى وجبت علينا حجّته ولزمنا اعتقاد دينه بما رأته عيوننا وسمعته آذاننا فان طال الزمان
بالناظر منا الى ان يتم نظره لمر يبال ومن تا ّخر بعائق عن نلك لمر يبق بﻼ دين ومن كان من النساء واﻻحداث ومن ﻻ يحسن ان ينطر فدينه
سيّة فسبحان الحفكيم المدبّر ولذلك تراه فى التوررية كبيرا ما يحبمع البنين والنسء مع
ّ تا ّم له حاصل اذ كل الناس مشتركون فى العلوم الح
اﻷباء فى ذ كر اﻵيات والبراهين | ث ّم اقول فى تقريب ذلك كمن وزن من هل هو ألف درهم الخمسة رجال درهما ولستّة رجال ك ّل واحد
وثلثين ولسبعة رجل ك ّل واحد واحد وسبعين ولثمانية رجل ك ّل واحد ونصف ولتسعة رجل ك ّل واحد وتسعا واراد بالعاجل ان يحقّق عندهم ما
 درهم وجب عليهم500  درهم ويجعل دليله على قوله وزن المال فاذا وزنه بالعاجل فوجد500 بقى من المال فهو يقول لهم ان الباقى
التصديق بما قاله لهم وهم ممهلون الى ان يعرفو من طريق الحساب د ّل واحد على قدر فهمه وعنايته واعتراض العوائق اّيا
There is a citation typo in both texts: Landauer inaccurately reports the second citation as Exodus 19:19
(not 19:9), but Rosenblatt (1984 edition) inaccurately applied the fix to the first citation as Exodus 20:19
(not 20:22).
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"weighing" the given facts which is clearly reductionistic. However, what is doing the
epistemic work in the first stage? Saadya's moneylending example from text 3.4.2.2 seems
straightforwardly reductionistic: the lender says p and verifies p with a scale. However,
this kind of reductionist verification is impossible for the divine testimony he is advocating
for. A miraculous subversion of the natural order is unconnected to the assertions of
prescribed divine law (e.g., how does turning a rod into a snake verify the assertion that
the Israelites should leave Egypt?). For Saadya to remain consistent in both the case of the
moneylender and the prophet, a visual guarantor for a speaker's telling needs to verify not
the assertion or proposition, but that the speaker is trustworthy. As shown regarding divine
revelation, when a prophet announces "Thus sayeth The Lord, p!" followed by the
perception of a miracle there exists two options as to what the miracle is verifying: 1) p or
2) "Thus sayeth the Lord." In recalling Text 3.3.2.2, Saadya is clear that miracles do not
justify the speaker's claim, but that the speaker is God, and the prophet speaks on his behalf:
"Similarly the throne and the firmament as well as its bearers, were all of them produced
for the first time by the Creator out of light for the purpose of assuring His prophet that it
was He that had revealed His word to him". Miracles serve as necessary but not sufficient
proofs that a prophet speaks for God since all three Abrahamic faiths claim prophets and
miracles. What differs is the trust in particular prophets and associated communal epistemic
authority structures. As Stroumsa notes, prophets are normal, accomplished human beings
who are only recognized as a prophet by: "the miracles he performs, by his moral and
intellectual perfection, and by the concord of his message with the content of the revelation
received by previous prophets."487 Thus, the work of verification is being performed by
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Stroumsa, "Saadya and Jewish Kalām," 74.
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who the speaker is, their identity and thus how trustworthy they are given their intellectual
and moral virtues. In discussing prophets, Saadya explains that even though a prophet
comes from God, having mingled with the evil of this world their "veracity would become
impaired, with the result that the souls of men would not repose confidence in him
anymore."488 This moral skepticism means knowledge ('ilm) could not be obtained from a
prophet, but mere taqlīd. Hence miracles are required to verify a prophet is trustworthy
allowing them to overcome the objections to testimony. While it seems trust naturally
appears to alleviate the moral concerns regarding a speaker's honesty leaving a more
reductionist approach to assess their accuracy later, Saadya, as a product of his milieu,
directly correlates moral character and intellectual expertise. As shown above, trust is thus
a thick concept for Saadya. This understanding receives further support from the full
analysis of Saadya and his blending of knowledge and moral expertise.
3.4.3 Saadya Gaon's Virtue-Theoretic Account of Testimony
There appears to be a strong and weak interpretation for the epistemic role of virtue in
Saadya's theory of testimony. In the weak sense, trust predicated fon the speaker's virtue
only serves a role in stage one outlined under reductionism. The virtuous character of a
speaker deeming them trustworthy performs the authenticating work necessary to accept a
telling by overcoming testimony's inherent corruption of willful distortion. However, it is
still up to the agent to use their own reason in stage two to confirm that the speaker's telling
did not contain an error in judgement. Only after the successful rational verification of
stage two does the listener achieve conviction and thereby certainty (which simultaneously
confirms the trustworthiness of the speaker). In the strong sense, trust in a worthy speaker
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Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 52-53. Treatise I; (Rosenblatt trans., 63).
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overcomes both objections in stage one. Stage two merely provides the "internalization" of
the knowledge obtained in stage one, a sort of second order awareness that one knows that
they know, the subjective removal of doubt and thus obtainment of certainty.
Attaining this strong sense of trust is possible since in Saadya's milieu moral and
intellectual wisdom are nearly indistinguishable. In returning to the moneylending example
of sorting and weighing statements, the continuation of Text 3.4.2.1 shows that Saadya
holds the same view:
Text 3.4.3.1
(Continuation of Text 3.4.2.1) …Scripture says, namely, The heart of the
wicked is of little worth. On the other hand, those expert in sorting are
presented as righteous men on account of their knowledge as well as their
patience, as it is stated first, Like tested silver is the speech of the righteous.
Thus praise is bestowed on the learned, and doubts are removed from them,
only on account of their patient penetration into all the phases of their art
after acquainting themselves thoroughly with it, as the saint said, Behold, l
waited for your words, I listened for your reasons whilst ye searched out
what to say (Job 32: 11). In like manner did the other saint say, And take
not the word of truth utterly out of my mouth (Ps. 119:43).489
A little later in al-Amānāt, Saadya claims that becoming wiser entails moral improvement:
Text 3.4.3.2
If now, the scholar and the student will pursue such a course in the perusal
of this book, then he that strives (mutaḥaqqiq) for certainty will gain in
certitude (tuḥaqqiqā), and doubt will be lifted from the doubter, and he that
believes by sheer authority (taqlīd) will come to believe out of insight
(nāẓir) and understanding. By the same token the gratuitous opponent will
come to a halt, and the conceited adversary will feel ashamed, whilst the
righteous and upright will rejoice.
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Saadia Gaon, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 3. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 6).
كق לב רשעים כמעט وجعل المنتقديّة صالحين لبصرهم وصبرهم بتقديهم כסף נבחר לשון צדיק وانّما يحمد العلماء وتزول عنهم...
( הן הוחלתי לדבריכם אזין עד תכונתיכם עד32,11 ى )איוב
ّ الشكوك بصبرهم على استغراق اجزاء الصناعة بعد بصرهم بها كما قال الول
.( ואל תצל מפי דבר אמת עד מאד119,43 ى اﻵخر )תהלים
ّ תחקרון מלין وقال الول
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Thus will men improve in their inner being as well as in their outer conduct.
Their prayers, too, will become pure, since they will have acquired in their
hearts a deterrent from error, an impulse to do what is right…490
Moral and intellectual character thus appear coterminous. If one is an intellectual expert,
they are also a moral expert and vis versa. This naturally follows from the authority of the
Torah as source of both moral and intellectual wisdom. Transmission of knowledge within
the established community and its epistemic rules naturally allows for trust. As such, rabbis
and Talmudic scholars emerge as trustworthy communal epistemic authorities. Hegedus
confirms this claiming that al-Amānāt's key argument is that trusting communal epistemic
authority is normal and rational, and problems emerge from not trusting communal
authority (or not trusting enough):
Saadya’s basic aim in the [al-Amānāt] is to demonstrate that a primary
belief in authority, where it is completed and strengthened by correct
speculation about the fundamental questions of the faith, leads to a firm and
solid belief, which is internalized by speculation. As such, belief is infinitely
more meaningful to the believer and more effective against external critics
than the initial naïve faith. On these grounds, free-thinking alone is to be
avoided, as it lacks the element of internalization. Thus, the soul tends not
to retain the results attained, or, if it does in fact hit the mark, it can always
be corrupted by uncertainties, even if the person is a ‘keen-eyed’
professional thinker (naẓẓār).491
I would add that Saadya also points out the error of being too trusting or trusting too much.
As we have seen, Saadya defends rational speculation vehemently. His desire is to move
people away from taqlīd or mere belief to internal conviction via reason. Saadya even goes
so far as to claim that one can trust God too much! Efros shows that the tenth and final
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Sa’adia ben Joseph, Kitāb al-Amānāt, 6. Intro.; (Rosenblatt trans., 9).
فاذا سار العالمر والتلميذ بالكتاب هذا المسير ازداد المتحقّق تحقّقا وانكشف عن الشاكّ ش ّكه وصار المؤمن تقليدا يؤبن نظرا وفهما ووقف
وبذالك تنصلع بواطن الناس مثل ظواهرهم وتخلص صلواتهم اذا...الطاعن بتلبيس واستحا المعاند المكابر وفرح الصالحون والمستقيمون
...المحرك لهم على الصواب
صار معهم فى قلوبهم الزاجر لهم عن الخطاء
ّ
491
Hegedus, Saadya Gaon, 49.
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treatise of al-Amānāt refutes Sufi abstinence which debated whether they could partake of
necessary provisions like medicine:492
It is interesting that in his criticism, Saadia attacks especially the element of
trust, the Sufic complete trust in God (Ar. tawakkul), which indeed exposed
the Sufists to attack among the Moslems themselves, and because of which
they were called mutawakkilun, trusters, and were debating the question
whether a mutawakkil may avail himself of medicine or not.493
Saadya thus works to balance two extremes: being afflicted with doubt and skepticism
because one refuses to rely on others and relying on others (presumably outside communal
authority structures) too readily which leads them to doubt and skepticism. Said differently,
Saadya implicitly maintains that believers can trust too little or too much. We see implicitly
in his works that the trustworthiness of testimony is situation dependent. 494 Saadya thereby
encourages people to trust, but trust wisely. This is seen by Saadya's emphasis and support
for Jewish communal epistemic authority, for without a historical chain of wise and moral
leaders, trustworthy tradition (and thus the law of revelation), would be unavailable.
In contemporary terms, Saadya is more reductionist than anti-reductionist, but his
openness to knowledge sources beyond natural means via testimony and his emphasis on
trust disrupts his placement in the contemporary framework. As I have shown, Saadya’s
overall theory of testimony remains the same regardless of whether God or humans are the
speaker (the mechanics of how each produces tellings is inconsequential). Listeners should
492

"There exist many people who assert that the highest endeavor of the servant of God in this world ought
to be to dedicate himself exclusively to the service of his Lord. That is to say, he should fast by day and arise
at night in order to praise and glorify God, abandoning all mundane cares, in the belief that God will provide
his sustenance, medicaments, and all his other needs… Nevertheless, the objection must be raised against
this view because of the exclusive devotion to this one [activity which it advocates] and the remark of its
proponents that one should not engage in any other. For if a person were not to concern himself about his
food, his body could not exist." Sa’adia ben Joseph, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 395.
493
Israel Efros, “Saadia’s General Ethical Theory and Its Relation to Sufism,” The Jewish Quarterly Review
57 (1967): 174–75.
494
This follows the manner Pouivet outlines on the virtues of testimony and "epistemic particularism"
Pouivet, Épistémologie des croyances religieuses, 87.
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assent to reports if they originate from a trustworthy source, specifically one that possesses
both knowledge and character. Using the framework developed in Chapter 2 (Chart 2.5.0.1)
from John Greco's rethinking, we can see that Saadya maintains that testimonial knowledge
reduces to non-testimonial species of knowledge like perception, rational inference, and
even the divine Logos itself marking him a source-reductionist. Saadya also maintains that
knowledge transmission is a crucial and distinct phenomenon, not merely back-to-back
cases of knowledge generation which makes him a transmission anti-reductionist. These
two positions permit trust, which I argue is the cornerstone of Saadya's detailed
understanding of knowledge from testimony.
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CHAPTER 4: AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S THEORY OF HUMAN AND DIVINE TESTIMONY
4.1 Introduction
Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī lived from 1058-1111 and was
appointed head of the Nizâmiyya Madrasa in Baghdad in 1091. He was an influential
thinker in jurisprudence, Kalām, and philosophy. His chief aim, as captured by his central
work Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn (Revival of the Religious Sciences, henceforth Iḥyāʾ), was to revive
the Islamic community by turning believers back to the Science of the Path of the
Afterlife.495 He is seen, and in fact he saw himself, as fulfilling the ḥadīth that Allāh will
send a reviver every 100 years such that he became known as the "Proof of Islam" (hujjat
al-Islām).496 Due to Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (The Precipitance of the Philosophers, henceforth
Tahāfut) and al-Munqidh min aḍalāl (Deliverer from Error, henceforth al-Munqidh), alGhazālī is frequently cited as a dogmatist who, because of his affiliation with Ash'arism,
forced the rationalist movement into retreat. 497 Contemporary scholarship recognizes that
al-Ghazālī did not single handedly destroy philosophy in Islam. 498 In many ways, alGhazālī's contribution is in modifying Avicenna’s philosophy by combining it with Ṣūfism
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All reference to al-Ghazālī's Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn ( )إحياء علوم الدينare to the Arabic 2005 edition published
by Dār ibn Hazm ( إحياء علوم الدين,أبو حامد محمد بن محمد الطوسي الغزالي, ed.  دار:المغني عى صمﻼ ﻷئفا نمي اﻷئفار )بيروت
(2005 ,ابن حزم.) with page numbers provided in parentheses to the English translation series published by
Fons Vitae (unless stated otherwise).
496
"Allāh will raise for this community at the end of every 100 years the one who will renovate its religion
for it." 37: 4278 from the Kutub al-Sittah collected by Abu Dawood.
497
All references to al-Ghazālī's al-Munqidh min aḍalāl ( )المنقذ من الضﻼلare to the Arabic edition edited by
Mahmood Bejou (Damascus, 1992) with page numbers provided in parentheses to the English translation by
Joseph McCarthy, al-Ghazālī, Deliverer from Error. Cf. Mehdi Mozaffari, Authority in Islam from
Muhammad to Khomeini, trans. Michel Vale (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1986), 12.
498
This is largely due to two important articles, cf. Richard M. Frank, “Al-Ghazālī’s Use of Avicenna’s
Philosophy,” Revue Des Etudes Islamiques, no. 55–57 (89 1987): 271–85; Abdelhamid Ibrahim Sabra, “The
Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary
Statement,” History of Science 25 (1987): 223–43; Frank Griffel, ed., Islam and Rationality: The Impact of
al-Ghazālī. Papers Collected on His 900th Anniversary., vol. 2 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), ix–x.
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to create room for a more traditional understanding of Islamic revelation. 499 The same
applies to his testimonial account. However, al-Ghazālī "camouflages" his indebtedness to
Avicenna by rebranding philosophical concepts using theological language. 500 These
changes may have been to endear philosophy to theologians, using terms and concepts they
would readily understand, or as a defense against accusations that he was a philosopher.
Given his aim to guide readers away from doubt and relying blindly on testimony toward
a personal experience with Allāh, al-Ghazālī's works can carry a level of esotericism since
not everyone can or should be able to access all truths. 501 A such, al-Ghazālī needs to be
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Frank Griffel notes in Philosophical Theology (2009) that al-Juwaynī "was the first Muslim theologian
who seriously studied Avicenna’s books", that he understood both the challenges and solutions inherent in
philosophy, and al-Ghazālī's knowledge of philosophy "likely began in the seminary of al-Juwaynī, where
reading philosophical literature may have been part of the higher curriculum." Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s
Philosophical Theology, 29–30. Jules Janssens suggests al-Ghazālī wrote the Maqāsid al Falasifa (Intentions
of the Philosophers, henceforth, Maqāsid) in his student days and was "repackaged" as the introduction to
the Tahāfut much later with a new introduction and conclusion of its own during the Nishapur controversy
when he was accused of being a philosopher. Jules Janssens, “Al-Ghazzālī and His Use of Avicennian Texts,”
in Problems in Arabic Philosophy, ed. Miklós Maróth (Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003),
37–49; Jules Janssens, “Al-Ghazzālī’s ‘Tahāfut’: Is It Really A Rejection Of Ibn Sīnā’s Philosophy?,”
Journal of Islamic Studies 12, no. 1 (2001): 1–17. Treiger also advocates that the Maqāsid served as alGhazālī's philosophical "dissertation" (ta'līqa) under the likely tutelage of al-Juwaynī. Treiger, Inspired
Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 3–4. Jules Janssens holds that al-Ghazālī frequently cites Avicenna without
naming his source and works such as his Maqāsid is largely a slightly free rewording of Avicenna's Treatise
on Logic (Daneshname), cf. Jules Janssens, “Le Dânesh-Nâmeh d’Ibn Sînâ: Un Texte à Revoir?,” Bulletin
de Philosophie Médiévale 28 (1986): 163–77; Jules Janssens, “Al-Ghazālī’s Use of Avicennian Texts in His
Maqāsid al-Falāsifa,” in Ежегодник Исламской Философии : 2019. № 9. = Ishraq : Islamic Philosophy
Yearbook : 2019. № 9., ed. А.И. Маточкина and А.К. Аликберов (M.: ООО «Садра», 2019), 80–121.
Deborah Black also sees Avicenna's epistemological categories as the blueprint for al-Ghazālī, cf. Deborah
Black also sees Black, “Certitude, Justification, and the Principles of Knowledge in Avicenna’s
Epistemology.” Also cf. Ulrich Rudolph, “Die Neubewertung Der Logik Durch Al-Gazl,” in Logik Und
Theologie: Das Organon Im Arabischen Und Im Lateinischen Mittelalter, ed. Dominik Perler and Ulrich
Rudolph (Brill, 2005), 73–97; Dimitri Gutas, “The Empiricism of Avicenna,” Oriens 40, no. 2 (2012): 391–
436.
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E.g., the rational soul is rebranded 'heart;' the material intellect, 'an intrinsic feature;' ethics, 'the science
of practice,' and theology, 'the science of unveiling.' Other Avicennian concepts like 'tasting' (dhawq) are
mystified. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 6. Cf. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical
Theology, 257. Treiger notes that al-Ghazālī appears to distance himself from Avicenna's concepts of the
material intellect, intellect in habitu, and actual intellect by obscuring his own usage with references to the
Mu'tazilites epistemological distinction between necessary ('ilm ḍarūrī) and acquired knowledge ('ilm
muktasb) in the Scale of Action and Iḥyāʾ Book 21 and then in explicitly attributing these ideas to the
Mutakallimūn in Iḥyāʾ Book 1. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 26–28.
501
Whether certain works are considered esoteric or exoteric is tied to whether one interprets al-Ghazālī as
an Asharite occasionalist or more of a crypto-Avicennian. Alexander Treiger sums up the issue succinctly:
"Al-Ghazālī is a versatile and prolific thinker, who wrote in different genres and for diverse audiences. His
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understood considering his stated audience, what kind of information he is conveying, and
how much of that information he wishes to convey. 502
I show that al-Ghazālī maintains knowledge from testimony is obtained through the
listener’s development of their own epistemic and moral virtues to verify reports they
receive in accordance with their potential through polishing the "mirror" of their heart, a
thick concept frequently used interchangeably with the soul and/or intellect. I argue that
al-Ghazālī works within this framework and maintains one theory of testimony for both
human and divine testimony which is reductionist in its acquisition but ultimately best
accounted for via Virtue Epistemology due to the central role that the trustworthiness of
speakers plays in transmitting knowledge. Since trust in the speaker is the most crucial
element of al-Ghazālī's theory of testimony, I will first provide an overview of the basic
framework of Islamic communal authority. Next, I overview al-Ghazālī's account of
knowledge to show in the following section how testimony fits for both its human and
divine forms. To conclude, I provide a contemporary assessment of al-Ghazālī's theory of

elusive style of writing, 'fluctuating' and seemingly imprecise terminology, and tantalizing allusions to
undisclosed 'mysteries' make an accurate interpretation of his thought extremely complicated." Treiger,
Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 4–5. A representative debate is the disagreement regarding alGhazālī's cosmology. Cf. W. H. T Gairdner, Al-Ghazālī’s Mishkāt al-Anwār and the Ghazālī-Problem.
(Strassburg: Trübner, 1914); Binyamin Abrahamov, “Al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Causality,” Studia Islamica,
no. 67 (1988): 75–98; Richard M. Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazâlî and Avicenna
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1992); Michael E. Marmura, “Ghazālian Causes and
Intermediaries,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 115, no. 1 (1995): 89–100; Jon McGinnis,
“Occasionalism, Natural Causation and Science in al-Ghazâlî,” in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy:
From the Many to the One : Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank, ed. Richard M Frank and James E
Montgomery (Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2006), 441–63.
502
Averroes chides al-Ghazālī in Decisive Treatise 2.50 saying, "An indication that he wished thereby to
alert people's minds is that he adhered to no single doctrine in his books. Rather, with the Asharites he was
an Asharite, with the Sufıs a Sufı , and with the philosophers a philosopher…" Averroës, The book of the
decisive treatise: determining the connection between the law and wisdom & the epistle dedicatory = Kitāb
faṣl al-maqāl wa-taqrīr mā bain aš-šarīʻa wa-’l-ḥukūma min al-ittiṣāl, trans. Charles E Butterworth (Provo,
Utah: Brigham Young Univ. Press, 2001), 22.
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testimony utilizing the framework established in chapter 2 differentiating reductionist and
anti-reductionist forms of knowledge generation and transmission.
4.2 al-Ghazālī and his Milieu
4.2.1 Medieval Islamic Communal Authority
Islam is unequivocal that ultimate authority rests in Allāh and, thanks to the "night of
power" (laylat al-qadr), his prophet Muhammad who received Allāh's testimony to report
the Qur'an. Al-Ghazālī affirms this position in his juridical work al-Mustasfa min 'ilm alusul (On Legal Theory of Muslim Jurisprudence, henceforth al-Mustasfa).503 Divine
authority granted Muhammed the authority to establish a new community (ummah) based
on faith to replace the former Arab Bedouin communities defined by blood or tribe. In
absorbing existing political and theocratic communities (based on various tribal and
religious laws) the Medina community blurred the lines between epistemic and practical
authority (whether religious, political, or military) under one seat of authority, Allāh.
Instituted and administered by Allāh's Prophet, the Medina community serves as the ideal
model for authority for all subsequent Islamic communities. In Authority in Islam, Mehdi
Mozaffari studies the "Constitution of Medina" (eight treaties of alliance written and signed
in 622-629 at Medina between the Prophet and his partners) to show that Muhammad filled
the seat of legitimate power serving as prophet, apostle, and tribal chief (i.e., supreme judge
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All reference to al-Ghazālī's al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul ( )المستصفى من علم اﻷصولare to the Arabic edition
by Ahmad Zaki Hammad (Cairo: Sidra, 2009), with page numbers provided in parentheses to the English
translation by Aḥmad Zakī Manṣūr Ḥammād, (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1987). Al-Mustasfa 1:100,
"Know, upon actual examination, that the source of rules is one, that is, the statements of Allāh, for the
statements of the Messenger of Allāh, do not establish rules nor obligations. Rather, he informs on the
authority of Allāh, that He has ruled on such and such. Therefore, ruling is for Allāh. Ijma' indicates the
Sunna, and the Sunna, the ruling of Allāh." al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 151; (Ḥammād trans.,
451)
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and arbiter).504 The structure of the Medina community unfolded beneath the Prophet
starting with his Companions (Ṣaḥābah), his "politicomilitary general staff" (the famous
Council of Ten, 'Ashara Mubashshara), and then the rest of the Believers (mu'minun),
supporters, and sympathizers (muslimūn).505 After 23 years, when Muhammed proclaimed
he had completed his work, the result was a political and religious community seen as
nothing short of miraculous.506 This "original locus in space and time" which captured "the
totality of statements revealed by Allāh to his Emissary" is what Mozaffari refers to as the
"fact of the Koran" which was universalized in its subsequent transmission and expansion
as the "fact of Islam" giving rise to the Islamic state.507 Since Muhammed never formally
institutionalized the community (or the Qur'an) there were immediate questions from minor
issues, such as what title Muhammed's immediate successor Abu Bakr should use
(Caliphate was eventually chosen), to the major, such as whether Ali ibn Abi Talib should
have succeeded instead. The Sunni-Shi'ite divide arose over questions of authority and
thereby who should lead after Muhammad. The Sunni tradition based political leadership
on piety while the Shiite tradition based it on bloodline. In the resulting traditions, Shiites
developed a more hierarchical structure and held to the infallibility of the Imam while
Sunnis developed a more decentralized structure. These early questions would have
impacted the official codification of the Qur'an approximately twenty years after
Muhammad's death.508 With no clearly established authoritative structure defined by
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Mozaffari, Authority in Islam, 24. Published simultaneously as Mehdi Mozaffari, “Authority in Islam from
Muhammad to Khomeini,” trans. Michel Vale, International Journal of Politics 16, no. 4 (1986): 1–127.
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Mozaffari, Authority in Islam, 4.
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Cf. Qur'an V, 3. "The works of Muhammad, that is, Islam, are regarded by Muslims as a miracle. In effect,
Islam's 'miracle' consists in its extraordinary art and capacity of transforming the secular into the theocratic,
the specific into the universal, and the everyday into the eternal." Ibid., 28.
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Ibid., 3–5.
508
"In the endeavor to avoid institutionalization, the verses of the Koran would remain for some time in the
same state as Muhammad had left them: scattered, diffuse, and uncodified. Collations of them would begin
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Muhammed, Mozaffari identifies four approaches to an "Islamic state" and at least five
different models of power.509 The caliphate model (under Sunni), following the seminal
Medina model, serves as the primary model of power as seen in the first caliphate model
and subsequently the monarchic caliphate model of the Umayyads (661-750) and the
Abbasids (750-1258). This diversity might be a consequence of the fact that "Islam has not
evolved a term of its own to specifically designate authority (Auctoritas)" per Mozaffari,
such that the expressions al-Amr, al-Hukm, and al-Mulk have been applied to both authority
and power.510 Despite this linguistic ambiguity, the Qur'an is explicit that Allāh alone has
authority, and any Islamic State relies on Allāh for its power.
Every Islamic community thus draws upon two universally recognized
authoritative sources: 1) a written law, the dictated speech of Allāh written down in the
Qur'an; and 2) an oral law, the ways (Sunna) and speech (ḥadīth) of the Prophet orally
recited by the Companions. The Qur'an is Allāh's words come down to Muhammed and is
recognized as a known and completely intact source with no question regarding either its

under the first two caliphs, but would not be completed until the third, 'Uthmãn b. 'Uffan (24-35/634-656).
One of these collations, that of Zayd b. Thãbit, would be chosen by 'Uthmãn as the authentic version and
made official. The others, those ascribed by tradition to 'Ali, 'Ubay, or 'Abd Allāh Mas'ud (who would be
sentenced by 'Uthmãn to flagellation because he refused to destroy his collation of the Koran) were
eliminated." Ibid., 5–6.
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Per Mozaffari, the approaches include: 1) the philosophical approach, e.g., al-Fārābī (259-339/872-950);
2) the administrative approach, e.g., al-Mawardi (974-1058); 3) the dogmatic approach, e.g., al-Ghazālī's
(1058-1111); 4) and the sociological approach, e.g., Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). Al-Fārābī's philosophical
approach is depicted as both "organic" (the parts of the city reflecting bodily organs echoing Plato's Republic)
and "utopian" (the Leader is a philosopher-prophet-imam-king, the perfection of humanity, who is the cause
of the city). Al-Mawardi's administrative approach depicted a "centralized hierarchized" institution which
oversaw a vast bureaucracy built on defined norms and precise rules. Al-Ghazālī's dogmatic approach called
for a "revival" of shari'a and the "dogmatization of the state" to protect the Caliphate by unifying believers.
Ibn Khaldun's sociological approach "demystified" the Muslim state making it "merely an organization
fashioned by men, with its origins here on earth, and not in heaven." Ibid., 8–18.
510
Al-mulk means "sovereignty" or "kingdom" which is also used to refer to the physical sensible world.
Ibid., 21.
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authenticity or infallibility.511 The Sunna and ḥadīth are the observations and hearings by
those closest to Muhammed and range in authenticity from near infallible to dubious. 512
The study and analysis of these sources is a science unto itself with an excellent treatment
by Aron Zyzow in The Economy of Certainty (2013).513 All Islamic jurisprudence and the
subsequent legal systems turns on the transmission, authentication, and interpretation of
these sources. This also meant the Islamic community was "cut off" from the Lawgiver
with the death of Muhammad and juridical interpretation became the only viable path to
new laws.514 Epistemic and practical authority in the Islamic world is largely found in the
custodians of the divine law, namely the jurists (mujtahid) or scholars (the 'Ulamā', literally
"the learned ones") who were found at the right hand of the caliph since it was their duty
to interpret the scriptures and apply them analogically.515 So while the executive position
of the caliph emerged due to the necessity of the office (both theologically and politically)
the 'Ulamā' served as the intermediary between the Law and Muslims that legitimized the
caliph, sultanate, or emirate that served beneath him. An executive ruler's power came from

511

A common prooftext which states God not only created humans but taught them is Qur'an 96:1-5
"Proclaim! In the name of thy Lord and Cherisher, Who created—Created man, out of a clot of congealed
blood: Proclaim! And thy Lord is Most Bountiful—He Who taught the pen—Taught man that which he knew
not." Abdullah Yusuf-Ali, trans., The Holy Qur’an (Faithpoint Press, 2005), 431.
512
These are based on the three types of hadith: 1) Sunnah Qawliyah, transmitted sayings of Prophet
Muhammad; 2) Sunnah Fi’liyiah, reports of the deeds and acts of Prophet Muhammad; 3)
Sunnah Taqririyah, reports of sayings or deeds of others which the Prophet either approved of or did not
disapprove of.
513
Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty. The expanded book publication of his dissertation.
514
"Therefore, while the science of legal theory [usul al-fiqh] rationalized the process by which legal
interpretation was to be carried out, interpretation, by itself, could not succeed in creating definitive new rules
unless a particular interpretation, against huge odds, was able to generate a consensus [ijmāʿ'] among the
jurists. Negatively, ijtihad could show what could not be the rule. Positively, it could only point to what could
be the rule. In the absence of consensus, then, all positions held by qualified interpreters of the law
(mujtahids) were deemed equally correct in practice." Mohammad Fadel, “The Social Logic of Taqlīd and
the Rise of the Mukhataṣar,” Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 198–99.
515
Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 7. In the chapter on sovereignty in The Caliphate of Man (2019),
Andrew March clarifies that the scholars "administered courts in the name of their own epistemic authority,
and the law enforced by courts was drawn from the scholars’ tradition of interpretation, which was almost
entirely outside the authority of the executive." Andrew F. March, The Caliphate of Man: Popular
Sovereignty in Modern Islamic Thought (Harvard University Press, 2019), 19.
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applying and enforcing laws he did not create and could not change for the scholars
possessed "ultimate legislative authority" with their ability to reject an executive ruling on
shari'a grounds.516 The 'Ulamā' even had influence over the appointment of the Caliph
either selecting one from among the scholars or via ijmāʿ (consensus).517
The power of the jurists and 'Ulamā' appears most clearly in the concept of ijmāʿ
(consensus) which plays a central yet controversial role in Islamic law. A full analysis is
beyond the present scope since it prescribes permissions and prohibitions without a clear
underlying text. Ijmāʿ, per Zyzow, acts as a limited "substitute for the infallible guidance
of the Prophet," not by replacing revealed law, or even "creating" new ones, but "declaring"
what Islamic law has to say to extra-scriptural situations. 518 Consensus presupposes that
Allāh graciously ensures at least one person in the Islamic community rightly interprets a
given law since scripture promises Islamic law will continue until the day of Judgment. 519

516

March unpacks the division of legal labor or a "dualistic" legal arrangement of al-siyāsa al-sharʿiyya
(literally "religiously legitimate governance" or "governance in accord with the sharīʿa,": "The term refers
to the authorization of discretionary public policy exercised by public authorities beyond the letter of the
sharīʿa. This is partly a division of labor. Most areas of social and economic life are in the hands of jurists
who derive their legitimacy from their administration of the sharīʿa. Their authority is moral and epistemic,
and derived not from popular or even sultanic authorization but from the general moral obligation to "Obey
God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you" (Q. 4:59; The Study Quran). On this view,
the scholars are at least part of what is meant by the "powers that be" appointed as "God’s and the Prophet’s
lieutenants on Earth." March, The Caliphate of Man, 21–22. Per Mozaffari "the caliph was obliged by
circumstances to give his power a purely religious quality" and thus "the Ṣerif's political support of the caliph
was not enough in itself and that the caliph could ill do without the guarantee of the 'Ulamā', expressed
solemnly and publicly." As the Abassid caliphate declined, the 'Ulamā' "endeavored to bring the facts in line
with the law" by brokering comprises between the political authority de jure of the Caliph and the political
authority de facto of the sultans and kings by legitimizing the latter so "the caliph had only to bestow upon
them honorary titles, often having a religious connotation." Mozaffari, Authority in Islam, 45.
517
Mozaffari records five means of appointment: 1. Deliberation in assembly (vestibule/saqifa); 2.
Nomination by the caliph in office ('ahd); 3. Nomination by a conclave (shūrā); 4. The caliphate resulting
from a revolt (fitna); and 5. Heredity (irth). Mozaffari, Authority in Islam, 32–33. "The ideal caliph was not
quite a philosopher-king, but was definitely something of a scholar-statesman, with the virtues of character
necessary for rulership (resolve, courage, self-restraint, phronesis), as well as the moral virtues necessary for
justice (including religious knowledge up to the mujtihād level)." March, The Caliphate of Man, 26.
518
Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 156–57.
519
The number of solutions (ijtihād the jurist's application of the law through qiyas i.e., juridical analogy) is
thus fixed to those proffered by the community at the time of the question.
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Ijmāʿ occurs when a majority of communal authorities identify and declare the correct
solution acquired via ijtihād (literally "effort" or "exertion") which "fixes it beyond the
reach of dispute."520 Al-Ash'arī and subsequently both al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī were
extremely critical of ijmāʿ. with al-Ghazālī insisting that ijmāʿ is only established with
unity within the entire community including commoners and even heretics. 521
To summarize, textual scholars held the keys to understanding the authoritative
written and oral law and justified their authority (including al-Ghazālī) from the Qur'an and
the ḥadīth report: "the scholars are the heirs of the prophets." 522 So while authority de jure
comes from the community (ummah), authority de facto resides in the jurists.523 This
authority was transmitted in a chain from Allāh to Muhammad and then to the Companions.
The disciples of the companions (tābi'ūn) then adopted the mantle of "authorized"
transmitters and interpreters of the Qur'an and Sunna.524 This strategy allowed the 'Ulamā'

520

Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 117.
An entire chapter on consensus follows the one on mutawātir in al-Mustasfa 1:173-1:216. al-Ghazālī alMustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 258-297; (Ḥammād trans., 662-739). Consensus could only be established on
common experience (al-ʿāda) and the hadith tradition. Consensus could never be established on prior
consensus. Al-Mustasfa 1:173-4, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 257-259; (Ḥammād trans., 662666). Regarding the inclusion of common people, heretics and unbelievers cf. Cf. 1:181-1:186, al-Ghazālī
al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 268-276; (Ḥammād trans., 685-697).
522
This hadith was a favorite of many jurists. For al-Ghazālī's usage cf. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in
Islamic Thought, 35, endnote 1. cf. Qur'an 4:59 9:122
523
"If authority in Islam was only authorized to protect the worldly and otherworldly interests of the Muslim
umma, those interests were known primarily through the law, and if the scholars were the custodians of the
law, then the rulers derived their authority from the approval of the scholars." March, The Caliphate of Man,
19.
524
Per Mozaffari: "With that guarantee, the caliph could be sure that the way was barred to any challenges
of a juridical nature to this authority. Of course, the degree and the weight of the influence of the 'Ulama'
depended on the personality and political power of the caliph. For a caliph who was strong politically, the
justificatory act of the 'Ulama', in the form of the bay'a or the fatwa (issuance of a writ of juridical and
political relevance on the shari'a) had more of a declarative and symbolic value. Conversely, the same act
could also have a constitutive and real value if the caliph was not sufficiently strong." Mozaffari, “Authority
in Islam from Muhammad to Khomeini,” 43–44. March confirms this: "During other periods (most notably,
the ʿAbbāsid era from the tenth century to the Mongol conquest, and then in Cairo during the Mamlūk period),
worldly power was fictitiously delegated by the caliph to a sultan with actual executive and coercive power.
But in most times and places, Muslims were ruled by 'mere' sultans (kings, shahs, beys, khans, etc.), and
521
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to maintain the balance of power (a role al-Ghazālī himself played). However, the 'Ulama'
as the legitimizers of power may have led to his spiritual crisis of 1095 and vow to never
serve political aims again.525
Al-Ghazālī was a member of the 'Ulamā' who began studying jurisprudence in his
hometown of Tūs (now modern Iran). He then moved to train under Ash'arite theologian
al-Juwaynī Imām al-Ḥaramayn at the Nizâmiyya Madrasa near Nishapur, who introduced
him to Grand-Seljuq Sultan Malikshâh's court. By the time of al-Juwaynī's death in 1085,
al-Ghazālī had become part of the court of Nizâm al-Mulk, grand-vizier of the Suljuq
Sultan and namesake for the schools he founded. Nizâm al-Mulk appointed al-Ghazālī to
the Nizâmiyya Madrasa in Baghdad in 1091 to defend Sunni doctrine against Chiism
(African spiritual religion), Shi'a teachings, and Ismailism. There he was introduced to the
caliphal court in Baghdad such that Mozaffari notes that "Ghazālī was simultaneously in
the service of three different institutions."526 Frank Griffel thus refers to al-Ghazālī as
"undoubtedly the most influential intellectual of his time," and contemporaries estimated
the value of his opulent robes.527 He was given three honorary titles: "Proof of Islam"

there followed juridical theories that explained why their coercive authority was just as valid and obedienceworthy (if not as exalted) as those of caliphs." March, The Caliphate of Man, 20.
525
Al-Ghazālī says in the Exordium of the Iḥyāʾ, he sought to point believers back to the earlier authorities
(i.e. "departed imams"): "Since this is a calamity afflicting religion and a grave crisis overshadowing it, I
have therefore deemed it important to engage in the writing of this book; to revive the science of religion
(Iḥyāʾ an li-‘ulūm al-dīn), to bring to light the exemplary lives of the departed imams (ala’imma almutaqaddimīn), and to show what branches of knowledge the prophets and the virtuous fathers regarded as
useful." Iḥyāʾ, 8. Introduction; (Faris trans., xi).
526
"First, there was the wizara, under the leadership of the powerful wazir (vizir) Nizam al-Mulk, who raised
his compatriot (both were from Ṭūs) from anonymity, charging him with the defense of the shafi'i credo
against the batini criticisms. Through the wizara Ghazãlí would serve the Seljuq sultanate: first Malikshãh
and then Sanjar. It was in honor of Sanjar that Ghazãlí wrote his Nasihat al-muluk (Mirror of Princes). The
caliphate was the third institution to benefit from Ghazālī's services. His book Mustazhiri, dedicated to the
caliph Al-Mustazhir, was a treatise in defense of the institution of the caliphate." Mozaffari, Authority in
Islam, 13.
527
Frank Griffel, “Al-Ghazālī,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer
2020
(Metaphysics
Research
Lab,
Stanford
University,
2020),
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(hujjat al-Islām), "Brilliance of the Religion" (zayn al-dīn), and "Eminence among the
Religious Leaders" (sharaf al-a imma), the latter two by al-Mulk. Following the
assassination of Vizier al-Mulk in 1092 and Sultan Malikshãh's fatal illness a month later,
Baghdad and the Seljuk Empire entered a period of political uncertainty (which al-Ghazālī
took an active part in) so violent and disease ridden that Griffel reports "within sixteen
months of Nizām al-Mulk’s assassination, the whole political elite of the Seljuq state was
dead, including the caliph."528 Relying on al-Ghazālī's autobiography al-Munqidh, we
learn the next few years form what is termed his "spiritual crises" when he began to study
Ṣūfīsm and left his position at the Nizāmiyya vowing at the tomb of Abraham never again
to serve or teach in institutions with political ties.529 The stated reasoning for this departure
was to better accord his lifestyle with Ṣūfī teachings and the virtuous life, but little
substantial change occurred in al-Ghazālī's thinking per Griffel (the most substantial
change is the link between a person's knowledge—convictions—and moral actions "gain
center stage'").530 As such he controversially accepted a position at the Nizāmiyya Madrasa

https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/al-ghazali/; Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical
Theology, 34.
528
Terken Khatun agreed to the Caliph's terms to appoint her 4-year-old son Sultan only after the caliph sent
al-Ghazālī to mediate and literally lay down the law. Their subsequent deaths from disease nullified the
arrangements and it is unclear where al-Ghazālī stood politically with the rise of Sultan Berk-Yaruq. Ten
years later al-Ghazālī wrote to then vizier Mujīr al-Din stating that the violent deaths of the previous four
viziers was a lesson about reaping what you sow. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 34, 36–39.
529
A physical ailment that prevented al-Ghazālī' from speaking and eating which baffled physicians saying
it was an affliction of the soul not the body gave him the resolve to give up his position and renounce his
titles and prestige to leave Baghdad. The vow occurred during his travels to Hebron after learning from Abu
l-Fath Nasr's practice of rejecting payments "illicitly" acquired thus vowing never again "to go to any ruler,
to take a ruler’s money, or to engage in one of his public disputations." After making arrangements for his
family, he lived a wanderer's life for 10 years traveling to Damascus (reportedly living in a minaret),
Jerusalem (visiting the Dome of Rock), and Medina and Mecca teaching from the Iḥyāʾ. He returned to Ṭūs
to build a "private" school (zāwiya) and Ṣūfī convent (khānqāh). Ibid., 44.
530
"Although the weight of certain motifs in al-Ghazālī’s writing changes after 488/1095, none of his
theological or philosophical positions transform from what they were before." Ibid., 43.
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in Nīsāpūr in 1106 (prompting his writing of al-Munqidh to help justify his decision).531
Such experiences clarify his overall aim to reform Islam by directing Muslims to devote
themselves to the afterlife and not this world as evidenced by the Iḥyāʾ.532 As we shall see,
the role of testimony for al-Ghazālī is thus to guide people to direct divine testimony and
not rely on human testimony.
4.2.2 al-Ghazālī’s Account of Knowledge
Al-Ghazālī's epistemology is the nexus of multiple influences from Avicenna, Ash'arism
Mu'tazilism, and mysticism. Metaphorically the heart of al-Ghazālī's epistemology (due to
his cosmology to which we will return under divine testimony) is literally the human
"heart" (qalb) which is the locus of both material and spiritual being reflected by his
interchangeable terminology of heart (qalb), soul/"self" (nafs), spirit (rūḥ), and intellect
('aql).533 Al-Ghazālī consistently likens the heart to a metal mirror (speculum) that reflects
reality (in accordance with two "modes") from both al-mulk—the sensible physical
world—and al-malakūt—the non-sensible world of spirit and intelligible meaning
(variously named, e.g. the "World of Dominion", but always beyond the limits of the
philosophical method).534 This is made clear in Book 21, bayan 6 of the Iḥyāʾ:

531

Treiger notes that at this time several scholars took issue with "philosophical influence" in al-Ghazālī's
thought and had him brought before the court of vizier Sanjar where he vindicated himself. Ibid., 47, 54–55;
Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 96–101.
532
"Revival was an unusual book for its time. It was conceived as a work on the "knowledge of the path to
the afterlife" ('ilm ṭarīq alākhira), a practical guidebook on how its readers may gain the afterlife through the
actions they perform in this world." Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 48.
533
This is in keeping with Aristotle's position. Avicenna famously housed intellect in the brain so al-Ghazālī
either deviates from Avicenna on this point or omits (possibly obscures) this fact for the sake of the mirror
metaphor since heart, mind, and soul are all used interchangeably. Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, Ghazālī’s
Theory of Virtue. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974), 25.
534
Al-Ghazālī also describes a third intermediary world, al-jabarūt, that "bridges" al-mulk and al-malakūt.
There is no scholarly consensus on how to translate this term (Gianotti opts for [Divine] "Almightiness")
since there is no consensus on what this world is. In kitab al-tawhid wa'l-tawakkul (Faith in Divine unity and
trust in Divine providence, book 35 of the Iḥyāʾ), it is likened to a ferry with no additional explanation.
Timothy J. Gianotti, Al-Ghazālī’s Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul: Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and
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Text 4.2.2.1
Know that the seat (mahall) of knowledge ('ilm) is the heart, by which I
mean the subtile [sic] tenuous substance (latīfah) which rules all the parts
of the body and is obeyed and served by all its members. In its relationship
to the real nature of intelligibles (ma'lūmāt) it is like a mirror in its
relationship to the forms (suwar) of changing appearances (mutalawwināt).
For even as that which changes has a form, and the image (mithāl) of that
form is reflected in the mirror and represented therein, so also every
intelligible has its specific nature, and this specific nature has a form which
is reflected and made manifest in the mirror of the heart. Even as the mirror
is one thing, the forms of individuals another, and the representation of their
image in the mirror another, being thus three things in all, so here too there
are three things: the heart, the specific nature of things, and the
representation and presende [sic] of these in the heart. The 'intellect' (alālim) is an expression for the heart in which there exists the image of the
specific nature of things. The intelligibles (al-ma'lūm) is an expression for
the specific nature of things. 'Intelligence' (al-'ilm) is an expression for the
representation of the image in the mirror.535
Noticeably, al-Ghazālī does not use the word 'aql for intellect like the philosophers, but
more in the sense of "intelligence." 536 He clarifies in Iḥyāʾ Book 1, bāb 7, bayān 2 "the
word 'aql is a term used interchangeably for four distinct meanings," and the first of these
is the mirror:
Text 4.2.2.2
First it ['aql] is the quality which distinguishes man from the other animals
and prepares him to understand and grasp the theoretical sciences
(nāẓiriyah), and master the abstract (fikriyah) disciplines. This is exactly
what Al-Harith ibn-Asad al-Muhasibi meant when he said in defining the
intellect ('aql) as an instinct (gharizah) through which the theoretical
sciences are grasped and understood. It is as though it were a light cast into
the heart preparing it thereby to grasp things and understand them. … This
is just like the mirror which is distinguished from other objects by its ability
Eschatology of the Iḥyāʻ (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 151–53. These presumed cosmological divisions do not origin
in kalam.
535
Iḥyāʾ, 888. Book 21. (Skellie Trans. The Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali: A Translation of His Book
of the Ihya’ on the Explanation of the Wonders of the Heart, trans. Walter James Skellie (Ann Arbor:
University Microfilms International, 1978), 46–47).
 وهي باﻹضافة إلى حقائق، وهي المطاعة المخدومة من جميع اﻷعضاء، أن محل العلم هو القلب؛ أعني اللطيفة المدبرة لجميع الجوارح:اع لم
 كذلك لكل، ومثال تلك الصورة ينطع في المرآة ويحصل بها،المعلومات كالمرآة باﻹضافة إلى صور المتلونات؛ فكما أن للمتلون صورة
 وحصول مثالها في، وصور اﻷشخاص غير، وكما أن المرآة غير،معلوم حقيقة ولتلك الحقيقة صورة تنطبع في مرآة القلب وتتضح فيها
: فالعالم. وحصول نفس الحقائق في القلب وحضورها فيه، وحقائق اﻷشياء، القلب: فكذلك ههنا ثﻼثة أمور.  فهي ثﻼثة أمور،المرآة غير
. عبارة عن حصول المثال في المرآة: والعلم. عبارة عن حقائق اﻷشياء: والمعلوم،عبارة عن القلب الذي فيه يحل مثال حقائق اﻷشياء
536
Treiger's assessment as "Intelligence" is accurate. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 18.
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to reflect images and colours through a particular quality peculiar of it,
namely its polish.537
Al-Ghazālī continues: second, 'aql refers to a priori or axiomatic (ḍarūrīyah) knowledge
regarding the possibility and impossibility of things (his examples include: two is greater
than one and a person cannot be in two places at once). Third, 'aql is "that knowledge which
is acquired through experience (empirical knowledge), in the course of events." The fourth
is a kind of prophetic knowledge obtained when the power is morally and intellectually
trained (able to suppress the appetite) to the extent that it is "able to tell what the end will
be."538 However, al-Ghazālī explicitly states that the first understanding of 'aql as a mirror
is the "foundation" to the others.
Text 4.2.2.3
As to these four usages of the word ‘aql it should be pointed out that the
first is the foundation of the other three, their origin and fountain-head. The
second is the branch nearest to the first while the third is an offshoot of both
the first and the second combined, since through the power of the instinct
and axiomatic knowledge, are the empirical sciences acquired. The fourth
is the final fruit and ultimate aim. The first two are native (bi-al-tabr), while
the last two are acquired (bi-al-iktisab).539
To clarify, while the concept of the heart represents the Avicennian intellect, the term 'aql
primarily refers to the heart's potentiality to receive intelligibles, or the Avicennian material
intellect, as determined by one's moral and intellectual attainment. 540 The 'aql as

537

Iḥyāʾ, 101. Book 1. (Faris Trans. The Book of Knowledge, 218–19).
 وتدبير الصناعات الخفية الفكرية وهو الذي، الوصف الذي يفارق اﻹنسان به سائر البهائم وهو الذي استعد به لقبول العلوم النظرية:فاﻷول
ّ
 وكأنه نور يقذف في القلب به يستعد، إنه غريزة يتهيأ بها إدراك العلوم النظرية:أراده الحا رث بن أسد المحاسبى حيث قال في حد العقل
.وهو كالمرآة التي تفارق غيرها من اﻷجسام في حكاية الصور واﻷلوان بصنة اختصت بها الصقالة...ﻹدراك اﻷشياء
538
Iḥyāʾ, 101. Book 1. (Faris Trans. The Book of Knowledge, 220).
539
Iḥyāʾ, 101. Book 1. (Faris Trans. The Book of Knowledge, 220).
 فرع اﻷول والثاني؛ إذ بقوة الغريزة والعلوم الضرورية تستفاد: والثالث. هو الفرع اﻷقرب إليه: والثاني. هو اﻷس والسنخ والمنبع:فاﻷول
. فاﻷوﻻن بالطبح واﻷخيران باﻻكتساب، هو الثمرة اﻷخيرة وهي الغاية القصوى: والرابع.علوم التجارب
540
"It should be noted, at this point, that the four meanings of the term "intelligence" correspond to
Avicenna’s hierarchy of the three lower grades of theoretical intellect (the material intellect, the intellect in
habitu, and the actual intellect), with the prophetic, so-called 'sacred intellect' (al-‘aql al-qudsī in Avicenna’s
terminology) superadded." Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 25, 29.
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potentiality is indistinguishable from the polish and thus capability to reflect. 541 The mirror
analogy thus serves as a pseudo-theory of abstraction that serves al-Ghazālī's skepticism
of epistemic realism. In experiencing an external object, whether in al-mulk or al-malakūt,
the qualities of the object are understood as intelligible forms in the mirror, but not the
object (the form) itself.542 In this, al-Ghazālī's "Avicennian Nominalism" is apparent since
modalities are compared to universals and relocated from the outside world exclusively as
concepts of the mind.543 This allows al-Ghazālī to hold that necessity, contingency, and
impossibility are not ontological predicates (as with Avicenna) but epistemological
predicates of judgments.544 This solves doctrinal problems (Allāh is not necessitated to
create) while creating difficulties (the nature of causality). It also effects the practice of
logic (i.e., which propositions qualify as certain and thus suitable for use in a syllogism)

541

Treiger, in analyzing Text 4.2.2.2, captures this nicely: "It ['aql] is a quality of the heart, its specific
configuration in virtue of which the heart becomes receptive of the imprints of intelligible forms. If the heart
is analogous to a mirror, intelligence ['aql] can be compared to this mirror’s specific configuration – its polish
– in virtue of which it is able to receive imprints of the forms of visible objects." Ibid., 17–19.
542
"Notice that al-Ghazālī is careful to say that it is not the objects of knowledge themselves but their realities
(ḥaqā’iq), i.e., their intelligible forms, that are reflected in the mirror of the heart and, furthermore, that it is
not the forms themselves but their likes, or images (mithāl, pl. amthila), that appear therein… Al-Ghazālī’s
insistence that the knower is doubly removed from the object of knowledge is not accidental. Its significance
lies in precluding any possibility of union with the object of knowledge, of the type sometimes affirmed by
the philosophers when they claim that the subject of intellection (‘āqil) becomes identical with the intellected
object (ma‘qūl) in the act of intellection (‘aql). According to al-Ghazālī, the object of knowledge does not
become united or identical with the heart, nor can it be said to indwell (ḥulūl) it; it is merely reflected in it,
which means that only an 'image' of its 'reality' is impressed upon the heart." Ibid., 32.
543
Griffel claims "What distinguishes al-Ghazalı from Avicenna…is that he remained ontologically
uncommitted to the existence of the universals outside of individual human minds." He thus ascribes
nominalism to al-Ghazālī but is keen to point out that al-Ghazālī "was not a nominalist in the sense of his
contemporary Roscelin (d. c. 1120) or William of Ockham (d. 1347) in the Latin West. These nominalists
outspokenly denied any ontological coherence between things and their formal (and universal)
representations in our minds." Griffel accurately reflects the aim of the Tahāfut in that for al-Ghazālī:
"Although the universals may exist as entities in the active intellect, such an existence cannot be
demonstrated. The realist understanding of the universals may or may not be true." Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s
Philosophical Theology, 176–78. Taneli Kukkonen also supports this reading. Cf Taneli Kukkonen, “Possible
Worlds in the Tahāfut Al-Falasifa: Al-Ghazālī on Creation and Contingency,” Journal of the History of
Philosophy Journal of the History of Philosophy 38, no. 4 (2000): 479–502. In Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī claims
that in perceiving particulars the mind effectively "abstracts" intelligibles which do not have an ontological
existence in the real world. Cf. al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 37–38, 44.
544
Cf. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 79, 162–73, 201–4.
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which is crucial to his theory of testimony. As we will see, the certainty of knowledge
likewise occurs in the "heart" leading to critiques that the certainty obtained is subjective
and not objective. In Book I section 7 of the Iḥyāʾ, he distinguishes between a philosophical
and a theological application of the term "certainty" (yaqin). For the philosophers (huzzar)
and the Mutakallimūn, yaqin "signifies lack of doubt (i.e., certainty)" in four possible states
of readiness to believe.545 For the jurists and the Ṣūfīs, yaqin (Faris translates as the state
of "faith") is not about "conjecture or doubt" but conviction. The former is the elimination
of doubt while the latter is a state of conviction so strong there is no room for doubt. Both
applications thus refer to a subjective psychological state (making certainty available by
those unable to perform philosophical demonstration).
Like Saadya, al-Ghazālī starts with the Mu'tazilite framework of "finding oneself"
in a particular cognitive state (ḥâl), like doubting or conviction (i'tiqad), and then verifying
if this state results from a cause ('illa) or an assumption (ma'na).546 True conviction results
from "the criterion of truth" and experiencing "repose of soul" (sukun al-nafs). Al-Ghazālī

545

"The first is where the evidence for believing and disbelieving is even; it is described by doubt", this is
the state of doubt (shakin); "The second state is where you are more inclined to accept one position while
realizing that the contrary is possible. But this possibility does not prevent you from giving preference to the
former," this is the state of presumption (zann); " The third state obtains when one is inclined to believe a
thing so earnestly that he is taken up by it to such an extent that nothing else seems possible to him and if
such a thing ever comes to his mind, he will refuse to believe it", this is the state of conviction approaching
certainty (I'tiqad muqarib li-l-yaqin); "the fourth state is that of definite knowledge (marifah haqiqiyah)
resulting from evidence which leaves no place for doubt or any possibility of doubt" which is the state of
certainty (yaqin). al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 184–92. Al-Ghazālī's ultimate rescue from systemic
doubt via a "divine light cast into his breast" in the Munqidh fits this understanding. Also cf. Frank, “AlGhazali on Taqlid,” 227–28.
546
Cf. Section 3.2.2 on Mu'tazilite influence in Saadya Gaon's epistemology. Al-Ghazālī takes issue with the
notion of i'tiqad (opinion/conviction), but Treiger explains how it relates to knowledge in that "Al-Ghazālī
compares opinion to a 'knot' on a person’s heart – a clever pun, exploiting the fact that the Arabic words for
knot (‘uqda) and opinion (i‘tiqād) come from the same root. True knowledge is, thus, the untying of the knots
of opinions (inhilāl al-‘uqad), characterized by unveiling and dilation of the chest (kashf wānshirāh)." Treiger
explains that al-Ghazālī criticizes their I'tiqad conception of knowledge for being both "too restrictive" (it
does not apply to knowing non-existent things do not exist) and "too inclusive" (it would imply that i‘tiqād
based on taqlīd would happen to be knowledge if correct). Cf. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic
Thought, 30.
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adopted and modified the Ash'arite position: "real knowledge" could only be obtained by
the elite (via a more "rigid" verification process than his teacher al-Juwaynī) while
everyone else can only obtain "knowledge in broad sense."547 The search for the causes of
belief states leads to the sources of knowledge (which in the mirror analogy is what
provides the intelligibles that are "reflected"). While all knowledge ultimately comes from
Allāh, al-Ghazālī notes up to seven sources of knowledge across his works. 548 Five sources
are said to provide certain knowledge ('ilm yaqini) suitable for a syllogism: 1) a priori
concepts (awwaliyyāt); 2) inner sense perceptions (mushāhadāt bātina); 3) outer sense
perception (mahsūsāt zāhira); 4) tajriba (experiential confirmation), i.e. learning from
repeated experience, e.g. fire burns; 549 and 5) mutawātir reports, knowledge that is
concurrently reported by a sufficient number of people. 550 After the certain sources, alGhazālī names two uncertain sources not permitted in syllogisms since they cannot be

547

For the Ash'arites, the criterion of truth is generally knowledge ('ilm or ma'rifa) but "knowledge" is a
broad and difficult notion to pin down as the relevant terms ('ilm, ma'rifa,ʾīmān, i'tiqad, tasdiq) are often
used interchangeably and their meaning is context dependent. ʾImān is one of several terms that are
commonly translated as "belief", but ʾīmān implies tasdiq. The Greek endoxa might be the closest equivalent
of Mashhūr, while testes (and potentially superstes) would be the Latin equivalent of ahad reports. I'tiqad is
also sometimes translated as "belief," but it is a belief that does not imply tasdiq. The Greek and Latin
equivalent of i'tiqad would be doxa and opinio. Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 208. Cf. al-Ghazālī, Munqidh
Min Al-Ḍalāl, 29-30.; (McCarthy trans. 61,63). Griffel notes that this distinction helps makes sense of alGhazālī's epistemology and is clearly found in al-Juwaynī, but less so in al-Ghazālī's works save perhaps
Iḥyāʾ III. Frank Griffel, “Taqlīd of the Philosophers: Al-Ghazālī’s Initial Accusation in His Tahāfut,” in
Ideas, Images, and Methods of Portrayal : Insights into Classical Arabic Literature and Islam, ed. Sebastian
Günther, Islamic History and Civilization 58 (Boston ; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 280.
548
His works on logic and jurisprudence denote which sources are suitable for use as premises in syllogisms,
hence both juridical works Mihakk al-nazar fi al-mantiq (Touchstone of Reasoning in Logic, henceforth
Mihakk) and al-Mustasfa min 'ilm al-usul (A distillation of the Science of the Principle of Jurisprudence)
show these seven. Cf. Mihakk 51 and Al-Mustasfa 1:44-49. For more on this list and al-Ghazālī's portrayal,
Cf. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 204–5, endnote 159.
549
Al-Ghazālī's other examples include bread leads to satiety, water quenches thirst, hitting an animal causes
it pain, a cut in the neck causes death, and scammony has a laxative effect on one’s bowels. Tajriba can be
translated as "experiment" but not in the contemporary sense of a designed and statistically analyzed
experiment.
550
A modified list of four appears in the Iḥyāʾ with demonstration (burhān) in lieu of both inner and outer
sensation which (in addition to the assessment of sources for use in a syllogism) indicates demonstration is
clearly considered a certain source of knowledge. For more knowledge sources cf. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s
Philosophical Theology, 204–5.
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"sufficiently verified:" 6) data from the estimative faculty that seems true, but cannot be
verified (wahmiyyāt);551 and 7) mashhūrat which are reports that are deemed authentic by
inference in later generations of transmission (comparable to Greek endoxa).552 Even
though al-Ghazali does not list it as a source of knowledge, taqlīd—blind uncritical
acceptance or imitation of authority—is a significant cause of people's cognitive states. AlGhazālī classifies the sources of knowledge under the Mu'tazilite distinction between
necessary knowledge ('ilm ḍarūrī, unreflective or non-discursive) and acquired knowledge
('ilm muktasb, require reflection, nāẓir) which he fits within his four meanings of 'aql with
a developmentalist progression following Avicenna's stages of human development. 553
Every human is born with the divine gift of a material intellect (their mirror) ready to
receive intelligibles and a priori or innate knowledge.554 Text 4.2.2.3 shows the first two
forms of 'aql are "native" which he calls necessary knowledge (al-‘ulūm al-darūrīya, in
the Munqidh) while the latter two forms are "acquired" through a reflective and evaluative

551

Cf. Farid Jabre, Essai sur le lexique de Ghazālī, vol. V, Section Des Etudes Philosophiques et Sociales
(Beyrouth, Liban: Publications de L’Universite Libanaise, 1970), 279.
552
The Mashhūr tradition describes ahad reports that subsequently became so widespread among scholars to
be transmitted by a number impossible to maintain a conspiracy to lie. These reports are often claimed to be
mutawātir by inference, i.e., if the second generation accepted the report, then they were certain of its
authenticity. Mashhūr might be considered a near mutawātir failing to achieve a requirement somewhere
between initial testimony and final report. The widespread acceptance of such an ahad report thus parallels
the concept of consensus ('ijma). Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 17–18.
553
Also cf. Munqidh, al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min Al-Ḍalāl, 72-73.; (McCarthy trans. 96-97).
554
Mishkat and Munqidh add the power of sensation to innate knowledge which appears at the age of
discernment (age 7) while theoretical knowledge at the age of reason (age 15). Treiger, Inspired Knowledge
in Islamic Thought, 23. For a summary of Avicenna's four developmental stages of the soul Cf. Gutas, “The
Empiricism of Avicenna,” 404–5.
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thought process.555 He even defines thinking as a syllogistic process carried out in the
heart.556
Al-Ghazālī brings the cognitive states and different sources for knowledge together
in his famous epistemological hierarchy of cognitive states, in which different epistemic
grounds provide increasing levels of cognitive assurance and even certainty. This hierarchy
is given most clearly in al-Arba'in fi usul al-din (The Book of Forty, henceforth alArba'in),557 in three progressing cognitive states: 1) ʾīmān (opinion or belief); 2) 'ilm
(knowledge); and 3) dhawq (literally "tasting" which McCarthy translates as "fruitional
experience").558 Each level is caused by or grounded in: 1) taqlīd (imitation); 2) burhān
(demonstration); 3) mushāhadah (personally witnessing):559
Text 4.2.2.4
Know that belief (al-ʾīmān), knowledge (al-'ilm) and taste (dhawq) are three
degrees apart: So if the commoner (literally "the impotent" al-'innin), for
example, imagines (yataṣawwara) the desire of love making is true by its
existence in others, in that he accepts [the report] from whom he thinks well
of (yuḥassinu) [i.e. trusts] and does not accuse him of lying, that is belief
(ʾīmān). And he who imagines (yataṣawwara) that he knows by
demonstration (al-burhān) the existence belonging to others, and it is
knowledge ('ilm). He gathers it [by] analogy (qiyas), that is he looks to his
desire for food, for example, and measures by it the desire of love making,
and all this is far from realizing the true sense of desire found belonging to
it. And just as with disease, the commoners know it correctly and believe
(yuʾamminu) in it, and the physician knows it correctly by demonstration
(burhān) and it is knowledge ('ilm) and he is aware, and not from becoming
sick, not obtaining for him taste (dhawq). So too the proposition regarding
annihilation in oneness (tawḥīd). So taste (dhawq) is witnessing
555

The corresponding sources for the former are a priori concepts, inner sense perception, and outer
perception while tajriba and mutawātir reports for the latter. However, as we will see, al-Ghazālī redefines
these categories to maintain a middle ground as both necessary ḍarūrī and reflective nāẓir. Al-Ghazālī
understands the judgments which result from tajriba "are different from sense perception," Griffel explains,
"as they express universal judgment rather than merely individual observations of isolated events." Griffel,
Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 205.
556
Cf. book 39 of the Iḥyāʾ entitled, The Book about Thinking (Kitab al-Taffakur).
557
Arba'in is a condensed summary of the Iḥyāʾ written for an Arabic audience (ca. 1102-3).
558
al-Ghazālī, Deliverer from Error.
559
For more on the tripartite division cf. Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 215–16.
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(mushāhadah), and knowledge is analogy (qiyas), and belief (ʾīmān) is
proper acceptance of thought with the dismissal of suspicion. So strive to
become the people of witnessing (mushāhadah). For the report (al-khabar)
is not like eye witnessing.560
These three epistemic levels can be obtained in what Frank and Treiger describe as "two
modes" of knowing: one for al-mulk via learning and acquisition and a second for almalakūt via divine inspiration and unveiling.561 This is most evident with personal
experience. While perception of physical objects is available to even the ʿavāmm,
perception of non-physical objects can only be achieved by the khāṣṣ al-khavāṣṣ and even
then, it is extremely rare.562 Such cognition for non-physical objects is captured by his
usage of the Ṣūfī concept dhawq—an unmediated "fruitional experience" or literally a

560

My translation from Arba'in Section 2 book 6. For Treiger's translation cf. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge
in Islamic Thought, 51.
 بأن يقبل ذلك ممن، فإن العنّين مث ّل يتصور أن يصدق بوجود شهوة الوقاع لغيره:واعلم أن اﻹيمان والعلم والذوق ثﻼث درجات متباعدة
 ومأخذه قياس أن ينظر إلى شهوته للطعام. وهوعلم، ويتصور أن يعلم بالبرهان وجوده لغيره. وذلك إيمان، وﻻ يتهمه بالكذب،يحسن ظنه به
 ويعرفه، وكذلك المرض يعرفه العامي الصحيح يؤمن به. وكل ذلك بعيد عن إدراك حقيقة الشهوة بوجودها له،مثﻼّ فيقيس بها شهوة الوقاع
 والعلم، فالذوق مشاهدة. فكذلك القول في الفناء في التوحيد. ومن لم يصر مريضأ لم يحصل له الذوق،الطبيب الصحيح بالبرهان وهو علم
. فليس الخبر كالمعاينة. فاجتهد أن تصير من أهل المشاهدة. واﻹيمان قبول بحسن الظن مع اﻻنفكاك عن التهمة،قياس
al-Ghazālī, Kitāb Al-Arba‘īn Fī Us.Ūl al-Dīn, ed. ’A. ’A. ‘Urwānī and M.B. al-Shaqfa (Damascus: Dār alqalam, 1424), 70–71. Al-Ghazālī gives a common illustration to these differing states regarding whether
Zayd is in the house. Cf. Iḥyāʾ’, Book 21, bayān 6. This illustration is used for both the cognition of physical
and non-physical objects. Cf. Iḥyāʾ’, Book 2, fasl 2. This is a proto theory of proportionality where knowers
maintain their belief in proportion to the strength of the "evidence." Cf. Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 228–
29.
561
"The clarity of presentation (al-‘idah, al-inkishaf) differs in the two modes of knowing. Al-Ghazālī
recognizes the availability of a higher and more perfect knowledge of God, which is that of a kind of infused
knowledge or revelation (‘ilham, kashf), but this is unusual, given only to the "elite" (aI-khawass), the
prophets and the saints. It is the former level of knowledge which is made generally accessible in the Koran
and the Sunna and in the formal teaching of the orthodox Muslim community. To whatever perfection one
aspire and whatever level of knowing he may ultimately attain, it is with this knowledge that he has
necessarily to begin." Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 212. Per Treiger, "al-Ghazālī asserts that with regard
to knowledge, human beings differ in several respects: in the quantity of what they know (kathrat alma‘lūmāt wa-qillatuhā); in the nobility (sharaf) of the subjects they know; in the speed of their acquisition
of knowables; and finally, and most importantly, in their mode of cognition of them (ṭarīq taḥṣīlihā). There
are two such modes: 1 - divine inspiration by way of direct intimation and unveiling (ilhām ilāhī ‘alā sabīl
al-mubāda’a wa-l-mukāshafa) on the one hand, and 2 - learning and acquisition (ta‘allum wa-ktisāb) on the
other." Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 64.
562
Treiger explains that dhawq is intellectual vision parallel to normal vision where vision for physical
objects is the perfect cognition of the elementary cognition "imagination" and mushāhadah (witnessing) for
non-physical objects is the perfect cognition of the elementary cognition "intellection." Treiger, Inspired
Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 57.
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"tasting" of the divine.563 Al-Ghazālī explains dhawq is preferred to both simple faith,
which is insufficient since the revelation of miracles in the Qur’an can be likened to magic
and deception, and 'ilm based on logic which can be broken by well-ordered arguments
because dhawq is immune from error.564 The knowledge generated from dhawq is the same
as that from demonstration (i.e. philosophical knowledge) but is the "perfection" (istikmal)
of such knowledge due to superadded assurance or a greater sense of certainty since it is
no longer mediated.565 This "witnessing" (mushāhadah) thus omits any logical structure
which makes it immediate and direct (as opposed to mediate and indirect) in the same way
as a physical face-to-face encounter.566 This highest level of cognition fits the fourth stage
of development of prophetic or saintly knowledge which requires "polishing the mirror",
i.e. obtaining the highest levels of virtue, typically by following the Ṣūfī path. However,
personal development does not guarantee dhawq since the mirror must be properly oriented
and the "veil" lifted.567

563

Practicing of the Sufi way leads him to state in the Munqidh that certain knowledge comes "not by study,"
but rather by dhawq—"fruitionaI experience and the state of ecstasy and ‘the exchange of qualities.’" alGhazālī, Munqidh Min Al-Ḍalāl, 74.; (McCarthy trans. 99).
564
al-Ghazālī instructs: "let such preternatural events be one of the proofs and concomitants that make up
your total reflection on the matter." al-Ghazālī, Deliverer from Error, 100. Treiger explains that the
witnessing behind dhawq is "sure and certain (yaqiniyah)," and thus immune from error unlike taqlīd and
attempts at burhān, due to the "light of certainty" made possible by an unspecified type of divine illumination.
565
The contemporary thought experiment "Mary's Room" seems to capture this greater sense of certainty.
Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 51.
566
Treiger points out the Avicennian foundation for al-Ghazālī’s usage of mushāhadah and dhawq, the
primary difference being "Avicenna repeatedly insists that mushāhadah is always accompanied by the middle
term of the syllogism that underlies the witnessed intelligible, and hence is always discursive in the sense of
having a syllogistic structure. It is only on one occasion that Avicenna comes close to suggesting that in
mushāhadah, the middle term becomes redundant and could be dispensed with, yet even in this passage the
carefully placed 'as if' indicates that he regarded the presence of the middle term to be as essential for
mushāhadah as it is for any other type of knowledge." Treiger goes on to say that al-Ghazālī did not feel
compelled to maintain this logical structure because he was not a philosopher, but this is an unfair assessment
given al-Ghazālī's commitment to logic. Most philosophers agree that direct perceptual experience is
preferred to knowledge from deduction or induction. Ibid., 63.
567
This lines up with Treiger's analysis that even this last level admits of variation in the scope of knowledge
and "degree of unveiling" (darajāt al-kashf) in which "The former type of variation is analogous to seeing
also 'Amr and Bakr in the house rather Zayd alone; the latter type of variation, to seeing details of Zayd's
face more clearly, depending on the quality of the light in the house, the time of the day, etc." Ibid., 55–56.
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It is also apparent from text 4.2.2.4 that not everyone can or does fully actualize the
potentiality of their material intellect. 568 Adopting a Ṣūfī idiom, al-Ghazālī formalizes
developmental realities in Mishkat al-Anwar (the Niche de Lights henceforth Mishkat) and
a personal letter to the Seljuq Vizier to distinguish three levels: ʿavāmm (heedless masses),
khavāṣṣ (intelligent elite); and khāṣṣ al-khavāṣṣ (elite of the elite).569 Humans are supposed
to learn (engage in syllogistic reasoning) or acquire theoretical knowledge (al-‘ulūm alnāẓirīya) for themselves through study, reflection, and "polishing the mirror" which can
sometimes, rarely, develop prophetic or saintly knowledge. Depending on what level an
individual achieves, different grounds for cognitive states are acceptable for one group, but
not for higher ones which explains both al-Ghazālī's esotericism and differing notion of
taqlīd. Ultimately, al-Ghazālī is driven by doubt (expressly felt in the autobiographical
Munqidh).570 His twin aim is to never introduce doubt where there is none (especially in
people who lack the capacity to remove it) and always eliminate doubt where it exists. 571

568

In il-Jam al-awwaam 'an 'ilm al-Kalām (Bridling the Masses from the Science of Kalām, henceforth ilJam), Al-Ghazālī states "Allāh created men of diverse and varying degrees, like the mines of gold, silver,
and other jewels—so look at their disparity and the great dissimilarity between them in shape, color, special
quality, and preciousness. Likewise, hearts are mines for the other jewels of spiritual knowledge and
cognizance." This is my translation of the title which is typically translated as "The restraining of the
Commonality From the Science of Theology" or the overly friendly "A Return to Purity in Creed". All
references to al-Ghazālī 's il-Jam al-awwaam 'an 'ilm al-Kalām ( )الجام العوام عن علم الكﻼمare to the Arabic
edition published by Dār al-Minhāj (Jiddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 2017).with page numbers provided in
parentheses to the English translation by Abdullāh bin Hamid ’Ali (Philadelphia, PA: Lamppost Productions,
2008). il-Jam, 98. Chapter 1 wazayīf 7; (Hamid Trans. 68).
569
Jonathan Brown explains as a "ranking of mystical awareness, from the uninitiated masses, the Ṣūfī
neophyte and finally the accomplished mystic." Jonathan A. C. Brown, “The Last Days of Al-Ghazzāli and
the Tripartite Division of the Sufi World,” The Muslim World 96, no. 1 (2006): 103. Cf. al-Ghazālī, The niche
of lights = Mishkat al-anwar, 2, 45–46.
570
In the Munqidh, al-Ghazālī famously foreshadows Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt by embarking on a
journey of radical skepticism of sense-data and rational thought (including an appeal to dreaming) such that
that Ignacio Götz addresses the question as to "whether Descartes was more indebted to al-Ghazâlî than he
would have been willing to admit." Cf. Ignacio L Götz, “The Quest for Certainty,” Journal of Philosophical
Research 28 (2003): 1–22. Also Cf. Tanelli. Kukkonen, "AL-Ghazālī’s Skepticism Revisited," in Rethinking
the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010),
29–60.
571
Al-Ghazālī states in il-Jam that the "means to firm faith is of little importance" answering the objection
that people should obtain true spiritual cognizance, not mere belief saying: "the happiness of the creation
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Thus, blind acceptance is even welcome for the ʿavāmm if it prevents doubt and keeps them
from unbelief.572 Such individuals need progress no further, even if their i'tiqad is achieved
through rote memorization that lacks understanding. 573 This is why the il-Jam and the
Munqidh argue that Kalām and philosophy should be kept from them lest it unnecessarily
introduce doubt.574 However, if an individual does not achieve "repose of the soul" because
doubt persists, then they should continue to seek answers.. For the khavāṣṣ and khāṣṣ alkhavāṣṣ, taqlīd is always unacceptable. However, as il-Jam makes plain, one aspect of
taqlīd is that those who rely on it (muqallid) do not realize they are doing so but are wrongly

[lies] in believing unshakably in something according to how it really is, so that their hearts would be
engraved with the image of that which is in conformity with the true nature of truth…When the image of the
truth is engraved and impressed on his heart, then there is no reason to look at the cause that produced it,
whether it be from evidence that is direct, illustrative, convincing, an acceptance of the belief based on how
one views] the one who says it, or an acceptance premised merely on blind uncritical imitation [taqlīd]
without a cause. What is sought is not the evidence that realizes the resulting benefit, it is the benefit itself.
It is to know the reality of the truth as it really is, so whoever believes in the reality of the truth with regard
to Allāh, His attributes, His books, His messengers, and the Last Day as they really are, then he is happy and
fortunate, even if that does not happen with polemical theological and detailed illustrative evidence." il-Jam,
156-161. Chapter 3 fasl 5; (Hamid Trans. 117-18).
572
This acceptance of taqlīd is largely relegated to emulating the prophets given their proven moral and
intellectual virtues, for to do so for anyone else overlooks and diminishes the prophets. Griffel, “Taqlīd of
the Philosophers,” 280–82. Cf. Faysal al-Tafriqa bayn al-Islam wa l-Zandaqa (The Clear Criterion for
Distinguishing between Islam and Godlessness, henceforth Faysal) al-Ghazālī, “Faysal Al-Tafriqa Bayn alIslam Wa l-Zandaqa,” in Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazālī’s al-Munqidh
Min al-Ḍalāl and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazālī, trans. Joseph McCarthy (Boston, Mass.: Twayne
Publishers, 1980), 147–49.
573
A member of the ʿavāmm who has orthodox belief (ʾīmān) via taqlīd still has true belief, but their i'tiqad
(conviction) is unwarranted (one can also experience i'tiqad regarding a false belief, such as with the Jews,
Christians, and often the philosophers, based on taqlīd). Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 249. The ʿavāmm
need not possess understanding (which is required for assent) of what they believe or merely memorize, but
as a result they never have knowledge for which understanding is required. In Part 1 chapter 4 of al-Maqsad
al-asnā fi sharh asmā Allāh al-husnā (The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God), al-Ghazālī explains
understanding is more than knowing linguistic meaning but requires comprehension of what the words
indicate. Cf. David B Burrell, The Ninety-Nine Beautiful Names of God = al-Maqṣad al-Asnā: Fī S̲ h̲arḥ
Asmāʼ Allāh al-Ḥusnā (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2007), 30–31.
574
Al-Ghazālī gives several analogies about skilled practitioners who need to be conscious of who is watching
while they engage in their craft lest others, such as their own children, try to imitate them are harmed. In the
Munqidh, al-Ghazālī speaks of the money lender who can reach into the bag of the Forger to remove pure
gold and not be fooled by fakes and the snake-charmer who can extract the antidote from the snake without
being bitten as analogies for working with philosophy and other religions. Just as the untrained is likely to
end up with fool's gold because they cannot distinguish it from real gold and the unskilled is likely to be
bitten because they do not know how to charm a snake, so too will the untrained and unskilled be led astray
in knowledge and belief if they are not able or unprepared to navigate it. Cf al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min AlḌalāl, 51-53.; (McCarthy trans. 78-79). cf. Griffel, “Taqlīd of the Philosophers,” 280–84.
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convinced they have real knowledge. For even at a higher level, those who memorize and
understand, but do not do the intellectual work themselves, are still reliant on taqlīd. Even
those who blindly follow the philosopher's explanations are still basing their knowledge on
taqlīd (e.g., Tahāfut). Combining al-Ghazālī's rigid conditions for knowledge and his
spiritual discipling goals, he readily accuses the elite if they have not independently
reasoned out the belief for themselves to call them to a higher level of knowledge and
morality.
In summation, listeners aim to find the cause of their cognitive state from either of
the modes of knowing. Necessary knowledge sources ('ilm ḍarūrī) provide greater
certainty than acquired knowledge ('ilm muktasb) sources like testimony. Dhawq
("fruitional experience") is the most desirable form of certain knowledge, being grounded
in witnessing (mushāhadah), that all the faithful should pursue since it allows one to
personally verify what they know. However, those not granted dhawq can achieve certain
‘ilm grounded in apodictic proofs or demonstration. Those not capable of 'ilm due to the
restraints of burhān and qiyas can still obtain ʾīmān (belief or faith) which is often
synonymous with i'tiqad (opinion) either grounded in tasdiq (assent/faith), by verifying the
speaker is a trustworthy authority, or taqlīd based on nothing more than hearsay and
favorable acceptance of others.
4.3 Testimony in al-Ghazālī
The most comprehensive account of testimony given by al-Ghazālī occurs in al-Mustasfa,
a work on usul al-fiq (literally "roots/principles of jurisprudence") where he follows the
typical juridical outline in naming the Qur'an as the first principle in the sources of Islamic
law and then an extensive section dedicated to reports (khabar) as a key source of Shari'a
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law.575 Even though theology is considered above legal theory in the hierarchy of religious
sciences, al-Mustasfa serves as an excellent insight into al-Ghazālī's theory of testimony
since it is written for other jurists and the 'Ulamā' which reduces the likelihood of esoteric
or metaphorical discourse.576
In explicating the Qur'an as a source, he explains that the truth (ḥaqqiqa) and
meaning (maʿna) of the Qur'an "refers to the speech (qawlu) subsisting in the being of
Allāh."577 The Qur'an is speech which subsists in Allāh as one of His eternal attributes.
Hence, "speech" refers to utterances that indicate what is in the mind or expressions of
meanings in the mind. Either way, speech presumes a mental reality. This permits divine
speech to be compatible with the divine attributes of incorporeality and tawḥīd (divine
oneness) since the multiplicity of speech occurs in its expression. 578 Unlike the divine
mind, speech in the mind of creatures "is multiple just as knowledge is multiple" and
creatures can only express "words inherent in the mind" via utterances, signs, or gestures. 579
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al-Mustasfa 1:129-1:173; al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 197-257; (Ḥammād trans., 541-661).
Further, the work is not only epistemological in nature, but al-Ghazālī states in the preface that the
combination of rational and religious approaches results in the "noblest knowledge." al-Mustasfa 1:3, "The
noblest knowledge is where Reason and Tradition are coupled, where rational opinion and the Shari'a are in
association. The sciences of jurisprudence (fiqh) and its principles [usul] are of this sort, for they take from
the choicest part of the Shari'a and Reason. They can be neither manipulated purely by Reason, such that the
Shari'a could not accept them, nor based upon blind following (taqlīd), where Reason could not attest to their
sanctity or rectitude." al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 3; (Ḥammād trans., 303).
577
Cf. Al-Mustasfa, 1:100-101, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 151-153; (Ḥammād trans., 451-55).
578
Al-Mustasfa 1:101, "The speech inherent in the mind is divisible into predicates, inquiries, commands,
prohibitions, and admonitions. These are meanings that differ in their genre by [their] various volitions and
cognitions. They are by their essence related to their objects, just as power, will, and knowledge are likewise
related. Some people claim that they are reducible to knowledge and will, and are not independent genres.
But establishing this is the task of a theologian, not a jurist." al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 152;
(Ḥammād trans., 453).
579
Cf. al-Mustasfa 1:101, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 152; (Ḥammād trans., 453). Also cf. ilJam where al-Ghazālī distinguishes between four levels of existence: 1) existence in the eyes, e.g., the image
of fire; 2) existence in the mind, e.g., the true nature of fire; 3) existence on the tongue, e.g., the oral word
used to denote "fire"; and 4) existence on the paper that it is written on, e.g., the symbol or markings used to
dente "fire." il-Jam, 141-147. Chapter 3 fasl 3; (Hamid Trans. 105).
576
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The expression of the inner word occurs via khabar, a report, which al-Ghazālī explicitly
defines as a proposition or assertion with a true or false value:
Text 4.3.0.1
Before this [discourse], however, we should define ‘khabar.’ This is a
statement which is liable to be true or false; or, it is a statement which either
truth or falsehood may enter. This definition is better than when they say
"…Truth and falsehood enter," for one report cannot be characterized by
both. Indeed the speech of Allāh, s.w.t., cannot by any means be
characterized by falsehood. Nor can reports of impossible things be
characterized by any means as truth.580
Reports fall into three possible "classifications": those that must be assented to; those that
must be denied; and those which require suspension of judgement. Seven types of reports
compel assent: 1) reports repeated a sufficient number of times to achieve tawātur; 2)
reports from Allāh who cannot lie; 3) reports from the Messenger who was confirmed by
miracles; 4) reports from the ummah (the whole Muslim community) based on the report
of the Messenger; 5) reports in agreement with the previous types; 6) ḥadīth reports verified
to have been said in the presence of Messenger and he did not object (i.e. the Prophet's
silence is consent); and 7) reports mentioned in the presence of a group who did not object
or call it a lie (i.e. no conspiracy). Conversely there are four types of reports that compel
denial: 1) reports contrary to any of the sources of knowledge; 2) reports contrary to the
Qur'an, mutawātir Sunna/ḥadīth, or 'ijmāʿ of the Ummah; 3) reports denied by a group too
large for conspiracy; and 4) reports that would have been reported by a large number of
people but have not been. Finally, reports that compel the suspension of judgement are
"whose truth or falsehood is unknown." This final category is a catch-all for reports that do
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Al-Mustasfa 1:132, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 201; (Ḥammād trans., 548).
 وهو.<< أو >>هو القول الذي يدخله الصدق أو الكذب،<< وحده أنه >>القول الذي يتطرق إليه التصديق أو التكذيب.ولنقدم عليه حد الخبر
 والخبر عن المحاﻻت ﻻ، فى كﻼم ﷲ تعالى ﻻ يدخله الكذب أصﻼ. إذ الخبر الواحد ﻻ يدخله كﻼهما، يدحله الصدق والكذب:أولى من قؤلهم
.ًيدخله الصدق أصﻼ
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not meet the assent or deny criteria but can still be regarded for practical matters like "the
rules of Shari'a and worship."581
Al-Ghazālī primarily has the ḥadīth tradition in view as a source for the purpose of
jurisprudence, however, these classifications reveal the crucial criteria of ṣadīq in
testimony. Ṣadīq is a thick concept applied to reports, agents, and collective agents which
captures truthfulness, honesty, and/or trustworthiness, the necessary quality for assent. 582
Reports that compel assent are ṣadīq and come from a reporter who is ṣadīq, but reports
that compel denial contradict what is verified ṣadīq or comes from a reporter who is takdib
(someone who lost their ṣadq).583 However, the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the
report and reporter cannot be assumed. It must be verified through a proof:
Text 4.3.0.2
For there are no reports (al-'akhabār) whose truth (ṣadīq) can be known
(yuʿlamu) purely through reporting (mujarrad al-ikhbar), except the
mutawātir. As for other reports, their truths (ṣadīq) are known only through
a proof (dalīl) indicating (yadullu) it is independent of the report (al-khabar)
itself.584
The proof for ṣadīq, whether of the report or the reporter, is ultimately found not in the
report but in the attributes of the reporter or the attestation of another verified ṣadīq reporter

581

Al-Mustasfa, 1:140-1:145, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 212-218; (Ḥammād trans., 571-84).
Cf. Iḥyāʾ book 37, chapter 3, bayan 1
583
Griffel provides an excellent summary: "Al-Gazalı’s two definitions of belief and unbelief rely on the
opposition between tasdıq and takdıb. Both terms cannot be easily translated into English. Tasdıq originally
means to assume that a person is sadiq or has sidq. In order to be sadiq someone must fulfill two conditions
not combined in any English word. A person who is sadiq is first of all trustworthy, i.e., the person reports
information to the best of his or her knowledge and does not lie. Secondly, the information that a person, who
is sadiq, conveys is true. Tasdıq is both the acceptance of the claim for truthfulness of the messenger and the
truth of the message. This claim is lost if the person violates only one of these two conditions. Takdıb, the
assumption that someone has lost his or her sidq, occurs if either the message that the person conveys turns
out to be false, or if it turns out that the messenger did not report it to the best of his or her knowledge." Frank
Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into As’arite
Theology,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004): 122–23.
584
Al-Mustasfa 1:140, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 213; (Ḥammād trans., 571). Tr. Mod.
. سوى نفس الخبر، وما عداه فإنما يعلم صدقه بدليل آخر يدل عليه.فليس في اﻷخبار ما يعلم صدقه بمجرد اﻹخبار إﻻ المتواتر
The exception of mutawātir reports is complicated, but as discussed below this is because mutawātir reports
contain their own proof via a hidden syllogism.
582
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(and their attributes). The ṣadīq of the report is the matter at hand and while passing the
criterion for compulsory denial is a necessary condition it is not a sufficient condition to
compel assent (a report can be shown not to be ṣadīq if it expressly contradicts established
trusted sources of knowledge, but it cannot be shown to be ṣadīq if it does not). Hence, the
report of Allāh is verified ṣadīq "because lying is impossible for Him." Two subsequent
proofs are given for this divine attribute via the attestation of the Messenger and because
Allāh's speech is self-subsisting.585 The prophet's ṣadīq is confirmed by miracles where the
miracle's epistemic role is not to verify the report of the prophet, but to verify that the
prophet is a trustworthy messenger from Allāh. 586 The proof of the Ummah's ṣadīq is the
attestation of the Messenger. Here we see the beginning of a chain (ʾisnād) of attestation
regarding ṣadīq: Allāh, the source of ṣadīq, attests to the ṣadīq of the Messenger who attests
to the ṣadīq of the Ummah and then "whosoever they [the Ummah] have affirmed as being
truthful (ṣadīq)." With the Ummah enters the epistemic role of communal epistemic
authorities and group numbers as a safeguard against conspiracy.
While verification of a report focuses on the speaker, it is the "quality" (i.e., polish)
of the listener's heart that determines what cognitive state is generated in the listener in
three levels of increasing certainty. Different kinds of reports and the listener's ability to
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It is odd that al-Ghazālī calls Muhammad's attestation the "stronger" of the two proofs since this makes
the proof circular given that the proof for the Messenger's sādiq is attestation by Allāh via miracles (and alGhazālī elsewhere notes the problematic nature of miracles). The latter is more compelling given the relation
of divine speech to the divine mind. This is in line with Allāh being the primary source of knowledge,
morality, authority, and thus sādiq itself which grounds all subsequent reporters' sādiq. The emphasis here
may be to give precedence to human attestation to another's trustworthiness in jurisprudence. Al-Mustasfa
1:141, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 213-214; (Ḥammād trans., 571-72). Regarding miracles cf.
Munqidh, al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min Al-Ḍalāl, 74-75.; (McCarthy trans. 100).
586
"The evidence of his [the Messenger's] truthfulness [sadiq] is the proof of his miracles, which indicate his
truthfulness [sadiq], together with the impossibility of miracles being manifested at the hands of imposters.
For if that were possible, then the Creator would be unable to confirm the messengership of His messengers,
and inability is impossible for Him." Al-Mustasfa 1:141, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 214;
(Ḥammād trans., 572).

184

perform verification can cause ʾīmān or even 'ilm to accrue in the listener's heart as a result
of taqlīd (or tasdiq), burhān, or dhawq. The first two levels occur with human testimony
as a form of acquired knowledge. In the first level, listeners "find" i'tiqad (or ʾīmān)
resulting from the uncritical acceptance of a report through taqlīd or belief (ʾīmān) by
assent to or faith (tasdiq) in a report where the listener works to verify the ṣadīq of the
report and/or the reporter commonly found with verifiable ahad reports and Mashhūr
reports. Such reports cannot produce certainty without additional "circumstantial
evidence."587 In the second level, listeners "find" that they possess certain 'ilm after a report
comes from a sufficient number of trustworthy reporters qualifying as tawātur. These
reports take on a non-discursive epistemological status which requires no external proof as
a result of a hidden syllogism.588 The third level occurs with divine testimony. Only the
khāṣṣ al-khavāṣṣ may obtain dhawq as a result of prophecy or inspiration. This only occurs
(and rarely) after the listener's mirror is sufficiently polished— heart/soul made virtuous—
and Allāh graciously removes the "veil" putting the listener in direct perceptual contact
with divine knowledge. If at any level, whether a member of the ʿavāmm, khavāṣṣ, or khāṣṣ
al-khavāṣṣ, the listener does not personally carry out the task of verifying the epistemic
grounds of a report but merely accepts them (as he accuses scholars who adopt the axioms,
principles, theses, and proofs of their religion from an authority i.e. "books and lectures"),
then they are guilty of taqlīd and the cognitive state of their "knowledge" is mere conviction
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Such reports are not suitable for use in syllogisms, but they may still be actionable.
Since the obtainment of knowledge is in view, the third "suspend judgement" categorization is deemed
only suitable for practical judgements while the former two aim at acquiring truth and avoiding falsehood.
E.g., while one should suspend judgement regarding truth on the testimony of two, but one is permitted to
act when truthfulness is conceivable.
588
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or presumption (zann).589 Thus, for al-Ghazālī, the same telling can be assented to with
differing levels of cognitive surety.

Chart 4.3.0.3
Cognitive State
Human Testimony (first mode)
i'tiqad / ʾīmān
Level 1
ʾīmān
Level 2 'ilm
Divine Testimony (second mode)
Level 3 dhawq

Epistemic Ground

Report Type

taqlīd
tasdiq
burhān, qiyas

ahad, tawātur
ahad
tawātur

mushāhadah

nabuwa, ilhām

4.3.1 Human Testimony
Following the progression in Chart 4.3.0.3, I will start with the first mode of knowledge in
this section and the second mode of knowledge in the next section. Al-Ghazālī maintains
his theory of testimony within the existing framework of Kalām and jurisprudence making
him less of an innovator and more of a refiner. Report types serve different epistemological
functions but rely on an identical reporting process. The testimonial framework consists of
an initial original "eye-witness" testimony (al-shahāda, literally witness) that generates a
report (khabar) or matn ("text") which is then transmitted (ruwiya) down a chain (ʾisnād)
of people until the final transmitter who is the "reporter." 590 After the initial testimony is
deemed acceptable, the report is considered under less stringent guidelines for
transmission. To illustrate al-Ghazālī's contribution, first I review his development in the
application of taqlīd. Regarding ahad and mutawātir reports, I will show how he
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Again, we see al-Ghazālī is expanding and nuancing the Ash'arite relegation of taqlīd to only the 'awamm
to the Mutakallimūn and the philosophers if their individual knowledge of their demonstrative knowledge
comes from "books and hearing (sama)" and not from conducting the demonstrations for themselves. Cf.
Iḥyāʾ book 1, chapter 6.
590
This original testimony needs to be perceptual but not necessarily visual with "I heard" being the most
common formula in the tradition of oral reports. Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 8.
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synthesizes more theologically orthodox Islamic positions like Ash'arism with the more
philosophical positions of the Mu'tazilites and the falsafa, most notably Avicenna, as seen
in his promotion of the syllogism as the proof within mutawātir reports. 591
Testimonially derived belief, or cause of conviction, resulting from taqlīd is the
most prevalent understanding of testimony which accounts for its reputation as a poor
source of knowledge. Understanding testimony as any belief transmitted from another
agent, taqlīd is not a type of report but a possible testimonial ground.592 Al-Ghazālī
famously accuses the followers of philosophy of taqlīd in Tahāfut.593 Without critical
"speculative investigation," some people blindly trade the teaching of the prophets for the
teachings of the philosophers.594 Thus, the Tahāfut can be read as more a condemnation of
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Gutas notes that even Avicenna acknowledged the twofold division with "Sequentially and multiply
reported data [mutawātir]" and "data approved on authority (maqbulat)" (Avicenna's reference to knowledge
from Tradition, i.e. sam'iyyat, "heard things") stating that both are based on perception but can provide
"unmediated knowledge" due to social context." Gutas, “The Empiricism of Avicenna,” 401.
592
The concept of taqlīd is broad and complex, taking on different meanings depending on the situation
within which it is employed. Within the confines of testimony, I follow R.M. Frank in "Al-Ghazālī on Taqlīd"
that the particular use in view pertains to "knowledge and belief with regard to matters that, in the view of
Ash’arite orthodoxy, may as such be properly subject to rational inquiry, determination and verification."
Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 207.
593
In the preface to Tahāfut, al-Ghazālī states the principal charge against "a group" who have rejected
orthodox Islam for the teachings of the philosophers is taqlīd; their unwavering trust in demonstration and
the Greek epistemological grounds results from trading one taqlīd for another upon "hearing high-sounding
names such as 'Socrates,' 'Hippocrates,' 'Plato,' 'Aristotle,'' and their likes…". He continues saying " There is
no basis for their unbelief other than traditional, conventional imitation (taqlīd), like the imitation of Jews
and Christians, since their upbringing and that of their offspring has followed a course other than the religion
of Islam, their fathers and forefathers having [also] followed [conventional imitation]…" al-Ghazālī, The
Incoherence of the Philosophers, 2. This critique is leveled at other groups as well. Cf. Fada’ih al-Batiniyya
(Disgraces of the Batinites)
594
Jules Janssens and Frank Griffel are largely in agreement that Tahāfut is not a rejection of Avicenna's
philosophy but of his followers who blindly accept philosophical teachings. Janssens humbly admits that it
is possible Avicenna and his philosophy are al-Ghazālī's target but concludes that "the disciples are more
likely than the master [Avicenna] to be guilty of taqlīd." Griffel takes a stronger stance stating, "it is clear
that the accusations are leveled against contemporaries of al-Ghazālī." In a footnote he dismisses the
possibility Janssens recognizes and argues "This flexibility [of his position in the 20th discussion] points to
the fact that he is indeed dealing with 'living' individuals, and not with the authors of philosophical books
from the past, such as Ibn Sina." Janssens, “Al-Ghazzālī’s ‘Tahāfut,’” 17; Griffel, “Taqlīd of the
Philosophers,” 285 & footnote 39. Treiger goes so far as to call Tahāfut "pseudo-refutation" or "stage combat"
that "creates the illusion of a real fight, while intending to inflict no damage on the opponent." Treiger,
Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 81, 84.
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taqlīd based testimony than a condemnation of the philosophers. 595 In il-Jam, al-Ghazālī
delineates levels of conviction caused by taqlīd based testimony. The lowest levels result
in false belief: The first is confirmation bias since believing a heard statement is dependent
on the listener's desired perspective ("merely because it suits his natural inclinations and
preferences"). A negative statement applied to an enemy result in immediate conviction,
but hearing the same statement applied to a friend results in immediate rejection; 596 the
next is when listeners rely on insufficient or inconsequential evidence by jumping to
conclusions or being impressed by appearances. The two highest levels of taqlīd induced
conviction can result in correct belief: the first of these is the listener assenting because
they have a positive opinion of the speaker whether because they know them to be virtuous
or because they have a positive reputation in the community (this is how children first learn
by emulating their parents and students begin by emulating or memorizing their teachers'
instruction); last is affirmation resulting from "oratory rhetorical proofs," such as most
Qur'anic proofs, e.g. proverbs which contain a logical structure but are not syllogisms.
Since taqlīd based testimony is the blind trusting of a speaker, al-Ghazālī has a mixed view.
It has ruinous potential, but it is also the only way ʿavāmm can follow the prophets.597

595

This reading follows al-Ghazālī's fondness for Avicenna. Evidence in the Tahāfut itself comes from his
concluding remarks where only three philosophical positions are rejected as kufir and he refrains from
"pronouncing those who uphold heretical innovation to be infidels (kufir) and of which pronouncement is
valid and which is not." al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 227. Griffel has also advanced this
idea. Cf. Griffel, “Taqlīd of the Philosophers,” 278; Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 99.
596
I have reversed the order of presentation from highest-to-lowest to lowest-to-highest. Al-Ghazālī, il-Jam,
148-155. Chapter 3 fasl 4; (Hamid Trans. 109-17). Frank notes that al-Ghazālī even has Mutakallimūn in
view: "The way scholars are psychologically and intellectually bound to the teachings of their masters and
to the schools to which they belong al-Ghazālī characterizes as a ta’assub, employing an expression that
originally describes one’s bond, his self-identification with and his loyalty to, his immediate kinship group
(at ‘asabah) or to a small party of men of which he is one (al ‘ubah). Al-Ghazālī’s view of academic
theologians is amply illustrated where, talking of the almost reflex tendency to reject immediately and out of
hand any thesis or argument that is explicitly presented as the teaching of an opposing school." Frank, “AlGhazali on Taqlid,” 221, 232–33.
597
Per Frank this is in contrast to the Ash'arites complete disapproval of taqlīd. Frank, "Al-Ghazālī on
Taqlīd," 211.
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Furthermore, it is the default epistemic starting position. Al-Ghazālī's autobiography
Munqidh describes his journey from taqlīd, which "lost its hold" on him when he was
young, to begin independent investigation. 598 Lapsing into taqlīd thus always remains a
possibility for all the types of reports al-Ghazālī discusses.
To explain how the Sunna, ḥadīth, and Qur'an reach subsequent generations solely
by means of "the tongue of the transmitters," al-Ghazālī adopts and refines the established
juridical distinction of reports between khabar al-wahid (literally "the report of one",
henceforth ahad reports) and al-khabar al-mutawātir (literally "concurrent reports").599
Reports that do not meet the stringent qualifications of tawātur are ahad reports.600 Despite
the name, ahad reports frequently include multiple reporters. 601 There were two primary
positions on ahad reports between the formalists who follow the traditional (sam'i, literally
"heard") approach claiming lineage to the Companions and the materialists who employed
a rational (ma'qūl) approach (like the Mu'tazilites). The positions disagree on whether a
report can be presumed authentic and therefore used as a source for juridical action.
Formalists like the Ḥanafīs accepted ahad reports by default for a report was presumed
(zann) authentic (unconcerned if its authenticity was certain) to serve as a valid source for
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al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min Al-Ḍalāl, 30-31.; (McCarthy trans. 63).
Al-Mustasfa 1:129, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 197; (Ḥammād trans., 541). Both tawātur
( )تواترand mutawātir ( ) ُمتَواتِرare used interchangeably to denote the same concept but reflect grammatical
variations (tawātur typically appears as a verbal noun while mutawātir typically appears as a participle as an
adjective or part of a participial phrase). Ulrich Rudolph shares this sentiment regarding al-Ghazālī and
jurisprudence: "In this case, his works may have been more conventional than in Sufism, but his impact on
the field was nonetheless considerable and in many respects innovative." Ulrich Rudolph, “Al-Ghazālī on
Philosophy and Jurisprudence,” in Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World, ed. Peter Adamson
(De Gruyter, 2019), 67.
600
Most hadiths fall short so works in jurisprudence primarily focused on this report type. Zyzow thus calls
ahad reports "the focus of concern." Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 22.
601
"What has been transmitted by five or six individuals, for example, may be a solitary report." al-Mustasfa
1:145, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 219; (Ḥammād trans., 584).
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norms until it is proven that one of the transmitters either lied or erred. 602 Materialists, on
the other hand, only accepted ahad reports as a valid source if its authenticity was verified
as certain.603 Al-Ghazālī not only sided with the Materialists (and Mu'tazilites) in insisting
that reports be deemed authentic, but also made the verification more stringent, so much
so that, if a ḥadīth is known to be authentic, then it is not an ahad report.604 Only rarely did
ahad reports serve as the last "bit of circumstantial evidence" to establish certain 'ilm.605
Thus, ahad reports served a more practical than a theoretical function, either being
"accepted" or "rejected" indicating whether they are actionable or not. 606 If an ahad report
is more probable than not, it is sufficient to establish practical obligations. 607
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The Hanafis did recognize the two falsifications of testimony, namely trustworthiness based on moral
integrity ('adāla) and accuracy (ḍabt), and that it is impossible to remove their possibility from any given
chain (isnad) of transmission, but "to reject all unit-traditions would undoubtedly mean rejecting some
elements of truth. To accept them all indiscriminately would mean accepting falsehood. To refuse to do
anything (tawaqquf) would also mean rejecting truth." Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 25.
603
As a result, there was no distinction between authentic and valid. "To realize their aim of building the law
out of absolutely sound materials, the materialists need criteria for judging traditions that enable them to have
certain knowledge and not mere presumption." Ibid., 22–23.
604
Al-Mustasfa, 1:272, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 321; (Ḥammād trans., 563). Jonathan A. C
Brown, "Did the Prophet Say It or Not? The Literal, Historical, and Effective Truth of Ḥadīths in Early
Sunnism," Journal of the American Oriental Society 129, no. 2 (2009): 226, footnote 34.
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Al-Mustasfa 1:135, Individual ahad reports "are liable to doubt. But with them the mind is inclined to
form a weak opinion, while the second and the third [bits of evidence] confirm it. But when each exists in
isolation, then doubt may enter them. However, certain [knowledge] accrues with their conjunction, just as
the statement of each member of the tawātur reporters is liable to doubt if each is taken individually, while
decisiveness accrues as a result of their conjunction." al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 205-206;
(Ḥammād trans., 557). Also cf. 1:136-1:137, 1:138
606
Cf. Al-Mustasfa 1:148, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 222-223; (Ḥammād trans., 591-92). The
justification for basing practical judgements on uncertain theoretical judgements stems from the generational
consensus which notes that it is permissible, but not mandatory, to act in accordance with ahad reports. This
acceptability is because no report of an objection to the practice had been transmitted from the original
ummah and al-Ghazālī claims such an objection "would have necessarily become well known" and there
would have been "a great impetus" to transmit it, that is the absence of an objection indicates a consensus
(ijma') of the earliest generation. al-Mustasfa 1:150, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 224-226;
(Ḥammād trans., 598).
607
Al-Mustasfa 1:146 "What is the impossibility of Allāh, saying to His worshippers, 'When a bird flies by
and you think it is a crow, then I have made ‘such and such’ obligatory upon you, and I have made your
supposition a sign for the necessity of acting, just as I have made the declination of the sun to be a sign for
the obligatoriness of prayer.' Therefore, zan itself would become the sign of obligatoriness, while the
existence of gan is known through sense perception." al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 219-220;
(Ḥammād trans., 587). Zyzow explains that "our own state of being is a condition for the obligation of action"
such that "uncertain authenticity of the tradition is of no importance." Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 28.
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The determining factor for the acceptability of a report is the same as compulsory
assent, namely the ṣadīq of the reporter which now becomes indistinguishable from their
moral stature and/or religious piety. Even though al-Ghazālī recognizes the twin
falsifications of error and dishonesty, he unequivocally holds that acceptable testimony is
based on the trustworthy character of the reporter in a section titled "The Transmitter and
His Character (sifa)" stating: "it is incumbent upon us to accept the statement of a
trustworthy ('adala) reporter though he may lie or err, while it is not permissible to accept
the statement of a fasiq [unvirtuous, law breaker] though he may tell the truth." 608 Again,
the identity of the speaker performs the epistemic work. For example, if an audience is not
familiar with the "messengership" of Muhammad, then they cannot be expected to obey
his commands for only "after believing in him, it becomes possible for them to give heed
to the envoys conveying his command and to listen to them."609 If one does not know
Muhammad, then al-Ghazālī concedes that people should accept an ahad report "only if
there is a decisive proof indicating the obligatoriness of acting on its basis." 610 Yet, he also
recognizes that it is better to follow someone who should know better even if they are not
fool-proof, but even this requires knowing that this person knows better. Determining
whether a reporter is trustworthy is tantamount to determining how upright they are. There
was an existing debate as to how the trustworthiness of a reporter was to be determined
between Abū Hanīfa and his followers, and the followers of al-Shafi'i and ibn Hanbal. The
Hanafīs maintained that any reporter who by all appearance was faithful in keeping Islamic
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Al-Mustasfa 1:154, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 230-231; (Ḥammād trans., 612). 'adala (عدْل
َ )
is the notion of justice and righteousness, which applied to a person means to act justly or to be righteous or
honest as "the quality of religious piety and personal morality which lends legal credibility to a reporter or a
witness" al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 235; (Ḥammād trans., 617, footnote 63).
609
Al-Mustasfa 1:152, al-Ghazālī, al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 227-228; (Ḥammād trans., 602-3).
610
Al-Mustasfa 1:152, al-Ghazālī, al-Mustasfa Min ’ilm al-Usul, 227-228, (Ḥammād trans., 602–3).
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law (including status as a mujtahid) was to be deemed trustworthy and their report accepted
by default.611 Al-Ghazālī explicitly rejects this insisting that trustworthiness is only
acknowledged through familiarity with the reporter's "inner character" and both public and
private conduct.612 He attacks the Ḥanafī position adamantly stating that the report of the
unacknowledged is analogous to that of fasiq (unvirtuous, impious person). Only pragmatic
concessions are made for entering contracts or transactions (where fasiq are prevalent but
necessary) and the direction for prayer or purity of water in which case one may accept
reports if one accrues "repose of the soul" (sukun al-nafs).613 Both schools agreed however
that higher standards for reporter trustworthiness were required for original reports—
testimony (mushāhadah)—vs. merely passing on a report from some other trustworthy
reporter—transmission (ruwiya).
To accept the transmission (ruwiya) of a report, al-Ghazālī outlines five conditions
a reporter must meet. Transmission (riwāya) is acceptable from speakers who are
trustworthy ('adala), which includes being "a Muslim, and accurate, whether he is
transmitting alone or with others."614 The first condition notes a concession on numbers;
one reporter is permitted since transmission merely passes on a formerly vetted report.
Second, the reporter must possess "responsibility" (al-taklif), which is a thick concept that
captures two requirements: the reporter is "capable of discernment" upon receiving the
report and deterred from lying (explicitly "fear of Allāh") upon delivering it. 615 Third, the
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Cf. Bernard G Weiss, The Search for God’s Law: Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Din alAmidi (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1992), 302.
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AL-Mustasfa, 1:158, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 236-237; (Ḥammād trans., 619).
613
Al- Mustasfa, 1:159-1:160, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 237-240; (Ḥammād trans., 622-25).
614
Al-Mustasfa, 1:155, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 232-3; (Ḥammād trans., 612).
615
Al-Mustasfa, 1:156, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 233-234; (Ḥammād trans., 614-615). An
exception is made for a minor's report if "the minor was capable of discernment when he received the report,
and of age when he delivered it."
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reporter should be accurate. Even the reports of otherwise trustworthy reporters should be
rejected if the reporter was: not capable of discernment or was inattentive at the time of
receiving, or "does not properly retain what he has received." Fourth, the reporter must be
a Muslim (a non-fasiq), even if the reporter is trustworthy in their own religion. This
limitation is largely because Islamic legal decisions are in view such that al-Ghazālī
indicates ijmāʿ' (consensus) deprives non-believers the capacity of exercising authority in
a religion they reject. Thus, not only are unbelieving reporters considered higher than fasiq
reporters, but also non-Muslim testimonies about other non-Muslims are to be accepted. 616
Fifth, the reporter must be trustworthy ('adāla) which captures both virtuous character and
religious piety. While "impeccability from all sins" is not required, any sin that belies
honesty can deem one untrustworthy (as determined by the judgement of the ijtihad, judge).
Al-Ghazālī cites Qur'anic sura 49:6 as a proof (dalīl) for both the fourth and fifth condition
i.e., for rejecting the reports of fasiq and for requiring trustworthiness ('adāla) in both
transmission (riwāya) and testimony (shahāda) since "trustworthiness ('adala) expresses
uprightness in conduct and in religion and is reducible to a stable disposition of the heart
(nafs) that enforces consistency of both righteousness and virtuousness so that trust of the
people in one's truthfulness accrues."617
In order to accept an original testimony (shahāda), al-Ghazālī specifies additional
qualifications a reporter must meet: freedom, maleness, sight, kinship, fixed number, and
animosity. These stricter requirements aim at filtering out unreliable reports by insisting
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Al-Mustasfa 1:156-157, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 233-236; (Ḥammād trans., 616-17).
Al-Mustasfa 1:157, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 234-235; (Ḥammād trans., 617-18). Qur'an
49:6, "… If a wicked person (fasiq) comes to you with any news (naba'), ascertain (tabīnū, make evident)
the truth, lest ye harm people unwittingly…" Yusuf-Ali, The Holy Qur’an, 355.
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on personal autonomy (contra slaves618 and women619), perceptual evidence (sight620 and
fixed number621), and virtuous character (kinship 622 and animosity623). All are considered
outward indicators of inward piety and thus helpful in determining the trustworthiness of
the speaker. Actions are also taken into account including the act of stepping forward to
attest to or discredit the trustworthiness of another speaker. This act can impugn one's own
trustworthy character, for to vouchsafe an untrustworthy report is fisq (sin) and nullifies
the attestors' trustworthiness.624 Al-Ghazālī states the correct opinion on attestation is:
"When trust (thiqa) accrues regarding his [the attestor's] insight and accuracy, his
unqualified statement is sufficient," but even for an attestor "whose trustworthiness
('adala) is known" he may be vetted if "acquaintance with the conditions of his
trustworthiness is not known."625 Interestingly, this introduces a regress since a reporter's
attestation or discrediting is accepted or rejected based on their trustworthiness. In
conflicts, the speaker understood to be most knowledgeable (on the pertinent issue) and the
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In early Islam, Muslims, Jews, and Christians were prohibited from being enslaved, thus slaves are ipso
facto unbelievers (kufir). Cf. Zuhaili 8:260. Since lawful enslavement was restricted to prisoners of war and
children of slaves, it was a common position, including that of al-Shafi', that matters of state did not belong
to slaves and thus their report was not accepted for matters of testimony (shahāda). Cf. Zuhaili 6:563.
However, a slave's report could be accepted regarding matters of transmission (ruwiya). Cf. Zuhaili 6:16 in
 وهبة الزحيليand Wahbah Al-Zuhaili, ( الفقه اﻹسﻼمي وأدلتهDamascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1989). Al-Ghazālī follows alShafi' cf. al-Mustasfa 1:156, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 233-234; (Ḥammād trans., 614).
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A husband was traditionally seen as having authority over his wife, and the Qur'anic Sura 2:282 indicates
that a (financial) trial requires two male witnesses or one male witness and two women "so that if one of
them errs, the other can remind her," which was frequently understood to mean women possessed inherent
shortcomings. Cf. Yusuf-Ali, The Holy Qur’an, 28. and "Tafsir Ibn Kathir: Surah Al Baqarah Pt II".
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As established with mutawātir reports, the best reports are grounded in first-person experience.
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The number of witnesses is a necessary but unknown entity to protect against conspiracy.
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A known genealogy secures against unacknowledged speakers and provides witnesses to the speaker's
trustworthiness.
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Al-Ghazālī appears to be thinking of people who have an unvirtuous habit that interferes with the quality
of their testimony in Al-Mustasfa, 1:157: "There may be a person who is accustomed to backbiting and the
judge is aware of this habit which he cannot refrain from." al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 234235; (Ḥammād trans., 618).
624
Al-Mustasfa 1:163, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 243-244; (Ḥammād trans., 633).
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Al-Mustasfa 1:162, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 241-243; (Ḥammād trans., 631-32). Thiqa
( )ثقةindicates trust or confidence. When applied to a person or a source it means they are trustworthy, reliable,
and/or an authority.
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most trustworthy is to be deferred to. However, since the inner character of another can
never be fully known, the only way a single report can generate certain knowledge in the
mind of a listener is if it is the nth time a report is heard causing it to achieve tawātur status.
Al-Ghazālī accepts the traditional view that the Qur'an, via the angel Gabriel, "is
manifested to us [the Ummah] through the utterances of the Messenger." Thus, human
testimony must also be capable of providing certain 'ilm via mutawātir reports; however,
he argues this 'ilm accrues due to a syllogism that the agent may or may not be conscious
of. Bernard Weiss (1985) and Wael Hallaq (1990) have addressed this unique Islamic
epistemic concept but find al-Ghazālī's inclusion of a syllogism to be a sticking point.626
Outside of detailing the conditions for mutawātir reports, most literature focuses on two
internal debates. First was whether or not tawātur produced 'ilm, which few questioned
because to deny that tawātur caused 'ilm was to deny the certainty of the Qur'an. 627 The
second was whether the 'ilm that accrued qualified as ḍarūrī (i.e., "necessary" or
"immediate" non-discursive knowledge) or muktasab (acquired knowledge via reflection
or intuition). In al-Mustasfa, al-Ghazālī dissects tawātur many ways, but makes it clear
that the identity of the speaker is of paramount importance until a sufficient number of
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Hallaq clarifies a further distinction of tawātur reports between al-tawātur al-lafzī which maintains the
exact wording of the original report, and al-tawātur al-ma'nawī which maintains the central point by a
sufficient number of variously worded transmissions. In practice, only the Qur'an meets al-tawātur al-lafzī,
for Weiss notes that outside of the Qur'an, few ḥadīths were successfully argued as achieving the status. The
most reliable ḥadīth typically qualified as al-tawātur al-ma'nawī while less reliable fell under ahad reports.
Bernard G. Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past: The Theory of ‘Tawâtur’ According to Ghazâlî,” Studia Islamica,
no. 61 (1985): 81–105; Wael Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability, and Certainty in Sunnī
Thought,” in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, ed. Nicholas Heer and Farhat Jacob Ziadeh (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1990), 1–31. Also cf. Bernard G Weiss, The Search for God’s Law: Islamic
Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, Revised ed. (Salt Lake City: University Of Utah Press ;
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2010), 283.
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Two "non-Islamic sects, the Sumaniyya and the Barāhima, the archetypic deniers of prophecy" claimed
that tawātur did not produced certainty; however so did "the Muʿtazilī al-Naẓẓām (d. 231/846) and [his
denial] was deemed one of his infamies (faḍāʾiḥ)". Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 13.
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reports ultimately renders the speaker's identity superfluous. He delineates five ranks of
reports that can be taken as originating from Muhammed where the best reports confirm
the identity of the speaker via personal experience, e.g. reports which include "I heard the
Prophet say…".628 On this foundation are laid the four conditions of tawātur: First, the
reporter must possess certain knowledge (not zann, assumption), for "the state of the
informed is no more than the state of the informer," in an allusion to the principle of "no
effect can be greater than its cause." Second, the reporter's knowledge must be necessary
and based in perception. Third, the number of reporters must be kāmil (literally "complete")
which is the technical term meaning "sufficient to rule out the possibility of collaborative
fabrication", i.e. conspiracy.629 While previous scholars gave a definitive number based on
significant revealed accounts, al-Ghazālī states explicitly that the number is known only to
Allāh (according to Hallaq this became the dominant view sometime in the 10/11 th
century).630 Fourth is what Weiss rightly identifies as a "super condition", that all
transmitters in between the original speaker and listener, whether intermediaries or the final
reporter, also must maintain the first three conditions.631
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The first and best reports are based on personal experience of the Prophet, e.g. "I heard the Messenger of
Allāh". Al-Ghazālī even states that "this [form] is impenetrable to doubt". Second are indirect reports, i.e.,
based on the report of another, where the Companion is "relying on what has been related to him, though not
[actually] hearing it from him." Even though this statement might rely on a tawātur report, it permits doubt
to enter. Third are reports of commands which open themselves to multiple interpretations (e.g., they can be
an imperative form of an indirect report or at an least indicative that was interpreted as a command). Fourth
are reports in which it is unknown whether the speaker is the prophet (in fact the speaker is completely
unknown, e.g., "we are commanded."). Last are reports on historical behavior (e.g., "they used to do)" which
only prove that the observed action was permitted but is in no way tied to a speaker let alone that the speaker
was the Prophet. 1:129-1:132, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 196-200; (Ḥammād trans., 542-48).
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In the original ordering, al-Ghazālī lists the number of transmitters as the fourth condition as a transition
to a discussion on the sufficient number. Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past,” 88–89.
630
Frequent numbers include 5, 12, 20, 40, 70, or 313 based on important numbers in the Qur'an. The number
70, for example, "is based on the alleged number of the followers of Moses, and 313 on the number of Muslim
fighters in the battle of Badr." Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability, and Certainty in Sunnī
Thought,” 11.
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Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past,” 90.
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Al-Ghazālī's specific criteria regarding tawātur allow him to give theoretical
answers to theological questions (such as why the reports in Judaism and Christianity do
not qualify as tawātur, namely their failure qualifies them as Mashhūr) but also obscures
the listener's actual epistemic processes in accepting testimony. The challenge in accepting
a report as tawātur is that the listener does not have access to the first two conditions
(namely that the reporter's knowledge is certain and based on perception). Al-Ghazālī does
not see this as problematic, for in his section "Proof (thabat) that tawātur produces
knowledge ('ilm)," the picture of tawātur he provides is a hybrid of experience (based on
perception) and demonstration. He clearly desires for testimony to serve as a unique form
of perception even for past events as if "hearing" a report was like listening to the original
speaker. Hypothetically, just as normal perceptible sound emanates out and travels through
the medium of air to reach the listener's ear, historical events seemingly create a
"perceptible" (the matn) that emanates out and travels through the medium of other people
to the listener's ear. The time it takes for the perceptible to travel is irrelevant permitting
even distant observers a "direct" experience. So analogously even observers centuries
removed from the original event can be said to experience the original event via the echo
traveling through the populace. 632 The obvious point of dis-analogy is that testimony's
medium is people which, unlike air, is not an unbiased failsafe transmitter. So, knowledge
from tawātur must occur in the same way that one comes to know that "fire burns", "bread
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Hallaq includes a footnote regarding al-Ghazālī and the view of tawātur in his milieu: "The immediate
knowledge which the tawātur engenders in the intellect eliminates, as we have already seen, any possibility
of inference, thus connecting the original with the comprehension and sense-perception of the hearer.
Therefore, when one hears a mutawātir number of identical reports transmitted, the knowledge that
accumulates therefrom carries with it the actual original experience, almost as if it were the direct experience
of the hearer himself. In tawātur, knowledge of past events stands on the same footing with particular sensory
experiences, such as seeing a bird fly or experiencing pain when your finger touches fire." Hallaq, “On
Inductive Corroboration, Probability, and Certainty in Sunnī Thought,” 19 footnote 43.
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satiates", or "alcohol intoxicates" through repeated perceptual experiences without being
aware of how many experiences is necessary for the knowledge to accrue. A lone
experience or hearing of a report that "Baghdad exists" is insufficient to produce
knowledge. If the report is blindly accepted (taqlīd), then it merely generates i'tiqad
(conviction). Thus, he syllogizes tawātur's unique kamil recurrence condition. To
determine that a report successfully managed to pass through generations undistorted
requires the mind to engage in a rational deduction based on two premises provided in alMustasfa:
Text 4.3.1.1
But if you mean by it that the mere statement of a reporter (al-mukhbiri)
does not yield decisive knowledge (al-'ilm) so long as two premises
(muqaddimatani) are not set in the mind (nafs)—the first of which is that
these [reporters], despite the difference of their circumstances, the diversity
of their objectives, and their large number cannot together conspire to lie
under any circumstance and that they will not agree except on truth; and the
second being that they do agree on the reports (al-ikhbar) about the event
and that knowledge about the truth is based upon these two premises
(muqaddimatani) having come together—then to this we concede. 633
We can reformulate this argument as follows:
1) If the only explanation for agreement about an event among a number
of reporters (with different circumstances and objectives, and a number
large enough to exclude the possibility of conspiracy) is the truth of that
event, then the report of that event is decisive.
2) Such a group does agree in their report of an event.
3) The report of the event yields decisive knowledge (al-'ilm).634
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Al-Mustasfa,1:133, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 202-203; (Ḥammād trans., 551).
، وتباين أغراضهم، أن هؤﻻء مع اختﻼف احوالهم: إحداهما:وإن عنيتم به أن مجرد قول المخبر ﻻ يفيد العلم ما لم ينتظم في النفس مقدمتان
 فيبتنى. أنهم قد اتفقوا على اﻹخبار عن الواقعة: والثانية. وﻻ يتفقون إﻵ على الصدق، على حال ﻻ يجمعهم على الكذب جامع:ومع كثرتهم
 فهذا مسلم.العلم باصدق على مجموع المقدمتين.
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In the nature of recurrence, Opwis likewise homed in on the same argument, rendering it as: "I – adequate
information leads to inner conviction (I'tiqad); II – inner conviction leads to certainty; III – adequate
information leads to certainty" which she pairs with: "I – if an adequate number has been reached, knowledge
obtains (experience); II – we know that knowledge has been obtained. (conviction/internal observation); III
– an adequate number has been reached." Felicitas Opwis, “Syllogistic Logic in Islamic Legal Theory: AlGhazālī’s Arguments for the Certainty of Legal Analogy (Qiyās),” in Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the
Islamic World, ed. Peter Adamson (De Gruyter, 2019), 108–9.

198

The first premise contains two criteria: the truth of the report, and the widespread
recurrence of the report. Al-Ghazālī has the entire community in view including familial
kinship (children of one father), homeland ("same quarter"), religion (all denominations),
commoners (non-walīs), and even unbelievers (which many other schools omitted). 635 This
reflection (nāẓir) by itself would only allow the mind to assent (tasdiq) to the report
producing mere belief (ʾīmān). However, with enough recurrences of the same report by
many different reporters eventually the report emerges as tawātur. This is identical to how
the knowledge regarding Baghdad's existence accrues for a listener after an unknown
number of times experiencing the recurring report "Baghdad exists". Based on the given
argument, al-Ghazālī is convinced no one can deny this and thus confirms that tawātur
accrues by means of reflection (nāẓir) saying: "knowledge about the truth of a tawātur
report accrues through these premises." 636 At the unknown moment when the report
becomes tawātur the importance of the reporters' trustworthiness, individually or
collectively, becomes irrelevant. For tawātur, once accrued, is its own source of
knowledge.
Recognizing a report as tawātur follows the Mu'tazilite notion where the agent
"finds oneself" (wajad nafsah) convinced (mu'taqid) or in a state of certainty upon
introspection. In the debate on whether tawātur is immediate or acquired knowledge,
everything depended on how indubitable tawātur emerged from a series of merely probable
reports.637 Using Mu'tazilite Abu'l-Qasim al-Ka'bi (d. 931) as a foil, however, al-Ghazālī
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Al-Mustasfa 1:139, 1:140, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 210-212; (Ḥammād trans., 566,
569).
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Al-Mustasfa 1:133, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 202-203; (Ḥammād trans., 552).
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Hanbali Mujtahid scholar Abu Ya'la aI-Farra' (d. 1066) provided an occasionalist answer in which Allāh
directly created the knowledge in the listener on achieving the kamil number. Al-Ghazālī does not even hint
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disrupts the traditional Mu'tazilite categories of necessary/immediate (ḍarūrī) knowledge
and acquired/reflective (nāẓir) knowledge, arguing "discursive knowledge is that in which
it is possible for doubt to enter and for its conditions to change" 638:
Text 4.3.1.2
All discursive (nāẓir) knowledge is such that a scholar [who has it] would
find (yajud) himself doubting it and then seeking [it]. But we do not find
(nujid) ourselves (anfusana) doubting the existence of Mecca, or the
existence of al-Shafi‘i…then seeking after them. If you mean by being
discursive (nāẓiriyan) anything pertaining to this, then we deny it. 639
This argument can likewise be reformulated as:
1) All discursive (nāẓir) knowledge is possible to doubt (or change to enter).
2) Introspection indicates ("we find") that knowledge from tawātur (e.g., the
existence of famous places and people) is not doubted.
3) Therefore, tawātur generates non-discursive (non-nāẓir) knowledge.640
Al-Ghazālī thus maintains that despite tawātur's reliance on a syllogism, the knowledge it
produces is classified not as muktasb but as ḍarūrī (immediate), which on the face of it is
an odd claim. However, he seems bound by the tradition of al-Shafi' to keep tawātur under
necessary knowledge so as not to be doubted, despite his inclusion of a syllogism which
would require nāẓir. Al-Ghazālī claims that the debate over whether tawātur is ḍarūrī
varies with the technical use of terminology, so instead he calls knowledge that does not

at this solution, but instead introduces the notion of a "hidden syllogism" which would be completely
unnecessary if Allāh just created this knowledge (which is not to say that Allāh could not provide such
knowledge which Hallaq notes. Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability, and Certainty in Sunnī
Thought,” 16–17.) This is further evidence that al-Ghazālī was not an occasionalist and should weigh on the
discussion of al-Ghazālī's notion of causality especially in Discussion 17 of the Tahāfut.
638
Abu'l-Qasim al-Ka'bi was a famous Muʿtazilī in the Baghdādī school during the beginning of the
scholastic phase of Muʿtazilī history. Cf. Racha Moujir el Omari, The Theology of Abu L-Qasim Al-Balkhi/alKa’bi (d. 319/931), vol. 99, Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science (Boston: Brill, 2016).
639
1:133, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 202; (Ḥammād trans., 550-51).
. طالبين لذلك، ونحن ﻻ نجد أنفسنا شاكين في وجود مكة ووجود الشافعي رحمه ﷲ. ثم طالبا،وكل علم نظري فالعالم به قد يجد نفسه فيه شاكا
 فنحن ننكره؛،فإن عنيتم بكونه نظريا شيئا من ذلك
640
Opwis likewise homes in on this argument rendering it as: "I – all necessary knowledge is certain; II –
some necessary knowledge is speculative knowledge; III – some speculative knowledge is certain" Opwis,
“Syllogistic Logic in Islamic Legal Theory,” 107.
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require reflection (nāẓir) "primary" (bi-ʾawwaliyy).641 In so doing, al-Ghazālī creates
enough room for the distinction that all "primary" knowledge is necessary, but not all
necessary knowledge is "primary":642
Text 4.3.1.3
There may be an intermediary (wāsiṭa) present in the mind (dihn), though
the person is not conscious of the way it intermediates and how knowledge
accrues through it. Hence, it is called primary (bi-ʾawwaliyy); but it actually
is not so, as in our statement "Two is half of four." For this is not known
except through an intermediary, i.e., a half of the whole’s parts equals the
other half, where ‘two’ is one of the two parts, which is equal to the second
part of the total, which is four; therefore, it is half. Thus, this kind of
knowledge has accrued through an intermediary (wāsiṭa) that is clear and
[actively] present in the mind. This is why when it is said, "Is thirty-six half
of seventy two?" one needs to think about it until one knows this totality is
divisible into two equal parts, each of them being thirty-six. Therefore,
knowledge about the truth of a tawātur report accrues through these
premises [Text 4.3.1.1]—and that which is similar cannot be primary (biʾawwaliyy).643

Bi-ʾawwaliyy ( )بأؤلئis a derivative of 'awwal (أَ ﱠول, first) indicating the notion of first, original, initial,
fundamental, elementary, etc. Al-Ghazālī inserts a passage that is best understood as presenting the
Mu'tazilite distinction between necessary (unreflective) and non-necessary knowledge (reflective) based on
what he immediately follows with in text 4.3.1.3. The reason for its inclusion appears to be explaining how
the classification of tawātur became a debate, but perhaps ironically it appears to have been a source of
confusion: "It is necessary for the mind to become conscious of these two premises so that it can acquire
knowledge to assent with. Even if these premises are not formed in the mind systematically by words, [the
mind] is conscious of them. Thus, the affirmation is obtained while one is not conscious of being conscious
of it. The truth of the matter about this is that it becomes necessary knowledge if it is an expression of what
accrues to [the mind] without any intermediary, like our statement that the eternal cannot be that which is
originated, and the originated cannot be that which is nonexistent. Therefore, this is not necessary, for it
resulted through the intermediacy of the two mentioned premises. But if it is an expression of what accrued
to without the formation of an intermediary in the mind, then it is necessary." Al-Mustasfa 1:133, al-Ghazālī
al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 202-203; (Ḥammād trans., 551).
 فقد شعرت بها, وإن لم تتشكل في النفس هذه المقدمات بلفظ منظوم. حتى يحصل العلم والتصديق,وﻻ بد وأن تشعر النفس بهاتين المقدمتين
 ))القديم: كقولنا, الضروري إن كان عبارة عما يحصل بغير واسطة: وتحقيق القول فيه أن.حتى حصل التصديق وإن لم يشعر بشعورها بها
 وإن كان عبارة عما يحصل. فإنه حصل بواسطة المقدمتين المذكورتين,))والموجود ﻵ يكون معدوما(( فهذا ليس بضروري،((ﻵ يكون محدثا
، فهذا ضروري،بدون تشكل الواسطة في الذهن
642
Weiss's commentary is helpful: "It would be in keeping with Ghazālī's way of thinking to speak of
necessary knowledge as 'source knowledge' and discursive knowledge as 'derived knowledge.' It must be
emphasized, however, that the terms 'source' and 'derived' are used here in a logical rather than strictly
epistemological sense. All logical deduction must start somewhere. Necessary knowledge is this starting
point." Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past,” 99.
643
Al-Mustasfa 1:133, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 202-203; (Ḥammād trans., 551-52).
- وليس بأولي— أعني العلم، فيسمى أوليا، وحصول العلم بواسطتها،ورب واسطة حاضرة في الذهن ﻻ يشعر اﻹنسان بوجه توسطها
 واﻻثنان اًحد الجزأين، وهو أن النصف أحد جزئي الجملة المساوي لﻼخر،))اﻻثنان نصف اﻷربعة(( فإنه \\ ﻻ يعلم ذلك إﻻ بواسطه:كقولنا
 ستة وثﻶثون هل: ولهذا لو قيل. لكنها جلية في الذهن حاضرة، فقد حصل هذا العلم بواسطة.المساوي الثاني من جملة اﻷربعة فهو إذن نصف
641
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He describes non-primary yet necessary knowledge as "that which we find ourselves
compelled to" which includes tawātur and the mathematical sciences since they require
reflection (nāẓir) and yet yield certain knowledge.644 This is a departure from the traditional
use of ḍarūrī, (necessary).645 Those who maintain that tawātur is ḍarūrī (necessary) in the
sense of "primary" do so mistakenly because they believe it results without an intermediary
when they are merely unconscious of it. Since such a reflection must be present in the soul
to acquire knowledge from tawātur, al-Ghazālī claims it is present in the soul even when
the knower "is not conscious of the way it intermediates and how knowledge accrues
through it." Here we can see the influence of Avicenna and his "hidden syllogism." 646 AlGhazālī uses the phrase "hidden syllogism" (qiyās khafī) in al-Mustasfa and Mahakk to
explain how tajriba creates universal judgements through repeated observations: "And if
you contemplate this you will know that al-'aql has already understood after repetition of
the senses by means of a hidden syllogism (qiyas khafi) that sketches in it, and it is not
cognizant of that syllogism."647 In text 4.3.1.1, al-Ghazālī appears to have an assumed

 فإذا العلم بصدق. حتى يعلم أن هذه الجملة تنقسم بجزأين متساويين أحدهما ستة وقﻼثون،هو نصف اثنين وسبعين؟ يفيقر فيه إلى تأمل ونظر
. وما هو كذلك فهو ليس بأؤلئ,خبر التواتر يحصل بواسطة هذه لمقدمات
644
Griffel makes a similar observation saying "Mathematics and to a certain extent also the natural sciences
count for him as apodictical sciences that yield necessary knowledge which is indeed indubitable." Griffel,
“Taqlīd of the Philosophers,” 288. Footnote 49.
645
Citing tawātur, Opwis also recognizes this: "In this he departs from the view commonly held among
Muslim theologians (Mutakallimūn) that acquired knowledge (muktasab) is not necessary (ḍarūrī) and,
hence, not certain." Opwis, “Syllogistic Logic in Islamic Legal Theory,” 102. Cf. Binyamin Abrahamov,
“Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 1 (1993):
20–21.
646
Deborah Black notes that in Avicenna tawātur relies on a hidden syllogism that is the real cause for
certitude Black, “Constructing Averroes’ Epistemology,” 103.
647
Al-Mustasfa 1:46, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 68; My translation.
 ولم يشعر بذلك القياس؛،وإذا تأملت هذ ا عرفت أن العقل قد باله بعد التكرر على الحس بواسطة قياس خفي ارتسم فيه
Al-Ghazālī offers a nearly identical explanation of the hidden syllogism in his explanation of tajriba as a
source of knowledge in Mahak. Cf. al-Ghazālī, ( محك النظر )في فن المنطق/ Maḥakk al-naẓar (fī fann almanṭiq), ed. ( تأليف اﻻمام المجددJiddah: Dār al-Minhāj lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzīʻ, 2016), 120.
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premise, just as Black sees in Avicenna's solution, "that it is impossible for all these
witnesses to be mistaken or colluding – a sort of anti-conspiracy principle." 648
It is here regarding the role of the syllogism that I differ from both Weiss and Haeq's
interpretation of knowledge from tawātur. While Weiss nowhere mentions Avicenna or his
influence via a hidden syllogism, his analysis of al-Ghazālī's understanding of tawātur is
spot on with one exception. He states that al-Ghazālī maintains that experiential and
testimonial knowledge "must be regarded as necessary precisely because the reasoning
upon which they are based is hidden."649 This makes sense assuming the common
Mu'tazilite distinction, however, al-Ghazālī redefines the terms and, as text 4.3.1.3 shows,
tawātur is not ḍarūrī because knowers are unaware of the syllogism (i.e. it is hidden), but
because the knowledge is compelled by the syllogism whether one is conscious of it or not.
Its hidden status is irrelevant. Since al-Ghazālī compares tawātur to experience, Hallaq
assumes that the syllogism must be based on inductive logic as opposed to deductive
logic.650 While Haeq is accurately picking up on testimony's (and tajriba's) ultimate
reduction to perception and, in this case, inductive inference, the hidden syllogism of
tawātur is built on deductive Aristotelian logic. 651 As we will recall, al-Ghazālī maintains

648

Black, “Constructing Averroes’ Epistemology,” 103. Footnote 19. Griffel speculates similarly regarding
experience in Avicenna that recurrence is either due to chance (and thus 'ilm will never accrue) or due to
truth (and thus 'ilm will necessarily accrue): "[Tajriba] in Avicenna seems to be based on the underlying
assumption that when two things repeatedly happen together, they do so either due to chance or due to
necessity." Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 209.
649
Weiss continues: "Where knowledge occurs without there being a clear-cut consciously utilized logical
basis which the intellect is able to retain and refer back to, it makes perfect sense to say that the knowledge
imposes itself upon the intellect." Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past,” 101.
650
He claims that "it is precisely here [tawātur] where the Muslim juristic conception of logic drastically
differs from its Aristotelian and Western post-Aristotelian counterpart." Hallaq, “On Inductive
Corroboration, Probability, and Certainty in Sunnī Thought,” 18. In a lengthy footnote he questions Weiss
(1984) for differentiating tawātur from "inductive knowledge" based on "a generalization from particular
experiences." Ibid. Footnote 43
651
Since Hallaq's project focuses on Sunni legal thought and not al-Ghazālī specifically, he may be speaking
of common jurists and religious scholars whom al-Ghazālī was intentionally trying to teach how to apply
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that "thinking" is syllogistic: "Know that the meaning of thought is to bring two pieces of
knowledge (mariftayni) into the heart to produce from them a third [piece of]
knowledge."652 Ulrich Rudolph argues al-Ghazālī thought that "every scholar should learn
how to use syllogisms correctly [and] in order to do so, he should study Aristotelian logic,
which is the authoritative and unsurpassed presentation of syllogistic reasoning." 653 It
remains that both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī utilized deductive syllogisms to generate what
today would qualify as inductive knowledge.
Al-Ghazālī desires to work within the tradition of orthodoxy, but the question
remains if syllogizing tawātur truly emerges as a source of knowledge on the same level
as demonstration, in providing certain knowledge, 'ilm. Two problems have been raised.
The first problem comes by al-Ghazālī's own admission, namely he is skeptical of people's
ability to accurately conduct logic which seems to indicate that obtaining certain
knowledge via tawātur is the ideal rather than the rule. Rudolph compiles a list of ways alGhazālī sees the ʿavāmm and khavāṣṣ incorrectly using logic and thus the "limits of his
own methodological programme."654 Insufficient methodological knowledge and thus
mixing argument types is common, but the most damaging is a failure to use proven

Aristotelian logic. Opwis credits al-Ghazālī a "major role" in "The conscious and deliberate application of
Aristotelian syllogistic logic in legal reasoning." Opwis, “Syllogistic Logic in Islamic Legal Theory,” 95.
652
Iḥyāʾ, 1801. Book 39, bayan 1. My translation.
.  أن معنى الفكر هو إحضار معرفتين في القلب ليستثمر منهما معرفة ثالثة:اعلم
653
Al-Ghazālī wrote a number of works "stressing the importance of Aristotelian logic", to use Rudolph's
words. These include Mi'yar al-ilm (The Standard of Knowledge), Mihakk al-nazar (The Touchstone for
Speculation), al-Qistas al-mustaqim (The Correct Balance), and prominent portions of al-Mustasfa and alMunqidh. Rudolph summarizes the goal of these works: first to explain the terminology (which he used in
Tahāfut); "Second and more important, they were supposed to teach religious scholars how to apply
Aristotelian logic within their own disciplines. Apparently, al-Ghazālī was convinced that everybody
working in the religious sciences had to learn the methods of proof and the conditions of demonstration. This
seems to be the reason why he explained these rules in more than one introductory writing and why his
various explanations were situated on different intellectual levels." Rudolph, “Al-Ghazālī on Philosophy and
Jurisprudence,” 73–74.
654
Ibid., 75–76.
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premises. The latter occurs because the jurists presume the premise is evident (wadih) or
use the juridical sources of the Qur'an and the ḥadīth as premises in ways that are
incompatible with demonstration (parallel to al-Fārābī and Maimonides' complaint
regarding Kalām).655 The clearest example is the acceptability of the mashhūr tradition in
practical juridical decisions, but not for establishing 'ilm.656 However, al-Ghazālī
(following Avicenna) does not bar the use of religious propositions in syllogism. 657 The
problem becomes one of hermeneutics and interpretation. 658 This leads to the general

655

"They [premises from the Qur'an and hadith] are neither universally valid nor do they meet the conditions
of certainty (yaqin), which would be the prerequisites of being a premise in a demonstrative syllogism." Ibid.,
76.
656
Cf. al-Mustasfa 1:134 & 1:139. Zyzow notes that al-Ghazālī follows the position of al-Naẓẓām in using
the concept of the mashhūr tradition to explain why the traditions of the Jews and Christians failed to meet
tawātur criteria. Martin Whittingham explores this in his aptly titled article "How Could So Many Christians
Be Wrong?". Regarding Christianity, the early reports regarding Christ are merely ahad reports that later
gained widespread acceptance but were either based on a lie or were non-perceptual. Hence, in al-Mustasfa
al-Ghazālī claims Christians did not lie but perceived the Romans crucifying a man who Allāh made to look
like Jesus. Per Whittingham, in "following the implicit logic of al-Ghazalı’s discussion, the Christian error
over the crucifixion is based on an innocent mistake, rather than on a conspiracy to defraud. Nevertheless,
the report is not mutawātir, since it was not based on sound sense perception." Al-Ghazālī turns to consensus
to dismiss the claims of "the Jews [who] have decisively held the falsity of the prophethood of Jesus and
Muhammad…and they exceed the number [required] for tawātur. But their decisiveness is improper, for they
assumed what is not decisive to be decisive." Cf. Al-Mustasfa 1:180, al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm alUsul, 267-268; (Ḥammād trans., 681). Zyzow, The Economy of Certainty, 18–19.; Martin Whittingham,
“How Could So Many Christians Be Wrong? The Role of Tawātur (Recurrent Transmission of Reports) in
Understanding Muslim Views of the Crucifixion,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 19, no. 2 (2008):
173.
657
Ömer Mahir Alper claims religious propositions can be counted among true and certain propositions and
thus used in syllogisms. Ömer Mahir Alper, “The Epistemological Value Of Scriptural Statements In
Avicenna: Can Religious Propositions Provide The Premises Of Philosophical Demonstrations?,” in
Philosophy and the Abrahamic Religions: Scriptural Hermeneutics and Epistemology, ed. Torrance Kirby,
Rahim Acar, and Bilāl Baṣal (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2013), 175–90. Opwis makes the
same claim: "The premises used in legal analogy, namely Qur’anic statements and recurrent hadiths,
constitute certain premises from which certain conclusions obtain. Yet, the dilemma persists that most of the
textual bases of analogy are not known with certainty. Rather, the majority of hadiths, which make up the
bulk of the source material of Islamic law, are classified as isolated or singular (ahad) reports; only a handful
of Prophetic sayings are deemed to belong to the category of recurrent hadiths." Opwis, “Syllogistic Logic
in Islamic Legal Theory,” 106.
658
Al-Ghazālī agrees with Avicenna's assessment except he rejects that Qur'anic language is symbolic. Per
Alper: "Although Avicenna recognizes the truth, certainty, and superiority of prophetic knowledge, he does
not approve of using all religious propositions dependent upon this knowledge as premises of philosophical
demonstration. This is because the prophet recasts revealed knowledge and conveys it to his society in
symbolic terms in order to ensure its comprehension by everybody." Alper, “The Epistemological Value Of
Scriptural Statements In Avicenna: Can Religious Propositions Provide The Premises Of Philosophical
Demonstrations?,” 182–83.
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incompatibility of jurisprudence and philosophical logic. While al-Ghazālī held that qiyas
(analogy), the primary tool of legal reasoning, could be technically converted into a
syllogism, "in practice," to quote Rudolph, "his advice is nuanced." 659
The second problem is raised by Weiss and Hallaq who point out that the certainty
from tawātur is subjective, not objective. "Finding" that what one once knew as merely
probable is now known certainly after an unknown number of recurrences varies with each
person's experience. Worse, the objective conditions of tawātur are inaccessible at the time
of hearing: 1) that the reporter possess certain knowledge is "the desideratum of the
dispute"; 2) that the original report is based on perception is indeterminable by the listener;
and most importantly 3) a large (ultimately unknown) number of reporters is a poor
objective basis for knowledge.660 To the first, al-Ghazālī will turn to the trustworthy
character of the speaker, which for the prophet is infallible. To the second, the perceptual
nature is incorporated in the report itself, e.g. "I heard the prophet say…", but truly this
amounts to two claims, "I heard the prophet say p" and "p" where the perceptual
requirement only applies to the first. To the third, al-Ghazālī is unconcerned with the
numbers given the epistemic work of the hidden syllogism even though it too is dependent
on numbers. All that notwithstanding, al-Ghazālī is ultimately content with the subjective
nature of the knowledge produced: "If the complete number [for tawātur] is reported and
certain knowledge does not accrue about their truthfulness, then necessarily the [report] is

659

Rudolph elaborates with examples before concluding that "the connection between logic and jurisprudence
as established by al-Ghazālī is less firm than we might have expected. In this respect his goal seems to have
been theoretical rather than practical. The fuqaha should know the general rules of Aristotelian logic but they
were not expected to apply them to every legal question." Rudolph, “Al-Ghazālī on Philosophy and
Jurisprudence,” 79.
660
Cf. Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past,” 96–97; Hallaq, “On Inductive Corroboration, Probability, and
Certainty in Sunnī Thought,” 12.

206

decisively a lie." If the listener does not find certain knowledge within despite a kamil
number of reporters, he concludes the reporter made a mistake or lied. 661 So while a report
must meet the conditions to become tawātur, it is the subjective experience of whether or
not the listener "finds themselves" in a state of certainty that serves as the indicator as to
whether a report has met the conditions and is therefore true. His goal is contentedly
subjective with the aim of showing that the knowledge and repose of the soul produced by
tawātur is as certain as one's own inner experience that they are sad or knowledge from
tajriba that bread satiates hunger.662 This fits his primary goal to establish the
trustworthiness of the 'ulama or khāṣṣ al-khavāṣṣ663 and thus his Ṣūfī goal to lead, or
deliver, people to their own personal encounter with Allāh and his word. 664 As a result,
these difficulties may explain why al-Ghazālī and the materialist camp were reluctant to
consider anything outside the Qur'an as tawātur, and since the Qur'an itself is considered a
miracle this may indicate that for a report to obtain tawātur status is nothing short of
miraculous.

661

The testimony of one erroneous or unvirtuous testifier spoils the batch, but there is no means of
determining who or when: "Either all the reporters lied or one of them lied," and since "testimony is not
accepted from four who are known to have a liar or conjecturer among them." Al-Mustasfa, 1:138, al-Ghazālī
al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 208-210; (Ḥammād trans., 564).
662
Opwis arrives at a similar reading: "In al-Ghazālī’s interpretation, the Qur’an and recurrent ḥadīths as
sources of knowledge lead to certain, necessary knowledge (tawātur yields 'ilm ḍarūrī yaqini), the
truthfulness of which is not objectively verifiable but determined in the mind (soul) of a person, subjectively.
It is reached upon a person’s 'knowledge' or 'conviction' that a report is true." Opwis, “Syllogistic Logic in
Islamic Legal Theory,” 110.
663
Opwis concludes: "His emphasis on the psychological factors of establishing certainty puts the focus not
so much on the source of law itself as on the interpreters of the sources, the ‘ulama. They are the ones who
know with certainty that the sources of the law and the analogies derived therefrom are true." Ibid., 112.
664
This solution ultimately parallels William James understanding of religious experience in that such
experiences are justified for the experiencer, but such justification cannot be shared. Cf. William James, “The
Varieties of Religious Experience,” in Writings 1902-1910, ed. Bruce Kuklick (New York: Library of
America, 1987), 1–478.
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4.3.2 Divine Testimony
The third and highest level of knowledge, and second mode of knowing, is from revelation
(waḥy) which al-Ghazālī covers under the "science of unveiling" ('ilm al-mukāshafa)
alongside the science of practice ('ilm al-mu'āmala) as the two parts of the Science of the
Path to the Afterlife ('ilm tarīq al-ākhira), the science al-Ghazālī wishes to revive (one
science for al-malakūt, the spiritual world, and al-mulk, the physical world,
respectively).665 In the science of unveiling, prophecy (nabuwwa) and inspiration (ilhām)
emerge as the two ways humans may obtain knowledge from al-malakūt, but are rare.
Prophecy is reserved for the prophets and thus ceased with Muhammad. Inspiration,
however, is a nearly identical alternative available to scholars who, according to the famous
ḥadīth, are heirs to the prophets.666 This reopens "knowledge from on high", however, these
unveilings are reserved for the khāṣṣ al-khavāṣṣ, so al-Ghazālī states: "These sciences are
not recorded in books and are not discussed by him whom God has blessed with any of
them except among his own circle of intimates who partake with him of them through
discourses and secret communication."667 So while al-Ghazālī slips tantalizing glimpses
into his major works, he never provides a full and consistent account. Al-Ghazālī's concept
of prophecy has already been extensively studied, so my aim is to analyze prophecy and
inspiration as forms of testimony from a divine speaker to a human listener and his
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Treiger explains that the science of practice (i.e., polishing the mirror) is the means to the science of
unveiling which is the means to "the attainment of the cognition of God (ma‘rifat Allāh) in this world and of
felicity (sa‘āda) in the afterlife." It should also be noted that al-Ghazālī uses "Unveiling" (mukāshafa) in his
own unique way, but the term, like the concept dhawq, is Sufi in origin. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in
Islamic Thought, 39, 42.
666
As we will see in Text 4.3.2.2, al-Ghazālī claims inspiration only differs from revelation in that prophets
are able to see the angel who imparts knowledge in the latter. This is made possible by following Avicenna's
account in which prophecy is merely the highest power of the human intellect.
667
Iḥyāʾ’, Book 1, bāb 2, bayān 2. al-Ghazālī, The Book of Knowledge, 42.
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subsequent audience despite their "perceptual" description. 668 Even though neither
prophecy or inspiration follow the common corporeal process of hearing spoken or reading
written words, insofar as an agent receives the transmission of knowledge from the mind
of another agent, that transmission qualifies as testimonial in nature. However, the rare and
esoteric nature of certain divine knowledge raises an important question, how can such
knowledge be verified? The answer aligns with al-Ghazālī's desire to revive the Science of
the Path to the Afterlife, personal experience.
Traditional Ashʿarism offered two means of verifying the truth claims of a prophet,
miracles and/or the trustworthiness (ṣadīq) of the prophet. Al-Ghazālī finds both wanting.
Miracles (alone) are denounced as a verification for prophethood in the Munqidh since they
are easily confused with magic and deception making them susceptible to doubt through
logical defeaters.669 Verification of prophethood via the prophet's virtuous life becomes
circular if the prophet reveals what it means to live a virtuous life. Without fully denying
miracles, al-Ghazālī opts more for the latter option but escapes the circularity per Griffel,
by adopting Avicenna's notion of prophecy with verification through personal
experience.670 Al-Ghazālī does not accept Avicenna's notion of prophecy wholesale, but
668

Cf. Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s Concept of Prophecy”; M. Afifi al-Akiti, “The Three Properties of Prophethood
in Certain Works of Avicenna and Al-Ghazālī,” in Interpreting Avicenna: Science And Philosophy In
Medieval Islam-Proceedings Of The Second Conference Of The Avicenna Study Group, ed. Jon McGinnis
and David C. Reisman (Brill, 2004), 189–210. M. Afifi al-Akiti clearly outlines al-Ghazālī's reliance on
Avicenna for the "three properties of prophethood", and their relation to the imaginative faculty, intellectual
faculty (i.e. intuition and ḥads), and the human soul (i.e. motive faculty as opposed to the perceptive faculty).
669
"Therefore, seek sure and certain knowledge of prophecy in this way [i.e., dhawq], not from the changing
of the staff into a serpent and the splitting of the moon. For if you consider that sort of thing alone, without
adding the many, indeed innumerable, circumstances accompanying it, you might think it was a case of magic
and deception, and that it was a 'leading astray' coming from God Most High, because 'He leads astray whom
He will and rightly guides whom He will', and the problems connected with apologetic miracles would
confront you. Furthermore, if your faith were based on a carefully ordered argument about the way the
apologetic miracle affords proof of prophecy, your faith would be broken by an equally well-ordered
argument showing how difficulty and doubt may affect that mode of proof." al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min AlḌalāl, 75.; (McCarthy trans. 100).
670
Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s Concept of Prophecy.”
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rejects: first, its distinctly syllogistic process, i.e. the prophet intuiting (ḥads) the middle
term;671 and second, akin to Plato's "noble lie", its symbolic rendering of the Qur'an with
the intent of virtuously bettering the masses who are incapable of obtaining philosophical
knowledge by any other means since this indicates the prophets and their messages are not
ṣadīq but takdib, i.e., lying.672 Al-Ghazālī opts for an experiential rather than demonstrative
form of prophecy and a plain sense rather than imagistic reading of the Qur'an. In the
Faysal al-Tafriqa bayna al-Islam wa-al-zandaqa (On the Boundaries of Theological
Tolerance in Islam, henceforth al-Tafriqa), he shifts the traditional Ash’arite emphasis on
tasdiq through Allāh (tasdiq bi-Allāh) to tasdiq through a messenger (tasdiq bi-rasul) to
provide a method of verifying Muhammad's ṣidq. According to Griffel, "only this
transformation allows al-Gazalı to develop an elaborate system to verify the ṣidq of the
Islamic message and of its messenger." 673 Thus the propositions of the prophet can be
verified, and assented to, insofar as they correspond to a proper object of being. The Qur'an
is thus the propositions of the Prophet's reports of real objects of being. Al-Tafriqa then
outlines five possible degrees of being to account for types of revealed propositions. 674
Thus, to deny the correspondence between revealed reports and one of these degrees of
being is kufir (unbelief). This is because revelation, Griffel states, is a "literal representation
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Al-Ghazālī does maintain that the intellect is the highest faculty, and this is most developed in the prophet.
Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s Concept of Prophecy,” 120. For more on the noble lie in philosophy in the Islamic
world, cf. Nicholas Oschman, "Al-Fārābī Metaphysics, and the Construction of Social Knowledge: Is
Deception Warranted If It Leads to Happiness?" (Milwaukee, Marquette University, 2020).
673
The latter is a more philosophical attitude per Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s Concept of Prophecy,” 123–25.
674
These are: real being (wujud dati), comprising all objects outside the human mind; sensible being (wujud
hissi), comprising being perceived through sense perception; imaginative being (wujud hayali), comprising
being within the imaginative faculty; conceptual being (wujud 'aqli), comprising being of a conceptual or
intellectual nature (often to explain metaphorical language); and similar being (wujud sibhi) comprising
accidental attributes (often to explain emotions and other attributes used of Allāh but not univocally
applicable to Allāh). Ibid., 127–30.
672
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of objects that are outside the text" or "being" "which is outside of language." 675 Regardless
of whether the being corresponds to historical or psychological events, what matters is the
prophet's capacity to accurately reflect the knowledge of those events in a report (this
assumes the Qur'an is both a divine and human created text where Allāh is the "ultimate
author" by causing the mental states of Muhammad who then coined the words). 676
Verification once again draws on experience (tajriba). Munqidh shows that just as one
identifies a jurist or a physician via one's knowledge of jurisprudence and medicine, one
can verify that one like Muhammad is a prophet:
Text 4.3.2.1
If it occurs to you to doubt whether a particular individual is a prophet or
not, certainty will be gained only by becoming acquainted with his
circumstances, either through witnessing (mushāhadah) or from tawātur
and hearsay. For when you are familiar with medicine and jurisprudence,
you can recognize jurisprudents and physicians by witnessing
(mushāhadah) their circumstances, and also by hearing their sayings, even
if you have not witnessed (tashahada) them. Moreover, you are quite
capable of knowing that al-Shafi'i (God's mercy be upon him!) was a
jurisprudent and that Galen was a physician-and that with a knowledge
based on fact, not by taqlīd from another. But by your learning something
about jurisprudence and medicine and then perusing their writings and
works: thus you will acquire a necessary (ḍarūrī) knowledge of their
scientific status.677
Just as with tawātur and experiential knowledge (e.g. bread satiates, etc.), knowledge that
Muhammad is a prophet and his report is true becomes ḍarūrī "by sampling what he said
about the acts of worship and their effect on the purification of hearts." 678 Thus, for the
675

The purpose of al-Tafriqa is "to develop a criterion how to distinguish a tolerated interpretation (ta'wil)
of revelation from one that is considered unbelief and apostasy from Islam." Ibid., 134–36.
676
"His capacity to represent correctly his knowledge of past and future events or his mental states is what
the unbelievers deny. The believers assume that Muhammad has expressed the right words that represent the
events in past and future or the states of his soul exactly as they were or will be." Ibid., 140.
677
al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min Al-Ḍalāl, 74.; (McCarthy trans. 99). Tr. mod.
 فإنك إذا عرفت، أو بالتواتر والتسامع، إما بالمشاهدة، فﻼ يحصل اليقين إﻻ بمعرفة أحواله، أنه نبي أم ﻻ،فإن وقع لك الشك في شخص معين
 وﻻ تعجز أيضا ً عن مرفة كون الشافعي، وإن لم تشاهدهم، وسماع أقوالهم، يمكنك أن تعرف الفقهاء واﻷطباء بمشاهدة أحوالهم،الطب والفقه
، بل بأن تتعلم شيئا من الفقه والطب وتطالع كتبهما وتصانيفهما. مرفة بالحقيقة ﻻبالتقليد عن الغير،ً وكون جالينوس طبيبا،ًرحمه ﷲ فقيها
.فيحصل لك علم ضروري بحالها
678
Ibid.; (McCarthy trans. 99).
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ʿavāmm, the personal experience of soul purification (and experiencing the truth of
proverbial sayings) after following the Prophet's dictates leads to certain knowledge that
Muhammad was indeed Allāh's prophet. 679 For the khavāṣṣ, Avicenna's understanding of
the soul provides verification.680 This is fitting since his psychology is understood as an
extension of his cosmology.681 For the khāṣṣ al-khavāṣṣ, they must verify the prophet
through their own divine experience.
The focus in al-Tafriqa is on the end result of prophecy, on what is received, namely
a word or proposition in the mind of the Prophet who then reports it to his listeners, but in
the Iḥyāʾ al-Ghazālī reveals how one can obtain their own experience and a glimpse of how
the experience occurs. In one sense it would be sufficient if al-Ghazālī, keeping with
Ash'arite tradition, left transmission a mystery as he does in both the Faysal and the
Munqidh, but he repeatedly offers foretastes, arguably to entice his readers to obtain their
own experience or from his own suppressed desire to share his experience. Ṣūfīsm's
influence is on full display in al-Ghazālī's guidance: 1) disavowal of material concerns and
connections; and 2) seek solitude for prayer and meditation. The meditative practice
consists of no distractions (even the Qur'an) and an "empty heart and concentrated purpose"
679

Al-Ghazālī also offers experiencing the truth of Qur'anic sayings as proof: "Consider, for example, how
right he was-God's blessing and peace be upon him!-in his saying: 'Whoever acts according to what he knows,
God will make him heir to what he does not know'; and how right he was in his saying: 'Whoever aids an
unjust man, God gives the latter dominion over him'; and how right he was in his saying: 'Whoever reaches
the point where all his cares are a single care, God Most High will save him from all cares in this life and the
next.' When you have had that experience in a thousand, two thousand, and many thousands of instances,
you will have acquired a necessary knowledge which will be indisputable." al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min AlḌalāl, 74-75.; (McCarthy trans. 99-100).
680
According to Griffel, "the body of theoretical knowledge that verifies the prophet's claim is knowledge of
the soul, i.e., psychology. Such an explanation of prophecy in terms of psychology is part of al-Gazalı’s
project in the Faysal. The yardstick for the verification of a prophet lies, therefore, in the judgment whether
his deeds and words fulfill the criteria and have the effects that knowledge about the soul (laid down in
psychological literature) ascribes to the actions of a true prophet." Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s Concept of
Prophecy,” 143.
681
Giannotti calls al-Ghazālī's psychology "inextricably woven into the fabric of his cosmology." Gianotti,
Al-Ghazālī’s Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul, 148.
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so nothing but Allāh enters the mind. He describes an exercise speaking "Allāh, Allāh"
aloud repeatedly until it disappears from the tongue but is preserved in the heart and
continuing still until the form and letters disappear from the heart so only "the ideal
meaning" remains. Then, al-Ghazālī says: "Upon doing this, if his desire is sincere, his
intention pure, and his perseverance good, and if his lusts do not draw him aside nor the
suggestions of the self (ḥadīth al-nafs) engross him with the ties of this present world, there
will shine forth the gleams of reality into his heart."682 The realities are those recorded on
the Preserved Tablet (lawhun mahfuz) from Sura 85:21-22 which contains all divine
knowledge, material or immaterial, and occupies a prominent place in his cosmology.
These are described first "like a blinding flash of lightning" but may become more frequent
or continue for longer with greater superiority of one's nature and "moral
characteristics."683 Later in book 35 of the Iḥyāʾ, this is described as the first step in which
one eyewitnesses the Pen (another item in his cosmology) inscribing certain knowledge on
the heart.684 This emphasis on how leads to five impediments which can "veil" the mirror
and thus an explanation of how prophecy and inspiration work.
Al-Ghazālī builds on the mirror metaphor to discuss five ways the reflection of
knowledge in the heart can be veiled by five obstructing causes (covered in bayan 6).
Knowledge of divine realties can be prevented by intellectual, moral, and willful
imperfections attributed to the mirror namely: 1) being incompletely formed, i.e. imperfect
nature found in youths; 2) being corroded with dirt, rust, and dullness, i.e. disobedience to
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Iḥyāʾ, 894-896. Book 21. (Skellie Trans. The Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 74–75).
Iḥyāʾ, 894-896. Book 21. (Skellie Trans. The Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 75–76). For more on
"light" as knowledge or intelligence cf. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 21.
684
Cf. Iḥyāʾ’, Book 35. al-Ghazālī, Faith in divine unity & trust in divine providence = Kitab al-Tawhid
wa’l-Tawakkul ; book XXXV of the revival of the religious sciences = Ilha’ ’ulum al-din, trans. David B.
Burrell (Louisville, Ky.: Fons Vitae, 2001), 19–20.
683
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Allāh and lustful appetites; 3) being "turned away from" the Preserved Tablet, i.e. focused
on livelihood or never trying to reflect on divine realities; 4) being veiled, i.e. a taqlīd belief
held since youth or on account of dogma;685 5) not being correctly oriented toward the
Preserve Tablet due to ignorance, i.e., combining two items of knowledge in the "process
of deduction" (tariq al-'itibar) to acquire knowledge (allusion to the syllogism).686 The
notion of these personal failings serving as a veil, however, leads to an explanation of how
knowledge is transmitted from Allāh to the human heart. In Iḥyāʾ book 21, bayan 8, alGhazālī provides a dense explanation that establishes a process linking divine knowledge
to the Preserved Tablet for both prophecy and inspiration in contradistinction to humanly
acquired knowledge:
Text 4.3.2.2
The true doctrine is that the heart has the capacity to have revealed in it the
true nature of reality in all things. But this is prevented by the intervention
of the five aforementioned causes. These are as a veil which hangs down
between the mirror of the heart and the Preserved Tablet (al-lawh almahfūz), which is engraved with all that Allāh has decreed until the day of
resurrection. The reflection of the real nature of knowledge from the mirror
of the Tablet upon the mirror of the heart is like the reflection of an image
from one mirror to another mirror opposite it. The veil between the two
mirrors is sometimes removed by the hand, and at other times by a gust of
wind which moves it. Thus the winds of divine favor sometimes blow and
the veils are drawn aside from the eyes of hearts so that there is reflected in
them something of that which is written upon the Preserved Tablet.
Sometimes this takes place during sleep, and thereby there is revealed that
which will come into being in the future. The veil is completely lifted by
685

Al-Ghazālī is adamant that taqlīd, accepting human testimony blindly, prevents the reception of divine
testimony: "The obedient man who has overcome his appetites and devotes himself exclusively to a certain
specific reality may not have this revealed to him because it is veiled from him by some belief which he has
held from his youth and which he has blindly followed and accepted in good faith. This belief walls him off
from the true nature of the Real and prevents there being revealed to his heart anything contrary to the strict
interpretation of the doctrines which he has blindly accepted. This too is a great veil which overshadows most
Muslim theologians (Mutakallimūn) and those who are fanatical followers of the schools (madhahib), may
indeed most righteous men who think upon the kingdom of the heavens and the earth for they are veiled by
their blindly followed dogmas which are hardened their souls and firmly fixed in their hearts, and have
become a veil between them and the perception of realities." Iḥyāʾ, 889. Book 21. (Skellie Trans. The
Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 50–51).
686
Iḥyāʾ, 888-892. Book 21. (Skellie Trans. The Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 48–54).
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death when the covering is withdrawn. At other times revelation is made
during waking hours and the veil is lifted by a secret favor from Allāh, and
some of the marvels of knowledge glisten in the heart from behind the
curtain of the unknown. This may be like a dazzling flash of lightning, or it
may be continuous up to a certain point, but its continuance is most rare.
Revelation then does not differ from acquiring as regards the knowledge
itself, its seat, and its cause, but it differs only in the removal of the veil for
this is not accomplished by man's volition. General inspiration does not
differ from prophetic inspiration in any of these respects, but only in the
matter of the witnessing (mushāhadah) the angel who imparts the
knowledge; for our hearts attain knowledge only by means of the angels. To
this the Most High refers in the statement, "It is not for any mortal that Allāh
should speak to him, except by inspiration, or from behind a veil; or by
sending a messenger who reveals, by His permission, what He pleases"
(42:50-51).687
In the following bayan, al-Ghazālī gives two analogies to clarify this reality. The first is a
pool fed by water from the surface or by digging and removing dirt from the bottom until
"pure water is reached." The heart is likened to the pool and knowledge to the water fed by
two doors (i.e., two modes): one door is the five senses as incoming surface streams of
knowledge from al-mulk. The second door is a "secret" of the heart's inner fountain only
opened to those who devote themselves to "the remembrance of Allāh" which flows "purer
and more constant, and perhaps more copious and abundant" from the real natures of things
written on the Preserved Tablet.688 The second metaphor describes a contest between
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Iḥyāʾ, 895. Book 21. (Skellie Trans. The Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 71–72). Tr mod.
،-  التي سيق ذكرها-  وإنما حيل بينه وبينها باﻷسباب الخمسة، أن القلب مستعد ﻷن تنجلي فيه حقيقة الحق في اﻷشياء كلها:وحقيقة القول فيه
 وتجلي حقائق.فهي كالحجاب المسدل الحائل بين مرآة القلب وبين اللوح المحفوظ الذي هو منقوش بجميع ما قضى ﷲ به إلى يوم القيامة
 والحجاب بين المرآتين تارة يزال باليد وأخرى يزول،العلوم من مرآة اللوح في مرآة القلب يضاهي انطباع صورة من مرآة في مرآة تقابلها
 وكذلك قد تهب رياح اﻷلطاف وتنكشف الحجب عن أعين القلوب فينجلي فيها بعض ما هو مسطور في اللوح.بهبوب الرياح تحركه
 وينكشف أيضا ً في، وتمام ارتفاع الحجاب بالموت فبه ينكشف الغطاء. وي كون ذلك تارة عند المنام فيعلم به ما يكون في المستقبل،المحفوظ
، فيلمع في القلوب من وراء ستر الغيب شيء من غرائب العلم تارة كالبرق الخاطف،اليقظة حتى يرتفع الحجاب بلطف خفي من ﷲ تعالى
 ولكن يفارقه من، ودوامه في غاية الندور فلم يفارق اﻹلهام اﻻكتساب في نفس العلم وﻻ في محله وﻻ في سببه.وأخرى على التوالي إل ى حد ما
 فإن العلم إنما، فإن ذلك ليس باختيار العبد ولم يفارق الوحي اﻹلهام في شيء من ذلك بل في مشاهدة الملبك المفيد للعلم،جهة زوال الحجاب
 >>وما كان لبشر آن يكلمه ﷲ إﻻ وحيا أؤ من ورآى حجاب أؤ يرسل رسوﻻ: وإليه اﻹشارة بقوله تعالى،يحصل في قلوبنا بواسطة المﻼئكة
.<<فيوحى باذنه ما يشآء
688
"The heart then is like the reservoir and knowledge like the water. The five external senses are like the
streams. Knowledge may possibly be conducted to the heart by means of the streams of the senses and the
consideration of things observed until it is thus filled with knowledge. It is also possible to stop up these
streams from it by solitude and retirement and averting the eyes from seeing, and then to resolve in the depths
of the heart upon purifying it and taking away from it the layers of coverings until the fountain of knowledge
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Chinese and Byzantine Greeks to impress a king with their craftsmanship on opposite walls
of a portico. A veil is erected between the walls while the groups work. The Byzantines
create a colorful scene on their wall while the Chinese only furbish and polish their wall.
When the veil is lifted, the Byzantine work reflects in the Chinese wall which has become
like a polished mirror.689 Both illustrations explain the difference between learned or
philosophic knowledge (surface waters and Byzantine colorful wall) and prophetic or
saintly knowledge (inner pool and Chinese reflective wall). Prophecy and inspiration are
both forms of inner perception (eye of prophecy) tied to the psychology of the prophet or
saint as opposed to outer perception. The knowledge obtained is the same but is achieved
by two different modes requiring labor of a different sort. The inspirational knowledge
promoted by Ṣūfīsm obtains a higher degree of certainty due to its non-discursive nature
as personal experience immune from doubt and error.
The two analogies reveal strong Neoplatonic influences on al-Ghazālī for the how
of both prophecy and inspiration rely on his cosmology. 690 First, al-Ghazālī describes how
the soul must be prepared for an unmediated experience with the divine parallel to Enneads

bursts forth from within it. " Iḥyāʾ, 896-898. Book 21, bayan 9; (Skellie Trans. The Religious Psychology of
Al-Ghazzali, 78–84).
689
"The story is told that once the Chinese and the Byzantine Greeks vied with one another before a certain
king as to the beauty of their workmanship in decorating and painting. So, the king decided to give over to
them a portico so that the Chinese might decorate one side of it and the Byzantine Greeks the other side and
to let a curtain hang down between them so as to prevent either group from looking at the other. And he did
so. The Byzantines gathered together numberless strange colors, but the Chinese entered without any color
at all and began to polish their side and to furbish it. When the Byzantines had finished the Chinese claimed
that they had finished also. The king was astonished at their statement and the way in which they had finished
the decorating without any color at all. So, they were asked, 'How have you finished the work without any
color?' They replied, 'You are not responsible for us; lift the veil.' So, they lifted it, and behold on their side
there shone forth the wonders of the Byzantine skill with added illumination and dazzling brilliance, since
that side had become like unto a polished mirror by reason of much furbishing. Thus, the beauty of their side
was increased by its added clearness." Iḥyāʾ, 898-900. Book 21 bayan 9. Trans. Skellie The Religious
Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 84-85.
690
Al-Ghazālī's silence regarding Neoplatonism comes as no surprise since prophecy and cosmology (upon
which it is dependent) are key topics in the science of unveiling, which as an esoteric science is not to be
committed to writing. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 39.
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V.1.6-8. Second, he assumes a Neoplatonic cosmology structured in accordance with
Avicenna's cosmological structure with several modifications, 691 including (like other
philosophical ideas) theological language masking the Neoplatonic elements: 692 the One is
Allāh; the Universal Intellect (Avicenna's Active Intellect) is the Pen (qal'am) representing
various ideas (including Allāh's plans for the world or judgement, hukm) which goes by
various names (e.g. Fire, Holy Spirit, and an angel), but serves to record Allāh's decree
(qadā) on the Preserved Tablet; the World Soul is the Preserved Tablet (al-lawh al-mahfūz)
and contains Allāh's ideal plans for the world. The differentiating factor of "better sight"
for prophets manifests as a direct connection to the Universal Intellect while inspiration
must proceed through the World Soul. The human soul as a mirror "polished" by increasing
in virtue that can be turned inward in hopes that the last "veil" is removed to reflect the
engravings on the Preserved Tablet which is also a mirror that reflects Allāh. Polishing the
mirror is thus a precondition for, but not a guarantee of, inspiration. This direct experience
of the Preserved Tablet is the how of prophecy which he relates to dhawq as "the real
meaning of prophecy."693
Putting everything together, this prophetic sequence qualifies as testimony despite
its perceptual description (i.e., tasting and witnessing) since objects of knowledge
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Al-Ghazālī rejects al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's theory of emanationism and makes the active intellect the
First Intellect as opposed to the tenth and lowest intellect. For more on al-Ghazālī's cosmology see Appendix
A of Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought. al-Ghazālī's nominalism and possible occasionalism
can also create problems causality for the causal chains required for the cosmology of the falsifa.
692
Given the esotericism of the topic, these correlations have led to scholarly disagreement. Treiger states
that Griffel's assessment that "in al-Ghazalı’s thought, just as in Avicenna’s Throne Philosophy, 'the wellguarded tablet' refers to both the first creation as well as the active intellect, without clearly distinguishing
between these two," is incorrect, claiming that the Preserved Tablet cannot be identified with the Active
Intellect. Cf. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s Philosophical Theology, 194; Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic
Thought, 107 endnote 27.
693
This is further evidenced by frequent references to light, the light of prophecy, and al-Ghazālī's
autobiographical experience of light being cast into his breast. al-Ghazālī, Munqidh Min Al-Ḍalāl, 36-37,
74-75.; (McCarthy trans. 66, 99-100).
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(including propositions & words) are being communicated from a speaker to a listener,
albeit in a manner that is not audible or written in the traditional sense. Al-Ghazālī describes
all knowledge as coming from Allāh, oftentimes inscribing it on the heart directly, but the
full explanation of the process incorporates intermediating angelic intelligence. 694 Using
Muhammad as our example of the khāṣṣ al-khavāṣṣ or the prophet due to his superior
virtues, he is able to prepare himself for a dhawq experience in which he receives divine
intelligibles from Allāh transmitted through the Pen and/or the Preserved Tablet.
Muhammed then reports these realities (beings) from his psychological experience as the
propositions (muhbar) of the Qur’an.

The faithful place their trust in the Prophet

Muhammad to accurately report the knowledge Allāh provided to form the Qur’an. 695 Thus
the Qur’an is Muhammed’s testimony to what Allāh transmitted to his heart, i.e. divine
testimony.696 In this sense, the prophet is yet another instrument in a chain of Allāh’s
transmission: this preserves the means by which Allāh "speaks" inwardly through the heart
and also drives people to polish the mirror of their heart to hear Allāh speak directly.
As a result, there is only one method of testimonial grounding for both human and
divine testimony. Prophets are deemed trustworthy like any other expert insofar as revealed
694

Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 226. This ambiguity can be attributed to al-Ghazālī's strong penchant for
instrumental causality, i.e., secondary causality, but the result is he often collapses the efficient and final
cause since the causation of the final cause is more attributable to Allāh than the intermediary efficient
cause(s). Al-Ghazālī appears to have relied on secondary causality even more so than Avicenna per Griffel
who shows how al-Ghazālī "reproduces al-Farabı’s explanation of how 'the First, which is God, is the
proximate cause of the existence of the secondary causes and of the active intellect'"). Griffel cites the London
Manuscript attributed to al-Ghazālī which references al-Fārābī, al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya. Griffel, Al-Ghazali’s
Philosophical Theology, 145.
695
Listeners put their faith in the Prophet and his revelation when they "trust the veracity of the report…he
affirms the relationship that these objects have to one another just as they are reported." Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s
Concept of Prophecy,” 127.
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Al-Mustasfa 1:100, "When we consider the manifestation of rules in relation to us, they do not become
manifest except by the statements of the Messenger, for we do not [directly] hear the words from Allāh, nor
from Jibril. Thus, the book is manifested to us through the utterances of the Messenger. So, if we consider
that which manifests these rules, it is only the utterances of the Messenger, since ijma' indicates that they
[jurists] relied on his statements." al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 151; (Ḥammād trans., 451-52).
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propositions fit the internal knowledge people already have whether through previous: a)
testimony due to the propositions accurately reporting the "being" of historical and nonsensory events; or b) rational cogitation due to conformity to reason or verification (often
via syllogisms). Insofar as Muhammad’s claims conform to the knowledge a listener has
within and those claims prove effective in purifying one’s soul, Muhammed's trustworthy
nature is verified and his status as prophet speaking on behalf of Allāh is confirmed. 697 As
with the certainty of tawātur, knowledge from the prophet, or even through dhawq,
provides a subjective certainty. In verifying a prophetic word, the listener compares the
revealed message with what has already been firmly established in their mind and in testing
the prophet. Certainty is thus achieved through the immediate notion of truth the believer
finds within. For the few who can obtain dhawq, the knowledge from their experience is
not only subjective (personal to them), but even if it were communicable, they are not able
to do so. Any knowledge conveyed could only be verified by the same means of prophecy
where listeners would once again test and experience inner peace. So long as the agent
obtains certainty, even if it is subjective, al-Ghazālī has achieved his aim.
4.4 Conclusion: Testimonial Assessment
As with Saadya, al-Ghazālī's theory of testimony does not fit cleanly within contemporary
frameworks. Due to differing cognitive states and phenomenological experiences of
epistemic grounds, al-Ghazālī could be understood as granting different testimonial
theories to different social positions: anti-reductionism is acceptable for the masses but it
does not truly provide knowledge (and acts as a veil to divine testimony for scholars and
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Griffel argues that a prophet’s work falls into the field of psychology whether as an ordinary believer’s
personal experience on matters of the soul as reflecting the Qur’an or as a scientist’s grasp of Avicenna’s
books on the soul where a prophets’ words correspond with lived experience (regardless of how the
correspondence is obtained). Griffel, “Al-Gazali’s Concept of Prophecy.” 143.
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saints); reductionism for scholars who should obtain knowledge for themselves or verify
all testimonial knowledge they receive; and conceivably IVT for saints who verify received
knowledge through an inner assurance via a religious experience. The common
denominator for all three is trust and the necessity of the virtues. Ghazālī’s theory of
testimony is thus best captured by Virtue Epistemology to account for his strictest vetting
of original speakers and looser acceptance of testimony from confirmed trustworthy
speakers. Tawātur becomes less VE since it turns to reductionism to avoid circularity when
paired with an ethical divine command theory. However, tawātur ultimately draws on the
trustworthiness of a multitude of speakers, meaning listeners must develop their own
epistemic and moral virtues in order to acquire testimony by relying on trust.
4.4.1 Is al-Ghazālī an anti-reductionist?
Al-Ghazālī is clearly very critical of the anti-reductionist position that one may assent to a
proposition without verification, yet al-Ghazālī also: makes anti-reductionistic allowances
for the ʿavāmm; claims that some forms of testimony qualify as sources of knowledge; and
holds a potential testimonial faculty. These seem to be a product of al-Ghazālī's
developmentalist epistemology which assumes everyone must begin by blindly relying on
authority. In the early stages, namely before the age of reason, an anti-reductionist
approach is a viable path to knowledge. However, trust can also account for this early stage,
which al-Ghazālī explicitly states. In describing the grounds of belief amongst the Bedouin
who followed Muhammad without seeing miracles or evidence, al-Ghazālī names a
responsible faculty (quwa), the estimative faculty (al-wahm). Relying only on one's wahm
however results in taqlīd, the worst epistemic ground for belief.698 The effects of al-wahm
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Frank describes wahm as what Aristotelian rhetoric appeals to or the contemporary notion of seemings.
"Wahm, however, is fundamental to our apperception and sense of the world in which we live. Its judgements
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are what lead to the bootstrapping problem introduced in chapter 1 and people are called
to forsake, especially scholars.699 Practically speaking, al-Ghazālī must make an allowance
for taqlīd since for the vast majority of people taqlīd can never fully be expunged and true
knowledge never fully obtained. The best practice is a form of risk mitigation through
identifying trustworthy speakers as seen in his attitude toward the Companions who he
claims should be trusted until shown fisq (impious).700 These necessary allowances aside,
al-Ghazālī firmly comes out against anti-reductionist positions found in the Ḥanafīs who
advocated for accepting the report of any Muslim until proven otherwise. As shown in the
discussion on human testimony, he advocates for only believing reports which have been
authenticated.
As we saw with Saadya, al-Ghazālī also lists tawātur as a "source" of knowledge
but only in an equivocal sense to the contemporary notion of a non-reducible genus of
knowledge. First, tawātur accounts for a small percentage of all testimony such that even
if it did qualify as a source of knowledge, it would be the exception that proved the rule.
While al-Ghazālī desires tawātur to be a non-reducible source of knowledge akin to

are founded in the complexly articulated world that experience gives us formed and structured by habit and
language; it is the source of our initial reactions to things, people, and events. It is the foundation of common
sense and so is of signal importance in influencing, if not in determining, what we will accept as plausible or
will reject as absurd." Frank, “Al-Ghazali on Taqlid,” 237.
699
This passage on wahm and taqlīd from Frank effectively captures the bootstrapping problem: "When one
undertakes formal study and inquiry in order to achieve a greater and more rigorously founded knowledge of
things, the capacity of the wahm to impose its unreflected judgements remains, often undiminished. One is
impressed by his masters. His acceptance of them as experts who really know tends to impose a new layer of
taqlīd and one in which wahm, since it is one of the leading powers of the soul, continues to function, albeit
in a kind of higher realm, one in which the objects one deals with are the expressions and terms of the formal
language that appear as bearers of formal concepts. The student’s intellectual habits are formed by what he
reads under the direction of his masters ("bil-kutubi was-sama’") and he comes to see things more or less as
they see them, articulating his understanding according to their conception and language and taking for
granted what they take for granted." Ibid., 238.
700
Al-Mustasfa, 1:164; al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 244-245; (Ḥammād trans., 635). Also Cf.
1:172 where al-Ghazālī claims no criterion or permissibility can be given for what the Messenger has been
obligated to promulgate. al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 256-257; (Ḥammād trans., 600).
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perception, it only produces necessary knowledge within the mind after reflection. Thus,
the epistemic work obtaining certainty is performed neither by the report nor by the fact of
an unknown number of concurring reports, but from a hidden syllogism which deduces
knowledge from these facts about the reports. As such, al-Ghazālī parallels knowledge
from tawātur to knowledge from experience which is the result of inductive inference. In
both cases, the knowledge clearly reduces to a species of observation which nearly fits
Hume's reductionism.
As with Saadya Gaon, this leaves the question of divine testimony which at first
appears to be a source of knowledge with no means of verification. Unlike Saadya who
held the Mu'tazilite view that the scripture was created to preserve tawḥīd, al-Ghazālī
maintains that the Qur'an is uncreated (Muhammad's presumed coinage of the words can
be accounted for via a robust divine determinism).701 Nevertheless, even if the Qur'an came
into being through the Prophet's reports of the beings existing within his psychology, this
would require the appearance of a reflection of a real object to qualify as generation when
such a reflection qualifies more naturally as transmission. For where al-Ghazālī speaks of
Allāh directly inscribing on the heart with the Pen, these analogies are clear allusions to
the transmission of divine knowledge through divine instruments. It remains a category
mistake to render Allāh's creation of the Pen (agent intellect) or Preserved Tablet as the
generation of knowledge in a substrate via testimony. 702 Thinkers in the lands of Islam
clearly maintained that Allāh's very being is the true source of knowledge of which all
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On the uncreated nature of the Qur'an, cf. il-Jam, 137-138. Chapter 3 fasl 2; (Hamid Trans. 102).
This holds true for the Mutazilite view. cf. Altmann, “Saadya’s Theory of Revelation: It’s Origin and
Background,” 150–51.
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other knowledge is a mere reflection such that the Preserved Tablet and the human heart
are metaphorically described as mirrors merely receiving the reflection of this knowledge.
4.4.2 Is al-Ghazālī a reductionist?
A strong case can be made that al-Ghazālī is a reductionist. As Text 4.3.0.2 shows, no truth
can come from reports save through tawātur (which itself depends on inductive inference
reducible to non-testimonial sources). Taqlīd, the default understanding of testimony, is
roundly criticized because people blindly accept reports without performing any personal
verification. In juridical testimony, compulsory assent only comes from seven types of
reports based on their form of verification. The verification of a prophet requires trying and
testing what is reported to see if they correspond with reality or advance one's moral purity.
Al-Ghazālī provides even stronger theoretical verification in the form of syllogisms in alQistas al-Mustaqim (The Just Balance, henceforth al-Qistas). There he claims the Qur’an
can be trusted since it provides proofs which conform to reason. Al-Ghazālī gives the
perfect example arguing how it is logical that Allāh sent the words of Qur’an upon mortal
men:
1. Moses is a man.
2. Moses is one upon whom the Scripture was sent down.
3. Some man has had sent down upon him the Book [the Qur’an]. 703
Al-Ghazālī even claims that "the greater number of the proofs [adilla] from the Qur’ān
follow in this manner" which aid in dispelling doubt and verifying for believers that the
claims are trustworthy.704 Thus, al-Ghazālī says he "gives credence to the veracity of
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All reference to al-Ghazālī's al-Qistas al-Mustaqim are to the Arabic edition by Mahmood Bejou
(Damascus: Damascus International Press, 1993), with page numbers provided in parentheses to the English
translation by D.P. Brewster al-Ghazālī, The Just Balance, ed. D. P Brewster (Lahore: Ashraf, 1978), 32. alGhazālī's al-Qistas al-Mustaqim, 32-33. Chapter 4.; (Brewster trans. 32). Cf. Martin Whittingham, AlGhazālī and the Qur’an: One Book, Many Meanings (London: Routledge, 2011), 92.
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al-Ghazālī's al-Qistas al-Mustaqim, 32-33. Chapter 4.; (Brewster trans. 33).
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Muhammad and of Moses" not on account of their miraculous signs and wonders, but in
the same way as one’s doubts about mathematics are dispelled by their teacher in
arithmetic.705 In all these instances, it can be claimed that one should not accept knowledge
via testimony unless it is "verified" in a way that reduces to sense perception or reason.
Listeners ultimately assess the truthfulness of the Prophet like any other knowledge expert.
Even knowledge transmitted from al-malakūt is accepted via personal experience such that
Treiger likens mystical dhawq to "intellectual vision."706
Verification undeniably plays a major role in al-Ghazālī's theory of testimony, but,
more often than not, what is being verified is not the report itself, but the identity of the
speaker and whether or not they can be trusted: "acting becomes necessary only when the
source is identified so that his condition and trustworthiness can be examined." 707 Arguably
it is this crucial distinction of what is being verified that causes al-Ghazālī to be considered
so radically different than al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes. The seven reports that
compel assent all contain an element of trust: 1) the hidden syllogism of tawātur requires
the premise of a sufficient number of trustworthy reporters such that lying and conspiracy
is impossible; 2) Allāh cannot lie and thus is automatically trustworthy; 3-7) are based on
the trustworthiness of Muhammad who derives his trustworthiness from Allāh (or the
Ummah which derives its trustworthiness from Muhammad). Even the mystical experience
of Allāh, which seems so committed to a personal perceptualizing, is achieved through a
process that begins with repentance and ends with trust to achieve the "final aim and highest
station" which is "love of God."708
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al-Ghazālī's al-Qistas al-Mustaqim, 58-59. Chapter 8.; (Brewster trans. 72-73).
Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 57.
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Al-Mustasfa 1:167; al-Ghazālī al-Mustasfa Min ’Ilm al-Usul, 249-250; (Ḥammād trans., 644).
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4.4.3 al-Ghazālī's Virtue-Theoretic of Testimony
As with most classical and medieval thinkers, al-Ghazālī's thought is built on a theory of
virtue. Space does not permit a full analysis, but Mohamed Ahmed Sherif has argued in
Ghazālī's Theory of Virtue that ethics is the central theme most representative of the
disciplines al-Ghazālī contributed to and virtue "pervades all the important characteristics
of the [ethical] theory."709 Virtue (fadilah) or good character (khuluq), which are used
interchangeably, and are the product of a mean obtained through habituation, learning
(authority), and divine gifting.710 Since the heart is the locus of both material and spiritual
being as reflected in his terminology of heart (qalb and soul/"self" (nafs), spirit (rūḥ), and
intellect ('aql),711 it is unsurprisingly, the four principal virtues (literally "mothers of
character" ummahāt al-akhlāq) are psychologically based in a faculty or passion (hawā):
wisdom (obtained by the trained deliberative faculty, 'aql), temperance (obtained by the
concupiscent faculty), courage (obtained by the irascible faculty), and justice (obtained
though both temperance and courage). 712 Al-Ghazālī's quest to "revive" the Islamic
community to the Science of the Path to the Afterlife consists of both the practical and
theoretical in which each requires the other for its obtainment. Reason is declared the
noblest faculty obtainable by ethics, i.e., polishing the mirror, and yet it is reason (not
jurisprudence) that permits the discovery of what is good and bad. 713 Ethics is classified in
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Sherif, Ghazālī’s Theory of Virtue., 2, 22.
In Iḥyāʾ Book 24, chapter 4, al-Ghazālī likens the virtuous mean to an "ant tossed into the middle of a
circle surrounded by fire" in which the ant will settle on a point in the middle. al-Ghazālī, Abstinence in
Islam: Kasr al Shahwatayn (Curbing the Two Appetites) from Iḥyāʼ ʻulūm al-Dīn (Revivification of the
Sciences of Religion), ed. Caesar E Farah (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1992), 85. Obtaining virtue by
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from Aristotle's. Sherif, Ghazālī’s Theory of Virtue., 29–34.
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Sherif, Ghazālī’s Theory of Virtue., 25.
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Ibid., 39.
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different sections of the Iḥyāʾ as a religious science, a rational science, and a mystical
discipline. This shows, to quote Sherif, al-Ghazālī "purposefully brings all of them together
and blends them in such a way that they complement each other and form a whole, which
is not merely the sum of the parts, but has its own characteristics as an ethical theory." 714
So we see that just as with Saadya, moral and intellectual wisdom are considered
coextensive. What differentiates the khavāṣṣ from the ʿavāmm is not just their intellectual
capacity, but also their moral virtue. Timothy Gianotti explains that in the Iḥyāʾ, "The term
'knowledge' then, is used to mean both the practical and theoretical dimensions of the
Science of the Way of the Afterlife." 715 This mirrors that "intelligence" (one of al-Ghazālī's
renderings of 'aql) is a quality of the heart.716 Since intelligibles are the reflections of real
beings in the heart as a mirror, they are obscured by the "rust and dullness" of vice. Each
person's intelligence is thus directly linked to their virtuous character.
It is the predominant role of trust in al-Ghazālī's theory of testimony which is best
accounted for via a virtue-theoretic framework thus placing it within VE. I have identified
at least five separate terms used in the verification of speakers that are connected to the
current notion of trust (ṣadīq, 'amana, 'adala, yuhasinu, thiqa). Trust is also linked to the
heart, the center of al-Ghazālī's epistemology. Just as 'aql was identified as the
differentiator between humans and animals (cf. Text 4.2.2.2), al-Ghazālī quotes the Qur'an

legal assessments but simply to human intellect. As he explains, it is our intellect that enables us to solve this
problem and to distinguish what has to be distinguished, namely 'true' and 'false' in propositions or beliefs.
Rudolph, “Al-Ghazālī on Philosophy and Jurisprudence,” 80–81.
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Sherif, Ghazālī’s Theory of Virtue., 21–22.
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Gianotti, Al-Ghazālī’s Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul, 119. Also Cf. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in
Islamic Thought, 18.
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Cf. Treiger, Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought, 19 footnote 23. As shown above, al-Ghazālī outlines
five reasons a heart is like a mirror in its inability to reflect truth: Cf. Iḥyāʾ, 890. Book 21, chapter 6; (Skellie
Trans. The Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 48–52).
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to make the same claim of the heart and specifically its "special property and noble quality"
to receive Allāh's trust ('amana): "This refers to his possession of a special characteristic
which distinguishes him from the heavens, the earth, and the mountains, by which he is
enabled to bear the trust ('amana) of Allāh. This trust is experiential knowledge and the
divine unity."717 Al-Ghazālī here is referencing a discussion in Book 35 of the Iḥyāʾ on
mystical virtues (i.e., Nearness to God, Fear of God, and Trust in God) which are developed
in a sequence starting with repentance and ending on trust to achieve the ultimate aim of
Divine Love.718 Sherif provides a succinct summary of Iḥyāʾ book 35 part 1:
Knowledge of divine unity combined with belief in the perfection of the
existing world produces the positive disposition of trust in God or reliance
of the heart on God alone. Once a man is convinced that God is the only
doer, and that He has complete knowledge and power over men together
with absolute mercy and providence, then his heart will inevitably rely on
Him and have complete trust in Him.719
In book 35, part 2 of the Iḥyāʾ' al-Ghazālī further outlines three levels of trust in God: That
of one's trust in their lawyer whom they must assist and feel compelled to check; that of a
child in their mother whom they have complete trust (but safeguards their will); and the
highest is to make oneself Allāh's willing instrument in every regard. 720 This final state is
described in a mix of both the practical and theoretical as a stage of completion: "Such a
one is confirmed in his certainty by the fact that he is a channel for action, willing, knowing,
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Iḥyāʾ, 890. Book 21, chapter 6; (Skellie Trans. The Religious Psychology of Al-Ghazzali, 53–54). Cf.
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refused to bear it, but man bore it".
718
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Sherif, Ghazālī’s Theory of Virtue., 143.
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of the revival of the religious sciences = Ilha’ ’ulum al-din, 61.
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and other attributes, in such a manner that nothing happens by constraint, for any
expectations regarding how things will proceed with him will be made known clearly." 721
In contemporary terms, al-Ghazālī is more reductionist than anti-reductionist, but
like Saadya he is open to knowledge sources beyond natural means via testimony which is
dependent on trust which defies typical reductionist categorization. As I have shown, alGhazālī's theory of testimony is best categorized under VE given the role of verified trust
from being too trusting via taqlīd, to juridical pronouncements based on trust, to divine
revelation as the perfection of trust. Using the assessment established in Chapter 2 from
John Greco's rethinking, al-Ghazālī clearly maintains that testimonial trust reduces to nontestimonial species of knowledge, namely perception and inductive inference, making him
a source reductionist. Transmission however is crucial to obtaining knowledge such that
transmission is made distinct from originating testimony with lessened restrictions if it
occurs within the community of trusted authorities: "First, the transmission (ruwiya) of an
individual is accepted even though his testimony (shahāda) is not acceptable"722 This
clearly does not fit transmission-reductionism's understanding of transmission as back-toback cases of generation but indicates the passing of a report. This makes him a
transmission anti-reductionist which can accommodate the crucial element of trust in alGhazālī's theory of testimony.
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CHAPTER 5: THOMAS AQUINAS'S THEORY OF HUMAN AND DIVINE TESTIMONY
5.1 Introduction
Thomas Aquinas lived from 1225-1274 and had a storied academic career as a Dominican
friar and Catholic priest who was deeply influential through teachings in theology,
philosophy, and scholastic natural law. His thought was shaped by the influx of new texts
and ideas translated from Arabic and Greek into Latin in the 12th and 13th century.723
Thomas was the pupil of Albert the Great who Pasquale Porro calls the "architect" of the
plan to bring the philosophy of Aristotle and his "Arab" commentators to Latin
Christianity.724 Albert's influence is seen in Thomas's incorporation of Aristotelian thought
via two channels: the Islamic rationalist tradition shaped by Aristotelianism and
Neoplatonism and the increasingly available Latin translations of Aristotle's Greek texts. 725
After studying with Albert in Paris, Thomas accompanied Albert to Cologne to start the
Dominican order's stadium generale (its institute of higher learning) where Thomas served
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John Wippel provides a fine summary: "The newly translated sources included practically all of Aristotle's
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as his assistant ordering Albert's notes on Dionysius’s De Divinis Nominibus and on
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as set out in Albert's Super Ethica.726 Shortly thereafter
Thomas received a dispensation and completed his Commentary on the Sentences in Paris
before being appointed Regent Master in theology at the University of Paris in 1256. He
later became the papal theologian in Rome upon the request of Pope Clement IV in 1265,
and then a second appointment to regent master in Paris in 1269. Thomas was thus an
authority who could recognize authorities within the Christian, Greek, and Islamic
traditions. The influx of Arabic and Greek texts and ideas also led to questions regarding
Thomas's authority, with some of Thomas's propositions being included in the expanded
Paris condemnation of 1277 (a complicated event reacting to developments in theology
and philosophy with the reception of Aristotle and his "Arab" commentators). 727 Thomas's
reputation and influence nonetheless survived even to the point of his canonization in 1323.
Despite being an authority writing on authoritative topics, Thomas never discussed
"authority" or "testimony" as central topics. Yet, Thomas's primary aim was essentially
testimonial via the instruction of both beginners and the proficient in sacra doctrina which,
as discussed below, is God's testimony transmitted by human testifiers. The works that
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2004): 51–59.
727

230

provide the clearest depictions of his stance toward testimonial knowledge are: Scriptum
super Sententiarium (his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, henceforth
Scriptum); Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate, (his commentary on Boethius's De
Trinitate, henceforth De trin.); Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Errores
Infidelium more commonly known as the Summa Contra Gentiles (henceforth SCG), and
the Summa Theologiae (henceforth ST). Unlike the testimonial accounts of Saadya Gaon
and al-Ghazālī, modern day assessments of Thomas's testimonial theory have already been
published. The nature of divine testimony in Thomas has received the most attention in the
works of John Lamont (2004), Eleonore Stump (2014), and Richard Cross (2018),
however, Lamont also speaks to human testimony with the most thorough examination
coming from Matthew Siebert (2016).728 Testimony in Thomas is linked to the notion of
fides (faith) which Christophe Grellard has shown is a polysemic Latin term that means
faith, trust, reliability, and fidelity, and can thus play a larger role under social
epistemology as "trust."729 Faith has two primary modes for Thomas: 1) a broad sense of
faith which is believing in the unseen (what is not evident) where knowledge accrues
inferentially from signs;730 and 2) a narrow sense of faith which is believing a speaker on
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divine things, even if they are not seen!... But, you may say, 'Although I am not able to see the good will of
a friendly person towards me, yet I can detect it (indagare) by many indications (indiciis); whereas you, on
the contrary, can furnish (ostendere) no proofs (indiciis) for the things not seen which you wish us to believe.'
Again, it is quite significant that you admit that through certain clear indications (indiciorum) some things,
even some not seen, ought to be believed." Augustine, De fide rerum quae non videntur: a critical text and
translation with introduction and commentary, ed. and trans. Mary Francis McDonald (Newburg, New York:
Catholic University of America, 1950), 89–91. Also Cf. De utilitate credenda sec, 31 in Augustine, Nicene
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account of their character and thereby assenting to the propositions they say. My
contribution to the conversation is twofold: first, I posit that Thomas held a virtue theoretic
account of testimony vs. an evidentialist account since knowledge is both the product of
the listener's virtue and grounded by the speaker's possession of virtue. 731 Since Thomas
maintains that knowledge is acquired through the employment of attuned habits,
testimonial knowledge entails the possession of virtues. 732 Even in the broad sense of faith,
signs include the virtues themselves or point to virtues of the speaker. Furthermore, it is
the virtues of the listener which discern the presence of a speaker's virtues providing the
epistemic ground for assent to tellings. Second, I maintain that despite differing processes
of knowledge transmission, Thomas held one consistent and unified theory of testimony
applicable to both human and divine testimony in the employment of those virtues. Human
testimony requires the operation of common intellectual virtues to determine whether
speakers are a) knowledgeable and b) honest which are both captured by their possession
of the virtue "truthfulness."733 The process is the same for divine testimony since listeners
must employ their virtues to ascertain the identity of the speaker as God which
automatically determines the speaker's possession of truth and honesty. The only

and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. C.L. Cornish, vol. 3, 1 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature
Publishing Co., 1887), https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1306.htm. and King and Ballantyne, “Augustine
on Testimony.”
731
As discussed in chapter 6, Thomas also distinguishes "evidence" from both the evidentness of a cognitive
object or the evidentness of a cognition, i.e., a thing’s being evident or an evident cognition. E.g., The oftencited definition of "self-evidence" is "Self-evident propositions" which "are those which are known as soon
as their terms are known" (evidentiam sciendum, quod propositiones per se notae sunt quae statim notis
terminis cognoscuntur), cf. IV Met. Lect. 5 sec. 595. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961), 278; Thomas Aquinas, In
duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. Raimondo M Spiazzi and M.R. Cathala, 3rd ed.
(Torino: Marietti, 1977), 165.
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The intellect is the power of the soul responsible for understanding. Knowledge in humans is thus caused
by the actualization of a power. Repeated intellectual acts develop a habitus (virtue or vice) by either the
proper or defective actualization of pre-existing potencies. In this way, habits are in the soul via its powers.
Cf. ST I-II.49.1; 50.2
733
Cf. ST II-II.109.1-4
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significant difference is divine testimony requires the divine infusion of a habit (i.e., fides)
to assent to, i.e., believe in, objects of fides.734
Since assent to testimony is grounded on account of who the speaker is, it is
necessary to review multiple aspects of Thomas's thought. To begin, I will explore his
conception of authority, especially communal authority within the Christian tradition.
Then, I will highlight aspects of Thomas's theory of knowledge to show how both human
and divine testimony fit within it. After that, I will provide a contemporary assessment of
Thomas's theory of testimony to conclude that the framework established in chapter 2
differentiating reductionist and anti-reductionist forms of knowledge generation and
transmission best captures his virtue-theoretic testimonial conception.
5.2 Thomas and his Milieu
5.2.1 Medieval Christian Communal Authority
Christianity, like its Abrahamic counterparts, understands God to be the ultimate authority
and the source of authority for all subsequent persons or institutions. This is only cemented
by the inclusion of Anselmian perfect being theology. The divine authority established in
God the Father by (what became known as) the Old Testament was claimed by Jesus Christ:
"All exousia (power/authority) in Heaven and on Earth has been given to me." 735 Jesus then
commissioned his Apostles to go and teach, but not before they received God's presence in
the Holy Spirit. The authority of God thus indwells Christians via the Holy Spirit who
worked through them to write and later canonize sacra scriptura, the written word of
734

Thomas uses "fides" for the theological virtue (habit) and its object. Cf. ST II-II.1.1-2; II-II.2.1-2; B. De
Trin. 3.1
735
Matthew 28:18. Ἐδόθη μοι πᾶσα ἐξουσία ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς. Here ἐξουσία captures the right, ability,
authority, and absolute power to execute one's will and translated into the Latin Vulgate as: potestas. Kurt
Aland, Barbara Aland, and et al, The Greek New Testament (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft., 1994),
116.
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God.736 The work of the Holy Spirit cannot be understated as the Spirit is responsible for
"governing" the universal church and thereby preventing it from error. 737 The direct
involvement of the Holy Spirit, whose name stems from the Hebrew ruach and Greek
pneuma for "spirit" or "breath", caused sacra scriptura to be "God breathed" and thus the
very words of God.738 The Apostles also were the leaders and founders of religious home
ekklesia (gatherings/assemblies) that collectively would become the catholic, i.e.,
universal, church. However, the Apostles only had a spiritual authority, not a political one,
as evidenced by their martyrdom by various political states. 739 Spiritual authority naturally
became epistemic authority which led to forms of political authority. The Apostle Peter is
traditionally recognized as the first among the Apostles and the one upon whom Christ said
he would build his church.740 In the Roman Catholic tradition, Peter is therefore seen as
the first "pope", i.e. Christ's representative on Earth, a position endowed with authoritative,
if not divine, proclamation.741 The choice of Peter as the highest authority in the Church is
variously interpreted but frequently seen as his being an exemplar for future church
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The same process applies to St. Paul who was authorized by the Damascene Christophany and verified by
the Apostles later and arguably for later saints on books whose authorship is and has been a contested
issue since Origin (d.254CE) who said regarding the epistle 'To the Hebrews'", "But who wrote the epistle,
in truth, God knows." Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 6.25.14. Cf. Eusebius, Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Arther Cushman McGiffert, vol. 1, 2 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature
Publishing Co., 1890), http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/250106.htm.
737
Cf. ST II-II.1.9 sed contra; Nicolas Healy states that, "Were the church to fall into such [grievous] error,
it would no longer be under his [God's] authority and we would no longer have a church. The gospel promises
would have been broken, which is something we cannot believe without abandoning our faith. So although
the churches are all liable to confusion and error, and although they all at times obstruct the working of the
Holy Spirit, the Spirit is more powerful than their sin and stupidity, so each teaches well enough and truly
enough that their members can acquire saving knowledge of God." Nicholas M. Healy, “‘By the Working of
the Holy Spirit’: The Crisis of Authority in the Christian Churches,” Anglican Theological Review. 88, no. 1
(2006): 20.
738
Cf. 1 Timothy 3:16
739
As asserted by tradition. For a focused treatment cf. Sean McDowell, Fate of the Apostles: Examining the
Martyrdom Accounts of the Closest Followers of Jesus. (New York: Routledge, 2016).
740
Cf. Matthew 16:18. Christ gives Simon the name Aramaic Cephas (Petros in Greek), the same word for
rock.
741
The earliest recording of the title pope (meaning 'father') is Pope Heraclas of Alexandria (232–248), cf.
Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 7.7.4.
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authorities due to his moral character which, most importantly, is predicated on the
forgiveness he receives from Christ.742 In this way, bishops are called to be model teachers
providing wisdom and moral examples to follow.743 As the position of pope was passed
down in an unbroken chain of Apostolic succession and the community of spiritual leaders
based on Peter's model increased, authority both grew and grew more formalized. 744 The
most enduring instance of communal epistemic authority is in the multi-century delineation
of which works constituted sacra scriptura, the combination of both the Jewish Written
Law and the Christian gospels and epistles. 745 The first recorded instance of a Christian
leader establishing a clear canon of acceptable works is Marcion of Sinope (c. 140) (before
being denounced a heretic and excommunicated in 144). Subsequent lists in the Muratorian
fragments or from Origin of Alexandra (3rd Century) reveal that despite debate there was
an accepted common core set of texts. 746 The debate officially ended via a series of Church
councils attended by St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430). 747 Canonicity of scriptures, per St.

742

Matthew Levering's analysis of Peter's paragon status includes his self-lessness (willing to die), a character
trait he did not exhibit until humbled and reinstated enabling him to lead by example per John 21. Bishops
should thus only be installed if they love Christ and not themselves all while being cognizant of the fact that
leadership and authority will be given to sinners (albeit repentant ones). For even Peter is forgiven for "the
most heinous sin of directly denying Christ at the time of Christ's most urgent need." Matthew Levering,
“Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas,” The Thomist: A Speculative
Quarterly Review 69, no. 3 (2005): 460–62.
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The authority given to Peter is both theoretical (epistemic) and practical (moral) empowering him to
"feed/tend my sheep" aligning with humankind's three needs of: wisdom; moral exemplars to inspire charity;
and bodily. Ibid., 462.
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The infallibility of the pope was recognized as dogma in 1870 but only when the pope speaks ex cathedra
(literally "from the chair") of Saint Peter on matters of faith or morality.
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Jesus' Apostles knew and utilized the Septuagint (LXX), a Greek translation of the Torah from the mid3rd Century CE. The earliest existent Christian list of Old Testament books is from circa 170CE by Melito,
bishop of Sardis. Cf. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 4.26.14. Debates continue on which books qualify as
canonical vs. apocryphal in addition to the process of canonization itself, cf. Colby Dickinson, “Canons and
Canonicity: Late Modern Reflections on Cultural and Religious Canonical Texts,” Annali Di Storia
Dell’Esegesi 30, no. 2 (July 2013): 369–92; Timothy H. Lim, When Texts Are Canonized (Providence: Brown
Judaic Studies, 2017).
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The earliest known list of the accepted canon is in the 39th Paschal Letter of Athanasius dates to 367CE.
747
These are the Council of Hippo (393CE), the Council of Carthage (397CE), and again the Council of
Carthage (419BCE)
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Augustine, should emerge from a communal consensus (or at least a virtual consensus) of
churches and credence in any disagreements should be equally given to greater number and
greater authority.748
This leads to the complex relationship of sacra doctrina and sacra scriptura which
are often used interchangeably but are not synonymous. 749 Both refer to revelatory teaching
or instruction where sacra scriptura refers to instruction via the recorded words of God (in
conjunction with and through human authors) and sacra doctrina refers to instruction via
the words of human saints and scholars. 750 Since the Christian communal authorities
ultimately decided what qualifies as sacra scriptura, sacra doctrina is the more
encompassing entity which Wilhelmus Valkenberg clarifies in saying "Holy Scripture as
the testimony of God's revelation is both the first and normative expression of sacra
doctrina and its lasting contents."751 As more encompassing, sacra doctrina also includes
scientific reasoning which Thomas will go on in a novel way to argue qualifies it as an
Aristotelian scientia (science). The authority of sacra doctrina comes from the belief in
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"Now, in regard to the canonical Scriptures, he must follow the judgment of the greater number of Catholic
churches; and among these, of course, a high place must be given to such as have been thought worthy to be
the seat of an apostle and to receive epistles. Accordingly, among the canonical Scriptures he will judge
according to the following standard: to prefer those that are received by all the Catholic churches to those
which some do not receive. Among those, again, which are not received by all, he will prefer such as have
the sanction of the greater number and those of greater authority, to such as are held by the smaller number
and those of less authority. If, however, he shall find that some books are held by the greater number of
churches, and others by the churches of greater authority (though this is not a very likely thing to happen), I
think that in such a case the authority on the two sides is to be looked upon as equal." On Christian Doctrines
2.12, Augustine, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Shaw James, vol. 2, 1 (Buffalo,
NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/12022.htm.
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Nor does the common distinction of "theology" and "scripture" readily map onto the Medieval
understanding. Theologia (from the Greek), for example, ranged in meaning from discourse or teaching on
any god(s) to the Christian God or Bible and later is generally accepted as an academic science, cf. Mariken
Teeuwen, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), 379–81.
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Wilhelmus Valkenberg offers the translation "the instruction of faith" or "holy teaching" for sacra
doctrina. Wilhelmus G. B. M Valkenberg, Words of the Living God: Place and Function of Holy Scripture
in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 9.
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Ibid., 10.
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the Holy Spirit's guidance of the Church and her leaders looking to the "articles of faith"
to appoint authorities who, per Levering, "…have heard Christ's teaching and who embody
divine doctrina in a set of practices that flow from Scripture and enable believers to
interpret Scripture."752
While Christianity does not have an "oral tradition" in the same way that Judaism
has the Talmud and Mishna or that Islam has the Sunna and ḥadīth, Christianity does have
what R. Francis Martin calls "a theory of faith-communication" correlated with sacra
doctrina in that it transmits unassailable teachings found implicitly but not explicitly in
sacra scriptura (i.e. the Trinity, Incarnation, or the Church).753 This faith-communication
is authoritative only insofar as it transmits from the community leaders such that they
literally come to be distinguished as auctoritates (authorities) alongside human reasoning
(rationes).754 Auctor and auctoritas had "strong connotations of 'veracity' and 'sagacity'"
and thus worthy of study and imitation.755 Taken from Roman law, auctoritates first
applied to individuals, which Valkenberg defines as "the quality by virtue of which
someone who assigns his rights is creditworthy or trustworthy", and then to authenticated
documents (i.e. not corrupt or erroneously attributed), which were collected and

752

Levering, “Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority,” 458.
R. Francis Martin, “Sacra Doctrina and the Authority of Its Sacra Scriptura: According to St. Thomas
Aquinas,” Pro Ecclesia 10, no. 1 (February 1, 2001): 84.
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"Auctoritas derives from auctor (cause, initiator, sponsor, promoter, surety) which derives from the verb
augere (to increase [active and passive], to enrich). Auctoritas first designated a surety in a transaction,
responsibility for a child, or the weight of an opinion. The root aug, thus implies a certain initiative, a
causality or ability to effect something, be this an objective reality, legal responsibility, knowledge, or even
confidence." Naturally, God is the first and ultimate auctor. Ibid., 94–95.
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Teeuwen, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle Ages, 222–23. Also cf. "Auctoritas" (par C.
Du Cange, 1678), dans Du Cange, et al., Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis, éd. augm.,
Niort : L. Favre, 1883-1887, t. 1, col. 467b. http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/AUCTORITAS1; "Auctoritas"
Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Thesaurus linguae Latinae. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co,
2021), https://publikationen.badw.de/en/thesaurus/lemmata#14390.
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systematized by the Medieval period. 756 The sayings of real auctoritates possess more
authority than the sayings of contemporary scholars (dicta magistralia) who came to be
known as the Magisterium (or "teaching authority")—the community authorized to
interpret and thus teach sacra doctrina. Theological schools (11th century) thereby gave
the title of Magister (Master) to its teachers.757 Nevertheless, the magisterium felt liberated
to identify and correct erroneous thought of earlier thinkers to better conform with the
higher authority of sacra scriptura.758 So while magister and magisterium were originally
applied more broadly to differing areas of responsibility and competence (e.g. pastoral
ministry), by the time of the 12th and 13th Century Mahoney explains they had a specific
meaning:
It was with the rise, however, of the Universities—which Pantin describes
as 'a new organ in the Church'—to become literally international bodies in
their staffing, students, interests, and prestige, that the great medieval
theologians, Albert, Thomas, Bonaventure, Scotus, and many others, were
able to influence their contemporaries not only on account of the inherent
brilliance of their teaching but also because of their status in the Church as
Magister and because of the coveted University chairs in theology which
they occupied.759
The Universities (and their doctors and faculties), thus came to exert authority within the
Church on account of their "public recognition" regarding pronouncements on public
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"Instead of scattered fragments of classical and Patristic texts in compendia and florilegia, scholars in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries began to write systematic treatises, collecting these auctoritates in a systematic
manner and explaining them. These authoritative texts formed the foundations for the medieval process of
learning: all medieval artes were based on a canon of auctoritates. The meaning of auctoritates thus became
specialized: in theology, only the right words in the appropriate context by authors approved by the Church
have a valid authority." Valkenberg, Words of the Living God, 12.
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The term magister broadly means "one who leads or teaches" while magisterium came to mean "doctrinal
authority and the content of Church doctrine." Teeuwen, The Vocabulary of Intellectual Life in the Middle
Ages, 95–99.
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Healy, “By the Working of the Holy Spirit,” 18.
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John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), 117.
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controversies, which was sometimes at odds with the pope, served the pope, or required
the pope to arbitrate.760
While the auctoritas of sacra scriptura, and by extension sacra doctrina, focused
on matters of faith and salvation (and necessarily since such matters transcend human
reason), the teachings of the magisterium affected secular concepts including that of civil
authority. The "conventional" view of civil authority, stemming from St. Augustine and
the theological problem of evil, aims to answer "how is it that God would subject one man
to another, and worse yet, how is it that tyrants are allowed to thrive?" 761 Malloy writes
that, "The answer of the conventionalist view [i.e. Augustinian] is that civil authority is
imposed on man, not as a natural condition (for subjection and tyranny are unnatural), but
as a punishment and a test in his fallen state."762 This is because coercive authority can only
be legitimized by human's free and thus fallen nature. This traditional and patristic view
which saw the pope has having "primacy over the temporal lord" and "temporal power as
a tool for the punishment of the wicked", was challenged by the rediscovery of the
Aristotelian view that humans were a "political animal" and thus civil authority was
"natural."763 Thus, civil society is a natural and positive feature when it governs for the
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Ibid., 118.
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sake of common well-being, but raises new challenges regarding political obligation, the
limits of obedience, and the nature of political authority itself. 764
Albert and Thomas accepted both that sacra doctrina is based on arguments from
authority, and that arguments from divine authority (i.e., revelation) are the strongest. 765
They were also at the center of promoting Aristotelian philosophy which created tension
with the Parisian Masters. Beyond civil authority, the "new" Aristotelian concept of human
nature had other profound effects on Thomas's theology including the relationship of divine
to human authority. An example relevant to divine testimony is his explanation of how
divine grace is dispensed in the sacraments using Aristotelian concepts of causation and
motion including instrumental causality. The question centers on the proper interpretation
of Augustine’s commentary on St. John’s Gospel 14:12, "And he shall do greater things
than these", as to whether creation (of righteous beings) or justification (of ungodly beings)
is the greater work (Augustine claims the latter). 766 The Magisterium largely interpreted
Augustine to mean that what applies to creation likewise applies to justification. Thus, recreating (justifying the ungodly) is a greater act than creating (creating the righteous). Since
humans cannot create, they also cannot be the cause of the greater action of justification

764

Even secular political authority was understood to derive its authority ultimately from God, such that
obedience to temporal authority was obedience to God (with exceptions). Cf. Malloy, Civil Authority in
Medieval Philosophy Lombard, Aquinas and Bonaventure, 20; Jean Porter, “Natural Equality: Freedom,
Authority and Obedience,” in The Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics, 2001., ed. Society of Christian
Ethics (U.S.), John Kelsay, and Sumner B Twiss (Collegeville, MN; Washington, D.C.: The Society ;
Distributor, Georgetown University Press, 2001), 275–99; Fáinche Ryan, “Auctoritas in the Theology of St
Thomas Aquinas,” New Blackfriars 88, no. 1016 (2007): 443–56.
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"…we ought to believe on the authority (auctoritate) of those to whom the revelation has been
made…although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from
authority based on divine revelation is the strongest (efficacissimus)" ST I.1.8.ad2, Aquinas, Summa
theologiae. Prima pars, 1-49, 12.Also Cf. ST II-II.104-105 regarding obedience.
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trans. John Gibb, vol. 7, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 1 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing
Co., 1888).
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through the sacraments.767 Since the power to confer grace is proper to God alone, no other
agent could be the cause of grace. Peter Lombard, in contrast, concluded from Augustine
that it was philosophically possible for the apostles to participate in justification as
"ministers" of God’s grace while carefully noting the power remained in God. 768 Lombard
was right to be cautious since his distinction that God communicated the power to forgive
sins to humans appears as the final thesis on St. Bonaventure's list of eight opinions the
Parisian masters rejected.769 Thomas follows Lombard arguing that Augustine indicated
instruments borrow powers not proper to themselves. 770 Thomas does not even use
Augustine’s language of "authoritative" or "ministerial." He adopts Aristotle's language
e.g. "For the principal agent is the first mover, but an instrumental agent is a moved
mover."771 As we shall see for divine testimony, such motion parallels Aristotle’s famous
discussion of the hand which moves the stick which moves the stone. 772 The source of all
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For the Parisian masters, power belonged to or inhered in a substance absolutely: substances possess
certain powers by nature of what they are such that finite causes can play no role in infinite effects.
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Edward Synan, “Brother Thomas, the Master, and the Masters,” in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974:
Commemorative Studies, ed. Armaud Maurer and Etienne Gilson, vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 227-240.
770
Likely from Augustine’s Super Joannem Tractatus 5 where an "authoritative" power is said to work
through a "ministerial" power in baptism, such that the power to remove sins originates in its true possessor,
the author, but the power can temporarily be found in a human during the sacrament, the minister. Pearson,
“Creation Through Instruments in Thomas’ Sentence Commentary,” 149. Augustine distinguishes between
authoritative and ministerial power to explain how grace is transmitted through baptism. For a contemporary
account cf. Mauro Turrini et al., “L’anthropologie sacramentelle de S. Thomas d’Aquin dans Summa
theologiae 3A QQ. 60-65” (s.l., Université Paris-Sorbonne, 1996).
771
Scriptum IV.1.1.4.q1a.corp,4.32. - Agens enim principale est primum movens, agens autem instrumentale
est movens motum. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences: Book IV, Distinctions 1-13, trans. Beth
Mortensen (Green Bay, Wis.: Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2017), 30–31. Thomas’s
language identifying a principal agent as a prime mover and an instrumental agent as a moved mover also
clearly parallels the larger framework Thomas adopted from propositions 56, 57, and 70 of Proclus’s
Elements of Theology through the Liber de causis (LDC), which was crucial in the development of medieval
philosophy and theology. Cf. Cristina D’Ancona and Richard Taylor, “Le Liber de causis,” in Dictionnaire
des philosophes antiques., ed. Richard Goulet, Jean-Marie Flamand, and Maroun Aouad (Paris: CNRS
Éditions, 2018), 599–647.
772
Cf. Aristotle's Book VIII of the Physics (255b32-256b2)

241

authority remains in God, but humans (not inherently depraved creatures requiring
correction and control, but social ones naturally disposed to the common good) can be
vessels of that authority. This example shows several aspects of Thomas's relation to
authority. First, he held God and the church's authority as absolute, but, following Albert,
he also accepted Aristotle and his Islamic commentators as authoritative in interpreting
reality. Second, he uses Aristotelianism to defend traditional conceptions of divine and
patristic authority and power, but in a redefined way. This leads to the third observation:
Thomas subtly challenged the authorities of his day which, as certain condemnations
reveal, did not go unnoticed and ultimately elevated Thomas's own role as an authority. 773
5.2.2 Thomas's Account of Knowledge
Thomas's epistemology has been shown to be a departure from traditional Augustinian
illumination theory and deeply connected to his teacher Albert who was deeply influenced
by the rediscovery of Aristotelian ideas through the philosophers in the lands of Islam.
Knowledge, or more precisely obtaining truth by cognitio (understanding the form of an
object per se), is the product of mental activity, namely the actualization of a power in the
human soul. Thomas's account of personal psychology and the role of the intellect as a
power of the soul is thus central to his epistemology. Unlike the traditional view which
maintained plural forms within the soul, for Aquinas the soul was one substantial form of
the body which had many powers. This follows Albert's new epistemological teaching that
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the active agent intellect and the potential material intellect are powers and thus within the
human soul as outlined in his de homine.774
Thomas adopts Albert's notion that knowledge occurs in the soul via knowing
powers in accord with the Platonic principle "whatever is received into something is
received according to the condition of the receiver."775 Thus, he establishes three possible
levels of knowing for corporeal beings, incorporeal beings, and humans who occupy a
"middle position," that is not by an act of an organ, but by a power of the soul, namely the
rational intellect and its activity of "abstraction."776 The agent intellect has two operations:
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Albert believed he was introducing the Latin West to the thought of Averroes in contradistinction to
Avicenna for whom the agent intellect was a separate substance that did not reside in the human soul. Instead,
Albert's teaching, what R. A. Gauthier calls "First Averroism", was completely new since it was a mistaken
understanding of Averroes's view. In a twist of fate, Averroes's true views on the intellect as a separate
substance, "Second Averroism", was thought be a later Latin misreading. "Second Averroism" maintained
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intelligible intellect in act) are ontologically separate substances supervening in physical reality and come to
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explanation, following Gomez Nogales, wrongly portrays "Second Averroism" as a later Christian
misreading. Cf. Salvador Gómez Nogales, "Problemas alrededor del Compendio sobre el alma de Averroes,"
al-Andalus 32 (1967); Gomez Nogales, "Saint Thomas, Averroès et l’Averroïsme," in Aquinas and Problems
of His Time, ed. Gérard Verbeke and D. Verhelst (Louvain, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1976), 161–
77; R. A Gauthier, "Notes Sur Les Débuts (1225-1240) Du Premier ‘Averroïsme,’" Revue des Sciences
philosophiques et théologiques 66, no. 3 (1982): 321–74; Richard C. Taylor, "Remarks on the Importance of
Albert the Great’s Analyses and Use of the Thought of Avicenna and Averroes in the De Homine for the
Development of the Early Natural Epistemology of Thomas Aquinas," in Die Seele Im Mittelalter : Von Der
Substanz Zum Funktionalen System, ed. Günther Mensching and Alia Mensching-Estrakhr, vol. 16,
Contradictio: Studien Zur Philosophie Und Ihrer Geschichte (Würzburg: Königshausen et Neumann, 2018),
131–58; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Rushd, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, ed. Richard C.
Taylor and Thérèse-Anne Druart (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), xcvi–cvi.
775
quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur Cf. ST I.75.5. Wayne Hankey notes that this is a Platonic
rule which Thomas finds in both Dionysius and the Liber de causis, two works Thomas was introduced to
by Albert. Wayne J. Hankey, “Aquinas and the Platonists,” in The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A
Doxographic Approach, ed. Stephen Gersh and Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002),
321. Hankey further notes Albert's boldness to contradict Augustine's conception of knowledge in the soul
(e.g. Albert's Super Mysticam, 2, 466, lines 52–58) is grounded in Dionysius. Wayne J. Hankey, “Dionysius
in Albertus Magnus and His Student Thomas Aquinas,” in The Oxford Handbook to Dionysius the
Areopagite, ed. Mark Edwards, Pallis Dimitrios, and George Steiris, (Forthcoming).
776
1) corporeal beings (e.g., animals) know through the act of a corporeal organ, i.e. sensation, such that the
object of knowing is "the form as it exists in corporeal matter"; 2) incorporeal beings (e.g., angels and God)
know through the act of an "angelic intellect" (completely disassociated from corporeal matter), such that,
the object of knowing is "a form subsisting apart from matter"; and 3) human beings occupy a "middle
position." Cf. ST I.85.1; and ST.I.14.1
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intellectus is the first operation which includes the act of abstraction; scientia is the second
operation which contains two acts for a total of three activities the agent intellect is
responsible.777 This first operation of abstraction is also referred to as apprehension since
it determines what a thing is, i.e. its quiddity. Abstraction is the epistemic process carried
out by the human agent intellect, a power of the soul, responsible for deriving universals
from particulars which Thomas held was in Aristotle.778 The process of abstraction is
complex, but divine testimony is explained as various effects resulting from instrumental
causality in the listener's psychology for which I follow Therese Cory's account of
Thomas's need theory of abstraction.779 This follows Thomas's adoption of Aristotle's
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Cf. Expositio Libri Peri Hermeneias I.1 (henceforth Peri Hermeneias). Thomas's terminology lends itself
to confusion. Intellectus should not be confused with the Intellect just as scientia should not be confused with
the term's usage for a science or the epistemic attitude toward an object of knowledge.
778
Aristotle does not have a clearly expressed doctrine of abstraction. In De Anima 3.8 he states the
intelligibles are in the sensibles, but Aristotle does not give an account as to how these intelligibles are known
and he does not use the language of intellectual abstraction. Richard Taylor shows that the "doctrine of
intellectual abstraction for the formation of intelligibles in act by the human rational soul or intellect was first
unambiguously set forth by Alexander of Aphrodisias (second century C.E.). His work was important for
Porphyry and influential in both the Latin and Arabic philosophical traditions." Cf. Richard C. Taylor, “The
Epistemology of Abstraction,” in The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, ed. Richard C. Taylor
and Luis Xavier López Farjeat, 2017, 273. Thomas's account of the soul and intellect in Sentences book 2, d.
17, q.2, a.1 closely follows Albert's de homine.
779
Per Cory, Thomas needed abstraction "in order to reconcile five core principles of his philosophical
psychology: (1) All our knowledge originates from sensation. (2) In order for a cognitive power (sense,
imagination, or intellect) to cognize some object, it must be assimilated to that object. That is to say, the
cognitive power must acquire a form that is a likeness or representation of the object, making the power be
"like" that object. (3) In order to inhere in a cognitive power, a form must have the same mode of existing as
the cognitive power (i.e., material or immaterial). (4) The senses and imagination are material cognitive
powers. (5) The human intellect is an immaterial cognitive power." The process starts with sensibles brought
in via the senses which are bundled by the common sense and organized into a phantasm (form in the
imagination that is the likeness of the individual object perceived). This comes from the non-intellectual
cognitive sources of knowledge or material processes prior to abstraction (which require exterior and interior
"senses" or powers through a complex psychology connected to the soul). As a cautious realist, Thomas
understands existing objects as emitting sensibles which are received by an animal's exterior senses and then
processed via an interior sense, namely the "common sense" (following Avicenna), to distinguish the
information. Since animals clearly exhibit cognition beyond immediate sense perception, Thomas also
accepts animals have an imagination or phantasy which humans likewise possess but more developed
allowing for the cognitive process of "composition and division." Cf. De Veritate I.3 & Peri Hermeneias I.3.
Since animals also exhibit instinctual behaviors requiring cognition (e.g., recognizing certain animals as
predators or certain items as useful in building nests), animals are said to possess an estimative power (or
cogitative power in humans) that enables them to identify particulars as objects of thought (whether things
or phenomena). An additional memorative power is attributed to animals' ability to retain cognitions produced
by the estimative power, which is the reminiscitive power in humans. To convert the "material" phantasm,
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notion that human beings start life as a tabula rasa (De Anima II.12) such that all
knowledge starts with sensation and is completed in the intellect (De Anima III.4-5).780
This result of abstraction is an intelligible species in the intellect such that the agent is said
to know the essence of the perceived object which does not have a true or false value (where
truth is conformity of the mental reality to ontological reality). The intellect also grasps
intellectu (what MacDonald calls "immediate propositions") in two ways: 1) from the real
ontological relations of things known via abstraction or 2) as self-evident first principles
because they are necessarily and universally true." 781 The human intellect is also portrayed
as grasping self-evident truths through participation in divine light (i.e. divine knowledge)

the "likeness" of the perceived object, in the imagination into an immaterial in the intellect requires the agent
intellect or "intellectual light." The agent intellect actively causes the intelligible species to actualize in the
potential intellect as an immaterial form, essence, or quiddity of the perceived object. Cory argues
persuasively using Avicenna and Averroes that Thomas's abstraction is not isolating an essential core via
subtraction, but "adds" or "actualizes" the form in another mode of existing: "Aquinas explicitly presents the
mechanism of abstraction as an adding or actualizing, per APM [the Active Principle Model]: intellectual
light is a form or act, and abstraction is the communication of that actuality to other things." She continues:
"per APM3, intellectual light does not transform the phantasm itself into an intelligible. Rather, it uses the
phantasm "Marengo" to generate a new intelligible form—the intelligible species "horse"—in the intellect.
In other words, the agent intellect lends to the phantasm the causal power for producing something
intelligible, without giving the phantasm itself the form of intelligibility that would normally be the basis for
that causal power." Therese Scarpelli Cory, “Rethinking Abstractionism: Aquinas’s Intellectual Light and
Some Arabic Sources,” Journal of the History of Philosophy Journal of the History of Philosophy 53, no. 4
(2015): 609–10, 619–22.
780
Cf. Questiones disputatae de veritate I.11 & I.2.ad1. In discussing the concept of intentions (i.e.,
identifying a perceptible as a particular person or object, e.g., this I perceive as a human and this human is
my friend), Francisco Romero distinguishes the "intuitionist" vs. "abstractionist" theories of Avicenna and
Averroes. Avicenna's intuitionist account holds that intensions are intuited by the interior senses (without
sense data or abstraction). Averroes abstractionist account holds that intentions are received with sense data
and abstracted by the interior senses. Cf. Francisco J. Romero-Carrasquillo, “An Abstractionist Correction
of Avicenna’s Theory of Intentionality in the Early Averroes,” Acta Philosophica 20 (January 1, 2011): 405–
20. According to Romero, both Thomas and Albert drew on Avicenna and Averroes with Thomas developing
a position similar to the former in contrast to Albert who interweaves both accounts. Cf. Francisco J. RomeroCarrasquillo, “The Reception of Averroes’s Abstractionist Theory of Intentionality in the Latin West
(Aquinas
and
the
Arabs,
Mexico
City,
2011),”
accessed
December
8,
2020,
https://www.academia.edu/4444839/The_Reception_of_Averroes_s_Abstractionist_Theory_of_Intentionali
ty_in_the_Latin_West_Aquinas_and_the_Arabs_Mexico_City_2011_.
781
Regarding the first: a predicate belongs to a subject because it belongs to the ratio, definition, of a given
quiddity). As for the second, a proposition is "cognized (cognita) or known (nota) by virtue of themselves
(per se) e.g. a proposition is "cognized (cognita) or known (nota) by virtue of themselves (per se)." Scott
MacDonald, “Theory of Knowledge,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann
and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 171. Cf. PA I.19.2; ST I.79.8; QDV
I.12 & 15.1; ST I.17.3.ad 2

245

or a sort of divine illumination through the light of the agent intellect. 782 The second
operation contains two additional knowledge producing acts where true or false values do
apply. The first is judgements (the intellect composing and dividing) where quiddities are
compared or applied to one another. 783 The second is discursive reasoning (raciocination)
using demonstration, namely moving from known judgments to new judgements and thus
new knowledge or the verification of knowledge. The three activities of the intellect
introduce varying degrees of knowing or cognitive states: doubt, suspicion, opinio, fides,
and scientia.
From these two operations emerges the categories of "acquired" discursive and
"necessary" nondiscursive knowledge.784 Like Saadya Gaon and al-Ghazālī, Thomas
desires for some acquired cognitions to also be necessary by two means: 1) the product of
a syllogism and 2) from divine testimony. Despite being discursive, syllogistic reasoning
is in accord with the second operation which produces scientia—a complete and certain
cognition regarding the truth of a proposition.785 Thomas identifies up to three types of
scientia by demonstration type.786 So while scientia results from the conclusion of a
demonstration, it ultimately requires premises whose epistemic ground comes from the first
operation of the intellect, which is nondiscursive.787 Thomas also states that discursive
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ST I.84.5; De trin. 1.1; SCG II.53; QDV 10.6, 11.1. Cf. Robert Pasnau, “Divine Illumination,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2020 (Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/illumination/.
783
Cf. Peri Hermeneias, Proeemium, n. 1, and ST I.85.5).
784
Curiously, just as Arabic 'ilm can mean both science and to know certainly, so too does Latin scientia.
785
From scire, to have reliable knowledge. Cf. PA I.4.5 and MacDonald, “Theory of Knowledge,” 2006,
163–80.
786
According to MacDonald, the lowest form Thomas speaks of is "probabilistic scientia" which regards the
material and natural world that obtain "for-the-most-part" to include generalizations and tendencies and thus
is, oddly for scientia, not immune from error. Ibid., 176–77. Cf. PA II.12.5.
787
Demonstration quia infers the cause from the effect (given human limitations) generating the scientia of
natural science and theology. Cf. PA I.4.14, 16 & I.7.8. Demonstration propter quid establishes the effect
from the cause on the basis of non-inferential premises. MacDonald provides a quick summary, first for the
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divine testimony permits perfect knowledge by believing God (credere deo).788
Testimony, however, even divine testimony, only produces the cognitive states of fides and
opinio. Despite not achieving scientia, fides and opinio provide convincing but contingent
epistemic grounds since they do not ensure the truth of the proposition. Thomas's prologue
to his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics reads:
Text 5.2.2.1
…in that process of reason which is not accompanied by every sort of
certitude certain levels are found accordingly as one approaches more or
less to perfect certitude. For although science (scientia) is not obtained by
this process of reason, nevertheless fides or opinio is sometimes achieved
(on account of the provability of the propositions one starts with), because
reason (ratio) leans completely to one side of a contradiction but with fear
concerning the other side.789
Opinio occurs when the intellect decides between two contradictory propositions but fear
of the opposite being true remains. The fear may even be so miniscule to achieve "probable

former: "Propositions about particular sensible objects, then, are sometimes better known to us even though
by nature or consider in themselves they are not better known. As such, they can constitute immediate
propositions for us and function as epistemic principles grounding what is for us (though not unqualified)
scientia," and then the latter: "To have scientia with respect to some proposition P is to hold P on the basis
of a demonstration the ultimate premises of which are propositions we are non-inferentially justified in
holding. These first principles will be (a) immediate, (b) universal, and (c) necessary, and with respect to the
demonstrative conclusions they entail, they will be (d) epistemically prior, and express facts that are both (e)
metaphysically prior, and (f) explanatory." MacDonald, “Theory of Knowledge,” 2006, 175–76, 173.
788
ST II-II.2.3, "man’s ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man
cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to John 6:45: Every one that hath heard of the Father
and hath learned cometh to Me. Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by
little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in
order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i,
2) that it behooves a learner to believe. Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly
happiness, he must first of all believe God (credat Deo), as a disciple believes the master who is teaching
him." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, trans. Laurence Shapcote OP, vol. 17,
Latin/English Edition of the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Green Bay: The Aquinas Institute, 2017), 27.
789
Expositio libri Posteriorum Analyticorum I.1.6, Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics
of Aristotle, trans. F.R. Larcher, vol. 30, The Collected Works of St. Thomas Aquinas. (Albany: Magi Books,
1970), 2. Tr. Mod. …in processu rationis, qui non est cum omnimoda certitudine, gradus aliquis invenitur,
secundum quod magis et minus ad perfectam certitudinem acceditur. Per huiusmodi enim processum,
quandoque quidem, etsi non fiat scientia, fit tamen fides vel opinio propter probabilitatem propositionum, ex
quibus proceditur: quia ratio totaliter declinat in unam partem contradictionis, licet cum formidine alterius.
Thomas Aquinas, Expositio libri Posteriorum, ed. Ordre des Prêcheurs, altera retractata, Opera Omnia Iussu
Leonis XIII P.M. Edita (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1989), 6. Cf. PA I.44; QDV 15.2, ad 3
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certitude" (e.g., many Christian doctrines qualify as opinio or fides). Opinio results from
inductive inference and dialectical argumentation and is thus neatly categorized as acquired
discursive knowledge. Thomas is clear, however, that fides and opinio are in no way to be
diminished.790 If all knowledge comes through sensation, knowledge of immaterial beings
like the soul, angels, or God, can only be known indirectly and after great effort.
Demonstration propter quid deduces that God exists and with certain attributes (via
apophaticism), but God's essence is beyond the reach of human knowledge in this life. This
leads to the distinction between the "preambles of faith" and the "articles of faith," namely
divine truths which natural reason can attain and those which "wholly surpass the capability
of human reason" and thus only available via divine testimony.791 The preambles of faith,
are readily categorized under acquired knowledge due to their discursive nature, however,
the articles of faith are not readily categorized into immediate knowledge. Knowledge from
testimony, namely fides, straddles both types of knowledge.
Thomas inherits a long and complicated tradition on the notion of fides and the
subsequent debate whether divine faith is acquired or infused. Commenting on the
definition of faith outlined in Hebrews 11:1, " fides is the substance of things hoped for,
the argumentum of things that appear not", Thomas distinguishes between fides in a broad
and a narrow sense. Following Augustine, fides in the broad sense is "assent to the unseen"

790

SCG I.5, 6 "And consequently, although human reason is unable to fully grasp things above reason, it
nevertheless acquires much perfection if at least it hold things, in any way whatever, by faith." Aquinas,
Summa contra gentiles, Books I-II, 11:7–10.
791
Cf. SCG I.3 "Now, in those things which we hold about God there is truth in two ways. For certain things
that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason: for instance, that God is three and
one. But there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance, that God is, that God
is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers, being guided by the light of natural reason, proved
demonstratively about God." Ibid., 11:4–5. Also cf. Ralph McInerny, Praeambula Fidei Thomism and the
God of the Philosophers (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006).
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or that which is not evident and thus open to the assent of faith. 792 This broad fides captures
confident opinio and human testimony, saying "faith in the broad sense, namely, that by
which we are said to believe that about which we have an opinion which we hold
tenaciously, or to believe on the testimony of some man." 793 Thus, if the object is evident
to the mind or to the senses then it would compel the intellect making faith impossible.794
Thomas applies the narrow sense of faith, which is based on an interpersonal believing the
speaker, to God and divine testimony, but does not bar its application to humans. It is
primarily this sense that Thomas has under consideration in his commentary on De
Trinitate where he follows Hugh of St. Victor in stating fides draws on both scientia and
opinio:
Text 5.2.2.2
Fides has something in common with opinion (opinio) and also with science
(scientia) and understanding (intellectus); so Hugh of St. Victor places it
between science (scientia) and opinion (opinione). With science (scientia)
and understanding (intellectu) it has in common unerring (certum) and firm
assent (fixum assensus). In this respect it differs from opinion, which
accepts one of two contraries but fears the other might be correct, and also
from doubt, which hesitates between two contraries. With opinion it shares
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Cf. Scriptum III.17.1.2.lc; ST I-II. 17.6; ST II-II.1,4
QDV 14.2, tr. mod. Thomas Aquinas, The Disputed Questions on Truth: St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Robert
W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn, S.J., and Robert W. Schmidt S.J., vol. 3 (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1953), 217.
794
Thomas says this explicitly in QDV 14.9.: "hence, it is impossible to have faith and scientific knowledge
about the same thing." Ibid., 3:249–50. Also cf. In B. de Trin., 2.1ad5; but he adds that while there can be no
demonstrations for faith propositions there can neither be demonstrations contrary to faith propositions.
Thomas holds that any demonstration contrary to faith is mistaken. Per Lamont: "There are two kinds of
human reasoning. One is demonstrative, compelling the mind's assent. There can be no place in matters of
faith for this kind of reasoning, but there can be in disproving claims that faith is impossible. For although
matters of faith cannot be demonstratively proved, neither can they be demonstratively disproved. If this sort
of reasoning were brought forward to prove what is held on faith, the merit of faith would be destroyed,
because the assent to it would not be voluntary but necessary. But persuasive reasoning, drawn from analogies
to the truths of faith, does not take away the nature of faith because it does not render them evident, for there
is no reduction to first principles intuited by the mind. Neither does it deprive faith of its merit, because it
does not compel the mind's assent but leaves the assent voluntary." For more on this issue cf. Lamont, Divine
Faith, 66; Christophe Grellard, De la certitude volontaire débats nominalistes sur la foi à la fin du Moyen
Âge, Philosophie à l’oeuvre 7 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2014), 40.
793
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the fact that it has to do with matters that are not clear to the mind, in which
respect it differs from science (scientia) and understanding (intellectus)."795
When Thomas says fides is in between opinio and scientia, he means intersects or possess
attributes from each type. With opinio, fides shares that its object of belief is not evident.
Since the object of belief is not evident, the will must move the intellect to assent. With
scientia, the assent of fides shares assuredness (no fear of the opposite being true). This
assuredness entails subjective certainty but not objective certainty since the certainty of
fides provides "firm adherence to a proposition" but not the "evidentness of a
proposition."796 This certainty follows from fides which necessarily is a theological virtue
since the object of faith is God and knowledge of God surpasses the limitations of the
human intellect (the subject of faith). Despite being a theological virtue, faith resides in the
intellect since it is the intellect, moved by the will, which performs the act of assent.
Questions arise since a non-intellectual virtue residing in the intellect provides greater
assurance than scientia and intellectus through fides.797 One solution is that theological
virtues and their object, the good of salvation, are higher than moral and intellectual virtues,
but a question of circularity arises since the good of salvation obtained by fides presupposes
beliefs acquired through fides.798 Thomas's conceivable escape can be found in the
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B. De Trin. 3.1. Translation from Thomas Aquinas, Faith, reason and theology: Questions I-IV of his
Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, trans. Armand A Maurer, vol. 36, The Collected Works of St.
Thomas Aquinas. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), 65. Dicendum, quod fides habet
aliquid commune cum opinione, et aliquid cum scientia et intellectu; ratione cuius ponitur media inter
scientiam et opinionem ab Hugone de S. Victore. Cum scientia siquidem et intellectu commune habet certum
et fixum assensum; in quo ab opinione differt, que accipit alterum contrariorum cum formidine alterius, et a
dubitatione, que fluctuat inter duo contraria. Set cum opinione commune habet quod est de rebus que non
sunt intellectui <ap>parentia; in quo differt a scientia et intellectu. Thomas Aquinas, Supoer Boetium de
Trinitate: Expositio Libri Beotii de Ebdomadibus, ed. Iussu Leonis XIII P.M., Opera Omnia (Roma:
Commissio Leonina, 1992), 107.
796
Lamont, Divine Faith, 60.
797
3 Sent. D.23, q. 1, a.3, sol. 3; ST I-II. 56.3; 62.1-2; & II-II.4.1-2. For an overview cf. Lamont, 57–58.
798
There is also a concern of differing ends, i.e. the intellectual good of obtaining truth vs. the personal good
of eternal life; however, these ends do not appear all too different in Thomas's conception of the beatific
vision. Ibid., 58–61.
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necessary disposing of the intellective appetite to desire and command an act of faith such
that this good disposition can be said to be the habit of faith. 799
The human role is seen in the first of two requirements for fides: "exterior
preaching" and an "interior call from God." 800 This echoes the traditional distinction
between "acquired faith", which is caused by hearing (ex auditu) that is unaided human
effort, and "infused faith", which can only be caused in the soul directly by God. 801 The
traditional view held that acquired faith could not provide salvation but prepared one for
infused faith.802 The distinction lies not in the content of propositions but the epistemic
ground for assent to those propositions. Acquired faith is thus assent to the propositions of
faith transmitted by humans on the epistemic grounds of normal human testimony. 803
Infused faith is assent to the propositions of faith transmitted by humans on the epistemic
grounds of divine testimony. Thomas only refers to infused faith but maintains the above
distinction of what is believed (human transmitted propositions of faith) as the material
object and who is believed (fallible humans or infallible First Truth) as the formal object
of faith.804 The difference is whom is believed. Acquired faith results from believing
humans (credere homini), while infused faith results from believing God (credere deo).

799

Cf. ST II-II.4.2.ad2
Lamont, Divine Faith, 72. God send "truths of faith" in two ways: "immediately by God himself through
internal inspiration" and "mediately on the authority of prelates, who take God's place." Cf. Ad Romano C.10,
L1-2 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans, ed. John Mortensen, trans.
Fabian Richard Larcher (Lander: Aquinas Institute for the Study of Sacred Doctrine, 2012), 286–87.
801
Lamont notes however that "Significantly, unlike previous scholastic theologians, Aquinas does not
postulate the existence of acquired faith as well as infused faith. Infused faith, for him, is the only faith there
is in Christian believers." Lamont, Divine Faith, 68–69.
802
Ibid., 52.
803
Cf. ST I-II.62.2.ad2
804
Lamont, Divine Faith, 61.
800

251

5.3 Testimony in Thomas
Thomas begins the Summa Theologiae saying that in addition to knowledge by
philosophical science through rational investigation it was necessary for human salvation
to receive knowledge beyond all human wisdom by sacra doctrina through revelation.805
This knowledge has the highest principle and cause of the universe—God—as its source.
Due to the doctrine of the trinity, Thomas is comfortable understanding this divine
knowledge as a manifestation of the divine essence, namely Jesus Christ who is the divine
logos or Word.806 Humans acquire this divine speech via human witnesses who testify to
their receiving a prophetic word or a personal encounter with Jesus Christ which were
collected to become sacra scriptura.807 Despite this profound human role, Thomas cites 2
Timothy 3:16, that "all Scripture is God-breathed", as the very first sed contra of the
Summa Theologiae to state that sacra scriptura is inspired by God, divinitus inspirata.808
So while God is the ultimate source, sacra scriptura simultaneously has both God and men
as its author which permits "acquired faith" to lead to "infused faith." Testimony for the
Christian tradition, and thus for Thomas, interweaves divine and human testimony. So,
while Thomas does not address testimony as a topic directly, he gives it special treatment
under prophecy, biblical inspiration, and infused faith. In such instances, divine testimony
provides certain knowledge. However, when discussing purely human instances of
testimony, such as legal witnesses in a law court, certain knowledge is impossible. Thomas
therefore needs one theory that seamlessly integrates and grounds divine and human
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Cf. ST I.1.1
This avoids making wisdom co-eternal with God but creates tension with the doctrine of divine unity.
807
"Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. XII, 14)." ST
I.1.6
808
Cf. ST I.1.1.
806
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testimony while accounting for the disparity in certainty. To do so, Thomas addresses the
same twin concerns that Saadya and al-Ghazālī sought to remedy, accuracy and honesty,
by relying on both the virtues of the listener and the speaker.
Divine and human testimony rely on the role of signification and Aristotle's
"semantic triangle" where words signify mental concepts which mediately signify real
external objects.809 Just as with human speech, God signifies His meaning through words
and things:
Text 5.3.0.1
The author of sacra scriptura is God, in whose power it is to signify His
meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things
themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by
words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words
have themselves also a signification.810
So, words are a form of signification of inner meaning shown to have several senses by
revelation's historical, literal, and spiritual senses (which itself has a threefold division).811
At its core, testimony is the use of signification to relate facts possessed by one agent to
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Peri Hermeneias, I.2.5, "Therefore 'passions in the soul' must be understood here as conceptions of the
intellect, and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to
the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying,
for the name 'man' signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it
immediately signify a singular man. The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the separated idea of
man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind,
it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately
and things by means of them." Jean T. Oesterle, Aristotle: On Interpretation (Marquette University Press,
1962), 25. Cf. Scriptum I.19.5.1
810
ST I.1.10, tr.mod. Respondeo dicendum quod auctor sacrae Scripturae est Deus, in cuius potestate est ut
non solum voces ad significandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest), sed etiam res ipsas. Et
ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis voces significent, hoc habet proprium ista scientia, quod ipsae res significatae
per voces, etiam significant aliquid. Aquinas, Summa theologiae. Prima pars, 1-49, 15.
811
The three spiritual senses of the medieval period include: the allegorical sense (including typology), the
moral (or "tropological") sense, and the anagogic (or future) sense. Cf. Christopher T. Baglow, “Sacred
Scripture and Sacred Doctrine in Saint Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction,
ed. Thomas G Weinandy, Daniel A Keating, and John Yocum (London; New York: T & T Clark
International, 2004); Nicholas M. Healy, “Introduction to Aquinas on Scripture,” in Aquinas on Scripture:
An Introduction to His Biblical Commentaries, ed. Thomas Gerard Weinandy, Daniel A Keating, and John
Yocum (London; New York: T & T Clark International, A Continuum imprint, 2005), 1–20.

253

another. The most common word for testimony is testimonium which refers to the speech
of a testis (a witness). Testimonium generates either the cognitive state opinio or fides. As
shown, Thomas distinguished between a broad and narrow sense of fides. These two senses
mark two ways to obtain belief states from a speaker, which I argue occurs for both human
and divine speakers.
The broad sense is akin to Augustine’s definition of assent to the unseen, since an
unseen object cannot compel the intellect to assent but requires an act of will. 812 Assent to
the unseen with humans involves a sort of probability calculus including factors such as
number of testifiers and character of the relevant testifiers to produce strong opinion as
Thomas states regarding witnesses: "…the authority of testimony (testimonium) is not
infallible but probable; and consequently the testimony (testimonium) for one side is
weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the other." 813 Strong opinion can even
obtain probable certitude from "Demon faith" which De Veritate and the ST state results
from testimony that compels assent due to the strength of evident signs and the demon's
"sharp-sighted" (perspicacitas) natural intellect.814 Demons make effectively certain
predictions inferring from miracles and the character of God who cannot err and cannot lie.
However, demons can neither see the future nor grasp Church teachings because they
cannot obtain the narrow sense of faith since they are incapable of trusting God. The narrow
sense of faith is linked with credere deo ("believing God") which distinguishes between
believing the material object of faith—the proposition(s)—and the formal object of faith—
812

Siebert notes that one’s assent being determined partly by the will is essential to faith, but this does not
lead to any sort of doxastic voluntarism since "assent is not commanded by the will alone, but by the will
under the direction of one’s reason." Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial Justification,” 563.
813
ST II-II.70.3 Tr mod. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:659–60. The original
translation renders testimonium as "evidence" which anachronistically presumes a form of evidentialism in
which testimony is a kind of "evidence" as opposed to a reason to believe as will be discussed in chapter 6.
814
Cf. QDV 14.9.ad.4 and ST II-II.5.2. Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial Justification,” 577–78.
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the speaker. While narrow faith is introduced regarding divine testimony, its application
can be found in human testimony as Matthew Siebert describes, "When one has faith that
p, one (i) believes the speaker’s statement in order to adhere to the speaker, (ii) with a
special act of will not present in opinion, and (iii) typically for the reason that the speaker
is truthful."815 For the sake of parity, I call such human fides "credere homini." The result
is four possibilities for testimony as seen in Chart 5.3.0.2.

Chart 5.3.0.2
Human Speaker
Broad sense Inductive reasoning
of fides
 Strong opinio

Divine Speaker
Inductive/Abductive reasoning or
"Demon faith"
 Probable certitude
Narrow
Interpersonal faith or Credere Infused faith or Credere Deo
sense of fides homini  Strong opinio
 Certain fides
Regardless of whether the testimony is from a human speaker or a divine speaker and
whether the listener acquires it via the broad or narrow sense of faith, the grounding of
testimony cannot be divorced from virtue. Listeners must employ a habitus, intellectual or
theological, to confirm that the speaker possesses the virtues that ensure both that the
speaker is an epistemic authority for the matter under discussion (to rule out error) and the
speaker is morally upstanding (to rule out the possibility of lying and deception). This
notion of trustworthy epistemic authority allows Thomas to account for the disparity in
certainty between human and divine testimony due to the failures of humans on matters of
virtue compared to its perfection in God:
Text 5.3.0.3
Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing; but if (the
authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the
815

Ibid., 569, 571–72.
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seer’s sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man of little science
is more certain about what he hears on the authority of an expert in science,
than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much
more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be
deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be
mistaken.816
In this way, human testimony and divine testimony are accounted for by the same process,
namely trust in an expert authority due to their knowledge and sincerity grounded in
virtuous character.
5.3.1 Human Testimony
Thomas discusses instances of human testimony scattered throughout his works and all of
them acquire belief either through broad or narrow faith where virtue is the epistemic
ground. The main concentration occurs in treatises on faith and legal testimony including:
acts of religion (the swearing of oaths) and acts of a law court (witness testimony in legal
proceedings). Perhaps curiously (but I argue fittingly) these discussions are not found in
the ST's Treatise on Law, but in the Treatise on the Cardinal Virtues and particularly on
the cardinal virtue justice.817 While testimony proper should not be equated with legal
testimony, the two discussions are highly instructive since oaths are not confined to the
courtroom and the same testimonial principles emerge to guard against false testimony.
While an oath is something divine received by man (aliquid divinum ab hominibus
assumitur), it should be analyzed here since the invocation of God is used to confirm
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ST II-II.4.8.ad2; Ad secundum dicendum quod, ceteris paribus, visio est certior auditu. Sed si ille a quo
auditur multum excedit visum videntis, sic certior est auditus quam visus. Sicut aliquis parvae scientiae magis
certificatur de eo quod audit ab aliquo scientissimo quam de eo quod sibi secundum suam rationem videtur.
Et multo magis homo certior est de eo quod audit a Deo, qui falli non potest, quam de eo quod videt propria
ratione, quae falli potest. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:58.
817
Treatises on Law cf. ST I-II.90–108; on the Cardinal Virtues cf. II-II.47-170; on virtue of justice cf. IIII.57-122.
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assertions between humans. In defining oaths, Thomas gives a succinct analysis of human
testimony:
Text 5.3.1.1
As the Apostle says (Heb 6:16), oaths are taken for the purpose of
confirmation (confirmationem). Now speculative propositions (in
scibilibus) receive confirmation from reason, which proceeds from
principles known naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent
facts regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore
propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by witnesses.
Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters for two
reasons. First, on account of man’s lack of truth, for many give way to lying,
according to Ps. 16:10, Their mouth hath spoken lies. Second, on account
of lack of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret
thoughts, nor absent things: and yet men speak about such things, and our
everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them.
Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can God
lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is named
jurare (to swear) because it is established as though it were a principle of
law (jure) that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as His
witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness
when we assert present or past events, and this is termed a declaratory oath;
while sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something
future, and this is termed a promissory oath. But oaths are not employed in
order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come under the
investigation of reason; for it would seem laughable in a scientific
discussion to wish to prove one’s point by an oath. 818

818

ST II-II.89.1 tr. mod., Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI, iuramentum ad
confirmationem ordinatur. Confirmatio autem in scibilibus per rationem fit, quae procedit ex aliquibus
naturaliter notis, quae sunt infallibiliter vera. Sed particularia facta contingentia hominum non possunt per
rationem necessariam confirmari. Et ideo ea quae de his dicuntur solent confirmari per testes. Sed humanum
testimonium non est sufficiens ad huiusmodi confirmandum, propter duo. Primo quidem, propter defectum
veritatis humanae, quia plurimi in mendacium labuntur, secundum illud Psalm., os eorum locutum est
mendacium. Secundo, propter defectum cognitionis, quia homines non possunt cognoscere neque futura,
neque cordium occulta, vel etiam absentia; de quibus tamen homines loquuntur, et expedit rebus humanis ut
certitudo aliqua de his habeatur. Et ideo necessarium fuit recurrere ad divinum testimonium, quia Deus
neque mentiri potest, neque eum aliquid latet. Assumere autem Deum in testem dicitur iurare, quia quasi
pro iure introductum est ut quod sub invocatione divini testimonii dicitur pro vero habeatur. Divinum autem
testimonium quandoque inducitur ad asserendum praesentia vel praeterita, et hoc dicitur
iuramentum assertorium. Quandoque autem inducitur divinum testimonium ad confirmandum aliquid
futurum, et hoc dicitur iuramentum promissorium. Ad ea vero quae sunt necessaria et per rationem
investiganda non inducitur iuramentum, derisibile enim videretur si quis in disputatione alicuius scientiae
vellet propositum per iuramentum probare. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:828.
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From this we see that Thomas affirms several aspects of testimony: First, Thomas
consistently maintains that assertions require confirmation. For Thomas, testimony is
linked to the good of the community (especially as it pertains to justice) giving it a moral
quality, such that the giving, or possible withholding of, witness testimony is interpreted
as morally obligatory. However, this moral duty only holds "provided he [the testifier] can
offer sufficient proof, since it is the accuser's duty to prove."819 Thus, the good of stopping
criminality is checked by the good of accurate testimony. The need for accuracy explains
why accusations must be written since "verbal utterances are apt to escape one's
memory."820 Society exists only insofar as justice prevails, but trust in justice necessitates
that people tell the truth, which requires accuracy. 821 The harm of false testimony (due to
error or lying) thereby raised objections insisting on the certitude of testimony.
Second, Thomas offers two clear paths to confirm testimony either by reason or
witnesses. The fastest and easiest is confirmation by reason (rationem). Oaths are rendered
unnecessary if assertions are discernable via natural or infallible sources. Thomas expends
little effort explaining but his meaning is obvious: assertions that are supported by
knowledge that obtains the level of scientia (e.g. from perception, natural reason, and/or
demonstration) are to be assented to while assertions that contradict such knowledge are to
be rejected.822 Testimony regarding past or present temporal events, which presumably
could be confirmed by natural reason or demonstration rendering oaths superfluous, is
confirmable by a unique class of oaths, declarative oaths. 823 The confirmation of testimony
819

ST II-II.68.1, Thomas repeats the claim a little later "…if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not
bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish." Ibid., 17:639–40.
820
ST II-II.68.2
821
Thus, it is a mortal sin to deny the truth even to avoid one's own condemnation, Cf. ST II-II.69.
822
The type of confirming scientia (objective, subjective, or probable) is irrelevant since all use rational
argumentation.
823
This may have bearing on Thomas's comments and arguments regarding the eternity of the world.

258

regarding temporal events largely falls under the second path via witnesses. Third,
witnesses need further confirmation given the potential for i) error or lack of knowledge
and ii) lying. The confirmation of witnesses relies on dignitas (cf. texts 5.3.1.5 & 5.3.1.6)
which is maximally held by God allowing the confirmation of human testimony by divine
witness.824 Thus, there is no need for an oath with divine testimony since Thomas states
"an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man’s lack of belief in another
man," such that to request an oath from God would not only be absurd but dimmish God
(cf. text 5.3.1.6).825
Lastly, since what is presumed to necessitate an oath is that the character of the
human speaker is either unknown or insufficient to confirm their assertion, fides as trust is
linked to the good of society and thus notions of justice and morality. To disrupt this
foundational trust via false witness or lying is thus a moral offense. Thus in Text 5.3.1.2,
Thomas quotes Cicero's de officiis who claims fides—"truth and fidelity to promises and
agreements"—is the foundation of justice, which lends itself to being translated as
"trust."826 This societal context undergirds Siebert's analysis that fides contributes to
society along three divisions of labor: vertical between experts and non-experts; horizontal
between peers; and vertical between teachers and students.827 The first vertical epistemic
division of labor between knowledge experts (i.e., talented intellectuals who can
demonstrate certain truths) and those who believe that truth on faith (since they cannot
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This section on oaths seems to be a perfect prooftext for Richard Cross's thesis that "the only grounds of
Christian belief is divine testimony: only if the relevant faith is caused by God can the process that causes it
be maximally reliable," and yet it is conspicuously absent. This is likely due to Cross limiting himself to
divine testimony as I will address in the next section. Cf. Cross, “Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief
in Medieval Religious Epistemology,” 29–30.
825
ST II-II.89.5. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:833.
826
Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque consantia et veritas. Marcus
Tullius Cicero, De Officiis (Harvard University Press, 1913), 24–25.
827
Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial Justification,” 557–60.
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perform the demonstration themselves due to a lack of time, talent, or training) is
commonly found among Medieval thinkers as outlined in chapter 1. Thus, while
confirmation by reason is preferred, it is not always feasible. Siebert notes this division of
labor occurs even between disciplines in which "lower" disciplines take conclusions
demonstrated by "higher" scientific disciplines on faith. 828 The second horizontal epistemic
division of labor is between epistemic peers which permits societies to function since
individuals must act in faith on reports from other people despite not being in a position to
personally verify claims for themselves. 829 The illustrative passage is from Aquinas’s de
Trinite in affirmatively answering "Is faith necessary for the human race?": 830
Text 5.3.1.2
Now, as the Metaphysics says there can be two reasons why something is
not evident (patens) to human cognition: because of something wanting on
the part of the knowable objects themselves, and because of some
deficiency on the part of our mind. Examples of something wanting on the
part of objects are individual and contingent things that are remote from our
senses, for example, our actions (facta), words (dicta) and thoughts
(cogitata), which are such that they can be known (nota) to one person and
unknown (incognita) to another. And because in human society one person
must make use of another just as he does himself in matters in which he is
not self-sufficient, he must take his stand on what another knows (scit) and
is unknown to himself (sibi ignota), just as he does on what he himself
knows (cognoscit). As a consequence, fides is necessary in human society,
one person believing (credat) what another says (dictis). As Cicero remarks
in the book De Officiis, this is the basis of justice. That is why there is no
lie without moral fault, for every lie does some harm to this so essential
faith.831
828

Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial Justification.” 557-558.
Cf. ST II-II.109.3.
830
De Trin. 3.1c. For Saadya's parallel account Cf. Text 3.3.0.1.
831
This text immediately follows Text 5.2.2.2. De Trin 3.1c. Tr. Mod. Aquinas, Faith, reason and theology,
36:65. Quod autem aliquid non sit patens humane cognitioni potest ex duobus contingere, ut dicitur in II
Metaphisice: scilicet ex defectu ipsarum rerum cognoscibilium, et ex defectu intellectus nostri. Ex defectu
quidem rerum, sicut in rebus singularibus et contingentibus, que a nostris sensibus sunt remote, sicut sunt
facta hominum et dicta et cogitata; que quidem talia sunt ut uni homini possint esse nota et alii incognita. Et
quia in conuictu hominum oportet quod unus utatur altero sicut se ipso in his in quibus sibi non sufficit, ideo
oportet ut stet illis que alius scit et sunt sibi ignota sicut his que ipse cognoscit; et exinde est quod in
conuersatione hominum est fides necessaria, qua unus homo dictis alterius credat, et hoc est iustitie
fundamentum, ut Tullius dicit in libro De officiis. Et inde est quod mendacium nullum sine peccato est, cum
829
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Thomas here explicitly affirms the indispensable role of fides in other humans and
elsewhere says humans owe faith to one another as a "natural right" (iure naturali).832 This
applies for: i) non-experts who must rely on expert authority due to their epistemic lack;
and ii) experts who develop future experts in the sciences via testimony despite it only
being highly probable and not certain. Thus, the continuation of text 5.3.1.2 describes the
second reason why something is not evident (patens) to human cognition as the third
vertical epistemic division of labor between teachers and students where the key to learning
any science is the preliminary steppingstone of fides.833 Students necessarily begin with
faith in their teacher, but this faith is only provisional as the student begins to understand
why the principles they accepted at the beginning of their education are true. 834
With the primacy of fides established for human testimony, the majority of
Thomas's analysis regarding the confirmation of testimony is devoted to confirmation by
witnesses which requires additional verification either by the broad or narrow sense of

per omne mendacium huic fidei tam necessarie derogetur. Aquinas, Supoer Boetium de Trinitate: Expositio
Libri Beotii de Ebdomadibus, 107.
832
Cf. ST II-II.70.1ad2. The examples regard secrecy and when it is acceptable to testify. While it is
acceptable to defy secrecy to maintain faith to humankind as in the common good, it is unacceptable to defy
secrecy when the common good remains intact since it disrupts the faith between one another. There is a fair
amount of literature on secrecy in the Middle Ages cf. Silvana Vecchio, “Segreti e bugie. I peccata occulta,”
in Il segreto = The secret, Certosa del Galluzzo, Micrologus: natura, scienze e società medievali = nature,
sciences and medieval societies, XIV (Firenze: SISMEL, 2006), 41–58.
833
The continuation of De Trin 3.1c reads: "Owing to a deficiency on our part, divine and necessary realities,
which are most knowable by nature, are not apparent to us. We are not adapted to examine them from the
outset, because we have to arrive at what is more knowable and prior by nature beginning with what is less
knowable and posterior by nature. But what we first know is known on the strength of what we eventually
come to know; so from the very beginning we must have some knowledge of those things which are more
knowable in themselves, and this is possible only by faith. The sequence of the sciences makes this clear, for
the science that concerns the highest causes, namely metaphysics, comes last in human knowledge, and yet
the sciences that precede it must presuppose certain truths that are more fully elucidated in that science. As
a result, every science has presuppositions which the learner must believe. Consequently, since the goal of
human life is perfect happiness, which consists in the full knowledge of divine realities, the direction of
human life toward perfect happiness from the very beginning requires faith in the divine, the complete
knowledge of which we look forward to in our final state of perfection." Aquinas, Faith, reason and theology,
36:65.
834
"Some of the preexisting knowledge required for learning a science must be testimonial" Siebert, “Aquinas
on Testimonial Justification.” 560.
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faith. Except for Holy Spirt guided activities (e.g., the Canon Law tradition) which are
connected to instrumental causality discussed under divine testimony, human testimony
cannot achieve certainty. The broad sense generates strong opinion by inferring the
probability of a proposition being true in weighing factors like the number of witnesses
and their dignitas.835 Thomas relies on a probability calculus to state we can obtain
probable certainty by accounting first for accurate information:
Text 5.3.1.3
According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), we must not expect to find
certitude equally in every matter. For in human acts, on which judgments
are passed and testimony required, it is impossible to have demonstrative
certitude, because they are about things contingent and variable. Hence the
certitude of probability (probabilis certitudo) suffices, such as may reach
the truth in the greater number of cases, although it fail in the minority. Now
it is probable that the assertion of several witnesses contains the truth rather
than the assertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies,
while several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably
established both by Divine and by human law, that the assertion of several
witnesses should be upheld.836
And second as a defense against collusion:
Text 5.3.1.4
In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and
infallible proof, and we must be content with a certain conjectural
probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade.
Consequently, although it is quite possible for two or three witnesses to
agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in
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Cf. Ibid., 568. Confirmation by the number of witnesses stems from Deuteronomy's injunction on the
sufficiency of two or three witnesses. Cf. Deuteronomy 17:6.
836
ST II-II.70.2, emphasis mine. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic., certitudo
non est similiter quaerenda in omni materia. In actibus enim humanis, super quibus constituuntur iudicia et
exiguntur testimonia, non potest haberi certitudo demonstrativa, eo quod sunt circa contingentia et
variabilia. Et ideo sufficit probabilis certitudo, quae ut in pluribus veritatem attingat, etsi in paucioribus a
veritate deficiat. Est autem probabile quod magis veritatem contineat dictum multorum quam dictum unius.
Et ideo, cum reus sit unus qui negat, sed multi testes asserunt idem cum actore, rationabiliter institutum est,
iure divino et humano, quod dicto testium stetur. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91,
17:658.
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so doing: wherefore their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they
do not waver in giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. 837
This reasoning echoes the Islamic notion of tawātur in which an increasing number of
testifiers safeguards against falsehood and collusion (praevaricatio) to ground a
proposition. However, unlike tawātur this knowledge can never achieve certainty as
Thomas states: "No matter how great a number of witnesses may be determined, the
testimony might sometimes be unjust…" 838
In discussing oaths, we can see that the dignitas ("standing") of the witnesses also
plays an equivalent role in the probability calculus. Among acceptable witnesses the
testimony of the witness with more dignitas is given more weight. Thomas states that the
benefit of the doubt should go to the accused if both the witnesses of the prosecution and
the defense are equal in number "and of equal dignitate."839 Thomas responds to an
objection by dismissing the count of how many witnesses are needed to accuse differing
church officials (ranging from seven to seventy-four witnesses) but affirming that the sole
testimony of a witness with more dignitas can rival the multiple testimonies of witnesses
with less dignitas:
Text 5.3.1.5
Reply Obj. 3: This passage [of the Papal Decretals] refers specially to the
bishops, priests, deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of
its dignity: and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men
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ST I-II.105.2.ad8, Ad octavum dicendum quod in negotiis humanis non potest haberi probatio
demonstrativa et infallibilis, sed sufficit aliqua coniecturalis probabilitas, secundum quam rhetor persuadet.
Et ideo, licet sit possibile duos aut tres testes in mendacium convenire, non tamen est facile nec probabile
quod conveniant; et ideo accipitur eorum testimonium tanquam verum; et praecipue si in suo testimonio non
vacillent, vel alias suspecti non fuerint. Ibid., 17:659.
838
ST II-II.70.2.ad1 Ibid., 17:658.
839
ST II-II.70.2.ad2, Likewise, if conflicting testimony occurs within a side, then the judge must discern
which side to favor using several factors including the dignitate of the witnesses. Ibid., 17:658–59.
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ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their testimony of more weight
than that of many witnesses.840
Thomas gives three reasons to defend this inegalitarian classification of witnesses based
on dignitas. The first (text 5.3.1.5) is that dignitas denotes sanctity which should be the
basis for rank and authority. Second, authorities (especially judges) rendering justice
generate opponents, "wherefore those who give testimony against them should not be
believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous." 841 Third, the dignitas of the
church is tied to the dignitas of its leaders such that the sin of a priest or bishop is taken far
more seriously than the sin of the laity.842 The takeaway is the greater the dignitas of a
witness the more credible their testimony.
The role of dignitas thus explains the swearing of oaths which presumes that one's
own dignitas is either unknown or insufficient to ground one's telling without attestation
from another witness whose dignitas is known or exceeds one's own. The most compelling
witness is obviously God, "who is the very truth", but Thomas also permits swearing an
oath by other creatures "in which God's truth is reflected." 843 This is affirmed by the fact
that a speaker's testimony is impugned by their culpa (defects) potentially disqualifying
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ST II-II.70.2.ad3 tr mod. Ad tertium dicendum quod illud locum habet specialiter in episcopis, presbyteris,
diaconibus et clericis Ecclesiae Romanae, propter eius dignitatem. Et hoc triplici ratione. Primo quidem,
quia in ea tales institui debent quorum sanctitati plus credatur quam multis testibus. Ibid., 17:659.
841
ST II-II.70.2.ad3, "Second, because those who have to judge other men, often have many opponents on
account of their justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be believed
indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous."
Secundo, quia homines qui habent de aliis iudicare, saepe, propter iustitiam, multos adversarios habent.
Unde non est passim credendum testibus contra eos, nisi magna multitudo conveniat. ST II-II.70.2.ad3;
Ibid.
842
ST II-II.70.2.ad3, "Third, because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public opinion
from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which would be more fraught with danger than if one
were to tolerate a sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and manifest, so that a grave
scandal would arise if he were tolerated." Ibid.
Tertio, quia ex condemnatione alicuius eorum derogaretur in opinione hominum dignitati illius Ecclesiae et
auctoritati. Quod est periculosius quam in ea tolerare aliquem peccatorem, nisi valde publicum et
manifestum, de quo grave scandalum oriretur. Ibid.
843
ST II-II.89.6; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:834–35.
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them as a witness.844 Culpa here is understood in a very broad sense highlighting three
distinct groups whose dignitas is known to be poor and thus their oaths are unacceptable.
First, those of poor character due to blameworthy moral failures such as the infidels, the
infamous, the formerly convicted, and perjurers. 845 Second, those with blameless
undeveloped or defective reasoning such as children, imbeciles, and (to some extent)
women.846 Third, those with conflicts of interest or those whose testimony can be easily
influenced such as paupers, slaves, and those who are susceptible to be commanded (illi
quibus imperari potest). Conversely, Thomas says that persons whose dignitas is known
to be great need not swear oaths and asking them to do so dishonors them:
Text 5.3.1.6
The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose assertion
is confirmed by oath. For a man’s assertion needs no confirmation save
because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person’s dignity
(dignitati) that one should doubt about the truth of what he says,
wherefore it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear. For this reason
the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that priests should not swear
for trifling reasons.847
Persons of such dignitas thus exhibit the necessary traits and habits to alleviate the twin
concerns of accuracy and honesty. It would seem no further proof is required for their
dignitas has already done the necessary confirmatory work to assent to their testimony. In
short, the possession of character makes them trustworthy.
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Cf. ST II-II.70.3
Cf. ST II-II.89.10
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While Thomas holds to the essential equality of all humans, his views on women are still debated. E.g.,
cf. Susanne M. DeCrane, Aquinas, Feminism, and the Common Good, Moral Traditions Series (Washington,
D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2004); Francisco J. Romero-Carrasquillo and Hilaire K. Troyer de
Romero, “Aquinas on the Inferiority of Woman,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87, no. 4
(2013): 685–710.
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ST II-II.89.10; Aliud autem est considerandum ex parte hominis, cuius dictum iuramento confirmatur.
Non enim indiget dictum hominis confirmatione nisi quia de eo dubitatur. Hoc autem derogat dignitati
personae, ut dubitetur de veritate eorum quae dicit. Et ideo personis magnae dignitatis non convenit iurare.
Propter quod dicitur II, qu. V, cap. si quis presbyter, quod sacerdotes ex levi causa iurare non
debent. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:841–42.
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The confirming role of dignitas makes possible for human testimony the second
means of acquiring belief via narrow faith. The virtues of the speaker permit listeners to
have faith, or trust, in the speaker as opposed to believing what the speaker says. Drawing
on Elizabeth Anscombe, Siebert argues for this approach in which fides refers to a "kind
of trust" saying "Aquinas focuses on the speaker's virtue of truthfulness as a reason for the
audience to adhere to the speaker in a way that makes inductive inference with regard to p
unnecessary."848 In the narrow sense of "faith", one wills to assent to a proposition by
believing (trusting) the speaker on account of their dignitas. The interpersonal nature is
seen in contrast to inferring the existence of Rome based on multiple occurrences. For if a
listener infers the existence of Rome from a speaker (e.g. "I just returned from Rome"),
this reveals that they do not fully trust the speaker to speak either accurately or honestly. 849
Siebert sees an analogy between credere deo ("believing God") and believing human
speakers as explained in the Treatise on the Theological Virtues regarding the virtue of
faith such that it is applicable to humans. 850 Propositions are "material objects" with
different "formal objects" for believing them.851 The formal object of faith is the reason
one assents to a proposition (the material object of faith), which in this case is due to faith

848

Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, “What Is It to Believe Someone?,” in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. C. F.
Delaney (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 141–51; Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial
Justification,” 579.
849
Aside from degree of certainty, there is little epistemic difference between "I just returned from Rome"
and "Rome exists" since in both cases (assuming no prior listener knowledge of Rome) one learns of Rome
by believing the speaker.
850
Cf. ST II-II.2.2; Super epistolam ad Romanos lectura 4.1 (Text 5.3.2.5). Also Cf. Matthew Kent Siebert,
“Aquinas on Believing God,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 89 (2015):
97–107.
851
"the material objects of my faith are propositions (the same theorems James knows), while the formal
object of my faith is believing the speaker (in this case, James), just as the Christian with faith believes God
(credere Deo)." Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial Justification,” 571–72.
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in the speaker.852 Support is found in Thomas's explanation of heresy as believing the
person:
Text 5.3.1.7
Now, whoever believes, assents to someone’s words; so that, in every form
of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold the
chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding which
one assents to that person hold a secondary place. 853
Here the listener's reason inclines the will to assent to the proposition, but only as spoken
by that speaker. Siebert argues this special act of the will differentiates faith from science
(which is forced by evidence) and opinion (which does not have firm assent) and makes
faith a meritorious act.854
Since dignitas can confirm testimony in both the broad and narrow sense of faith,
it is important to note how the two differ. In broad faith, belief is grounded by inferring
from signs such as the speaker's character that they speak truly. In narrow faith, dignitas
grounds trust in the speaker or "believing the speaker" (as opposed to believing what the
speaker said). By way of example, if you tell me p, where p is "I have a headache," I can
assent to p by believing you because of our established relationship and your dignitas; or I
can assent by inferring from the signs of your saying "ow", wincing, and holding your head
(and that you would not normally lie about having a headache), but then I would not obtain
p by believing you. Similarly, if a speaker says p, but 1) the listener already knows p, or 2)
p is a proof the listener can work to conclusion, then the listener believes p, but not by
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Thomas distinguishes credere deo from: Credere Deum ("believing that God [exists]") – the intellect’s
act of being determined to the one proposition believed–or Credere in Deum ("believing in God") – the will’s
act of believing out of love of God, where the will’s object is God himself. Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial
Justification.” 570.
853
ST.II-II.11.1, Quia vero quicumque credit alicuius dicto assentit, principale videtur esse, et quasi finis, in
unaquaque credulitate ille cuius dicto assentitur, quasi autem secundaria sunt ea quae quis tenendo vult
alicui assentire. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:113–14.
854
Siebert, “Aquinas on Testimonial Justification,” 574. Cf. QDV 14.1.

267

believing the speaker.855 For a listener to believe a speaker is thus to trust them. Siebert
notes however, that "even if faith is not inferential, it still requires a reason or explanation
for it seeming good to the audience to adhere to the speaker." 856 What motivates such faith,
Siebert claims, is recognizing that the speaker is truthful (i.e., as consequence of their
dignitas).
Siebert clearly has Thomas's discussion on truth as a virtue in mind (which returns
to the Treatise on Justice).857 There Thomas states that while veritas ("truth") is not a
virtue, veracitas (a quality of habitually conveying the truth) is.858 Truthfulness as a virtue
stems from Aristotle's discussion in Nichomachean Ethics IV.7, which primarily is about
reputation or public displays of character. The related vices of boastfulness and selfdeprecation reveal that "truthfulness", to quote Siebert's article "Testimonial
Trustworthiness" (2018), "is, for Aristotle, a virtue of accurate self-representation
motivated by the love of truth."859 To be truthful is to be in the habit of representing reality
as it is. Two observations can be made here. First, having clarified what it means for veritas
to be a virtue, Thomas directly links speaking truth with goodness. All four articles on
"truth" in the ST affirm this stating veritas is a special virtue that makes humans good and
should induce humility.860 Second, there is an indirect link to fides and trust or
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Siebert provides several unlikely but interesting cases that highlight this distinction: a hypnosis case in
which I know an expert hypnotizes you to say p (which is true) where I believe p but not by believing you;
and a double bluff case in which we distrust one another, "so you try to mislead me by saying something
true…but I see through your ruse and infer that what you say is true…I believe what you say, but not by
believing you." Ibid., 572.
856
Ibid., 575.
857
ST II-II.109.1 Siebert, “Aquinas on Believing God,” 102.
858
ST II-II.109.1, "Second, truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which sense one
is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good
act: and virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good." Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae. Secunda Secundae, 1-91, 17:145–46. For a contemporary comparison cf. Bernard Williams,
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton University Press.).
859
Siebert, “Testimonial Trustworthiness: Truthfulness and Trust,” 262.
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Cf. ST II-II.109.2-4
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trustworthiness in Thomas's medieval milieu. Duns Scotus links fides to human testimony
from persons whose truthfulness (veritas) he knows.861 William of Ockham likewise has
the Disciple in his Dialogues say neither veritas nor veracitas are possible where there is
not sana fides (sound faith).862
However, even the human speaker with the most dignitas (and thus truthfulness)
cannot provide certain knowledge through testimony due to the intellectual and virtuous
limitation of humans. The recourse, clearly demonstrated by the role of swearing oaths, is
seeking confirmation from the speaker with maximum dignitas, the very definition of
truthfulness and goodness, God.
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"Just as I believe by acquired faith through hearing others (such as parents who truthfulness I trust) that
many ages have passed away and that the world did not begin with myself; and I believe, thanks to the report
of persons worthy of trust, that Rome, which I have never seen, exists, so too I hold firmly the things revealed
in Scripture through faith acquired through hearing these things said, thanks to my trusting the Church which
approves the truthfulness of those [Scriptural] authors." Noone, Timothy. Newman-Scotus Reader: contexts
and Commonalities 231-232
…sicut etiam ego fide acquisita ex audito aliorum (scilicet parentum, quorum veritati credo) credo multa
tempora transivisse et mundum non incepisse mecum; et credo Romam esse, quam nunquam, vidi, ex relatu
fide dignorum; sic revelatis in Scriptura—per fidem acquisitam ex auditu—firmiter adhaereo, credendo
Ecclesiae approbanti veritatem illorum scriptorium." Scotus, Lectura III d. 23 1. Unica n. 15 (ed. Vaticanna
XXI 102).
862
"It follows from this that it is consistent never will any pagan or infidel have true power which is veritas
or veracitas: because there is no power without fides. Therefore, just as there is no justice without sana fides
(sound trust), Augustine testifies and held at 3. q. 1. C. where he said: "Where there is no sana fides, there
can be no sound justice." Similarly, therefore, where there is not sana fides, veritas or veracitas are not able
to be. However it is well known that pagans did not have true fides. Therefore, regarding none of them was
it necessary to presume that ever was the testimony which we know to be false to be admitted." William of
Ockham, Dialogus, pars 1, lib. 6, cap. 77, my translation.
Discipulus: Ista ratio videtur mihi mirabilis. Nam sequitur ex ipsa quod nunquam de aliquo pagano vel
infideli constat quod habuerit veram virtutem quae est veritas seu veracitas: quia nulla est virtus sine sana
fide. Ideo sicut nec iustitia est sine sana fide teste Aug. ut habetur 3. q. 1. c. ubi ait: Ubi sana fides non est
ibi non potest esse sana iustitia. Ergo consimiliter ubi sana fides non est veritas seu veracitas esse non potest.
Constat autem quod pagani veram fidem minime habuerunt. Ergo de nullo illorum praesumendum fuit quod
unquam esset ad testimonium admittendus quod constat esse falsum. William of Ockham, Dialogus, ed.
Melchior
Goldast
(London:
The
British
Academy,
1995),
http://publications.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/w1d6cg.html. Ockham appears to be citing
Augustine's "On the Sermon on the Mount", Book 1, chapter 10., 27 cf. Augustine, “On the Sermon on the
Mount,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. William Findlay, vol. 6, 1 (Buffalo:
Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1888), https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/16011.htm.
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5.3.2 Divine Testimony
As established in the above discussion on fides, Thomas holds that God speaks and humans
obtain sacra doctrina by divine testimony. The very name "doctrina" denotes that God's
activity is that of teaching, i.e., the transmission of knowledge. Likewise, sacra scriptura
is the joint product of God and human authors. We should therefore expect divine
testimony and human testimony to be, if not equivalent, at least compatible. To this end,
Martin claims God's act of transmitting knowledge is like a human agent's in "presenting
what is to be known," but with a unique preceding step of "supplying someone with the
light, or the capacity, to understand what is presented."863 Divine testimony is grounded in
the same two ways as human testimony: a broad sense of faith, but given greater certitude
due to the compelling evidence of God's character as seen by the unique example of "demon
faith," and a narrow sense of faith by believing God (credere deo) grounded in the identity
of the speaker especially God's maximal knowledgeability and trustworthy dignitas. The
role of virtue consequently looms large.
While both human and divine testimony rely on the same means of grounding
testimony in accordance with virtue, God's method of speaking differs in moving listeners
to fides, that is to assent to propositions of faith. Lamont states that "the question of how
the Holy Spirit acts in us so as to make us believe is not answered by Aquinas," but I
contend that Thomas does provide an account of how the Holy Spirit moves the mind of
the listener under prophecy.864 That God speaks at all Thomas considers an unworthy gift

863

Martin, “Sacra Doctrina and the Authority of Its Sacra Scriptura,” 86.
Thomas cites 1 John 5:7, "there are three who bear witness (testimonium dant) in heaven, The Father, the
Word (verbum) and the Holy Spirit," primarily to show that the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity
by the fact that the Holy Spirit is also listed as an agent capable of testimony. ST I.30.2 sed contra; Aquinas,
Summa theologiae. Prima pars, 1-49, 319. cf. SCG 4.18; Expositio in evangelium Joannis C.1 L.1:3-4.
864
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such that the genus of prophecy is in turn part of the genus of revelation, which is individual
acts of gratuitous grace.865 The effectivity of prophecy occurs by differing "degrees of
grace" (gratiae gradus): the greatest degree occurs when the mind of the prophet is moved,
next when the minds of those who record and interpret the words of the prophet are moved,
and the lowest degree when the minds of the faithful who receive the revealed words of the
prophet are moved.866 The first clearly refers to prophecy proper, the second to biblical
inspiration which Thomas famously says in the Summa Theologiae "is something imperfect
in the genus of prophecy",867 and the third to infused faith, the theological virtue of faith
(which starts to flow to beings after sanctifying grace changes the nature of the soul). In all
three instances, the Holy Spirit graciously moves the mind of a person bestowing
knowledge that person would not otherwise have. As such, all three qualify as testimony
insofar as an agent is responsible for the accrual of knowledge by a recipient. Thomas
explains precisely how the Holy Spirit moves the human mind in these processes using the
philosophical concept of instrumental causality—the theory of causal motion where the
power of a principal agent works hiddenly through a lower cause to achieve an end beyond
the lower cause’s natural powers, saying: "In prophetic revelation the prophet's mind is
moved by the Holy Spirit, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to the principal
agent."868 In this section, I will first explicate instrumental causality to confirm that God is
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Cf. ST II-II.171 on prophecy and SCG III.154.
Cf. SCG III.154.19-20.
867
ST II-II.171.5. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae. Secunda secundae, 92-189, trans. Laurence Shapcote,
vol. 18, Latin/English edition of the works of St. Thomas Aquinas (Green Bay: The Aquinas Institute, 2017),
618.
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ST II-II.173.4. tr. mod. Ibid., 18:642. Cf. Quodlibet VII.6.1.ad 5 and Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate
(QDV) 5.9; 12.8.ad3, ad5; 14.10.ad7; 26.1.ad9; 29.4. I argue elsewhere that Thomas formulates a new account
of instrumental causality by integrating Islamic causal accounts within Greek and Christian ones, i.e., by
building upon Augustine and Proclus through the Liber de Causis, he incorporated Islamic influences through
Arabic sources including: the Arabic Liber de Causis, Averroes’s two sources of motion, and Avicenna’s
modes of efficient causation. Cf. Brett Yardley, “Biblical Inspiration & Islamic Instrumental Causality:
866
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the principal speaker and how divine speech is transmitted to and through humans. Then,
I will show what permits listeners to assent to divine testimony either via the broad or
narrow sense of faith.
The concept of instrumental causality Thomas formulated underwent little change
throughout Thomas’s career and features prominently in his Scriptum.869 The theory even
appears in his principium in 1256 to show the instrumental role of human teachers for sacra
doctrina in accordance with the third "degree of grace". His inaugural lecture in Paris was
on Psalm 103:13, Rigans montes de superioribus suis, demonstrating how God
communicates wisdom through intermediaries and secondary causes since clouds raining
on mountains that flow down in rivers to the Earth below is parallel to divine wisdom
shining on learned minds who minister to faithful listeners. 870 Accounts of Thomas’s
doctrine of biblical inspiration use the language of instrumental causality saying Scripture
has two authors in which humans are God’s "instruments" 871 (but they rarely identify or

Thomas Aquinas on Prophecy and the Two Authors of Sacred Scripture,” The Muslim World 109, no. 3
(2019): 431–49.
869
I speak of the theory of instrumental causality itself, not Aquinas’s perspective as to the theory’s role in
bestowing grace through the sacraments, of which there are three views: 1) Thomas shared the Parisian
Masters’ opinion that the sacraments only served a dispositive role in the bestowal of grace for his entire
career, cf. Louis Billot, De ecclesiae sacramentis Prior (Romae: Univ. Gregoriana, 1932).; 2) Thomas later
changed his mind regarding the sacraments from a dispositive to an instrumental role, cf. H. Dondaine, “A
Propos d’Avicenne et de Saint Thomas,” Revue Thomiste 51, no. 2 (1951): 441.; and 3) Thomas always held
that the sacraments served an instrumental role and merely reports the common opinion of the Parisian
Masters, cf. M. Tuyaerts, “Utrum S. Thomas Causalitatem Sacramentorum Respectu Gratiae Mere
Dispositivam Umquam Docuerit,” Angelicum 8, no. 2 (1931): 149–86.
870
Pasquale Porro notes the ease of recognizing the Neoplatonic framework inherent within this work
following James Weisheipl who indicated Dionysisus’s influence on Thomas cf. Porro, Thomas Aquinas,
57.; and James A Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 173–74. Also cf. appendix of Adriano Oliva, Les débuts de
l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la sacra doctrina: avec l’édition du prologue de son
Commentaire des Sentences (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2006).
871
"Hence, because the Holy Ghost employed men as His instruments, we cannot therefore say that it was
these inspired instruments who, perchance, have fallen into error, and not the primary author."
“Providentissimus Deus (November 18, 1893) | LEO XIII,” accessed February 11, 2019,
http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_18111893_providentissimusdeus.html.
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explicate the underlying philosophical concept itself).872 In the instrumental motion of
divine speech, the Holy Spirit does not directly move the mind of the prophet. In book III
of the SCG, Thomas depicts an entire order by which revelation and prophecy begin with
single acts of gratuitous grace by God who directly manifests objects of faith to recipients
who in turn pass the object to others in a chain all the way to the lowest recipient—the
prophet.873 The ST states the middle positions between God and men are occupied by
angels874 (and sometimes other men),875 whom Thomas also refers to as "instruments"
relying on the divine "principal agent" for their action.876 Thomas never gives an account
of instrumental casualty in its own right, instead providing explanations in application to a
particular theological topic. Within his corpus, instrumental causality (as a form of
causality) falls under the theory of "participation," the "sharing in the essential act of
another, which is limited by the potency of the participating subject" as defined by John
Rziha.877 Thomas identifies three types of participation in the second chapter of his
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Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange interprets Thomas using the language of instrumental causality to explain
the two authors view, "one divine and principal, the other human and instrumental." Réginald GarrigouLagrange and Patrick Cummins, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought (Ex Fontibus Co., 2015). Cf.
Raymond Edward Brown, Joseph A Fitzmyer, and Roland E Murphy, The New Jerome Biblical Commentary
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 1028.
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Cf. SCG III.154.1.
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Secunda secundae, 92-189, 18:629.
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sicut instrumentum), prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of the angels, is said to be
Divine." Ibid., 18:626.
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John Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human Participation in Eternal Law
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2009), 11. Rziha also traces the contemporary
recovery of Thomas’s notion of participation by Cornelio Fabro, L.B. Geiger, John Wippel and Rudi Te
Velde. Cf. Cornelio Fabro and B. M Bonansea, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy,” The
Review of Metaphysics 27, no. 3 (1974): 449–91.; Louis Bertrand Geiger, La participation dans la
philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1953).; John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and
Participation,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1987), 117–58.; and Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and substantiality in
Thomas Aquinas (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1995).
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commentary on the De Hebdomadibus—[1] the participation of an individual in a species
and a species in a genus; [2] matter in form and a subject in an accident; and [3] an effect
in its cause—so the concept applies to a wide range of doctrines. 878 In the widest possible
sense, instrumental causality can be seen as synonymous with all secondary causes from
the bestowal of being as creatures imperfectly participate in divine being to meritorious
acts as rational wills participate in God’s will.879 Such a broad construal can lead to
misunderstandings since, as Brian Shanley shows, it can obscure an instrument’s "genuine
casual capacity" since "instrumental causes normally have their own proper activity that is
independent of the principal cause and is precisely what is needed by the principal cause
in order to accomplish the effect."880 The differences stem from what degree acts
participate in the divine act according to three different modes of participation: by nature,
grace, and glory.881 So whereas all human knowledge naturally participates in God’s
knowledge, it lacks certainty because only acts according to the mode of grace can be free
from defect.882
Thomas’s arguably most robust account of instrumental causality (and which also
pertains to a mode of grace) is his first in Scriptum book IV which answers whether humans
can be "ministers" (used synonymously with "instruments") of divine grace in the
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E.g. prayer as participation in divine providence to creatures existence as participation in divine goodness.
Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 38–39. Cf. SCG III.95-5; ST I.20.4; ST I-II.110.1; and De Potencia 3.7.
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Cf. Ibid., 54. and ST III.62.1.
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Brian J Shanley, “Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas,” American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly 72, no. 1 (1998): 106.
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I.89.2.2; I.109.1; II-II.1.8); participated virtue (social virtues by nature, perfecting virtues by grace, and
perfect virtues by glory (I-II,61.5); participation in divine sonship (ST I.33.3; ST III.23.1.1, III,.5.4);
participation in the image of God (ST I.93.4). Rziha, Perfecting Human Actions, 80.
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Cf. ST I-II 58.3.a2.
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sacraments.883 Since biblical inspiration, like sacramental justification, consists of
individual acts of gratuitous grace where God brings about an effect through humans, the
sacramental account of instrumental causality readily applies. The only real difference is
that divine testimony deals with knowledge and objects of faith through the "light of grace"
or "intellectual light." As such, motions of prophecy are discussed in terms of divine and
prophetic light stemming from the influences of Augustine and Dionysius (whom scholars
have called "a quasi-biblical author" in the eyes of Albert and Thomas). 884 Later in the ST,
Thomas explains that biblical authors like Moses were mediators of God’s knowledge
("light") by alluding to Dionysius the Areopagite’s The Celestial Hierarchy, which says
that biblical "Fathers" passed on sacred doctrines illumed by "the Light of the Father"—
Jesus—from "the Origin of Light"—the Father—down through a procession of
illumination including the "Celestial Intelligences." 885 To frame our discussion of
instrumental causality’s role in divine testimony, I will draw on four issues Paul Pearson
identifies on instrumental causality in the Scriptum which Thomas addresses on how an
instrumental agent operates: 1) the ontological status of instrumental power; 2) the
distinction between proper and instrumental power; 3) proportionality in instrumental
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Cf. Scriptum IV.1.1; ST III.62-65; QDV 27.4
For Augustine on illumination Cf. "On the Teacher" (De magistro) 12.40 and for Dionysius Cf. Wayne J.
Hankey, “The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the Liber de Causis & Blessed Dionysius in Thomas Aquinas,
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Press, 2015).
885
In ST II-II.173.1 Thomas alludes to The Celestial Hierarchy where Dionysius says: "Calling then upon
Jesus, the Light of the Father, the Real and True, 'Which lights every man that comes into the world, by
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causes and their effects, and 4) the distinction between perfective and dispositive
instruments.886
First Issue: The ontological status of instrumental power
Regarding the ontological status of instrumental power, instruments borrow powers not
proper to themselves. Thomas claims sacraments are a cause in the act of conferring grace,
but only insofar as they are part of an action initiated by God. The key text in the Scriptum
addressing human roles in acts of grace explains: "an action is not attributed to an
instrument, but to a principal agent, by whose power the instruments are applied to their
work inasmuch as they are moved by it."887 To illustrate, Thomas uses the example of the
relationship between a carpenter and a saw. The ontological status of instrumental power
in an instrumental cause, the power to build a house, is not attributed to the saw but to the
carpenter for the saw by itself lacks the power to produce a house. However, when the
carpenter employs a saw in the production of a house, the power of the carpenter passes
through the saw in a "hidden way" (occulte).888 It must be emphasized here that while the
instrumental power must work through the proper power of the instrument’s substantial
form (discussed in the second issue), the instrumental power never resides in the instrument
without the principal agent actively moving it. The instrument is not gifted, cannot save,
or experience any residual effects of the instrumental power. In the same way as the
instrumental power to build a house only resides in a saw while it remains in the hand of
the carpenter and to the extent that the carpenter uses it, instrumental power only exists in
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an instrument: a) while the principal agent (to whom the power properly belongs) continues
to move the instrument,889 and b) to the extent that the instrument is moved by the principal
agent.890 The acts must be simultaneous.
Regarding the first issue of the ontological status of power and divine testimony,
God is the principal agent and the prophets are his instruments in the transmission of divine
speech.891 God is the original speaker and the true source of sacra doctrina who
ontologically has the proper power to "signify his meaning" through words and things. 892
In regard to sacra scriptura, God is the true source and his powers are responsible for its
infallible origin and its spiritual sense.893 Humans are God’s instruments allowing human
words to be considered the word of God. Finally, the prophetic light (lumen propheticum)
exists in the soul of the prophet only transiently. 894
The Second Issue: The distinction between proper and instrumental power
While instruments are infused with the instrumental power of the principal agent during an
instrumental action, the instrument must possess a power proper to its substantial form
which makes it useful in the first place. Instrumental power only occurs in the instrument
by moving its proper power. Hence, the proper power of the instrument must be suited to
the end sought by the principal agent to receive the instrumental power. The two powers
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must work simultaneously to produce the instrumental action just as the substantial form
of a saw must have the proper power of cutting in order to be used by the carpenter to
produce a house.895 In showing precisely how sacraments are a cause of grace, Thomas
argues for two powers coming together to create one twofold action: "Now two kinds of
action apply to an instrument: one that it has from its own nature, and another that it has to
the extent that it is moved by a prior agent." 896 Thomas explains in the ST (in denying that
Christ has two wills) that how the proper power of an instrument is moved varies according
to its form or soul: inanimate instruments by a corporeal movement; instruments with a
sensitive soul by the sensitive appetite; and "an instrument animated with a rational soul is
moved by its will (voluntas), as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act,
the servant being like an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says." 897
Humans as instruments raises a concern regarding the will and its freedom. If God’s
power is the source and most operative agent in every action of created beings, then humans
cannot contribute in any meaningful sense. If the principal agent co-opts or overrides the
human instrument’s rational will, then it is effectively reduced to a sensible being, or worse
an inanimate object. However, Thomas claims in De Veritate that human minds can be
moved by another and still move itself.898 James Albertson claims while "the creature does
not act independently of God, nor does God act without the creature; there is no room here
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for either a simultaneous concursus or occasionalism."899 Instead Thomas teaches that both
the principal agent and instrumental agent contribute separately to a single act:
Text 5.3.2.1
It is also clear that the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God
not as though part were effected by God and part by the natural agent; but
the whole effect proceeds from each, yet in different ways, just as the whole
of the one same effect is ascribed to the instrument, and again the whole is
ascribed to the principal agent. 900
This issue of two causes in one effect disrupts the proportionality of an effect to its cause
(as discussed in the third issue).901
The second issue of proper power explains how divine speech as sacra scriptura
has both a divine and human author.902 Since God the principal agent desires to produce an
object of knowledge, the suitable instrument must have a rational soul. The employment
of this rational soul thus explains how human authors are responsible for Scripture’s literal
sense and its inclusion of their unique experiences, style, and idiosyncrasies in the final
text. Insofar as the writers’ proper power lies in their will (voluntas), Thomas describes
899
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four levels where God can move the human mind to form revelatory judgements beyond
the recipient’s natural faculties.903 Each way lines up with a step in Thomas’s natural
abstraction process, where sense data is organized into phantasms by the common sense in
the imagination before the phantasms are empowered by the agent intellect (intellectual
light) to impress a likeness in the possible intellect as an intelligible species, with each
subsequent way bypassing fewer steps.904 The first and second way occur in the intellect.
The first is merely "the infusion of an intelligible light (intelligibilis luminis)"905 allowing
a recipient to form infallible judgments regarding knowledge (or species) in the mind
previously obtained (e.g., Joseph interpreting Pharaoh’s dreams in Genesis 41:1-7 and
Jesus "opening" the Apostle’s minds in Luke 24:45). The second impresses intelligible
species directly onto the intellect (e.g., Solomon and the Apostles receive infused scientific
knowledge or wisdom). The third way either impresses new or rearranges existing
phantasms within the imagination as seen with dreams (e.g. those of Pharaoh in Genesis
41:1-7 or Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel 4:1-2) or the perception of bodily likenesses (e.g. King
Balthasar’s seeing the hand which wrote on the wall in Daniel 5:5). 906 The fourth way
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provides sensible objects to the senses, namely interactions with angels who have assumed
bodies or miracles which are often treated as signs verifying the oral teaching of God (e.g.
Daniel saw the writing on the wall in Daniel 5:25).
The Third Issue: Proportionality in instrumental causes and their effects
Typically, an effect is always in proportion to its cause and objects cannot perform acts
that are beyond what is natural to them, but instrumental acts produce effects greater than
an instrument is capable of alone. In the Scriptum, Thomas argues that, because of the
motion of the principal agent in the instrument, the effects may be more noble than the
instrumental cause:
Text 5.3.2.2
Nor again is it necessary that an instrumental agent be simply nobler than
its effect, for an eﬀect is not proportioned to the instrument, but to the
principal agent, who sometimes through lowly instruments accomplishes
nobler eﬀects, as a doctor induces health through an enema. 907
Since multiple agents may be involved in an instrumental act, especially if there is a chain
of instruments as secondary causes, assigning proportionality depends on how the act is
dissected or which relationship between cause and effect is in view. In many ways the
effect will not be in proportion to the instrument, but to the principal agent. However, the
effect of the instrument must be in proportion with respect to the instrument’s proper
power. That is, while the total effect of the instrumental act may exceed the nobility of the
instrument as cause, the effect may not exceed the nobility of the instrument’s proper power
as cause. For example, with respect to the saw the production of a house is an effect more
noble than the saw as a cause (since the effect of the house is in proportion to the carpenter
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as the principal agent), but the production of cuts made by that saw may not be more noble
than the instrument since cutting is the proper power of the saw. 908 This dissection of
instrumental causation reveals a distinction in the instrument’s role within the complex
action depending on whether or not it completes the act (as discussed in the fourth issue).
The third issue of proportionality explains how fallible humans can transmit
infallible divine speech or be a reliable conduit for acquired faith. The effect of divine
testimony can be more noble than its human causes, since the effect is in proportion to God,
its principal cause. Yet, the actual transmission, e.g., literal sense of sacra scriptura, is still
in proportion to the human transmitter's proper powers. Thomas points out that
supernaturally moved human minds do not necessarily understand the intelligible objects
they now possess and in fact never fully understand because the human mind is a limited
instrument in the process of revelation. Thus, Thomas further divides prophecy into
"perfect prophecy" and "prophetic instinct" according to whether the final recipient realizes
he or she is being moved and/or understands what intelligibles are being received. For
example, Moses is given not only divine mysteries under a "veil of figures" fitting for an
uncultured people (rudi populo), but also the understanding to explain the images to the
people.909 Despite this distinction, Thomas calls all prophets "deficient instruments" (even
if they know they are being moved by the Holy Spirit) since their minds will not be
perfected until after death.910
The Fourth Issue: The distinction between perfective and dispositive instruments
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Since an instrumental action can incorporate many instruments in one long complex causal
motion, Thomas distinguishes between dispositive instruments in the middle of the chain
and perfective instruments which play a direct role in the final product. Thomas argues in
his Scriptum that there are two ways instrumental causality appears as an efficient cause:
Text 5.3.2.3
[I]t should be known that an efficient cause can be divided in two ways. In
one way, on the part of the eﬀect, that is, in the disposing cause
(disponentem), which causes a disposition to the final form; and [in another
way] in a perfecting cause (perficientem), which introduces the final
perfection.911
Dispositive instruments either provide the necessary materials or play an indirect role in
the production of the final form while perfective instruments play a direct role in the end
goal or "final perfection that the principal agent intends." 912 Like the discussion above,
whether an instrument is dispositive or perfective depends on how the action is dissected
and what effect is in view (e.g., act vs. potency). The saw is a dispositive instrument in the
production of the carpenter’s ultimate desired form (the house) through the material
provision of boards, but a perfective instrument in the production of the boards.
In the last issue, the production of divine testimony sees the employment of both
dispositive and perfective instruments. When God moves the hierarchy of angels, they are
dispositive instruments since they likewise move the lower hierarchy of angels and
ultimately the prophets. However, when humans are moved by the degrees of grace to
prophesy, write, or edit the final product of Scripture, they are perfective instruments.
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Similarly, the ex auditu preaching serves as a dispositive instrument preparing the intellect
and will to act and receive the infusion of faith.
Grounding Diving Testimony
Now we turn to what grounds a listener's assent to divine propositions via either the broad
or narrow sense of fides. Recalling our discussion of fides, Thomas discusses two things
required for faith in the ST (dicendum quod ad fidem duo requiruntur), which maintain the
traditional acquired and infused faith distinction as the material objects of faith—the what
of belief—and the act of assent to the material objects of faith which is grounded by who
is being believed—the formal object of faith. 913 The analysis of instrumental causality
resolves Thomas's first requirement that the material objects of faith, the propositions,
necessarily originate from God. Regarding the second act of assent, Thomas delineates two
causes:
Text 5.3.2.4
Man’s assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold
cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being
persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient
cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same
sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another
internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith. 914
The two causes are the two ways which ground testimony where the former is the broad
sense of faith and the latter is the narrow sense of faith.
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As Text 5.3.2.4 shows, Thomas maintains listeners can assent to propositions (that
are neither self-evident nor demonstrative) spoken by God on account of signs or human
speakers. Signs or miracles, however, are a necessary but not a sufficient condition to
ground material objects of faith. Thomas maintains that miracles do not confirm the
propositions of the material object of faith but the formal object of faith, namely that the
prophet indeed speaks for God stating: "proofs which urge [listeners] toward faith, like
miracles, do not prove faith by itself, but prove the truthfulness (veritatem) of the one
announcing faith."915 Miracles thereby establish that God is the ultimate speaker, but it is
God's authority established by his attributes that does the epistemic work of grounding
divine testimony. Assent caused by signs and miracles generate strong opinio because it is
the result of the listener's intellectual virtues. This parallels demon faith in which the
intellect is compelled to assent to the unseen by inferring from evidentia and not by an act
of the will to adhere to the speaker. The key factor is the listener grounds their testimony
in an inference from the evidentness of signs or a trustworthy human speaker. Such assent,
however, is not grounded because one believes—trusts—God as the speaker. Such faith is
still valuable since it prepares for narrow faith, where humans are moved "inwardly",
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almost as if one is tracing their assent back up the chain of instrumental causation to the
principal agent. When humans believe sacra scriptura, they are in effect believing God
through the human authors.916
This leads to the notion of credere deo under narrow faith. As shown with human
testimony, narrow faith is assent to a speaker's propositions insofar as they are grounded
by the listener's trust in who the speaker is which includes their virtues, especially as they
relate to accuracy and honesty. Since credere homini is that which is better known but not
which is ontologically prior (insofar as all human virtues participate in divine virtues) our
discussion on human testimony carries over to divine testimony. However, narrow faith in
a divine speaker differs since it results from an infused habit, the theological virtue of faith,
from God. This infusion of faith and theological habit is described by John Hawthorne as
a "faith based on a supernaturally elevated will that consequently disposes the subject to
assent to propositions directly or indirectly by God," in a way that is infallible or "hyperreliable".917 Thomas states that believers do not believe lightly (non leviter credit) for they
have sufficient motive for believing that they are moved by the authority (auctoritate) of
divine teaching.918 Divine authority, he says is confirmed by miracles and by the "inward
instinct of the Divine invitation" (interiori instinctu Dei invitantis) which must be a
description of infused faith.919 Hence, Thomas states in his commentary on Romans that
true faith occurs when the reason (ratione) for the belief is that it was said by God:
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Text 5.3.2.5
…to believe in God (credere Deum) indicates the matter of faith taken as a
theological virtue, having God for its object. Consequently, this act does not
yet attain the nature of faith, because if one believes in God in virtue of
certain human reasons and natural signs, he is not yet said to have the faith
of which we now speak, but only when he believes something for the reason
that it was said by God (est a Deo dictum)—which is indicated by the
phrase, ‘to believe God (credere Deo).920
Lamont takes care to note that to believe God does not mean a listener assents to p because
they happen to believe God said p (whether or not God actually said p) but the listener
assents to p because "God's actually having said something is the reason for believing it."921
This even alleviates concerns over the assent to propositions the prophet or believer does
not fully comprehend. The grounding reason is the person and being of God who is the
ultimate authority and standard for not only virtues such as "truthfulness", but also Truth
itself, i.e., the Logos. Andrea Robiglio implies in "Testes nobilitatis: una riflessione sul
nesso tra verità e nobiltà", that what makes credere deo and infused faith certain whereas
credere homini merely renders probable opinio is that God can present himself
transparently and immediately while human self-presentation is always mediate through
the slow establishment of a relationship. 922
Despite the immediate disclosure of God's self, Eleonore Stump takes the analysis
of infused faith one step further arguing that Thomas’s accounts of faith and wisdom are
based on developing a trusting interpersonal relationship between God and humans
(analogous to human relationship formation) to allow for knowledge to pass from speaker
920
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to listener.923 Her argument is built on Thomas's account of the will. 924 She states the most
notable case for when the will must move the intellect to assent is the interpersonal process
of coming to faith in God, which results in gaining wisdom, namely the will acting on the
intellect to assent to the propositions of faith.925 Stump describes a person coming to faith
as moving through two sequences in which the will influences the intellect. First, the person
has their will drawn to God because of his goodness in cooperation with the intellect’s
purpose of achieving eudaimonia in seeing God.926 The recognition of God’s goodness
provides the necessary grounds to establish an interpersonal relationship between the
believer as listener and God as the speaker. The subsequent trust from this relationship
allows the believer to assent to the propositions of faith. Citing the ST, Stump argues that
the second sequence begins once the relationship is established.927 The relationship
develops in the person of faith some degree of "connaturality" or "sympathy" with God
enabling a disposition in the intellect, namely the intellectual virtue of wisdom, such that
"this virtue will manifest itself in [a believer’s] intuitively knowing things she would not
otherwise have known by the exercise of reason or would not have known as readily or as
well."928 God thus voluntarily and intentionally shares some part of his mind with the
listener (whether that be information about the natural world or beyond).929 In sum,
Aquinas holds to a theory of testimony in which connatural knowledge is a kind of
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testimonial knowledge transmitted from a speaker and is justified by an empathic
experience in which a listener comes to initially trust a speaker, namely God.
5.4 Conclusion: Testimonial Assessment
I have shown that not only is Thomas's testimonial theory unified, but also that listeners
obtain testimonial knowledge through the operation of intellectual or theological virtues to
assess and trust authoritative speakers via their possession of virtue to eliminate the
concerns of inaccuracy and dishonesty. Given that knowledge (or cognitive states) for
Thomas is caused by an agent's "discriminating habits", it is difficult to capture his theory
of testimony using contemporary frameworks which presume evidentialism. Research to
date has thus linked Thomas with the testimonial categories of anti-reductionism,
reductionism, the interpersonal view of testimony (IVT), or some combination of the three.
The prevailing interpretation is that Thomas draws on trust or assurance-based theories like
IVT to account for divine testimony via infused faith and then both IVT and reductionism
to account for differing forms of human testimony. However, even the reductive instances
of human testimony which infer beliefs from evidentia still include both the operation of a
virtue on behalf of the listener and the assessment of the virtuous character of the speakers.
Thus, assent to testimony is ultimately grounded by virtues enabling the listener to adhere
to the speaker through trust and accurately confirm the speaker's character traits.
5.4.1 Is Thomas an anti-reductionist?
No scholar to my knowledge has assessed Thomas's theory of testimony and argued he is
an anti-reductionist, but scholars advancing anti-reductionist projects to secure divine
testimony find a friend in Thomas or broadly "Thomistic" approaches. 930 Given David

930

Wahlberg, Revelation as Testimony, 7, 16.

289

Hume's reputation as the father of reductionism in conjunction with his infamous critique
of miracles and the Apostles' testimony, the evidentialist dichotomy defaults Thomas to
anti-reductionism. As Robert Pasnau has argued, Thomas (or any thinker with an antireductionist approach to divine testimony) is ultimately a fideist due to "blind trust" as
outlined in chapter 1.931 Pasnau thereby argues that Thomas advances a common Christian
fideism using Summa Contra Gentiles I.4 to claim a division between "those who can know
and those who can only believe" (e.g., blind trust) the preambles of faith. 932 As we have
established, Thomas does have a high view of authorities whose testimony carry more
weight, especially church authorities. Yet, as John Hawthorne points out in his response to
Pasnau, Thomas would negatively answer the crucial question, "Is it enough if they [the
masses] simply get lucky in trusting the right people [expert authorities]?" 933 Listeners
cannot presume a right to believe, they must confirm tellings prior to assent.
Thomas does, however, make comments that appear anti-reductionist at first glance
which seem to imply either no confirmatory work by the listener or a presumptive right to
belief. In text 5.3.1.6 for example, we saw that Thomas claims human assertions do not
require confirmation unless there is doubt. In another instance, Siebert notes Thomas
endorses the Christian maxim "good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary
appear" (paralleling the juridical "presumption of innocence"). 934 In both cases, the antireductionist position dissipates in the wider context. The first comment regards swearing
oaths, which itself is an act of confirmation for testimony. Since the virtuous nature or
dignitas of a speaker provides confirmation against the fears of accuracy and honesty, no
931
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additional confirmation is needed for speakers whose dignitas has already been confirmed
(to do so would merely question and thereby insult their character). To the second, Thomas
qualifies the statement in an objection: "one ought to be careful not to believe everyone
readily, according to 1 John 4:1: Believe not every spirit."935 Thomas's qualification
differentiates between moral and epistemic good meaning listeners should presume others
are not lying but not presume they are accurately telling the truth. 936
Thomas also clearly denies anti-reductionist's default presumption of belief.
Regarding unjust accusation he says "it happens sometimes that a man through levity of
mind proceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and this
pertains to rashness."937 Elsewhere he agrees with Ecclesiasticus 19:4 which reads "one
who trusts others too quickly is lightminded," stating probable reasons are required to
assent to human testimony "because the cognition of one man is not naturally ordained
toward the cognition of another, that it is regulated through itself." 938 Perhaps as a result of
his stance toward confirming testimony, Thomas never appears to list testimony as a unique
source of knowledge, a hallmark criteria for anti-reductionism.
The last possibility is that testimony from God generates knowledge since it cannot
be obtained by any other means (e.g., sacra scriptura and the articles of faith). As stated
with Saadya and al-Ghazālī this is a category mistake. Furthermore, Thomas holds to the
Christian tradition of the Trinity and thus Christ as the uncreated Logos. So even though
935
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the literal words of sacra scriptura are the twofold product of both a divine and human
author, the knowledge it contains is held to be transmitted from God. This leads back to
the discussion on instrumental causality as a form of secondary causality and thus the
theory of participation. Insofar as all human knowledge is merely a participation in the true
source, i.e., divine knowledge, there is little room to argue for testimony as a generative
source of knowledge.
5.4.2 Is Thomas a reductionist?
A compelling case can be made that Thomas is a reductionist. The cognitive states of
scientia and opinio are caused by nontestimonial sources insofar as they are made evident
by the senses or by reason. In addition to the texts against anti-reductionism just mentioned,
Thomas commends listeners' for verifying claims. In discussing the error of the
Manicheans concerning Christ's incarnation, he offers the Apostles as examples of
"suitable witnesses of Christ" (idoneos Christi testes) in confirming that Jesus had been
resurrected bodily.939 As shown, Siebert argues that Thomas’s usage of the broad sense of
faith qualifies as reductionist since the grounding of human testimony reduces to other
sources. "Strong opinion" accrues from testimonial knowledge as a result of inductive or
"probable" inference based on "signs" or "probable" (non-demonstrative) syllogisms. As
shown in text 5.3.1.3, Thomas's thought echoes that of Saadya Gaon and al-Ghazālī in
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SCG IV.29; "Now it is impossible for a valid witness of the truth to be afforded by things that happen not
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aligning with contemporary inferential reasoning in giving more credence to an assertion
proclaimed by more people:
1.
2.
3.

If more people say that p, then probably p
More people say that p
Therefore, probably p

As Siebert notes, strong opinion results when "other things being equal, we should give
more weight to p when more witnesses say p than not, because ‘it is probable that the saying
of many contains the truth more than the saying of one.’" 940
It is also conceivable to understand virtue in a reductive way by inferring from the
virtuous nature of a speaker to the probability that they speak truly. Elizabeth Fricker offers
a local-reductionism where listeners' assess a speaker's trustworthiness in terms of sincerity
and competence which amounts to an assessment, "or a prediction from", the speaker's
psychology.941 As has been pointed out, this conception of testimony arguably prohibits
learning from written texts or chains of transmission in which the psychologies of the
original or intermediate witnesses cannot be assessed. 942 Nevertheless, Lamont notes this
is a point of tension in Thomas's theory since he attempts to balance the position that faith
is rational, voluntary, and requires grace and thus asks:
…if the formal object of faith, the reason for believing, is God's speaking,
why does faith involve a will to salvation…? Our intellect can tell us that
God cannot speak falsely, and knowledge of this fact is sufficient to bring
us to believe what God says without in any way willing to reach him.
Moreover, it is quite possible for us to see that there is a contradiction
implied in God's speaking falsely, and hence that it is impossible that this
could happen. Since this is so, why should faith differ from knowledge?
And why should it necessarily be voluntary? 943
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This tension seems to line up with the notion of "demon faith" since demons believe on
account of a rational inference from these sorts of facts. Hawthorne refers to "demon faith"
as posteriori abductive knowledge since knowledge from testimony comes not from
trusting the speaker but "impressive empirical evidence that provides compelling signs that
God is speaking through the church."944 This harkens back to Lamont's clarification that
one assents because they believe God when God says p vs. believing p because God said
p. Of course, it is possible for listeners to assent to the material object of faith for reasons
other than the formal object, namely God and his moving the will to assent, which is how
Thomas explains how heretics can believe some but not all of sacra doctrina.945 Thus it is
imperative for the listener to recognize who the speaker is (and their dignitas), that it is
God who is speaking. The possession of the confirmatory speaker virtue is obtained
through the employment of the listener's virtues. Thus, even authors who were unknowing
instruments in the production of scripture do not assent to faith propositions as result of
faith. The tension may also fall under the interpersonal aspect of credere deo in which one
believes God on account of their relationship with him and not on account of what they
know about him which has been shown also applies to human testimony.
5.4.3 Thomas's Virtue-Theoretic of Testimony
It should not be surprising that testimony is understood in terms of virtues, given Thomas
holds that knowledge results from the proper functioning of intellectual and theological
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virtues. As Andrea Robiglio has argued, in pre-modern thought truth and "nobilitas" are
linked in a way that contemporary philosophical debates struggle to accommodate as seen
with central notions such as "reputation, trust, value, dignity, character, prestige,
recognition, honor, together with their opposites, such as distrust, unworthiness, dishonor,
lack of rights, etc."946 He thus raises the crucial question, "Is the witness reliable because
he/she testifies to the truth or is the truth certified because a reliable witness says it?" 947
While one earns a reputation for reliably testifying, Thomas's realism and conception of
truth in the Logos permits the latter. In fact, as was well discussed in the Middle ages, this
is the only means to obtain knowledge beyond deductive reason and empirical evidence.
As Robiglio points out, even Thomas's teacher Albert affirmed one of the ancient meanings
of the word "probable" as referring to rational agents (not states of affairs), such that the
vir probabilis is the trustworthy expert since they were capable of providing a successful
proof (dialectical argument) for their statements. 948
As a result, all contemporary testimonial assessments to date note the role of virtue
and thus often assign IVT to Thomas. Even though trust-based theories of testimony were
popularized after Lamont published Divine Faith (2004), he recognized that Thomas did
not hold an anti-reductionist theory, but an "intellectual virtue view," saying "On the
intellectual virtue view, knowledge from testimony does not stop short of the world: "what
makes belief in someone's testimony reasonable, is the actual honesty and knowledge of
the person being believed; there is no need or room for a presumptive right to be inserted
between believer and person believed in order to warrant trust on such occasions." 949
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Intellectual virtues are what permit listeners to assent to p by believing the speaker
(believing the formal object of faith permits assent to the material object of faith) and not
merely assent to p because they believe that the speaker said it (inferring the truth of the
material object from qualities of the formal object of faith). The true difference between
divine and human testimony appears to be which virtue is responsible for knowledge from
testimony. For divine faith, the answer is clearly the theological virtue fides since "divine
faith always attains the object of the intellect, which is truth, its act is always good, and
hence it can be a virtue."950 The same cannot be said for belief in human testimony. Given
human speakers often lie or err, fides cannot be the operative virtue (in the listener) since
it often fails to obtain the truth. Narrow faith must be a special act of the will. This act of
the will is what differentiates faith from science (which is forced by evidence) and opinion
(which does not have firm assent). This difference is what makes faith a meritorious act. 951
Third, the typical motivation for faith is that a speaker is truthful (or possesses truthfulness
as a virtue). Since society requires a minimum level of truth for epistemic divisions of
labor, knowledge can be gained from faith in speakers.
Siebert argues Aquinas’s view of testimony is unique, first in being "pluralist" by
holding to both a reductionist and an assurance view, and second in how his assurance view
is different from contemporary accounts. Aquinas does not neatly fit in IVT since his focus
is not on the speaker’s role or means by which a speaker take responsibility for their claims.
Aquinas's focus is on the speaker's authority, established by their moral and intellectual
virtues, which acts as a form of pre-verification or preemptive reason to assent to their
propositions making the listener "more sensitive to the speaker’s knowledge" and "less
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sensitive to [their] own evidence."952 This introduces a virtue account of testimonial
trustworthiness, in which speakers fulfill the responsibility to speak the truth out of a
virtuous motivation. While Thomas gives a clear account of what qualifies a virtue as either
moral or intellectual by their aim, the possession of intellectual virtues entails the
possession of moral virtues. This is superior to contemporary approaches which define a
trustworthy speaker just as sincere and competent for several reasons: first, since nonvirtuous speakers can be sincere and competent, but not worthy of a listener’s faith; second,
truthfulness is a more fundamental reason for faith in a speaker since "having faith in a
speaker does not require taking the speaker to be an authority, but it does require taking
the speaker to be truthful, even when the speaker is an epistemic authority." 953 Siebert is
thus in agreement with Lamont that the formal object of faith is the reason one assents to a
proposition (the material object of faith), which in this case is due to fides in the person of
the speaker.
Trust thus plays a primary role in Thomas account of testimony. This is clearest
with divine testimony since God is the most trustworthy speaker. Yet, there is no
presumptive right to trust. Emphasis is primarily placed on employing one's own
intellectual virtues to confirm that the speaker is truly God. This trustworthiness applies to
human speakers as well, but requires additional work given the great potential of
inaccuracy and dishonesty. Human and divine trustworthiness come together in divine
testimony through the production of sacra doctrina and human testimony through the
swearing of oaths, in which trust is confirmed through dignitas. Thus, once these
relationships of trust have been verified through a speaker's dignitas, knowledge is allowed
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to transmit more freely. As such, Christ wished for his followers to dispense with the need
for swearing since their identity in Him mark them as truthful. 954
In contemporary terms, Thomas is more reductionist than anti-reductionist, but his
openness to knowledge sources beyond natural means via divine testimony and his
emphasis on trust disrupts his placement in the contemporary framework. As I have shown,
Thomas's overall theory of testimony employs virtue to obtain knowledge, primarily in
determining the truthfulness of the speaker and this is true for both divine and human
speakers even though the process of transmission is different. Listeners must confirm the
dignitas of the speaker to determine they are truthful both in terms of their intellectual
accuracy and their moral honesty. Using the framework developed in Chapter 2 from John
Greco's rethinking, we can see that Thomas maintains that testimonial knowledge is
reductionistic insofar as it necessarily comes through another species of knowledge like
perception, rational inference, and even the divine Logos itself marking him a sourcereductionist. Thomas also maintains that all testimonial knowledge is ultimately
transmitted, as required by divine participation, thus it is distinct phenomenon and not
back-to-back cases of generation.955 This makes him a transmission anti-reductionist.
These two positions permit trust, the meritorious act of the will in assenting to what a
speaker says by believing the speaker because of who they are.
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CHAPTER 6: TOWARD A TRANSHISTORICAL CONCEPT OF TESTIMONY
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 2, the epistemological concept of testimony is broadly understood
as learning via the utterances of other people and two primary approaches to testimony
have developed since the rise of social epistemology in the 1970’s, testimony as evidence
and as assurance: Coady laid the groundwork for an evidential framework in Testimony
(1992) where he identified the theories "reductionism" and "anti-reductionism" in which
testimony constitutes evidence of what speakers say;956 Hinchman (2005) and Moran
(2006) introduced the Interpersonal View of Testimony (IVT) in which testimonial acts
offer assurance for what speakers say.957 Despite some earlier social epistemological
works arguing that Ancient or Medieval philosophers like Augustine were reductionists or
anti-reductionists,958 the emerging consensus is that pre-Modern thinkers do not neatly
populate either the evidential or assurance framework of testimony. 959 Yet, an
epistemological conception, especially one as important and pervasive as testimony, should
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not be incongruent with entire traditions of historical thought. For if theories of testimony
(and testimonial frameworks) cannot be applied across history (transhistorical) without
distorting thinkers' accounts, then the prevailing theories need to be redressed. 960 More
specifically, if the prevailing theories treat testimony as evidence or assurance when
historical thinkers did not employ these epistemological concepts, then the theories need
to be expanded or made more inclusive.961 The broad epistemological concept of testimony
and its framework should not be beholden to one historical period, but transhistorical. The
problem, to be clear, centers on what testimony is and its epistemic role, not how it occurred
which was clearly understood differently as knowledge theories progressed. In this chapter,
I argue for such a transhistorical concept of testimony and propose a "rethought"
testimonial framework before testing them with a virtue-theoretic approach to testimony.
I consider two levels of "testimony": testimony as a telling or verbal instance of
coming to know either via generation or transmission, and testimony as the epistemological
process or activity which yields knowledge or beliefs via tellings.962 I show that the current
conceptions of testimony are unable to give an accurate account of testimonial theories
prior to the rise of evidentialism without distorting the phenomena. 963 Ancient and
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The same could be said for any epistemological knowledge source, e.g., if perception was understood
specifically in terms of light reflection, then it would disrupt historic accounts in which light was thought of
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Medieval testimonial accounts cannot be evidential given that the epistemic role of
evidence only emerged in the 13th to 14th century with Duns Scotus and William Ockham,
and the justificatory role in the 18th C.. While many historic accounts do rely on a notion
of trust like the assurance approach, many do not and still maintain a strong emphasis on
rejecting the presumption that speakers are either knowledgeable or trustworthy. 964 I argue
that the contemporary discussions of testimony would be served by a testimonial concept
and framework that is not understood primarily in terms of evidence or evidentialism, but
that remains theory neutral to as great an extent as possible.
In the first section of this chapter, I offer a "transhistorical" notion of testimony,
i.e., one that does not presuppose a single concept of "evidence." To do so, I trace the
historical development of the concepts "evidence" and "evidentness" to show that
philosophers prior to the 18th century appreciated a richer variety of evidentiary distinctions
than is typical of contemporary epistemologists. I show that, in contrast to a justificatory
sense of "evidence" common amongst post-Enlightenment philosophers, earlier thinkers
such as Scotus and Ockham conceived of "evidence" more broadly to include the
evidentness of a cognitive object or a cognition grasping that object, i.e., a thing’s being
evident or an evident cognition.965 I argue these distinctions clarify when testimony that p
does and does not qualify as evidence. In the second section, I propose a neutral framework

"represents a novel and creative attempt to rejuvenate Islamic philosophy for a modern audience…using the
language and conceptual apparatus of contemporary Anglo-American 'analytic' philosophy" by adopting a
"‘rational reconstructive’ approach to the history of philosophy." Anthony Robert Booth, Analytic Islamic
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Palgrave
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testimonial view anti-reductionist. Wahlberg, Revelation as Testimony, 109, 132.
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(introduced in chapter 2) using John Greco's "rethinking" of testimonial categories. I
conclude in the 3rd section by drawing on the broader notion of evidence given in the first
section to test the transhistorical testimonial framework from the second section with a
virtue-theoretic framework. To do so, I argue that reasonable reliance on the testimony of
others is best understood through the notion of epistemic trust as the inverse correlation of
the intellectual aspect of the virtue of autonomy where listeners should strive to achieve a
virtuous mean of intellectual autonomy between the vices of being too trusting (i.e., not
autonomous enough) and not trusting enough (i.e., too autonomous).
6.2 Testimony as evident vs. evidence
The so-called "social turn" comprised by the rise of social epistemology in the late 20 th
century is often seen as following an anti-evidentialist turn in general epistemology away
from the idea that all knowledge must accord with an "epistemic imperative" in the form
of beliefs supported by evidence. Instead of focusing on evaluating whether individuals
(isolated from their social environment) maintain justified beliefs through doxastic rules
governing knowledge generation and transmission, social epistemology aims to give an
account of knowledge reflecting the complex reality of social relationships and institutions.
Despite this move away from the post-Renaissance Western world dominated by
an "individualistic ideology," the discussion of testimony in philosophy remains largely
rooted in evidentialism. As Linda Zagzebski observes:
This view [of testimony as individualistic] no doubt emerged in the early
modern period because of the rise of a view of autonomy that stresses
individual rather than corporate responsibility, together with the view that
individual responsibility is a matter of properly handling one’s own
evidence. What is taken to be debatable is only the nature of the relevant
evidence, a debate that assumes the evidence model of testimony… 966
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The persistence of the evidence model of testimony is largely due to Coady’s influential
work Testimony (1992), in which he relies heavily on David Hume and Thomas Reid.967
Coady defines testimony as "a kind of evidence," though he admits that viewing testimony
as evidence is not "wholly unproblematic."968
Coady’s reductionist and anti-reductionists frameworks are inherently evidentialist.
As he says, "[Hume’s] theory constitutes a reduction of testimony as a form of evidence or
support to the status of a species… of inductive inference." 969 By contrast, on the Reidean
anti-reductionist view, testimony is evidence just as a sense perception is evidence. On this
latter view, there are two ways of understanding how testimony qualifies as evidence
without itself requiring further verification: a rule of inference, or a rule of presumption.
Under a rule of inference, a speaker says that p and the listener infers p. Under the rule of
presumption, one ought to accept all testimony unless there is additional evidence that the
speaker is ignorant, insincere, or in some other way deficient. This view of testimony as
presumed truth or trust is shared by the IVT. As such, approaches to testimony as assurance
are often labeled "anti-reductionist" even though they do not necessarily treat testimony as
evidence. Both reductionist and anti-reductionist theories however understand testimony
as an utterance which in some way acts as evidence for a belief.
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This view of testimony has limitations. Note here an ambiguity in the concept
"testimony." If testimony is to be treated as grounds for a belief, then it would be more
accurate to say that a testimony is grounds for a belief. However, since "a testimony" is
grammatically awkward in English, I opt for the phrase a telling to refer to the particular
event where a speaker tells a listener that p, or, per Lamont, "the act of conveying
knowledge to someone through providing him with one's testimony." 970 More than simply
a listener being told that p by a speaker, a telling implies something is learned by the
listener thus requiring their comprehension, belief, and knowledge of p when the speaker
says that p.971 On the testimony-as-evidence view, it is difficult to make sense of a telling.
This is because, as Zagzebski has observed, evidence is fundamentally third-personal.
Third-personal reasons, which she calls "theoretical," are commonly available to any
rational agent who can recognize, aggregate, and share them. 972 On the other hand, firstpersonal reasons, which she calls "deliberative," are only available to an individual and
cannot be shared or aggregated with theoretical reasons. 973 On the testimony-as-evidence
view, the fact that a telling occurred is what provides one with evidence, whether or not
one experienced the telling oneself. Experiences, like the experience of hearing an
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with others. They are relevant from anyone’s point of view. The connections between theoretical reasons and
what they are reasons for are among the facts of the universe. Theoretical reasons aggregate and can be used
in calculations of probability. What we call evidence is most naturally put in the category of those theoretical
reasons we can identify." Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, 63–64.
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utterance, are first-personal. One may of course have first-personal (deliberative) reasons
to believe something, but such reasons do not automatically translate to third-personal
(theoretical) reasons for others—i.e., they do not automatically become evidence for others.
Thus, testimony-as-evidence seems to be limited to the fact that a telling occurred,
or that someone had the experience of a telling, but the experience itself would not qualify
as evidence (for those who did not personally undergo it) to form certain beliefs. 974 On the
plausible assumption that first-personal experiences provide reasons to believe, the
testimony-as-evidence view oversimplifies the sense in which tellings do so. As Zagzebski
says:
The evidence model of testimony is the only model that makes sense if all
epistemic reasons are third personal. In that way of looking at reasons,
testimony is a process by which third-person reasons are passed around.
They are either passed around directly—we acquire them as we see the
world around us, or they are passed around indirectly by inductive
inference. There is no other alternative. 975
A telling as evidence or grounds for a belief thus emerges as an entirely different kind of
epistemic ground than what is typically denoted by the term "evidence." The use of this
term both outside and inside philosophy is notoriously slippery. Thomas Kelly notes that
non-philosophical usage—from courtrooms to scientists to historians—covers a host of
ideas typically revolving around physical objects themselves or their arrangement. 976 As
Patrick Rysiew points out, the situation in philosophy is no better and may in fact be worse:
More troubling is the fact that there’s not much agreement within
philosophy as to what evidence is: it has been variously said to consist in
one’s "sense-data" (certain empiricists), "observation statements"
(positivists), what one knows (Williamson 2000b), the "information a
974
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person has to go on" (Feldman 2003: 45) or whatever indicates to us that
the proposition is true (Conee 2011), one’s non-factive, phenomenal states
(certain epistemic internalists), whatever states or processes, etc., lead in
some suitably reliable way, to a belief (e.g., Greco 1999, 2002). 977
In short, contemporary philosophers want the concept of evidence to do more than it is
suited for. Kelly helpfully identifies four distinct roles for evidence: (1) evidence as that
which justifies belief; (2) evidence as that which rational thinkers respect; 978 (3) evidence
as a guide (sign, symptom, mark) to truth; and (4) evidence as neutral, intersubjective
arbiter.979 In analyzing Kelly's list, Rysiew asks "whether a single kind of thing is suited to
play the various roles evidence has been thought to play; and whether we’re likely to arrive
at a unified theory (a single concept) of evidence." 980 Rysiew is optimistic about the second
given historical considerations we will address momentarily. However, to the first, Rysiew
is skeptical evidence understood as a single kind can function in all the various roles
assigned to it.
Rysiew is not alone here. William Alston sees the terms "evidence" and "reasons"
as "too squishy" to capture key differences in justification such that he introduces the
distinction between doxastic and nondoxastic grounds for beliefs. Nondoxastic grounds are
primarily if not exclusively phenomena.981 This fits the common understanding of
"evidence" as a publicly available object or neutral guide to truth. Nondoxastic grounds are
inherently non-propositional. They are raw epistemic input ready for sensory or rational
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consumption or processing. Doxastic grounds, on the other hand, are themselves beliefs,
such that a belief is grounded by another belief.982 Since a belief is a propositional attitude
about p, doxastic grounds are propositional by definition. They are preprocessed epistemic
inputs having already been prepared as the output of another mind. So, when "testimony"
is considered as "evidence" in the third-personal sense described above, what is meant is a
telling in which a belief obtained from another person's utterance serves as the doxastic
grounds for one’s own belief that p.983
We seem to intuitively or subconsciously understand this distinction insofar as in
ordinary language we reserve the term "evidence" for sensory objects or facts that a subject
knows to obtain while we reserve the term "reasons" for what Alston calls "propositionally
structured entities" (whether they be facts or well-supported beliefs). 984 Thomas Kelly also
recognizes this distinction in grammatical function stating that the difference between
evidence and a reason is that the former is a mass term while the latter is a count noun.985
Kelly appears to have in mind Jeffrey Pelletier’s work in which mass terms denote stuff
while count nouns denote objects. Language, Pelletier argues, reveals ontological
presuppositions by our use of mass terms vs. count nouns. As count nouns, "reasons to
believe" are "entities that are distinct from each other and thus one can distinguish and
count them," while as a mass term, "evidence" is "stuff that is undifferentiated with respect
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to the term being used to describe it."986 Applying this thought to epistemic grounds
parallels the conclusions of philosophers such as Zagzebski that evidence can aggregate,
or be added to existing evidence, while reasons do not aggregate but rather replace one
another.987 This division has led to questions about whether a unified evidential account
can be maintained.
Returning to Rysiew, he is optimistic that a unified theory of evidence which is
reliant on Thomas Reid (d. 1796) can overcome the challenges that evidentialism faces. He
says:
Whether or not these problems are insuperable, there is another way of
thinking of evidence that preserves its essential connection with truth. Here,
instead of beginning with the abstract noun (‘evidence’), we take
evidentness as the root notion and treat the nominative ‘evidence’ in
derivative terms, as that which makes something evident (manifest, etc.).988
Rysiew limits himself solely to Reid’s account, but this approach echoes the thought of
John Duns Scotus (d. 1308), William of Ockham (d.1347), and John Buridan (d. 1358),
who collectively introduced the notion of evidence and its dependence on evidentness.
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Scotus writes that the stronger form of knowledge (scientia) arose from the evidence of a
scientific object.989 Ockham used evidence as the factor that distinguished knowledge from
belief, insofar as knowledge is defined as assent to a true proposition with evidence or
evidentness.990 John Buridan and his contemporaries varied the notion of evidence to allow
for different levels of knowledge, whether absolute, natural, or moral. 991 As Robert Pasnau
points out in his account of the history of epistemology, for these thinkers there are three
distinguishable notions of evidentness that are entwined:
A. The evidentness of a cognitive object; that is, a thing’s being evident.
B. The evidentness of a cognition that grasps such an object; that is, an
evident cognition.
C. That which makes something be evident; that is, the evidence.992
Modern and contemporary epistemology predominately only speak of notion C, and thus
misinterpret historic thinkers who predominately mean notion A and B. 993 Notion C traces
back through notion B and then notion A to metaphysical foundations. For medieval
philosophers, the bridge from the metaphysical to the cognitive was typically considered
to be the powers or "virtues" of human nature. Knowledge was the fruit of a causal process,
or the proper use of intellectual and moral virtues.994 However, shortly after Thomas
989
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Aquinas, the strong metaphysical underpinning of knowledge was largely replaced with
explaining cognition and how knowledge is acquired. 995 Despite the two historical types of
evidentness seemingly having been lost from all but language and the subconscious,
epistemological problems appear to be driving contemporary epistemologists such as
Rysiew back to these older notions of evidentness. Analyses like Alston’s distinction
between nondoxastic and doxastic grounds and Zagzebski’s distinction between theoretical
and deliberative reasons, reveal an epistemic ground for belief other than the typical
evidentialist notion of publicly available facts.
The historic sense of "evidence" (notion C) is thus congruent with Alston’s
nondoxastic grounds and Zagzebski’s theoretical reasons, as publicly available facts or
objects everyone can experience to make something evident or to justify beliefs. The
historic sense of "evidentness" (notion A/B) likewise is congruent with Alston’s doxastic
grounds and Zagzebski’s deliberative reasons. Borrowing an example from Kelly, we may
say that when I have a headache, the experience of cranial pain might qualify as evidence
(notion C) since it makes evident to me that I have a headache, but since I cannot share my
experience of cranial pain publicly, it cannot be evidence (notion C) for anyone else.
Following the historic tripartite conception of evidentness, a headache is evident (notion
A) to me since my experiencing of the cognitive object cranial pain is evident to me. This
gives rise to the evidentness (notion B) of my cognition "I have a headache" through my
grasping of the cognitive object cranial pain in propositional form. Both these usages of

of S's virtues seems insufficient to support "S should be believed" without the interpersonal component.
Regardless, this is not how premodern minds understood the epistemic role of the virtues.
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evidentness are first-personal. Only that which makes my headache evident to someone
else qualifies as evidence (notion C) in the modern sense.
Two likely channels emerge as to what makes my headache evident to you in this
notion C sense: (1) observable signs correlated with headaches by induction (such as my
applying pressure to my forehead while wincing or your learning that I exhibit lifestyle
factors which often trigger headaches such as stress, poor sleep, or excessive alcohol
consumption); and (2) my telling you that I have a headache. For (2), what qualifies as
evidence is the utterance "I have a headache," or perhaps the fact that the situation took
place in which I performed the utterance "I have a headache." But a telling as evidence in
this form is too weak to perform the role of an epistemic ground for the belief that someone
else has a headache, since it is susceptible to all sorts of error, such as insincerity,
ignorance, random inaccuracy, etc.
The reason the utterance does not rise to the level of evidence is due to its doxastic
or propositional nature, which includes the notion of there being a reason to believe that p.
But mere utterances do not automatically provide such reason. A computer programmed to
produce the sounds "I have a headache" does not give one any reason to believe that anyone
in fact has a headache.996 A telling, in the normal case, is not merely raw unprocessed facts.
My telling that I have a headache is produced by my evident cognition (notion B) built
upon the evidentness (notion A) of the cranial pain. Thus, my telling you that I have a
headache does not qualify as evidence (notion C) for you (or me) merely by virtue of being
a third-personal utterance. Rather, my telling gives rise to the evident cognition in you that
"I have a headache," and so your belief is based on the grounds of my belief, in a way in
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which the justification of your belief depends on our relationship, and not merely on the
existence of my utterance. Thus, my telling is a first-personal doxastic ground or reason
(i.e., a "deliberative reason") for you to adopt my belief that I have a headache, but not a
third-personal nondoxastic ground or "evidence" (i.e., a "theoretical reason").
This brings us to a clearer picture of what testimony is and is not. What is most
clear is that testimony is a telling which can serve as an epistemic ground. It is arguably a
reason to believe, but not necessarily evidence. This expands the concept of "testimony"
to include more than notion C evidence. Testimonial theories that restrict a telling to merely
Notion C evidence will be limited in what knowledge can be transmitted, namely the
evidence that a telling occurred. A listener must infer from the evidence of my saying "I
have a headache" that I indeed do have a headache. This can be perfectly acceptable for
reductionist accounts which understand all testimony via other knowledge sources.
Theories that allow "evidence" to be expanded to include notion A and notion B notions of
evidentness, however, will further allow the content of telling. The exact conception of
evidence will thus depend on a given evidentialist theory and how they navigate the
challenges outlined above.997 Treating testimony as a reason to believe thus admittedly
creates additional work for the traditional reductionism and anti-reductionism
understandings of testimony which treat all testimony as evidence. In fact, Zagzebski
points out that a model of testimony which can be reduced to a "process of passing around
theoretical reasons" can prevent or delay investigation into the nature of the self and "makes
997
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invisible the epistemic bonds between individuals and the foundations of epistemic
communities."998 The difference is that a telling, as a non-evidential reason to believe, is
interpersonal. What allows a telling to serve as an epistemic ground has frequently turned
to trust-based IVT theories like Moran's "Assurance theory" which deny the evidentialist
framework. As such, if you tell me your belief, then my acceptance of your belief is based
on my trusting you.999 It involves a relationship (however simple or brief) between the
speaker and the listener.1000
Since a reason to believe does not aggregate like evidence but can replace former
reasons, a speaker’s testimony can preemptively replace a listener’s reasons to believe. So,
when it does, testimony is authoritative. Thus, for testimony to be authoritative to a person
or community, it must be an interpersonal reason, which is problematic for notion C
evidence. Zagzebski’s answer is that for testimony to be authoritative, it must provide a
deliberative reason, which depends on an interpersonal relationship, and is therefore nonevidential in the contemporary sense.1001 However, trust in this sense is a basic form of
evidentness. As Zagzebski says:
Although the notion of evidence is multiply ambiguous, I have said that I
think it is most naturally put in the category of third-person reasons. … we
need trust that what we take to be indicative of truth is in fact indicative of
truth, and so the evidence for p we think we can identify is never as basic
as trust in the self, and… it is not as basic as trust in others as a reason for
believing p. What we call evidence is not only derivative from trust in the
self, it is also derivative from trust in others upon whom I rely in identifying
the evidence. It follows that trust is a first-person, deliberative reason for
belief that is more basic than anything I take to be third-person reasons.
Since no one has figured out how to combine the first-person and
third-person perspectives into a single viewpoint, deliberative and
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theoretical reasons do not aggregate. There is no system of adding together
both kinds of reasons for believing p to give a summary verdict on the
reasonableness of believing p. Third-person evidence for p does not exhaust
all of the reasons for believing p, and in fact, does not even include the most
basic kind of reason for believing p.1002
Per Zagzebski, such authoritative testimony is justified just like the authority of belief: 1003
Justification Thesis 1 for the Authority of Testimony (JAT 1) - The
authority of a person's testimony for me is justified by my conscientious
judgment that I am more likely to satisfy my desire to get true beliefs and
avoid false beliefs if I believe what the authority tells me than if I try to
figure out what to believe myself.1004
Hence, listeners should accept authoritative testimony granted their goal is knowledge and
their epistemic position is inferior to that of the expert in this situation. In this regard,
testimony from an epistemic authority is akin to a command from a practical authority,
where adopting a belief preemptively is parallel to obeying a command to believe.
Testimony as a reason to believe, especially as an authoritative reason to believe,
shifts the epistemic burden from "what the speaker says" to "whom the speaker is"
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including the knowledge and character the speaker possesses and their relationship to the
listener.1005 The aim is to understand testimony – a telling – as a reason to believe and not
necessarily as evidence in order to provide a neutral account along the lines of: to know
that p is to form one's belief that p on the basis of a reason for p that one is aware of. In
this respect, a reason can still be accounted for as evidence when understood in the historic
sense of evidentness while testimony as a reason also allows for other historical accounts
of knowledge. Insofar as testimony as a telling can be accepted as a reason or the fact that
a telling occurred is a "kind of evidence" to justify or ground a belief, then understanding
testimony as a telling is step toward a neutral concept which can be applied
transhistorically.
6.3 Towards a transhistorical testimonial framework
In this section I propose a neutral testimonial framework that does not presume testimony
is a form of evidence and does not presume a role for justification either for or by testimony.
I am not unconvinced that the terms "reductionism" and "anti-reductionism" can be used
free from evidential preconceptions and thus have outlived their usefulness. Nevertheless,
the conceptual positioning afforded by the terms helps frame two pertinent questions
regarding testimony: 1) is testimony an autonomous generative source of knowledge or can
testimonial knowledge be reduced to a non-testimonial species of knowledge?; 2) Is
testimony a unique phenomenon of knowledge transmission or can knowledge
transmission be reduced to knowledge generation? Following John Greco's reductionist
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and anti-reductionist responses to both questions, I construct a framework I believe flexible
enough to be congruent with the prevailing theories throughout history. 1006
A reductionist and anti-reductionist response for each question yields four
positions. Regarding the first question of testimony's status as a source of knowledge,
Source Reductionism (SR) maintains that testimony is not a generative species of
knowledge since testimonial knowledge "reduces" to a non-subspecies of knowledge. In
contrast, Source Anti-reductionism (SA) maintains that testimony is an autonomous
generative source of knowledge, or at least "that testimonial knowledge cannot be
understood entirely in terms of non-testimonial generative sources." 1007 Regarding the
second question of how listeners come to know p via the tellings of a speaker, Transmission
Reductionism (TR) maintains that transmission reduces to back-to-back instances of
knowledge generation. Knowledge that p is generated in the speaker who's telling then
generates that p in the listener via induction from my existing knowledge (about the topic,
the speaker, etc.). Transmission Anti-reductionism (TA) maintains that transmission does
not reduce to knowledge generation but is a distinct epistemic phenomenon. I interpret this
framework to analyze testimony as follows:
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Chart 6.3.0.1

Reductionism:

AntiReductionism:

Source:
1 - Can testimonial knowledge
be reduced to a non-testimonial
species of knowledge?
"Source Reductionism" (SR)
Yes: Testimony is NOT a
generative species of knowledge
since it "reduces" to a nonsubspecies of knowledge
"Source Anti-reductionism" (SA)
No: Testimony IS a generative
species of knowledge in its own
right

Transmission:
2 - Can knowledge transmission
be reduced to knowledge
generation?
"Transmission Reductionism"
(TR)
Yes: Transmission "reduces" to
back-to-back instances
knowledge generation
"Transmission Antireductionism" (TA)
No: Transmission does not
reduce to knowledge generation
but is a distinct phenomenon.1008

Since responses to the source question must be paired with those to the transmission
question, four theories emerge from the possible combinations: Theory 1 (SR & TR);
Theory 2 (SA & TR); Theory 3 (SA & TA); and Theory 4 (SR & TA). Trust, Greco argues,
can fit into any positions including an anti-reductionist response. 1009 Theory 1 (SR & TR)
depicts the weakest form of testimony, a subspecies of knowledge which is generated in
the listener on the basis of speaker testimony due to induction or a familiar epistemological
process following its generation in the speaker by a traditional knowledge source. This
amounts to traditional reductionism which post-Enlightenment epistemology most readily
fits since the individual agency of the knower takes precedent. 1010 Theory 2 (SA & TR)
provides the strongest form of testimony. Testimony is not only an autonomous source of
knowledge, but each telling would qualify as a new instance of knowledge generation.
Theory 3 (SA & TA) depicts testimony as a generative source of knowledge which can
1008
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then be transmitted given the specifics of a given case. In Theory 4 (SR & TA), testimony
is not a generative source of knowledge and must rely on traditional sources for knowledge
acquisition but provides a unique form of knowledge transmission (in this regard testimony
parallels memory).1011
I have found that the framework is flexible enough to remain neutral on how
knowledge is generated and transmitted for the primary epistemological approaches
whether evidentialism, reliabilism, or virtue epistemology. 1012 In fact, theories may draw
on multiple approaches. While generation and transmission are irreducible to (cannot be
understood in terms of) each other, the processes relevant to generation or transmission
within any of the four theories need not be the same. To use Greco's terms, a "unified"
theory draws on a "common genus" for coming to know in both generation and
transmission whereas a "non-unified" theory does not, instead drawing from different
normative theories.1013 The framework also makes no demands on the scope or context for
understanding testimony as a source of knowledge in relation to testimonial transmission.
Testimonial transmission is often visualized as knowledge being passed through a chain of
speakers and listeners. Testimony as a generative source of knowledge sees the first link in
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a chain as a telling and not a non-testimonial source. However, it is common to refer to a
speaker as a source of knowledge for any given listener, making testimony the last link in
the chain. Hence, the meaning of "source" is context dependent in the same way "new" in
"I bought a new car" can mean "newly built" or a "new to me." On the individual level,
distinctions between generation and transmission disappear with the listener coming to
know something (typically without understanding the chain). 1014 Scholars like Greco
narrow the scope to a given community where knowledge generation refers to the
acquisition of knowledge into a community from an external source (the first link for the
community) and transmission is passing/distributing knowledge within the community. 1015
However, in a wider context the chain of transmission continues outside the community
where the first link likely ends in another source. The widest possible context entails
metaphysical considerations on the nature of knowledge. However, since the framework
does not presume a given scope it can account for anti-transmission examples (e.g., the
creationist teacher) and provide a neutral and thereby transhistorical framework for the
epistemology of testimony.
What I have shown thus far is that testimony is bigger than evidence and that
treating testimony as evidence is not only anachronistic to Ancient and Medieval thinkers
who maintained testimonial theories, but also insufficient without relying on the more
specific historic notions of evidentness vs. evidence. I argued that testimony is a telling or
verbal instance of coming to know by either generation or transmission. Then I proposed a
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flexible framework for analyzing testimony in various normative epistemological
approaches while remaining flexible enough to account for a wide variety of concepts and
historical perspectives using John Greco's distinction between forms of source and
transmission reductionism vs. anti-reductionism. This should provide both a concept of
testimony and a framework for the epistemology of testimony that is transhistorical.
However, providing a neutral framework has an unintentional consequence. Just as
objectively presenting all ethical normative theories as equally valid ultimately endorses a
form of moral relativism, so too does a transhistorical framework lend itself to social
constructivism. Thus, in the final section, I will both test the flexibility of the proposed
transhistorical theory of testimony and offer my take on the most promising path forward
for understanding testimony.
6.4 Accounting for a virtue-theoretic testimonial theory
To test the explanatory power and flexibility of the proposed transhistorical concept of
testimony and framework, I will analyze a virtue-theoretic approach built on the virtue of
autonomy instead of trust directly. The traditional approaches principally operate under
what Roger Pouivet calls "epistemic methodism" assuming that a thinker's testimonial
theory is static and thereby captured by one theory within the framework, e.g., Hume is
Theory 1 (SR & TR), and always Theory 1.1016 Even Greco introduced the rethought
categories to argue we universally adopt what I have labeled Theory 4 (SR&TA). I argue
that the framework allows shifts between theories to account for the complexities of virtue
and social environments in accord with Pouivet calls "epistemic particularism." 1017 Thus,
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the framework is flexible enough to account for when testimonial uptake achieves the
virtuous mean or falls into the vices of insufficiency and excess.
6.4.1 Trust and the Virtue of Intellectual Autonomy
Since Ancient and Medieval thinkers largely conducted philosophy within either the
Platonic or Aristotelian system building tradition of the day, their theories of testimony
cannot wholly be divorced from their metaphysical considerations. To posit a virtue
theoretic framework assumes some "human nature" (at least broadly construed to answer
the "what is it" question) which determines our telos and excellences. The acquisition of
wisdom has historically been seen as our highest end, which testimony would directly
serve. Historically, virtue is multivalent with the most basic distinction between moral and
intellectual virtues, but virtues are also seen as perfections of human faculties, dispositions
of the will (or dispositions to correct dysfunction), and skills. 1018 However, while virtue
accounts are comfortable with testimony being a speech act of telling in which trust serves
as a reason to believe, they do not follow the typical IVT position that listeners have an
"epistemic entitlement to believe what the speaker says." 1019
In virtue epistemology (VE), knowledge is often understood in terms of intellectual
virtue either as the result of an act or causal process. Definitions of knowledge in
accordance with virtue are controversial, but assuming some working definition is possible
it will be akin to Zagzebski's attempt in Virtues of the Mind where "knowledge is a state of
cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue," or to better accord
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with contemporary understandings, "Knowledge is a state of (true) belief arising out of acts
of intellectual virtue" where:
"an act of intellectual virtue A [1] is an act that arises from the motivational
component of A, [2] is something a person with virtue A would (probably)
do in the circumstances, [3] is successful in achieving the end of the A
motivation, and [4] is such that the agent acquires a true belief (cognitive
contact with reality) through these features of the act" 1020
John Lamont, claiming to hold a "broadly Thomist" view, likewise maintains that
knowledge is the product of an intellectual virtue, but without involving motivation as in
Zagzebski's definition.1021 This is because, according to Lamont, intellectual virtues are not
acquired excellence but capacities "whose function is to arrive at true beliefs, and whose
operation consists in the production of true beliefs" and do so independently of any activity
involving emotion, deliberation, choice, or an activity of the will. 1022
While the exact definition of knowledge in VE is flexible, the key question remains
the same: testimonial knowledge is a state of belief arising out of which intellectual act?
The recent literature focuses on trust (rightly) either relating it to an unspecified virtue
(with a few exceptions) or as a kind of virtue itself.1023 While virtue reliabilists advocate
for trust as an intellectual virtue, virtue responsibilists are less convinced. Zagzebski
appears optimistic (as her definition attests), but Robert Roberts & Jay Woods (2007),
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Jason Baehr (2011), and Paul Faulkner (2014) express varying levels of hesitancy or
caution.1024 The reason for this stems from one's perspective of VE's relationship to the
project of "traditional epistemology." Reliabilists understand intellectual virtues in terms
of "cognitive abilities" or "reliable faculties," that is, dispositions which "need not involve
a motivational component, nor must they be acquired or habituated over time." 1025
Responsibilists are more faithful to virtue conceptions linked to character frequently citing
that intellectual and moral virtues are not distinct categories of virtues and it is "unhelpful
to try to draw a strict line between the intellectual and the moral virtues" according to
Roberts and Wood.1026 Hence, while intellectual virtues may be reliable for low-grade or
easy knowledge, it is argued they "cannot capture important elements of high-grade or
laborious knowledge." 1027 Instead of assuming we possess specific virtues tailored to
epistemic needs, every virtue can be an intellectual, moral, or civic virtue (e.g. intellectual
courage, moral courage, and civic courage) with the difference emerging in the relation
between the virtue and the domain's goods, which regarding testimony are intellectual
goods.1028 Baehr identifies the spectrum of responsiblist positions in The Inquiring Mind
ranging from "Strong Conservative VE" to "Strong Autonomous VE" (with two weak
varieties of each position in-between) where the former sees the concept of intellectual
virtue as "useful for addressing one or more problems in traditional epistemology" (e.g.
Linda Zagzebski) while the latter is "the basis of an approach to epistemology that is
independent of traditional epistemology" (e.g. Jonathan Kvanvig). 1029 If virtue reliabilism
1024
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were also depicted on Baehr's spectrum, it would be an even stronger form of Conservative
VE (see Chart 6.4.1.1) given its aim to align with traditional epistemology. True to virtuetheoretic form, Baehr rejects both "strong" conceptions while the "Weak" variations of
Conservative and Autonomous VE (arguably forming a mean) are presented as promising.
In short, responsibilists maintain intellectual virtues cannot be disconnected from the whole
to solve contemporary epistemological problems since their strength is tied to their
metaphysical underpinnings.

Chart 6.4.1.1
Spectrum of Virtue Epistemology positions related to traditional epistemology
Virtue Reliabilism John Baehr's four varieties of character‐based virtue epistemology
(i.e., Responsibilism)1030
Strong
Weak
Weak
Strong
Conservative
Conservative
Autonomous
Autonomous
The concept of
"the concept
"the concept of "an
"an
virtue as cognitive
of intellectual intellectual
independent
independent
abilities or reliable virtue merits a virtue merits a focus on
focus on
faculties fits the
central and
secondary or
intellectual
intellectual
traditional
fundamental
background
character and character and
epistemological
role within
role within
virtues
virtues should
task of providing
traditional
traditional
complements
replace
an account of
epistemology" "epistemology" traditional
traditional
knowledge in terms
epistemology" epistemology"
of necessary,
sufficient, and
informative
conditions1031
Instead of arguing directly for a trust based intellectual virtue, I propose that the
intellectual aspect for the historic virtue of autonomy is most responsible for testimonial
knowledge. This is not to say testimonial knowledge arises solely from intellectual
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autonomy. Presumably, testimonial knowledge results from the synergy of a collection of
virtues (e.g., love of knowledge, intellectual firmness, courage and caution, humility,
generosity, and practical wisdom). I am claiming that intellectual autonomy is the primary
or driving force behind testimonial knowledge. This is because I argue that intellectual
autonomy and trust are inversely related in one's interactions with authority (both practical
and theoretical). My depiction of the virtue of autonomy envisions a sliding scale in which
one acts more autonomously or less autonomously from situation to situation and is thus
quite different from common notions envisioning autonomy to be either one does or does
not act autonomously. I argue that the ideal all-or-nothing autonomy is impossible if not
incoherent since learning is dependent on others. "Human knowledge is to some extent a
collective enterprise," according to Lamont, for dependence on others is not just limited to
"observing signs of competence" before trusting a speaker, but:
these signs are usually determined by socially established conventions. The
creation of such signs is the work of a society, not of an individual. This
means that much of our learning depends on the actions of a society as a
whole, not just on the trustworthiness of the individuals whom we believe.
Such dependence lessens our autonomy even more radically than our
dependence on the word of individuals, whom we can to some extent
evaluate.1032
Our social context reveals that for humans to be autonomous at all, autonomy cannot be an
absolute either/or, but must admit of the gradations—measured in trust—that I propose.
Autonomy, rooted in the human will, is clearly a virtue suited to many goods and
thus does not fall prey to responsiblist critiques of being purely an intellectual virtue like
trust. Autonomy is deeply linked to an agent's character and when applied to cognitive
goods imparts a self-knowledge of both themselves and what they know such that Roberts
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and Wood describe "autonomy vis‐à‐vis knowledge" gained from others as "a kind of
wisdom about knowledge, a large‐perspectival self‐understanding with respect to the fields
of learning" or "a practical wisdom such that the agent knows what she knows and knows
the limits thereof."1033 What the reductionism vs. anti-reductionism debate correctly
identifies is that when agents receive a telling they can either trust the speaker by assenting
or not trust the speaker by investigating the matter themselves. The more one relies on their
own intellectual autonomy, the less they trust others and their tellings. Inversely, the more
one trusts others, the less they rely on their own intellectual autonomy. This line of thinking
also captures the moral dimension to trusting a speaker as an Aristotelian virtue mean
between two vices: excessive intellectual autonomy results in not trusting enough (being
overly suspicious of others) whereas insufficient intellectual autonomy results in trusting
too much or too readily making agents susceptible to lies and manipulation (blind faith).
Both undercut the end of knowledge acquisition. Invoking the phrase of Jesus, "be wise as
serpents and innocent as doves" (Matthew 10:16), Roberts and Wood articulate what I take
to be as a virtuous mean where "intellectual autonomy is a wise disposition of balance
between hetero-regulation and auto-regulation in intellectual practice" and "intellectual
autonomy is the virtue of proper self‐regulation, but always with regard to other‐regulation
or the possibility thereof." As Robert and Woods aptly point out, "autonomy is, after all,
a social virtue."1034 It should be readily apparent that testimony as a telling which provides
a reason to believe fits this paradigm easily since the notions of evidence and justification
are absent. The question then is if the proposed framework can give an adequate account
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of this intellectual autonomy approach for virtuous and vicious trust in other's tellings. I
believe it can.
6.4.2 Insufficient Autonomy, Excessive Trust
The framework's provision of multiple theories allows a virtue-theory of testimony to find
room for both virtuous and vicious accounts of assenting to a telling. Starting with the first
question regarding source—whether testimonial knowledge is an autonomous generative
source of knowledge or if it reduces to a non-testimonial species of knowledge—we have
two issues to contend with: faculty and scope.
Given that human virtues can be understood as an acquired base of excellent
functioning or "mature completions" of natural human faculties, testimonial knowledge
could arise from an innate human faculty—an innate basis of our power to acquire, refine,
and transmit intellectual goods—like "testimonial credulity." 1035 The debate over whether
testimony is a "source" of knowledge can be seen as a proxy battle for whether testimony
qualifies as a human intellectual faculty. If we have a faculty of testimonial credulity, such
a faculty would invoke a type of SA since it should yield knowledge akin to other faculties
such as the senses. Thomas Reid enshrined the idea that something akin to testimonial
credulity is a faculty or disposition to believe what others tell us. Lamont may ascribe to
such a faculty in maintaining that intellectual virtues are capacities which are not
acquired.1036 Many historical accounts that promote trust, which I identified under rational
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fideism outlined in chapter 1, presume something like an underlying faculty relevant to
testimonial uptake fitting SA reflected in Theory 2 (SA & TR) Theory 3 (SA & TA).
Whether we have such a faculty is controversial, but within a virtue theoretic the
employment of such a faculty cannot fulfill anti-reductionist demands since it requires
development. Assuming the faculty exists, Roberts and Woods point out that "unless a
person has acquired these refined aptitudes and concerns, the bare faculty of testimonial
credulity is not a very reliable source of warranted beliefs" or "to express the point in
Aristotelian terms, testimonial credulity is a disposition that admits of, and demands,
perfecting."1037 Even in ideal conditions, a testimonial faculty would be insufficient "for
the most interesting and important kinds of knowledge" such that reductionists will simply
maintain that the human faculty is a "faulty tendency, which must be strongly controlled if
we are to do our epistemic best, by an insistence on seeing the evidence for ourselves." 1038
The result is that even those who maintain the existence of such a faculty for testimonial
credibility claim it is properly functioning only when it is "fitted with a sophisticated
filtering device consisting of various epistemic skills and virtues." 1039 This thought appears
even in Alvin Plantinga's epistemological account of warrant which grants an entitlement
to trust without an additional reason:
I believe you when you tell me about your summer vacation, but not when
you tout on television the marvelous virtues of the deodorant you have been
hired to sell. We learn not to form beliefs about a domestic quarrel until we
have heard from both parties; we learn to mistrust pronouncements of
campaigning politicians, lawyers arguing a case, and people with a strong
financial interest in our believing what they tell us. 1040
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Since virtues require habituation, then trustworthy testimonial knowledge is dependent on
a habitus acquired from practice. Catherine Elgin refers to this as "attunement" which is an
acquired trait (or set or traits) by an agent. 1041 Since the functioning of our testimonial
faculty would need to be broadened and integrated into the character of a person, the
testimonial faculty becomes less important than the virtue developed to obtain the
intellectual goods of testimony. Developing this faculty would arguably occur through
verification by other sources of knowledge (e.g., perception, intuition, etc.) and the
testimony of others in a practice that mirrors induction where my experience with tellings
from different speaker types reveal that trusting such speakers yields "a true belief." The
result is a SA faculty for testimony that requires reductionist-like honing. Relying on the
faculty alone, or an undeveloped faculty, would thus be epistemically vicious.
The second issue pertaining to source is scope since "source" is represented in two
ways: 1) the point at which a person came to know that p, and 2) the origination of that p.
Regarding the first, generation implies how knowledge entered a chain of transmission,
namely the source. Greco defines generation within the context of a community such that
the source of knowledge is acquisition of knowledge from outside the community. 1042
However, in a wider context this does not solve the issue since the chain of transmission
by which persons "pass" information merely continues outside the community where it
conceivably must end in another source. This implies testimony is like memory as a source
of knowledge for an individual, but memory merely preserves knowledge generated by
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another non-memorial source. Similarly, testimony must either terminate in a nontestimonial source or else be circular. SA thus only applies on an individual or communal
level but collapses in the widest scope to Source Reductionism.
At this point an interesting challenge is created by divine testimony since it runs
past human epistemological limits. It would seem the knowledge only obtainable via divine
testimony would ipso facto qualify as SA (at least from the perspective of human listeners).
This is captured by the duo modo, or duplex source, approach to knowledge that I propose
open-rationalists maintain in chapter 1 where God's testimony is the only source of p in
that God knows p and transmits it to others via tellings. At first glance it seems possible to
conceive of God's tellings as generating knowledge, especially if God is literally taken as
creating speech acts. This would-be source anti-reductionism seems to be a matter of
perspective which disappears when God Himself (i.e., His essence) is the true source of
knowledge which He then transmits. So, given the widest possible context of all knowable
knowledge and historic conceptions of God's essence, the distinction once again collapses
into SR. Exactly how this works will differ within a given philosophical and/or theological
system such as emanation, participation, causation, etc. However, if true knowledge is a
divine attribute, then God Himself is the true source and his telling merely transmits aspects
of God's nature to listeners.
Since true knowledge traces back to one source, generation at the level of episteme
or scientia "knowledge" disappears, but not at the level of endoxa or opinio. Given
medieval metaphysics, SA can explain how an idea was generated within a discipline. Take
for example the position of Latin Averroism, which Averroes never taught or believed.
Latin philosophers nevertheless acquired the doctrine from the writings of Averroes via a
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misunderstanding.1043 In this sense, the source of Latin Averroism is from testimony. It
was generated on account of Averroes's testimony through his works. Of course, this
implies the belief is based on falsehood and ipso facto not scientia level knowledge thereby
preventing anyone from "knowing" Latin Averroism in the hard sense. Accurate
verification by the listener would prevent the belief from generating. Lesser examples of
what Greco calls "garbage" would also be generated and transmitted in this way. 1044 Yet,
the explanatory power of SA seems limited to micro-contexts in which listeners do not or
cannot verify a speaker with epistemic grounds for p in the chain of transmission.
Within our proposed framework, source-anti-reductionism whether conceived of as
an individual faculty or limitations on transmission scope reflects an act with insufficient
intellectual autonomy. The agent is too trusting either due an undeveloped faculty or a lack
of understanding regarding the speaker. Theory 2 (SA & TR) and Theory 3 (SA & TA)
thereby capture various situations of un-virtuously obtained testimony.
6.4.3 Excessive Autonomy, Insufficient Trust
Since a virtuous act of intellectual autonomy holds some form of source-reductionism,
Theory 1 (SR & TR) and Theory 4 (SR & TA) remain viable. This leads us to the 2 nd
question regarding transmission—whether knowledge transmission is reducible to
knowledge generation. Since knowledge is the result of a causal process in VE, tellings are
thought of as providing only the belief or opinio of others which merely point one in the
right direction to obtain scientia on their own. Testimony might serve only as a
steppingstone toward obtaining the ideal of certitudo via certain methods such as
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demonstration. The idealized form of this approach of strictly filtering knowledge in hopes
of obtaining the ideal of certain knowledge is best epitomized by the myth of Ibn Tufayl's
goal of obtaining certain knowledge and skepticism regarding the beliefs of others. As
proposed in chapter 1, this aligns best with the strong-rationalist approach since knowledge
is strictly governed by an epistemic method and limited by human nature. Yet it is hard to
see how the inherent skepticism and lack of trust in others does not ultimately undercut the
end goal of obtaining knowledge. As such, turning the quest for knowledge into primarily
an independent project is routinely condemned as we saw in chapter 1. Roberts and Wood
share similar sentiments regarding this approach to testimonial knowledge:
These epistemologists are suspicious of testimony because it seems to
compromise the principle that each person should be responsible for his own
cognitions and because testimony may seem to be a generally low‐grade
kind of evidence. But, given natural human limitations, and the way things
go according to the human cognitive design plan, the early modern tendency
to prescribe a general suspicion of tradition and testimony could be read as
an endorsement of epistemic arrogance and fastidiousness—an insistence
on the right and duty always to "see for oneself". A character that made us
generally suspicious of testimony or overly insistent on having in our own
possession all the evidence supporting each of our beliefs, would be a
paralyzing intellectual paranoia, a hyper‐individualism that would be both
unrealistic and, to the extent that it actually got instantiated as a personality
trait, detrimental to our cognitive functioning.1045
Such overreliance on personal sources for knowledge either leaves no room for trust or
actively dissuades its use. Such a strict, solitary, and overreliance on one's own intellectual
autonomy leads to the vice of excess as demonstrated by a lack of trust. This approach to
knowledge is captured by Theory 1 (SR & TR) with its lack of a role for trust. Testimony
reduces to back-to-back cases of knowledge generation from non-testimonial types of
knowledge which are individual, like perception. This especially fits contemporary
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reductionism which likewise struggles with skepticism and complaints of making
knowledge "too hard" to obtain due to a lack of reliance on others.
A further reason to see Theory 1 (SR & TR) as falling into the vice of excessive
intellectual autonomy is testimonial knowledge obtained by such intellectual acts cannot
be meritorious. Since knowledge is causal, facts or proofs compel belief. In the medieval
mind, such as Thomas's, the intellect can be moved by one of two factors, by an intelligible
or by the will.1046 In over emphasizing one's intellectual autonomy, an agent ironically
reduces the role of their own will in what they know. Testimonial knowledge reduces solely
to the product of intelligibles produced by their other non-testimonial faculties. Thus, in
cases where cognitive objects or intelligibles are insufficient to move the intellect or only
partially determine it, then the agent either should doubt or is characterized by an uncertain
attitude which cannot remove doubt. Either way, the intellect is undetermined, and
knowledge is neither generated nor transmitted. In cases where the agent either grasps the
cognitive object immediately (when the intellectual intuition grasps the meaning and truth
that p right way) or mediately (when the knowledge of terms and their composition with
first principles through demonstration determines knowledge) the intellect is determined
and knowledge is obtained, but it is not meritorious since there is no room for the will. One
cannot receive credit for merely accepting knowledge when the intellect is compelled. Only
when determination of the intellect results from the will, because the cognitive objects are
insufficient to compel assent resulting in an epistemic impasse can the act be considered
meritorious, which Christophe Grellard describes in detail:
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This is an exceptional situation where the knowledge of terms and principles
is not enough to produce assent, so that the will then compensates for this
cognitive insufficiency by forcing the intellect to assent. Here, assent is
really a choice since the intellect is not constrained by anything external,
but exclusively by a faculty of the soul. Nevertheless, the assent is not
irrational, since it is based on a motive – the consideration of the good or
the suitable, for example the testimony of a man worthy of faith [trust]. 1047
Theory 1 (SR & TR) is not open to determining the intellect in this manner since no role
for the will remains after reducing all knowledge to the effect of either natural causes or a
syllogism. What remains is Theory 4 (SR & TA), which I argue accommodates the virtuous
mean.
6.4.4 The Virtuous Mean of Trust and Intellectual Autonomy
As illustrated, VE is content with demonstrative knowledge and other traditional sources
of knowledge such that it embraces SR, but it still remains open to testimonial knowledge
via transmission. Again, while IVT accounts of testimony invoke trust like Richard
Moran’s "Assurance theory", VE theories reject an automatic entitlement to trust. To
presume a speaker is trustworthy, or that one is entitled to trust, was deemed epistemically
vicious since it treated testimony as a form of SA. Instead, knowing when to be autonomous
or when to trust as an intellectual virtue emerges either as a habitus acquired from practice
or as the perfection of an underlying faculty. So, the question arises, when should someone
trust another?
As shown above, to trust another is not to rely on one's own autonomy. However,
to accept the reasoning of an authority under the right circumstances "is no compromise of
your autonomy, but rather is an expression of it" per Roberts and Wood assuming you
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understand the type of authority the speaker has and how that type of authority is limited
in its domain and competence.1048 As illustrated in chapter 1, we can recognize
permutations from at least four types of authority, the complexity of which calls for careful
training to determine when a telling is within bounds and thus the speaker worthy of trust.
The simplest examples frequently cite accepting the epistemic authority of an eyewitness
insofar as their testimony remains within the limits of what they could know or have
experienced and accepting the practical authority of a police officer insofar as their
commands remain within the limits of the law. This means intellectual autonomy is
virtuous when the agent's trust is not blind. It also means a child's trust in a parent is not
blind when their experience of received goods demonstrates, at the very least, the authority
of their parents. This is determined by the agent's relation to the speaker, the world, and
thus situation.1049
Developing the habit to know whom and when to virtuously trust others for
knowledge, that is in a manner achieving the virtuous mean, requires understanding each
particular situation one is in. Many factors determine how autonomous or how much trust
is morally and epistemically demanded to accept a telling. Paul Faulkner argues
interpersonal relationships have an enormous impact and introduce an ethical aspect.
However, it is also possible to trust a speaker in one context, but not another as we saw
with Plantinga above. Thus, situations will likely be altered by the agent's knowledge of
the topic in view. Since "no one is equally autonomous across all fields of knowledge,"
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Roberts and Woods account for a virtue's "circumstance indexicality" or adaptation to types
of circumstances.1050 This alters the mean of intellectual autonomy for an agent in certain
arenas and on certain topics, especially those in which they have studied, reflected, and
become an intellectual authority. That is, we would expect an agent to exhibit greater
autonomy and be less trusting in their area of expertise, but not in an unrelated field. We
readily recognize circumstance indexicality when topics depart from philosophy and enter
neuroscience or automotive repair. Nevertheless, given "circumstance independence", we
would expect one with a developed sense of intellectual autonomy to be more discerning
and adaptable to a wider range of circumstances. Roberts and Wood refer to such
individuals as "exemplars of extraordinary virtue at least in part because they are somewhat
independent of the narrower, more typical range of circumstances for which the virtue fits
most of the people who exhibit it."1051 Again we affirm circumstance independence when
we expect more of graduate students than undergraduate students at the same talk even
when neither have relevant area-specific knowledge.
So, when Paul Faulkner, drawing on Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice,
argues that listeners indeed presume that a speaker is trustworthy only if given a
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relationship with ethical demands, he is making a similar claim. The presumption of trust
is thus only virtuous within the bounds of the authority for the given relationship and in
understanding the point, i.e. telos, of a conversation.1052 His approach provides two limits,
the practical domain which all testimony occurs in and the telos of the conversation since
"there are a multitude of potential explanations of any given bit of testimony, where each
explanation starts from the interest the speaker has in the conversation." 1053 Even though
"an audience’s basic reason for entering into a testimonial exchange is to find things out,"
a speaker’s reason may not align with the audience's. 1054 As Faulkner says,
… from the multitude of potential explanations of any given bit of
testimony, there is no reason to single out ‘satisfying the audience’s
epistemic interest’ as the default explanation. And this is to say that a
presumption of trustworthiness cannot be established as the epistemic
default, because testimony does not have the proper function of servicing
an audience’s epistemic interests.1055
It follows from this that:
…what an audience needs, in every case, in order to epistemically
rationalize testimonial uptake is some judgement that this explanation
applies, that the speaker’s purpose in communicating is indeed informative,
and that the speaker is thereby trustworthy. More generally, what is thereby
needed is some particular reason for thinking that a given bit of testimony
is true.1056
Faulkner's answer to when is it reasonable to believe that a speaker intends to be
informative is that "trust, morally understood, is central to the epistemology of testimony
in that it can be our ‘reason’ for testimonial uptake." 1057Linda Zagzebski's account of
authoritative testimony fits here nicely as well. A listener's reason for accepting
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authoritative testimony must be a deliberative reason, and therefore a reason as opposed
to evidence.1058 Thus, the effect of authoritative testimony mirrors that of authoritative
belief:
Justification Thesis 1 for the Authority of Testimony (JAT 1) - The
authority of a person's testimony for me is justified by my conscientious
judgment that I am more likely to satisfy my desire to get true beliefs and
avoid false beliefs if I believe what the authority tells me than if I try to
figure out what to believe myself.1059
You should accept authoritative testimony granted your goal is knowledge and, in this
situation, your epistemic position is inferior to that of the expert. In this regard, testimony
from an epistemic authority is akin to a command from a practical authority, where
adopting a belief preemptively is parallel to obeying a command to believe. However,
while accepting the authority of another can be reconciled without violating one's own
autonomy, the question remains of whether deferring to an authority is truly an act of
autonomy since such an act seems to be non-autonomous by definition.
"How can adherence to a hetero‐regulator be autonomy?" is how Roberts and
Wood phrase the same question raised by Zagzebski concerning not only when it is
virtuous to allow an authority's reasoning to preemptively replace one's own, but also how
such an act can still be called autonomous. It could be said that if one autonomously
chooses to serve another, then in a way they are following of reasons they themselves did
not produce is still autonomous. However, such an act is indirect and seems to mask a lack
of understanding pertaining to an authority's limitations. Instead, as we saw in Chapter 1
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on communal epistemic authority, adherence to the reasons of another can truly said to be
autonomous when a community and its authorities are appropriated by the agent, that is
made a part of the self. For an act of accepting the reason of another can still be autonomous
as when Zagzebski states that "I" becomes "we" which follows Roberts and Wood claim
that: "the hetero‐regulator must be assimilated or appropriated to some extent by the
epistemic agent; it must become part of the autos (self) of the agent."1060 They identify
three modes or features of how such an appropriation can occur: first by understanding in
terms of the communal authority such that an agent is more autonomous the more they
know why a communal authority is authoritative "or about how the teachings work and are
good"; second, by habitually or spontaneously using the thought of the authority such that
its thought becomes the agent's thought without having to be recalled; and third, by
willfully incorporating or affiliating with the authority, such that "to think autonomously
in terms of a hetero‐regulator is to love in terms of the hetero‐regulator, to care, to be
concerned, to be emotionally involved in those terms; it is to be intrinsically motivated to
think in those terms."1061 Colloquially the three stages might be summarized as being able
to 1) talk the talk, 2) walk the walk, and 3) willfully owning both.1062 In short, as social
creatures, we become who we trust. This also emphasizes why thinkers like al-Ghazālī
gave greater weight to testimony from members of his trusted community, other Muslims.
Thus, we can easily conceive a situation in which two students in a religion course, one a
faithful Christian and the other faithful Muslim, will have different epistemic experiences
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based on whether the teacher is a member of their community. If the teacher is openly
Catholic (e.g., wears a priestly collar or a cross), then the level of intellectual autonomy
and trust required to virtuously accept a telling such as "human purpose is found in seeing
God" will differ for the students (the reverse would be true if the teacher were openly
Muslim). Insofar as the Christian student recognizes the teacher as sharing in their
community, accepting the telling would be virtuous based on the trust established by their
understanding of the teacher and their relationship to a shared "we." For the Muslim
student, however, accepting the same telling outright would amount to a blind trust in the
authority of the teacher and be vicious without the established trust relationship of a shared
community. Of course, an act of intellectual autonomy to trust an authority is only as
virtuous and likely to obtain truth as the authority in question is virtuous or knowledgeable.
As many proverbs will attest, our community itself does not define the good and the
true.1063 For the intellectual aspect of a virtue cannot be wholly divorced from the noncognitive and moral aspects which are determined by a non-social metaphysical reality.
The final result is that the virtuous mean for the act of one's intellectual autonomy
giving rise to testimonial knowledge is best accommodated by Theory 4 (SR & TA).
Testimony as a telling serves as a reason to believe via a unique transmission phenomenon
requiring trust dependent on a virtue-theoretic framework to account for its epistemic and
non-epistemic properties but is not an autonomous source of knowledge. This also fits John

1063

Cf. Psalm 1:1-2, "Blessed is the man who walks not in the counsel of the wicked, nor stands in the way
of sinners, nor sits in the seat of scoffers; but his delight is in the law of the Lord, and on his law he meditates
day and night."; 1 Corinthians 15:33, "Do not be deceived: 'Bad company ruins good morals.'" (RSV); Surat
'Al Furqaan 25:27-29 "And (Be mindful of) the Day the wrongdoer will bite his hands saying, 'Would that I
had taken a path along with the Messenger (Salallahu Aleyhi Wasallam)! Woe to me! Would that I had not
taken so-and-so for my friend! Indeed, he led me astray from the advice (the Qur’an) after it had come to
me.' And Satan is man’s betrayer." Yusuf-Ali, The Holy Qur’an, 241.

340

McDowell's concept of "knowledge as standing in the space of reasons." Both John Lamont
and Mats Wahlberg's account of divine testimony adopt McDowell's "anti-reductionist"
view of testimonial knowledge, which is unique since McDowell holds that listeners cannot
automatically trust a telling. Instead, listeners must be "doxastically responsible", the
virtuous mean of intellectual autonomy, with any source of knowledge, including
testimony:1064
Acquiring knowledge by testimony is not a mindless reception of something
which has nothing to do with rationality; it yields a standing in the space of
reasons. We can protect that idea by insisting that the knowledge is available
to be picked up only by someone whose taking the speaker's word for it is
not doxastically irresponsible. This works in much the same way as the
parallel insistence in the case of retained knowledge and perception. A
person sufficiently responsible to count as having achieved epistemic
standing from someone else's words needs to be aware of how knowledge
can be had by others, and rationally responsive to considerations whose
relevance that awareness embodies. That requires his forming beliefs on the
say-so of others to be rationally shaped by an understanding of, among other
things, the risks one subjects oneself to in accepting what people say. 1065

This anti-reductionism view fits with TA, not SA since doxastic responsibility is a
necessary condition for acquiring knowledge from testimony. There is no entitlement to
trust or to testimonial knowledge. A mindless acceptance of a telling (even if true) would
not qualify as testimonial knowledge—the vice of insufficiency—since it occurs outside
the space of reasons as doxastically irresponsible. Instead, McDowell's analysis requires
"favors from the world" (and thus not an overly autonomous interiorized self typically
found in Theory 1, SR&TR, approaches) and thus how the listener is related to the world
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which deeply connects human knowledge to the world and reality (thus avoiding social
constructivism). The result according to Mats Wahlberg is:
Even if we act responsibly when believing what somebody tells us, this
does not mean that our belief is justified. Doxastic responsibility and
justification (rational entitlement) are, according to McDowell’s
conception, two different things. Whether one’s testimonial belief that p is
justified depends on whether the testimony that the belief is based on
actually makes knowledge that p available, that is, on whether one's
informant knows that p and expresses this knowledge in words. One's
reason/justification for believing that p is, in the beneficial case when one’s
informant is reliable, that one has learned from so-and-so that p. This
testimonial reason is excellent, since it constitutes a factive standing in the
space of reasons, like seeing that p or remembering that p. Having this kind
of justification entails that p is true.1066
How finely tuned a reason needs to be in order to qualify as a virtuous belief will vary
between given testimonial accounts. Lamont sets a higher bar for a reason to believe
testimony (presumably following the Medieval approach) since credere deo (to believe
God) requires the listener to recognize the identity of the speaker. Wahlberg sets a lower
bar arguing that it is not doxastically irresponsible to believe divine testimony through
human spokespersons (assuming the necessary character for human speakers) and later
recognizing that God was the speaker.1067 However, Wahlberg admits that this does not
qualify as credere deo until the listener learns God is the true speaker. 1068
The inclusion of TA in Theory 4 (SR & TA) leaves this virtue theory open to
Jennifer Lackey's counterexamples of knowledge generation which have been shown to
break weak and moderate transmission theories which require that either the speaker or
someone in the testimonial chain know that p. However, Stephen Wright has proposed
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(rightly I believe) a strong form of transmission which avoids these objections even when
the speaker does not believe and thereby does not know that p (only if someone has
epistemic grounds for p) by transmitting epistemic grounds as opposed to knowledge. 1069
My aim has not been to enter into the transmission debate, but to test the flexibility of the
proposed framework. The VE account of testimony presented for the virtue of intellectual
autonomy does so by showing how the vice of insufficiency is reflected in Theory 2 (SA
& TR) and Theory 3 (SA & TA), the vice of excess in Theory 1 (SR & TR), and the virtuous
mean in Theory 4 (SR & TA).
6.5 Conclusion
The testimonial theories of Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas reveal that the
contemporary definition of testimony and the corresponding frameworks are not
transhistorical since testimony is presumed to be evidence that is or requires justification.
I argued that an epistemological a concept that is incongruent with entire traditions of
historical thought reveals an incomplete theory that needs to be redressed. I thus argued
that testimony is better defined as a telling which serves not as evidence but as a reason to
believe. This redefinition makes contemporary evidential approaches more difficult, since
testimony must be understood as the fact that a telling occurred, but does not exlude them.
In fact, the proposed expansion of the concept of testimony will benefit contemporary
positions given justificatory evidence's inability to assess the complexities of the human
knowledge experience which encompasses both a) publicly available "epistemic" facts,
experiences, and/or propositions that logically (or probably) connect reality to truth, and b)

1069

"A speaker's testimony that p can make epistemic grounds for p available to transmit to a listener only if
someone has epistemic grounds for p." Thus Wright's strong case for transmission avoids Lackey's
Creationist teacher example. Wright, Knowledge Transmission, 4, 14.

343

private "non-epistemic" experiences, intuitions, emotions, self-trust, and/or trust in others
that connect a personal subject to truth. I then proposed a rethinking of the traditional
reductionist and antireductionst frameworks using John Greco's distinction between source
and transmission. To test the explanatory power (and thus congruency with historical
positions) of my proposed definition and framework, I offered a virtue-theoretic approach
to testimony based on the intellectual aspect of the virtue of autonomy in an inverse
relationship to the concept of trust. The model is capable of accounting for the unvirtuous
(deficient or excessive) use of one's intellectual autonomy revealing a virtuous mean of
trusting verified authorities determined by the situation.
Given that a lack of a common concept of testimony can only further segregate
historical and contemporary scholars, it is my hope that a transhistorical approach will open
new avenues for testimonial study and provide a bridge between the two groups. For
applying social epistemology's concepts to history allows us to read the medieval tradition
in a new light. Likewise, contemporary philosophers can connect theories to their
ideological predecessors and provide relevant examples and historical arguments and
potentially learn from pre-Renaissance thinkers who were particularly good at not only
identifying their communal epistemic authorities, but also maintaining rigorous methods
to assess those authorities in order hold them accountable for the truth value of their claims.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
7.1 Afterward: Project Summary and case study
The answer to the original question of what authority should you trust, or, more
specifically, whom or what should you trust, emerges as sources which both are more likely
to have the truth (than yourself) and are steadfast in communicating that truth. This is
hardly radical. In fact, this is how most of our knowledge has proceeded for centuries; it
comes from trusting a speaker in the form of testimony—whether scholars reading experts,
students listening to teachers, children obeying their parents, or pedestrians inquiring of
strangers—so that the knowledge transmitted is rarely personally verified. This is the
unremarkable reality that we rely on experts who pass knowledge from one generation to
the next. However, since knowledge is communal and relies on trust, how do these impact
Truth and knowledge?
The preceding analysis of the testimonial theories of Saadya Gaon of Judaism (882942AD), al-Ghazālī of Islam (1058-1111AD), and Thomas Aquinas of Christianity (12251274AD) has confirmed that trust is essential to knowledge. The Medieval world
predominantly asks two questions regarding testimony: 1) Is the speaker a responsible
knower of p (do we know that they are in a position to know and not err)?; and 2) Is the
speaker a responsible reporter of p (do we know they are not lying and that their cognitive
faculties are not impaired)? The ideal answers are: there is no way for the speaker to be
wrong about p; and it is impossible for the speaker to either lie or report inaccurately. The
ideal speaker is unsurprisingly God. The complexities of individual medieval accounts
arise from navigating the multiplicity of non-ideal answers presented by non-divine
speakers. Since trust is inherently social, however, the particulars of whom, what, and even
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how we trust has an outsized impact on whether what we believe, rightly or wrongly, counts
as true. Recognition of this fact indicates that epistemology, even social epistemology,
needs to occur in dialogue with other branches of philosophy and science. In this
conclusion, I will reflect on what this project has accomplished and then treat it as a case
study to address the dark side of trust's role in knowledge for a post-2020 world alongside
the opportunities this presents. I will conclude by arguing that issues in contemporary
epistemology parallel those of G.E.M. Anscombe's modern moral philosophy and that
moving forward we should seriously heed her call to first establish a philosophy of
psychology, namely a philosophy of human nature.
7.1.1 Project Summary
The first chapter reiterated the importance of testimonial knowledge and the social nature
of knowledge after the so-called "social turn" in the late 20th century which called the
individualistic rule-based epistemic approaches of modernism into question. Recognizing
the social nature of knowledge introduces the bootstrapping problem of knowledge where
a novice's reliance on, or trust in, epistemic authorities is inescapably, or necessarily, blind.
I analyzed the notion of authority to reveal a difference between practical authority (which
demands obedience) and epistemic authority (which demands assent/belief) to demarcate
their respective (albeit not mutually exclusive) arenas. I then presented three historical
cognitive approaches to escape the bootstrapping problem. First, closed-rationalism that
relies on individualistic self-trust in limiting personal knowledge to what one can
personally verify in accordance with a rational epistemic rule. Second, rational-fideism that
blindly trusts claims until contradictory facts surface. Third, open-rationalism which relies
on virtuous-trust to remain receptive to knowledge from any virtuous epistemic authority.
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I maintained that Saadya Gaon, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas Aquinas, largely due to their faith
commitments to revelation as divine speech, fall in this last category.
In chapter two, I gave a brief history of social epistemology's ascendency since the
1960s with a focus on testimony proper. I summarized the two major contemporary debates
on testimony. Regarding the first on whether testimony is a proper source of knowledge, I
discussed the primary transmission and generation views of testimony in which testimony
either maintains a special epistemological role separate from generating knowledge or can
serve as a means of producing knowledge in listeners. These positions were shown to
largely line up with three positions of the second: testimonial justification. Reductionism
(including global vs. local reductionism) maintains that testimony itself cannot provide
justification since it reduces to other sources (e.g., perception or induction); antireductionism maintains that testimony does justify since it is a justified form of social
evidence; and the Interpersonal View of Testimony (or Assurance View) offers a nonevidentialist approach to testimony based on the assurance of, or invitation to trust by, the
speaker. Since testimonial knowledge long preceded the rise of social epistemology, I then
summarized accounts of medieval testimonial theories (capped at 2019) related to Saadya,
al-Ghazālī, Thomas, and their predominant intellectual interlocutors. Given the importance
of the IVT and its reliance on a virtue-theoretic framework, I also briefly discussed virtue
epistemology's contributions to testimony and introduce the key ideas of virtue reliabilism
vs. virtue responsibilism. I concluded this chapter by highlighting the inadequacies of the
current testimonial frameworks and draw on John Greco's call to "rethink" the categories
of testimony by offering a new schema combining reductionist and anti-reductionist
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positions on testimony as source or transmission to produce four conceivable permutations
with which to better assess the historical positions of Medieval thinkers.
In chapter three, I gave the first account of Saadya Gaon's theory of testimony
which details the process of both divine and human testimony, the seamless transition from
divine to human testimony, and the virtue-based account underlying each. After an
overview of the structures of practical and epistemic authority prevalent in the Jewish
community and Saadya's position as a Gaon, I reviewed Saadya's epistemology through
four roots of knowledge divided into the Mu'tazilite division between necessary and
acquired knowledge. I then explicated Saadya's account of human testimony which
requires trusting speakers as epistemic and moral exemplars, namely those who are
knowledgeable and speak truthfully. Since God, the All-Wise (Al-Ḥakīm), is the perfect
possessor of wisdom and goodness, Saadya's testimonial theory readily applies save for
God's incorporeal and simple nature.1070 I thus reviewed Saadya's account of the "second
air" and "Light of Glory" as the metaphysical medium by which God transmits and verifies
his word to prophets. In the final analysis, I argue that Saadya invokes what is now
considered anti-reductionist as well as reductionist concepts of testimony which are
resolved in recognizing that seeking verification, say via a miracle, attests not to the
accuracy of the given proposition, but to the identity and thus trustworthiness of the
speaker. Thus, Saadya's theory of testimony is the same for both human and divine
testimony which are best accounted for through a virtue-theoretic framework.
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In chapter four, I provided the first testimonial assessment for al-Ghazālī and
showed that his theory of testimony remains the same for both divine and human speakers
given its link to virtue and particularly the notion of trustworthiness. I outlined the
overlapping nature of political and epistemic authority in Islam and the resulting
hierarchies of knowledge for saints, scholars, and the masses. I show that al-Ghazālī draws
on Islamic jurisprudence, the Mutakallimūn, and Avicenna in likewise following the
Mu'tazilite division of necessary and acquired knowledge. Knowledge is inherently tied to
personal virtue as shown through the polishing of one's heart or inner mirror which reflects
reality. I show that al-Ghazālī adopts the āḥād (unitary) and mutawātir (recurring) reports
of Islamic jurisprudence based on the trustworthiness of speakers. However, he redefines
the normal categories by classifying knowledge from tawātur as "primary", i.e., both
necessary and reflective, thereby providing certain knowledge given its reliance on a
hidden syllogism. I then explained his theory of divine testimony via inspiration and
prophecy in which divine knowledge shines into a listener's heart through a personal
experience through intermediaries like the Preserved Tablet. Al-Ghazālī, I argue, accounts
for the disparity between the cognitive states achieved by unreliable human testimony and
certain divine testimony through trusting reliable speakers as made evident by their
character. I thereby claim al-Ghazali's maintained one theory of testimony for both human
and divine testimony which is best accounted for via virtue theory.
In chapter five, I reevaluate Thomas's theory of testimony arguing that Thomas held
to a virtue theoretic account of testimony vs. an evidentialist account which applies to his
approach to both human and divine testimony. After providing an overview of Thomas's
conception of authority and epistemology, I argue that testimony is linked to the concept
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of fides both as trust and as infused faith. Thomas distinguishes between fides in a broad
and narrow sense which is applicable to both human and divine speakers as believing based
on an inference from signs or believing the speaker. While Thomas similarly invokes
inductive knowledge from testimonial claims, I show that the character or dignitas of the
speaker always plays a role in the verification of testimony as seen with the swearing of
oaths. I explain Thomas's account of divine testimony for both scripture and personal faith
as linked to instrumental causality in which God as the principal agent moves the will of
humans to receive and transmit knowledge. Since believing God (credere deo) requires
recognizing who the speaker is, I show that the speaker's identify and character performs
the primary epistemic work. I conclude that Thomas has one unified theory of testimony
for both human and divine testimony that is based on the employment of a listener's virtues
to verify the speaker's possession of virtues and thus testimony is best accounted for under
a virtue theoretic framework.
In chapter six, I argued that applying the contemporary framework of testimony
from social epistemology to pre-enlightenment thinkers will create an anachronistic
distortion of their testimonial theories. This is due to the current understanding of testimony
as a kind of evidence which is incompatible with the historical differentiation between
evident, evidentness, and evidence. Thus, I propose a transhistorical theory of testimony.
First, I recast "a testimony" as a telling that provides a reason to believe without
constituting evidence following William Alston's nondoxastic vs. doxastic grounds and
Linda Zagzebski's deliberative and theoretical reasons. Second, I redefined the testimonial
framework along John Greco's "rethinking" which combines the positions of reductionism
and anti-reductionism with the notions of testimony as generative source vs. transmission.
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I then test the proposed framework with a virtue-theoretic testimonial theory that would fit
historical accounts by basing testimony not on trust per se, but the intellectual virtue of
autonomy. I argue the proposed framework permits enough flexibility without losing
explanatory power to even account for insufficient autonomy (blind-trust), excessive
autonomy (self-trust), and the mean of virtuous trust.
7.1.2 This Project as Case Study
I did not set out to challenge or reframe contemporary theories of testimony. I originally
only wanted to see whether Thomas Aquinas modified or updated his theory of testimony
given his reliance on thinkers in the lands of Islam (requiring the not-yet-categorized
testimonial theories of Jewish and Islamic minded thinkers). How this project evolved from
that seminal idea is itself a case study on how communal epistemic authority both promotes
and colors knowledge acquisition and transmission. For before the project even began, I
identified myself as a member of both a broad community (academic) and particular
subcommunities (philosophy, history of, Abrahamic, etc.) with expected standards on
knowledge distribution and acceptance. I identified a subsection of experts recognized as
knowledgeable in testimony (the literature of social epistemology) and, having been trained
by the community and its system/framework to do so, trusted those epistemic authorities.
I thus believed that testimonial theories of justification (i.e., reductionism, antireductionism, and assurance) were definitive. At this point, I experienced the subconscious
motivation to "take a side", to look at the facts from the perspective of my tribe, or to defend
one of my affiliated subcommunities. I learned from the experts that David Hume, largely
inspired by his infamous treatise against miracles, fathered contemporary reductionism.
Since Hume, and his argument(s) against miracles, creates cognitive dissonance for my
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Abrahamic identity, I humbly confess my shame in then suggesting that since Abrahamic
thinkers like Saadya, al-Ghazālī, and Thomas defend miracles that they must be antireductionists and if I catalogued their theories, I might discover lost arguments or evidence
to the tip the scale against reductionism in the contemporary debate. Obviously, this is a
poor research method, and, thanks to wise advisors, I repented. Once I turned from trying
to mine Medieval literature to solve a contemporary problem to letting the Medieval
authors speak for their own theories of testimony, I discovered that my chosen thinkers
were not anti-reductionists. In fact, I have shown all three maintained "source
reductionism" as a part of their testimonial theory. I found my preconceived notions did
not fit the "facts." Furthermore, I found not only did they not fit my assessment, neither did
they fit Hume's assessment. None of them fit into the three predefined categories of
testimony laid out by my community's epistemic experts. This led me to reassess and finally
discover the importance of trust and its more nebulous epistemic qualities which led to a
deeper inquiry into authority, its types, and its role in knowledge production and
transmission.
As I pause to reflect, it is concerning to think what this project would have become
if I had insisted on not updating my beliefs by blindly trusting the experts. What if I had
worked to fit these findings to support my affiliations supporting my perceived selfidentity? Or worse, what if, as a product of my communal training, I was unable to see
these findings for what they were? I would have distorted the Truth and passed it on as
knowledge. It should be obvious that my direct experience of my own trust in experts and
the hidden bent to further or protect my existing identity-forming communities is not
unique. Most of our knowledge relies on our communal ties such that they shape how we
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perceive the world. If trust is inherently social and much of knowledge relies on trust, what
are we to make of Truth?
7.2 Facing New Times
Shadows loom behind any approach to knowledge which relies on trusting communal
authorities. In our "Post-Truth" world of science denial, "alternative facts", and fake news,
the systems in which knowledge transmission is limited, disrupted, or hijacked have borne
fruit in everyday life and can no longer be ignored. 1071 The persisting dilemma stems from
the bootstrapping problem introduced in chapter 1 in which we learn what an epistemic
authority is from a communally accepted epistemic authority. Thus, analogous to the
challenge of moral conventionalism in ethics, if epistemic authority is inescapably circular,
then the objectivity of knowledge is called into question. In this way, knowledge
acquisition is analogous to Immanuel Kant's approach to the noumenal; just as the Kantian
individual has no access to things-in-themselves save through the shaping effect of the
mind's transcendentals, people have no access to knowledge except through the cognitive
division of labor made possible via communal epistemic authorities which inevitably has
a shaping effect.1072 Social epistemology has allowed us to appreciate that acquiring
knowledge occurs within a community and more specifically, a community we identify
with—our tribe.
The concepts of epistemic and practical authority outlined in chapter 1 exist within
overlapping and inhering spheres of influence and expertise. Our community, or tribe, can
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be said to know p when one of its epistemic authorities generates or acquires p and the
community (virtuously or viciously) trusts that expert. Philip Kitcher gives a clear model
on how generations transmit and receive knowledge in The Advancement of Science
(2004).1073 He analyzes transmission through a framework which introduces the key notion
of a community's "consensus practice" and how that consensus is composed by showing 1)
what knowledge a community holds, 2) who provides that knowledge, 3) why people assent
to it, and 4) how 1-3 are inexorably interrelated: 1074
The consensus practice of a community at a given time is thus represented
by (i) the core consensus, the elements of individual practice common to
the individual practices of all members of the community, (ii) the
acknowledgments of authority (themselves parts of individual practice)
shared by all members of the community (including, perhaps, criteria for
granting deferred authority); (iii) an organization of the community into
subcommunities, resulting from (ii), with particular subcommunities
recognized as responsible for and authoritative over particular types of
issues, (iv) a virtual consensus, generated from (i) by the incorporation of
parts of the consensus practice of subcommunities in accordance with the
relations delineated in (ii) and (iii).1075
Using this framework, the history of epistemology (in an idealized sense) can be
understood as a periodized example of Developmentalism. The history of knowledge is
divisible into periods each beginning with a community of people consisting of "veterans"
and "apprentices" in which the apprentices will become the veterans of the subsequent
period through time spent under previous veterans’ tutelage, peer discussions, and personal
studies, all of which modifies their knowledge. At the beginning of each period,
subcommunities of veterans and apprentices exist that other members of the total
community will perceive as authoritative on certain topics and thus readily embrace their
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knowledge claims. The intersection of all the idiosyncratic views from the authoritative
subcommunities (including much of which was bequeathed to them) creates the "consensus
practice" or "what all members of a community share." The notion of "virtual consensus"
emerges from this core consensus to represent what the community believes by deferring
authority to subcommunities of experts on specific questions. This certainly does not imply
uniformity or total agreement within the community (even within subcommunities), but a
consensus will derive from a complex web based on individual credibility resulting from
initial pedigree in light of studies under certain veterans, personal contributions, and the
handling of consensus views endorsed by the community as the period progresses and
repeats itself with new apprentices. 1076 In short, the consensus practice of a given
community looks at the summation of shared particular views within self-vetting
knowledge subcommunities that the rest of the community trusts as epistemic authorities.
As complex and as accurate as this account is, it depicts an ideal and an ideal within one
community, and specifically a knowledge-oriented community (the scientific community).
Reality is more complex with not only competing communities, but communities whose
telos is not knowledge, and members inhabit multiple communities simultaneously with
varying degrees of personal identification (a notion we will return to shortly).
Humans are social creatures who are biologically wired to trust our community or
tribe for survival, but the size and complexity of contemporary communities frequently
exceed what we are wired for. In fact, in many ways we "live and die through our
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allegiance" since, as Ezra Klein points out in Why We're Polarized (2020), that this used
to literally be the case:
Human beings evolved to exist in groups. To be part of a group, and to see
that group thrive, meant survival. To be exiled from a group, or to see your
group crushed by its enemies, could mean death. Is it really so strange that
we evolved to feel the life-and-death stakes of group belonging and
status?1077
Klein goes on to say we still see the physical manifestations of this today in the emergent
science of loneliness.1078 Malcom Gladwell came to similar conclusions in Talking to
Strangers (2019) where he analyzes recent social failures that allowed for tragedies like
Penn State's 2011 and the US Olympic gymnastics team's 2016 sexual abuse scandals and
racial bias in police violence to reveal three epistemological assumptions built for smaller
tight-knit communities but fail us in today's world.1079 Our conundrum, per Malcolm
Gladwell, is:
We have no choice but to talk to strangers, especially in our modern
borderless world. We aren't living in villages anymore. Police officers have
to stop people they don't know. Intelligence officers have to deal with
deception and uncertainty. Young people want to go to parties explicitly to
meet strangers: that's part of the thrill of romantic discovery. Yet at this
most necessary of tasks we are inept. We think we can transform the
stranger, without cost or sacrifice, into the familiar and the known, and we
can't.1080
These assessments fit Sebastian Junger's assessment in Tribe (2016) that while our modern
world lessens our dependence on tribe for physical needs, it has made tribe more elusive
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and harder to be a part of. We fear losing it. We will do anything to keep it. Worse, hardship
or conflict foster the sense of tribal loyalty and belonging people crave, sometimes
providing an answer to the eternal quest for meaning.1081 In sum, people can face real
repercussions if they put truth before tribe, and real benefits in bending truth at the altar of
tribe.
The result is that perception of Truth depends on tribe for its acquisition and
distribution while simultaneously our tribe depends on Truth not only to thrive, but literally
to survive. The relationship between tribe and Truth is thus of paramount importance,
especially since history reveals not only how the tribe's role in Truth has been overlooked,
but also, whether knowingly or unknowingly, how tribe has been elevated above Truth.
Given our recent recognition (i.e. since the 1960s & 70s) and the contemporary
exacerbation of this fact, I will look at three distortions to the relationship between tribe
and Truth: first, tribe chooses truth, the reality of human nature in which identity related
biases aim to promote or defend our tribe; second, tribe controls truth, the fact that political
authority will manipulate and distort epistemic authority for its own advantage; and third,
tribe constructs truth, which explains that all knowledge is a social construction such that
there is no objective truth and all is subjective.
7.2.1 Tribe chooses Truth
While we have dubbed our current era the "information age," the reality is we have
deceived ourselves into believing that we value Truth over tribe. This self-deception likely
results from the way we acquire most of our knowledge, namely through our tribe. This
tracks the pressing Socratic question that frames Michael Lynch's Know-it-all-society
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(2019), "how ought we to believe?" which reveals that "how we go about believing has a
direct effect on what we believe." 1082 Everyone is part of a tribe and tribes shape our
knowledge, such that, as Linda Zagzebski illustrates in Epistemic Authority (2016),
community becomes "like an extended self." 1083 The result is we are epistemically
predisposed to trust information within the tribe by default (or at least engage in less
vetting) and be skeptical of information from without.1084 The result: we are
socially/evolutionarily programmed away from open-mindedness. This is the basis for socalled bubbles and "echo chambers" of information.1085 In choosing information an
source(s), the tribe effectively chooses (and then reinforces) what is considered truth.
The ready access to facts in our "information age" has actually made our task of
identifying true knowledge tougher: media outlets now sort themselves by political
ideology (discussed in the next section) and a quick internet search not only falsely inflates
our knowledge (even on yet to be searched for subjects), but also "gives us just the
information we want."1086 To state the conclusion in advance, "the internet", according to
Lynch, "becomes one big reinforcement mechanism, obtaining for each one of us the
information that we are already biased to believe, and encouraging us to regard those in
other bubbles as misinformed miscreants."1087 Worse, social media, a platform that
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customizes user experience using algorithms to track and "to predict what sort of
information you – and crucially, those similar to you – will find interesting, what posts you
will like, and what links you will click",1088 has become a major source of news with Pew
Research Center reporting in 2019 that 55% of U.S. adults get their news from social media
either "often" or "sometimes" (up 8% from 2018) with "often" comprising 28% (up from
20% in 2018).1089 In his aptly titled chapter "The Outrage Factory," Lynch asserts that
people are confused about what they are really doing with their social media posts
("shares"); while "shares typically seem to us like assertions and/or endorsements of
assertions," research reveals that 60% of people who share articles have not read them. 1090
In reality, people share content that riles them, and their fellow tribe members, up. Whether
knowingly or unknowingly, people conflate the illocutionary force of their locutions:
Put together, these points—what we are doing with our shares and what we
are not doing—make it difficult to believe that the primary function of our
communicative acts of sharing is really either assertion or endorsement,
even though that's what we typically think we are doing… We think we are
sharing news stories in order to transfer knowledge, but much of the time
we aren't really trying to do that at all—whatever we may consciously think.
If we were, we would presumably have read the piece that we're sharing.
But most of us don't.1091
What social media posts and shares really appear to be doing is building communal trust
through emotional bonding. Thus, the reason people share them is "because expressions of
tribal emotional attitudes like outrage are rewarded by the amount of shares and likes they
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elicit."1092 People thus form beliefs (and the tribe reinforces its beliefs) through the building
of trust in sharing attitudes. The more you learn to trust your tribe, the more you believe
that the tribe is right and opposing tribes are wrong. In this way, Lynch likens social media
to a "boot camp for our convictions":
It bolsters a confidence, increases trust in our cohort, and makes us loathe
the enemy. But in doing so, it also makes us more vulnerable to
manipulation and feeds our hardwired penchant for being know-it-alls. We
think we are playing by the rules of rationality—appealing to evidence and
data. But in fact, the rules we are playing by are those that govern our selfexpressions and social interactions—the rules of the playground, the dating
game, and the office watercooler. These rules have more to do with
generating and receiving emotional reactions, solidifying tribal
membership, and enlarging social status than with what is warranted by the
evidence and what isn't.1093
In another way, the sharing of tribal attitudes serves as a means of telling other members
that this is what the tribe believes and if you are one of us, then you will believe the same.
Tribes, despite this negative appraisal, provide a significant epistemic good in
permitting a cognitive division of labor. Reality and how we should live in it is complex,
too complex for any individual to understand and successfully navigate. Ideally, we
become (or remain) members of tribes that share our values and our goals. This enables us
to trust communal epistemic experts to explain and direct in us a way keeping with those
shared values and goals (assuming something akin to Zagzebski's thesis that given
appropriate time and resources we would arrive at the same conclusions for ourselves). 1094
This trust goes astray for two important reasons: first, the telos of many tribes is not Truth,
but survival and thus power. Klein sums this up in regard to politics: "parties, though based
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on a set of principles, aren’t disinterested teachers in search of truth. They are organized
groups looking to increase their power. Or, as the psychologists would put it, their
reasoning may be motivated by something other than accuracy." 1095 Second, sociologically
and psychologically, tribes make up large parts of our "identities," such that
accommodating facts that conflict with tribal convictions is not just a matter of changing
one's mind, it is a matter of going against one's tribe, to change one's identity. 1096 An old
sociological test is to ask someone to complete the phrase "I am…" as many times as they
can in a minute (typical answers include: their name; social roles, e.g. a father, a teacher,
etc.; and groups, e.g. a Christian, a Democrat, etc.); the answers that emerge from the
participant's narrative memory the easiest and fastest represent the identities most
ingressive or salient to their sense of self. These identities are proven to have an impact on
when and how new information is received. If a new fact does not conflict with one's salient
identities, then it is readily assented to; however, the same fact will meet with resistance if
one perceives it as threatening to a core identity. Understandably, it is much more difficult,
and socially costly to change your identities than it is your mind; the personal cost of
putting truth before tribe is zero, but the social cost is massive. When speaking the Truth
results in ostracization, Klein notes that "the most important psychological imperative most
of us have in a given day is protecting our idea of who we are and our relationships with
the people we trust and love."1097 Lynch introduces the corresponding concept of "moral
entanglement":
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Moral entanglement happens when one becomes committed to a belief in a
matter of fact because its truth—rightly or wrongly—is regarded as
evidentially related to a moral commitment, in the following sense: its
falsity would undermine the perceived evidence for that moral commitment.
When that happens, a seemingly straightforward claim about physical
events has become shot through with moral values. Thus, the empirical
belief takes on moral salience from the explicit moral values around it, and
any attack on it is treated as an attack on those values. 1098
It seems clear to me that accepting facts contrary to the tribe's commitments falls under
moral entanglement (perhaps disloyalty). Tribal members will also maintain absurd beliefs
to avoid cognitive dissonance in order to preserve a conviction several degrees removed
from the purported fact in question. For example, many Abrahamic faith communities
reject scientific claims about the rising temperature of the Earth conceivably because
trusting the scientific community would entail cognitive dissonance regarding other claims
which "contradict" religious convictions about evolution; underlying this conviction is a
commitment to a young Earth, under which in turn underlies a particular biblical
hermeneutic around which they have structured their entire life. In short, it is easier to reject
the Truth when it pulls on a thread that threatens to unravel the fabric of their entire belief
structure.
For this reason, facts that conflict with or undermine the tribe's beliefs are often
interpreted as attacks on one's identity. Worse, identities have sorted (at least since the
1950s) to create reinforcing "mega-identities," meaning an attack on one identity is an
attack on all of a recipient's perceived identities. Per Klein, this is clearly seen in politics:
Today, the parties are sharply split across racial, religious, geographic,
cultural, and psychological lines. There are many, many powerful identities
lurking in that list, and they are fusing together, stacking atop one another,
so a conflict or threat that activates one activates all. And since these megasec.
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identities stretch across so many aspects of our society, they are constantly
being activated, and that means they are constantly being reinforced. 1099
The result is people engage in what Yale Law professor Dan Kahan calls "identityprotective cognition" in which "it’s natural for individuals subconsciously to resist
evidence that challenges factual beliefs supportive of their values, particularly when those
beliefs are widely held within groups with which they identify."1100 In defining identityprotective cognition, Kahan cites multiple sources showing how group membership effects
how people process information in nearly all categories:
Individuals tend to adopt the beliefs common to members of salient "ingroups." They also resist revision of those beliefs in the face of contrary
factual information, particularly when that information originates from
"out-group" sources, who are likely to be perceived as less knowledgeable
and less trustworthy than "in-group" ones.1101
Studies confirm that tribalism short-circuits our intelligence such that "being better at math
made partisans less likely to solve the problem correctly when solving the problem
correctly meant betraying their political instincts." Why? It seems clear, per Klein, that
"people weren’t reasoning to get the right answer; they were reasoning to get the answer
that they wanted to be right."1102 As we will see later, this reveals that more information,
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training, etc. is fruitless since we are deluding ourselves and where our telos truly lies.1103
The result is what Dave Roberts calls "tribal epistemology" or when "information is
evaluated based not on conformity to common standards of evidence or correspondence to
a common understanding of the world, but on whether it supports the tribe’s values and
goals and is vouchsafed by tribal leaders." 1104 As a result, even the definition of an expert
is distorted on politicized issues to "a credentialed person who agrees with me." 1105 Of
course this leads to bizarre conclusions when the same source reports on both tribal and
non-tribally important topics.1106
We clearly see again; the epistemic reality here mirrors the ethical with Hume's
expressivism in that assertions reduce to the "yay" or "boo" expressions of "emotional" and
"tribal attitudes." The default human condition it would seem, is not that of rational animal,
but a rationalizing emotional one in keeping with Jonathan Haidt's infamous article "The
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Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail."1107 If we follow our emotional and psychological
biases, then we will ask "how do I feel about this?", "does this help or hurt the tribe?", and
then find reasons that back our tribe's convictions. Psychological studies have shown that
emotions distort our cognitive processes in: reception, e.g., confirmation bias (the tendency
to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing beliefs or theories); recall, e.g.,
selective memory (being more likely to remember facts that reflect on positively and vis
versa); and intellectual arrogance, e.g., fear of error and desire for esteem. 1108
In sum, this overemphasis on the tribe describes what I have termed "blind-trust"
in chapters 1 and 6 which permits selective knowledge sourcing, identity-protectiveness,
and moral entanglements. This first dark side of trust leads to the second, for allowing the
tribe to essentially choose the truth that best serves it opens the door to manipulation. As
Lynch states, "The more we come to think that tribal convictions are all that should matter,
the more we arrogantly dismiss evidence for victory and truth for power, the weaker our
grip on democracy becomes, no matter who is in power." 1109 Adrian Bardon likewise
claims in a preview of his 2020 book The Truth about Denial:
Under the right conditions, universal human traits like in-group favoritism,
existential anxiety and a desire for stability and control combine into a toxic,
system-justifying identity politics. When group interests, creeds, or dogmas
are threatened by unwelcome factual information, biased thinking becomes
1107
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denial. And unfortunately, these facts about human nature can be
manipulated for political ends.1110
The core argument of Klein's book is that everyone engaged in American politics (which
extrapolates to any country) is engaged in identity politics: "What we are often fighting
over in American politics is group identity and status-fights that express themselves in
debates over policy and power but cannot be truly reconciled to either." 1111 Policy and
ideology, he explains, drive voters less than the strength of their partisan identity which
has become a "means of self-expression and group identity."1112 In our increasingly socially
alienated societies, this identity is less about who or what we are for than who we are
against, otherwise known as negative partisanship. The result, according to Klein, is "How
we feel matters much more than what we think, and in elections, the feelings that matter
most are often our feelings about the other side," which current politicians have employed
as an explicit political strategy of polarization.1113 The results of recent elections should
not be surprising for "we are so locked into our political identities that there is virtually no
candidate, no information, no condition, that can force us to change our minds. We will
justify almost anything or anyone so long as it helps our side, and the result is politics
devoid of guardrails, standards, persuasion, or accountability." 1114 This is devastating to
the development of the virtues. More immediately relevant, it also lays the groundwork for
bad actors to acquire positions of power at a time when increasing numbers of citizens
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report democracy is unessential (and even a "bad way to run this country") and increasingly
support authoritarian alternatives. 1115
7.2.2 Tribe corrupts Truth
Now that technology aids epistemic biases through Google searches and social media
algorithms to rationalize and reinforce our most emotional responses, the age-old truth that
"information has always been, and will continued to be, a chief tool of empire and war" is
being amplified. Lynch goes on to warn that "it is by the use, and misuse, of information
that those who desire to manipulate hearts and minds have always acted." 1116 Identityprotective cognition and moral entanglement are most active, and therefore our reasoning
is most vulnerable, when people feel their identities are threatened. 1117 As shown above,
when tribal identities are activated (in terms of position, financials, or traditions) our
epistemic skills slip making it more likely we will conflate the trust entailed by an epistemic
authority and merited by a practical authority. If epistemic authority is understood as a kind
of power, then this means it can be converted into practical and political authority, albeit
by sacrificing epistemic integrity. Truth is thereby corrupted by tribe primarily in two
ways: willful manipulation and/or implicit bias.
Practical authorities corrupt epistemic arenas through their "spin" on Truth and their
campaigning to be perceived as geniuses (or at least as reputational authorities) with the
intent (or pretense) of being an epistemic authority will lead to better governance; however,
this political distortion of Truth becomes malignant when practical authorities use their
power to manipulate epistemic authorities. This corruption occurs in altering the flow of
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information by pressuring scientific institutions and media outlets or, in abandoning all
pretense, changing scientific findings or instituting an official state media. 1118 Both result
in direct censorship of Truth. Not even democratic societies, where such direct control of
knowledge transmission is supposedly impossible, are immune to direct censorship.
Political authorities have historically corrupted epistemic authorities by activating the
populace's identities, sometimes successfully silencing information sources entirely. This,
for example, is what former American House Speaker Newt Gingrich successfully did in
1995 by shuttering the Office of Technology Assessments, "a blue-ribbon congressional
agency that had been established for scientists to offer objective analysis on issues ranging
from defense and space to climate and energy," which E.J. Dionne et al. describes as "part
of Gingrich's broader (and largely successful) effort to centralize power in the Speaker's
office", but "…also sent a message that ideological commitments would trump
evidence."1119 Common tools are fear and scapegoating, which require no explanation, but
another effective means to corrupt the truth is by narrowing the scope of a tribe's accepted
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information sources. For even if all knowledge is limited and beholden to perspectivalism,
a diversity of knowledge sources will provide more breadth, depth, and mitigate overall
bias. Klein rightly recognizes that practical authorities such as political parties "exist within
informational ecosystems" and "those ecosystems create the context in which voters make
demands, in which politicians make strategic choices, in which presidential aspirants craft
messages."1120 Wider informational ecosystems thus include both objective sources and
partial/partisan sources such that listeners:
trust in sources that pull them left [or right] and sources that pull them
toward the center, in sources oriented toward escalation and sources
oriented toward moderation, in sources that root their identity in a political
movement and sources that carefully tend a reputation for being
antagonistic toward political movements. 1121
Inversely, a smaller cadre of accepted news sources means less breadth, depth, and
increased bias. This decreased diversity of sources allows for practical authorities to focus
their leverage and by extension their message to build an information ecosystem around
partial/partisan sources in danger of being propagandistic.1122 The result is indirect
censorship, or when political authorities control which media people trust by deeming
knowledge sources that affirm their agenda as genuine while castigating the remainder as
illegitimate, partisan, or, more colloquially, "fake news." 1123
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When neither direct nor indirect censorship is possible, practical authorities can
resort to disrupting epistemic authority. The first is to pollute transmission channels with
misinformation or outright lies to create confusion, e.g., Federal agencies report that
Russian-sponsored troll farms and for-profit conspiracy sites attempted to sway the US
2016 electoral cycle. Lynch notes that while few people are gullible or biased enough to
believe such misinformation, many become unconvinced of what is true and thus withhold
belief. In short, "political misinformation doesn't need to convince, just sow doubts." 1124
The second, and far more destructive avenue, is to politically weaponize the
postmodernism and post-truth culture by disvaluing Truth altogether. Under this approach,
Truth is not important or simply less important than another ideal, e.g., tolerance. In On
Bullshit (2005), Harry Frankfurt turned "bullshit" into a technical term to capture this
phenomenon; the bullshitter deceives but does not lie since "the truth-values of his
statements are of no central interest to him…He does not care whether the things he says
describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose." 1125
This approach is becoming more and more prevalent in politics. In 2008, US Senator John
McCain corrected a voter who claimed President Barak Obama was a Muslim, but by 2011
House Speaker John Boehnor refused to do likewise saying "it's not my job to tell the
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American people what to think," and then doubled-down when pressed further saying "The
American people have the right to think what they want to think." 1126 By 2016, "alternative
facts" stemming from the size of Trump's inaugural address crowds became common
parlance, but as NBC report Chuck Todd correctly pointed out: "Alternative facts are not
facts. They're falsehoods."1127 In 2018, Rudi Giuliani claimed testimonials in Special
Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation were merely "somebody’s version of the truth, not
the truth," only to defend himself by saying "Truth isn't Truth" and "[Facts] are in the eye
of the beholder."1128 One American news anchor's closing tagline even baldly states,
"Remember, even when I'm wrong, I'm right."1129 In short, it does not matter if a political
authority is wrong if what counts is something other than Truth, i.e. practical power,
wealth, geography, and tribal loyalty.1130 The common objection is "whataboutism" or the
old tu quoque fallacy that everybody is equally guilty in putting their tribe before Truth. In
the words of Lynch:
If we become convinced that those who answer differently are also
approaching the question with minds made up, we may begin to feel that
the whole enterprise is bankrupt. We may begin to listen to those who tell
us that everyone is entitled to their alternative facts, that all news is fake
news and social media simply weaponized information. We may begin to
think, with Camus, that "dialogue and personal relations have been replaced
by propaganda or polemic." In other words, the dogmatic arrogance we see
in our political discourse may be due to our belief in our tribe's infallibility,
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or it may be due to the fact that we've simply punted on truth and embraced
power as the measure of our success. 1131
Yet, as several political commentators have come to realize, putting tribe before Truth
comes at a cost.1132 "To abandon facts is to abandon freedom," insists Timothy Snyder in
On Tyranny, for "if nothing is true, then no one can criticize power, because there is no
basis upon which to do so…you submit to tyranny when you renounce the difference
between what you want to hear and what is actually the case." 1133 To abandon Truth is the
epistemic equivalent of embracing "might makes right." This leads to another way Truth is
perpetually corrupted and the entire epistemic enterprise is called into question.
The second way Truth is corrupted by tribe is through implicit bias, an insidious
byproduct of communal epistemic authorities training and heralding the next generation of
experts after their own tribal likeness (i.e., the communal understanding of what constitutes
epistemic authority) through a process that, whether willfully or unintentionally, is
inherently exclusionary of epistemic authorities from "the Other's" communities. If truth is
a matter of core consensus, then applying political influence via practical authority can
effectively change what "truth" is by influencing the core consensus through replacing the
epistemic authorities. This is exacerbated when the blind-trust of citizens in selected
practical authorities maintains the conflation of practical and epistemic authority long after
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any direct influence or manipulation. Literature abounds on colonial and decolonial
thought, but we can illustrate this bias in identifying epistemic authorities using Kitcher's
model when the consensus practice adopts and reinforces a definition or picture of who or
what an epistemic authority looks like in a self-reinforcing process that disregards, deters,
or denigrates the Other's epistemic authorities who do not conform to the community's
accepted standard, method/rule, or epistemic imperative. 1134 Historically, we can see that
Modernity’s concept of epistemic authority, built on the disembodied ego cogito, began
when the veteran practices of scholasticism were rejected and European male apprentices
such as Descartes shifted the community’s virtual consensus by no longer deferring
authority to the religious subcommunity and adopting the justificatory grounds of
autonomous reason.1135 By making the ego cogito the new consensus practice to qualify
individual practices as authoritative, the community limited knowledge specialization to
those who espoused or reflected this ego cogito. Once these European male apprentices
become veterans, they in turn expected acknowledgments of authority based on
subcommunities subsequently created based on specialization in specific areas even when
that specialization produced claims that distorted reality, e.g., Orientalism. The perceived
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developmentalist superiority blinded the enlightened thinker to the fact that this core
consensus effectively excluded the individual practices of non-European thinkers by
limiting the acknowledgments of authority to only include the European ego cogito either
as traditionally formulated by European men or as adopted by the Other (such as the
colonized) thereby mistaking their virtual consensus for the global consensus by making
the ego cogito normative. The result is a form of tribal arrogance which is intrinsically
hierarchical and treats non-members, "the Other", like a child as history has shown in the
gruesome effects of colonialism.
Practical authority exerting power outside of its appropriate domain is one of the
key reasons for a disruption in epistemological trust, but it raises the question of whether
we can escape the bootstrapping problem. If all our own reason is shaped by the tribe to
promote the tribe's wellbeing, can we trust our own reason? As even Klein notes, "taking
this literature too seriously can feel like staring into the abyss." 1136 If all knowledge is
necessarily perspectival, is there such thing as capital "T" Truth? Or is all knowledge, all
truth, merely a social construct?
7.2.3 Tribe constructs Truth
The dark side of trust seems inevitably to lead, as we saw in Chapter 2, back to the
fundamental divide which emerged in social epistemology over whether to break from or
continue traditional epistemology's search for, and subsequent transmission of, Truth. 1137
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Standpoint epistemologists have stressed that our given perspectives lead us to insights
others cannot have. Some have argued along the lines that since each perspective is a social
construction and those perspectives determine what we accept as true, then truth is
relative.1138 Since my social perspective is a product of the identities and tribes I inhabit,
then truth is a social construction. According to Lynch, the argument's true seductive power
comes from its appeal to our current prioritization of autonomy and egalitarianism (as we
saw in chapter 1).1139 This parallels the constructivist route, following Thomas Kuhn and
Richard Rorty who are metaphysical relativists asserting there are only social facts.
Objective metaphysical truth either does not exist or cannot be known given human
limitations. Pretending that a social fact is an objective metaphysical fact amounts to a lie
since it claims a privileged access to Truth which nobody can have (not even theists via
their scriptures). Thus, to impose or enforce personal truths on others through an appeal to
objective metaphysical truth is not noble but proselytizing at best and coercion at worst. In
fact, the history of philosophy and science reveal that communities have frequently
maintained that the current social truth is metaphysical truth with devastating results. 1140
Rorty's account is that all scientific knowledge is merely pragmatic; a given truth is

Ancient and Medieval sense of episteme or scientia, that is governed by an objective standard, namely
necessary and universal "reality", which terms and concepts signify. The relationship between the two is what
is contested and lies at the heart of seeing social epistemology either as constructivist or a continuation of
traditional epistemology.
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believed because it "works" for an individual or community and this truth will cease, or
will be amended, once a new experiment shows that this "truth" no longer works. Society
can mutually agree (create a consensus) on one set of shared beliefs/values, but this
consensus will be ever changing, possibly even contradictory through time and can lead to
intolerance as practical power enforces its claim to truth.
How do we escape this circularity? Is there a way to move forward? Logically, we
must deduce whether there are necessary and universal metaphysical truths upon which
social truths are based or there are no necessary and universal metaphysical truths such that
all knowledge is nothing more than social facts. The consensus among experts in
philosophy, epistemology, and even social epistemology, is that constructivism is
fallacious. For while our beliefs do depend on our perspective, it does not follow that truth
is somehow relative to our perspectives.1141 Certain concepts clearly are social as
standpoint epistemology illustrates. For example: political laws are the product of a given
social contract and thus what a given society deems acceptable; national borders, while
they are frequently denoted by non-social objects such as rivers and walls, only exist in the
minds of given peoples (thus explaining border disputes); and the well-documented
concepts of race and gender which also incorporate biological and phenotypic traits, but
vary by tribe, place, and time as to which traits are significant or are "essential."1142
However, it is equally clear that there are concepts that are neither social nor constructed.
The rules of logic like the syllogism, mathematical concepts like the triangle, and
natural/scientific truths like gravity or the atomic weight of gold all point to an unchanging
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metaphysical reality.1143 Even as I write this, COVID-19 and the Coronavirus pandemic is
sweeping the world making it very hard to doubt the truth of where it is causing sickness
and death completely independent of communal consensus or what practical authorities
wish to be true for the benefit of their tribe. 1144 Perhaps the two camps can find common
ground in the late Renaissance thinker Giambattista Vico who famously said "that the true
is what is made", such that social truths apply only to that which we as humans have
brought into being, but objective metaphysical truth applies to everything else we have not
made (since it was made by God or nature).1145 This allows for the only recourse to
metaphysical truth which, while it can be obscured, cannot be changed and will ultimately
assert itself. In regard to all this, it appears that Bertrand Russell was right:
1143
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The concept of ‘truth’ as something dependent upon facts largely outside
human control has always been one of the ways in which philosophy
hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check
upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain
kind of madness—the intoxication of power which invaded philosophy with
Fichte, and to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are prone.
I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and
that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is
increasing the danger of vast social disaster. 1146
7.3 The post-2020 opportunity to reassess authority, transmission, and trust
7.3.1 There has been an awakening
This depiction of contemporary times is admittedly grim. We can respond effectively to
Constructivism, but tribal epistemology and its penchant for political manipulation has no
easy solution.1147 The problem stems from whole epistemic systems built on unvirtuous
acts, or, in the words of Klein, "toxic systems compromise good individuals with ease.
They do so not by demanding we betray our values but by enlisting our values such that
we betray each other. What is rational and even moral for us to do individually becomes
destructive when done collectively."1148 With the prevalence of internet knowing, social
media, and the rise of political populism, the bright side is an awakening to the need for
Truth and virtue.
There has been an increased number of calls for a return to Truth in non-academic
publications. Not long ago there were only a few concerned voices, such as New York Times
(NYT) literary critic Michiko Kakutani who warned in 1994, "throughout our culture, the
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old notions of 'truth' and 'knowledge' are in danger of being replaced by the new ones of
'opinion', 'perception', and 'credibility'",1149 but now there is a steady flow of articles and
books with a similar message. Dionne et al. open One Nation After Trump (2018) claiming
"crisis is an opportunity" and title an entire chapter "When the Truth Doesn't Matter." 1150
National Public Radio's (NPR) On Point in February of 2020 brought over eight
philosophers and scholars in for a four part special series, "In Search of Truth", dedicated
to the topic.1151 According to former White House speechwriter, Atlantic columnist, and
media commentator David Frum in Trumpocracy (2018), one of the "gifts" of post-truth
21st century politics, which filled the "cavity excavated by the work of thousands of toiling
academics and intellectuals" following Michel Foucault et al. in believing that "liberation
would follow only once we accepted that 'truth' served merely as a euphemism for selfserving ideologies devised by holders of power", is the "recovery of the preciousness of
truth."1152 The result, which he calls the second gift of our time, is "a growing majority of
Americans crave truth, seek truth, and vindicate truth. They cherish truth as something real
in itself, not a construct of power, not a 'narrative' that varies according to the hyphens in
one's personal identity."1153
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There has been a similar awakening and call for a return to moral character. The
pull quote for the entire book A Warning (2019) is the 26th American president Theodore
Roosevelt's take on character.1154 A similar pull quote from America's first president
George Washington on character and virtue opens the second chapter entitled "The
Character of a Man" which outlines the Cardinal Virtues and the four part rubric of Cicero's
De Officiis to show, based on countless examples and episodes, the 45 th American president
exhibits none of them.1155 Dionne et al. also devote an entire chapter to "Bad Behavior",
claiming that while we tend to overemphasize the "breaking of rules" it is the violating of
previous norms that is more pressing for "many of the virtues we ask of our fellow human
beings cannot in practice be legislated or, at best, can be codified only imperfectly and
incompletely."1156 They also see this as a critical moment in history, one in which people
are once again aware and need to act since:
We don't fully appreciate the power of norms until they are violated on a
regular basis. And the breaking of norms often produces a cascading effect:
as one person breaks with tradition and expectation, behavior previously
considered inappropriate is normalized and taken up by others. 1157
What Frum calls the "third gift" of this time is likewise focused on character: "a renewal
of their disgust for those who join power to cruelty," and Americans have been reminded
"of the old schoolyard lesson: the bully is a coward." 1158
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7.3.2 "Modern Epistemic Philosophy"
Epistemology finds itself in the same precarious position as moral philosophy. The
bootstrapping problem mirrors the ethical challenge of relativism. Tribal epistemology is
driven by biases placing the emotional before the rational as in Hume's Expressivism. If
social truths are all that is available, either because metaphysical Truth does not exist or is
beyond reach, then we are left not with one chain of transmission descending from the past
to contend with, but myriad, one for each community.1159 For as Nietzsche claims of
morality, in the history of epistemology there are different and opposing epistemologies at
work.1160 He concludes that epistemic authority ultimately collapses into the will and
autonomy of practical authority. As such, Jonathan Sanford's words in Before Virtue (2015)
about moral philosophy could just as easily describe epistemology:
on the one hand it is a discipline in disarray, with first principles, aims, and
methodology all still very much in dispute; and on the other hand it is a
discipline in which the stakes are especially high and about whose
conclusions academics and nonacademics alike care very much, even if
many people seem not to care particularly about the philosophical strategies
employed to arrive at those conclusions. 1161
If Truth lacks on objective ground, we are perilously close to might (individually or
communally) making epistemic right.
Yet insofar as epistemology shares the same problems as moral philosophy, it
stands to reason that the same solutions should also be applicable. The driving question of
Lynch's Know-It-All Society (2019) was modifying Socrates's "how we ought to live?" into
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"how we ought to believe?".1162 We have seen this debate between whether there is or is
not a moral ground (or at least an unknowable one) in moral philosophy. G. E. M.
Anscombe recognized Nietzsche's critiques of modernity in "Modern Moral
Philosophy."1163 As Anscombe saw it, modern moral philosophy combined the denial of
objective moral facts and divine law to create a subjective sentimentalism. Values were
thus nothing more than personal preferences while "ought," with nothing to ground it, was
nothing more than a "mesmeric force," (e.g. "It is as if the notion 'criminal' were to remain
when criminal law and criminal courts had been abolished and forgotten"). 1164 By replacing
moral with epistemic we can see the parallels between a moral ought, what one "should
do", and an epistemic ought, what one "should believe." In our modern epistemic
philosophy, we have the "my truth" and "your truth" of perspectivalism with no ground to
determine one over the other, but we maintain the imperative to hold them as the Truth.
Alasdair MacIntyre in turn argues that the real alternative is "Nietzsche or Aristotle?," for
if the Enlightenment project was built on the presupposition of rejecting Aristotle, then the
Aristotelian project is worthy of reconsideration if the Enlightenment project fails. 1165 As
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we have seen above, social epistemology has dealt a mighty blow to Enlightenment
thinking.
Perhaps the parallel between moral and epistemic philosophy should not be
surprising given Aristotle's emphasis on moral and intellectual virtues. Yet, even if we
analogously apply the arguments of Anscombe and MacIntyre et al. against "modern moral
philosophy" to "modern epistemic philosophy" we cannot maintain the ought of belief
without a proper account of what exists and a corresponding set of intellectual virtues (e.g.,
"open-mindedness" and "love of truth"). Epistemic concepts, like their moral counterparts,
Julia Driver points out rely on richer "thick" concepts which "outside of a certain
metaphysical perspective—lack content."1166 The critiques leveled at Modernity and
Constructivism indicate that the "thin" concepts of rational rules and autonomous methods
cannot adequately account for our knowledge given its social dynamics. Instead of a
philosophic method that delivers answers, we should heed Pierre Hadot's reminder to
contemporary philosophers that for the Greeks philosophy looked very different than what
today is meant by the term: that for Socrates and Plato the most basic and essential
philosophic task was not logic or argumentation but "the Delphic injunction to ‘know
thyself’," a concern with the health of the mind. Philosophy originally had less to do with
textual practices such as reading, writing, and oral dialogue, but was a way of life or "an
art of living dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom (as the word ‘philosophia’ implies), and
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thus to the practices that such a pursuit should entail." 1167 By extension, if our goal truly is
wisdom, we too must begin by knowing ourselves. We must know what we are and how
we think. We must recognize our active role in acquiring knowledge, what community(ies)
we have membership in, what methods their epistemic authorities employ to generate and
transmit knowledge, and how they have shaped us. Thus, we should also study the mistakes
our community has made in the past, and recognize that no tribe, even our own, is infallible.
Thus, in order to proceed we must finally heed the first of Anscombe's theses, namely that
it is unprofitable to continue doing moral philosophy, "until we are equipped with a sound
philosophy of psychology."1168 Since it has been established that truth and knowledge have
a complicated social relationship to facts, we can argue that it is likewise no longer
profitable to do epistemic philosophy (epistemology) until we have an adequate
philosophical anthropology, a philosophy of human nature.
I realize however, that not everyone will agree with the drastic step of ceasing to
do epistemology while we develop a philosophy of psychology and its required
metaphysical perspectives. For those individuals (or those who wish to work on both
simultaneously), I believe there are practical steps we can implement while the theoretical
catches up.
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7.3.3. Practical Steps to proceed
A common theme across contemporary commentaries is "hope," 1169 but I fear little can be
done in the way of grand sweeping solutions without Anscombe's called for philosophy of
psychology since the problem is ingrained epistemic systems built on the trust of billions
of individuals. Change must come at the individual level and only by changing the
individuals will the systems change. Here I will thus confine myself to how we should
proceed after recognizing these systems are built on trust.
While the solution is ultimately to promote individuals to be open to trusting the
virtuous speaker, even those outside the tribe (open-rationalism), how openness is
encouraged profoundly alters the outcome. Telling people who are "intellectually arrogant"
to be "open" or to listen to countervailing voices is fruitless since "when we suffer from it,
we think we having nothing to learn from anyone else—that our worldview can't improve
from hearing what people with different perspectives have to say."1170 Thus, exposure to
another tribe's echo-chamber only elicits rebuttal and further polarizes. 1171 Recognizing
this explains why there is such widespread agreement that ignorance is not the underlying
problem and thus more information, more knowledge is not the solution. It is "seductive"
to think so, per Klein, since "It suggests our fellow countrymen aren’t wrong so much as
they’re misguided, ignorant, or—most appealingly—deceived by scoundrels from the
other party. It holds that our debates are tractable and that the answers to our toughest
problems aren’t very controversial at all."1172 The solution is also simple: increase scientific
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literacy and critical thinking skills through teaching. However, as we saw, this wrongly
assumes that people's true telos is truth and not tribe (despite their claims to the contrary).
As we saw earlier regarding identity-protective cognition and moral entanglement,
according to Lynch "it can become practically rational to ignore evidence that might
undermine [our convictions]. Convictions make it practically rational to be epistemically
irrational."1173 As Klein, drawing on Kahan et al.'s research claims, people value winning
an argument over actually being right:
Humans reason for purposes other than finding truth—purposes like
increasing their standing in their community or ensuring they don’t find
themselves exiled by the leaders of their tribe. If this hypothesis proved true,
then a smarter, better-educated citizenry wouldn’t put an end to these
disagreements. It would just mean the participants are better equipped to
argue for their own side.1174
This is exactly what Bardon has found in The Truth about Denial (2020), "well-trained
academic scientists [i.e., educated experts] are the most highly attuned to the issue of
confirmation bias, but are also in possession of the most sophisticate means to convince
themselves they are right," thus "…greater education and political sophistication give the
true believer more ammunition—and more confidence—in justifying his or her
position."1175
Since the system is built on trust, the first step is to not abandon trust and our truthdefault mode. Since blind-trust leaves us vulnerable to gullibility, there is a strong push to
abandon trust and embrace a reductionist approach within what I have termed closed-
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rationalism. However, according to Timothy Levine in Duped (2019) this works contrary
to the natural order of society.1176 Following Levine, Gladwell claims a balance between
trust and security needs to be achieved; the consequence of not defaulting to trust parallels
Saadya Gaon's assessment, the collapse of society. The problem is when people default to
trust when they should not. To get people to "snap out" of default-trust requires a "trigger"
as Gladwell points out from Levine's research, "we are not hopelessly gullible, we have
doubts, lots of doubts…You believe someone not because you have no doubts about them.
Belief is not the absence of doubt. You believe someone because you don't have enough
doubts about them."1177 The takeaway is thus to embrace trust and work within it. Change
comes by giving reasons to decrease someone's doubts in trustworthy sources and
increasing someone's doubts about an untrustworthy source.
To leverage our trust-based system, two steps have been proven effective within
the confines of positive collaborative interactions between opposing tribes which allow for
"slow", as opposed "fast", thinking.1178 The first is to humanize, or in the spirit of
Emmanuel Levinas to give a face to, the Other. It is easy to demonize and reject a faceless
group especially in our age of internet anonymity. As Dylan Marron has shown in his
podcast "Conversations with People Who Hate Me", people who leave hateful comments
on his online content change their tone, often backtrack, and are amenable to fruitful

1176

Accepting truth-default theory despite fears of gullibility is "a great deal for us. What we get in exchange
for being vulnerable to an occasional lie is efficient communication and social coordination. The benefits are
huge and the costs are trivial in comparison. Sure, we get deceived once in a while. That is just the cost of
doing business." Timothy R. Levine, Duped: Truth-Default Theory and the Social Science of Lying and
Deception (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2019), 188–89.
1177
Gladwell, Talking to Strangers, 76, 77–78.
1178
Klein, Why We’re Polarized, 137; Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Penguin, 2011).
"Fast thinking" is Kahneman's term for our automatic or impulsive mental system resulting from our
evolutionary or behavior history. "Slow thinking" represents exerting self-control and deliberately focusing
one's attention on details. Cf. Erin E Devers and Jason D Runyan, “The Impact of Thinking Fast and Slow
on the Evangelical Mind,” Christian Scholar’s Review 47, no. 4 (2018): 433–44.

387

conversations during a Skype call.1179 Each step in planned cross-talks should be aimed at
avoiding and defusing kneejerk emotional responses. In moderating conversations between
internet "trolls" and the people they have trolled, Marron stopped using the word "troll." 1180
The second proven step is to appoint speakers who are tribal allies. Not surprisingly, Truths
in danger of moral entanglement or triggering denial for a particular tribe are best received
when they come from a member of the tribe. An outsider's tribal affiliation will always
encounter far more closed minds than insider affiliation. Researchers found that a lecture
presenting climate science information by Katharine Hayhoe, an Evangelical Climate
Scientist, to a predominately Evangelical undergraduate audience "through the lens of an
evangelical tradition" resulted in increased acceptance and awareness of climate concerns:
Acceptance that global warming is happening increased for 48% of
participants, and that humans are causing it for 39%. Awareness of the
expert scientific consensus increased among 27% of participants. 52% were
more worried about climate change after watching the lecture, and 67%
increased their responses about how much harm climate change will do.
55% of participants viewed addressing climate change a higher priority after
attending Katharine Hayhoe’s lecture. For most of the remaining
participants, there was no change in responses to these questions. 1181
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For the half of the audience who reported no change, we can assume they will weaponize
the lecture to defend prevailing tribal views by rationalizing their existing position,
however, experience should also indicate that hearing facts from a peer (and one with
greater credentials) should generate some level of cognitive dissonance that even stubborn
listeners will be forced to process.
Our trust-based system also possesses serious challenges to such structured
interactions. First, the logistics of finding and coordinating tribal experts and leaders who
share the telos of Truth; second, cura personalis for those leaders. Where practical
authorities stand to lose power when Truth is spoken, few will be amenable in allowing
tribal experts speak to their constituents. In the above example, in addition to Hayhoe the
evangelical university needed to possess leaders willing to host the event. Indirect
censorship of Truth driven by communal epistemic authorities, however, is far less
damaging than labeling them traitors and turncoats. This leads to the second challenge:
speaking out against the tribe's stated position comes at a tremendous cost. As a result of
her efforts to communicate climate change facts to Evangelicals, Hayhoe reports receiving
attacks "nearly every day."1182 Likewise, David Brooks, a conservative NYT columnist,
told Klein in 2019 of the "social agony" caused by criticizing Trump:
'I had been part of the conservative movement my whole life,' he told me.
'The Weekly Standard. The Wall Street Journal, National Review,
Washington Times. Suddenly, I wasn’t the kind of conservative all the other
conservatives were, and so my social circles drifted away.' Brooks was
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living alone at the time, and the consequences, for his life, were painful.
'My weekends were just howling silences,' he says. 1183
Unfortunately, caring for such "turncoats" is not as simple as ushering them into the other
tribe, for the same kinds of biases and tribal prejudices persist there. Just because there is
intellectual "repentance" on an issue does not mean "forgiveness" will follow. Thus, these
"traitors" will never be fully accepted due to other tribal disagreements or since they are
viewed as having "blood on their hands" from their past actions/inactions. As tribal
creatures, social ostracization may be too high a price to pay for being "right" once again
making it hard for Truth to overcome tribe. The solution is for our respective tribes to be
willing and open to accepting the stranger into our midst.
These solutions reiterate how real change will only follow change at the individual
level. This is, as Lynch has recognized, because "...at the end of the day, dealing with our
attitudes toward truth and conviction won't be solved just by teaching people more facts
when we don't agree on what counts as a 'fact'. The problem of how to deal with the spread
of dogmatism and the politics of arrogance is not a technical problem; it is a human
problem."1184 Hence, even if we do not heed Anscombe's call for a philosophy of
psychology, we should recognize that social epistemology has revealed the importance of
first understanding ourselves before we can understand anything else.
7.4 Final Thoughts
As I argued in chapter 1, the "social turn" allows us to identify three answers to what
authority we should trust: a rational fideism that only "blind-trusts" the epistemic
authorities of one's own like-minded (and often like-looking) community; a closed
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rationalism that "self-trusts" one's autonomous use of rational rules or methods; and an
open rationalism that is open to "virtuous-trust" in trustworthy speakers outside oneself and
their community. We saw blind-trust was unfruitful epistemically, but now as disastrous
given its susceptibility to manipulation by practical authority. Self-trust likewise stifled the
epistemic quest but is now revealed to be susceptible to implicit bias that can violently
silence the Other and their outside perspective. Virtuous-trust, on the other hand, is more
than merely the last option. The method obligates us to remain open outwards and upwards
to the trustworthy speaker in accordance with the virtues which are arguably open to
cultural elucidation (sometimes cited as a weakness of virtue theory). A crucial element of
the escape requires us to strategically self-verify using our personal autonomy, not as the
authority or standard that determines the space of reason but as a tool that identifies where
we stand in the space of reasons,1185 to inspect epistemic authorities and what they claim
in order to determine if they are trustworthy and accurately reporting on the objectively
neutral standard. First, we can inspect the epistemic authorities "outside" our typical
community in order to determine if the Other's epistemic authorities have a better
understanding. Second, our first-person experience, though influenced by social truth, is
not inherently social, granting us an unsocial glimpse of the reality before us. This allows
us to break from the circularity of social knowledge.
I suggested in the first chapter that the way forward is to recapture concepts of
authority and testimony before the shift to individual will and autonomy as the objective
standard. I proposed following Anscombe and MacIntyre to escape from epistemic
relativism with an objective (i.e., culturally neutral) standard beyond any/all communal
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epistemic authority available to everyone, namely a return to metaphysics upon which
Trust can be based. This is not a romanticizing of the past, or a yearning to make some
period of privilege great again. Instead, it is the humble acknowledgement that if our
intellectual journey has led to a dead end, then we should not stubbornly persist, but turn
around in hopes of discovering where we made a wrong turn. However, even if we knew
where we went astray, we simply cannot jump back to the past. That is, we cannot be who
we used to be after traveling down this current path and back. The journey changes us. In
fact, the "detour" may have been necessary to open us to the epistemic authority of the
Other we once rejected.
I have been arguing here against rejecting metaphysical truth while recognizing the
importance that our attempt to know it is inescapably social. Thus, instead of pushing back
against the meta-epistemological shift to the ultimate authority of autonomy, I have
acquiesced to its role in placing it at the center of my virtue account of testimony (chapter
6). This highlights my own given perspective shaped by a contemporary worldview steeped
in the importance of autonomy, and/or that I trust that the intellectual authorities of the past
five centuries who not only perceived its value, but also transmitted their expertise to me.
Either way, I feel comfortable trusting their authority on autonomy since it lends credence
to the fact that my first-person reasons to trust myself are more basic and thus logically
prior to third person reasons (evidence) to trust anything else. 1186
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